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export/(28 Mar 19) 377 WSSS SAAM SSI Approval Letter.md
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# (28 Mar 19) 377 WSSS SAAM SSI Approval Letter
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
377TH WEAPONS SYSTEM SECURITY SQUADRON (AFGSC)
28 Mar 19
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
FROM: 377 WSSS/S3
SUBJECT: Special Security Instructions (SSI) Approval
1. SSIs are furnished to each Integrated Defense force member and posted sentry in accordance
with (IAW) AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, para 12.5.5. They define post limits,
communications available, physical security deficiencies on post, compensatory measures, entry
requirements, applicable special instructions and special equipment required.
2. The following Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) SSIs are approved by the
377 WSSS Operations Officer and supersede previous documents of the same name:
Cobra 1-3 & 10, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Kilo 1-2, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Mongoose 1-4, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Mustang 1-6 & 10, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Pelican 1-5, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Raptor 1-2, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Guardian, SAAM Security Controller, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Skywatch 1-2, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Tango 1-8, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Viper 1-4, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Watchdog, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
3. TSgt Caleb Green, 377 WSSS/S5, is responsible for tracking and dissemination of SSIs. For
further information, please contact TSgt Green at (505)853-7551, or caleb.green.2@us.af.mil.
GIBBONS.ARTHUR Digitally signed by
.MARVIN.IV.128391 GIBBONS.ARTHUR.MARVIN.IV.
1283916894
6894 Date: 2019.03.28 08:23:39 -06'00'
ARTHUR M. GIBBONS IV, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

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export/(3) Supervisors Certification(1).md
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# (3) Supervisors Certification(1)
Amanda Renea Rackey SSgt/E-5
Daniel Thomas Cronin TSgt/E-6
NCOIC, Plans & Programs
10 August 2020 505-846-0102

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# (3) Supervisors Certification
SUPERVISOR’S CERTIFICATION (FORMALLY 1879)
NAME/RANK OF SUBJECT
(First) (Middle) (Last) (Rank/Grade)
If this request is for upgrading a currently held clearance or for a Periodic Reinvestigation (PR).
the subject’s IMMEDIATE supervisor MUST complete the certification. This certification does
not require the supervisor to review the completed form.
IMMEDIATE supervisor is required to fill out form:
Please check/complete the paragraph that applies:
1. The immediate supervisor is aware of adverse information concerning the individual named
within this form. PLEASE INDICATE THE ADVERSE INFORMATION BELOW:
2. The immediate supervisor is NOT aware of adverse information concerning the individual
named within this form.
After completing the above, please complete the following blocks:
Supervisor’s Full Name:
(First) (Middle) (Last) (Rank/Grade)
Supervisor’s Title:
Date signed by Supervisor: Supervisor’s Phone Number:
Supervisor’s Signature:
Any questions, please call 11 SFG / Security Manager at DSN 858-4029

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export/(3x5) 19 AW Card_CAO 29 Nov 21.md
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# (3x5) 19 AW Card_CAO 29 Nov 21
Name and Rank:
Unit:
Official Duty title:
Hometown:
Time in service:
Time at Little Rock:
Goals:
Hobbies:
Location for photo:
19th Airlift Wing priority portrayed and why?
(AIRMEN | Courageous Leaders, Resilient Warriors & Strong Families)
(MISSION | Undaunted Tactical Airlift and Agile Combat Support)
(CULTURE | Thriving Herk Nation)
image1.jpeg

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export/(5 Aug 19) 377 WSSS Daily Posting SSI Approval Letter.md
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# (5 Aug 19) 377 WSSS Daily Posting SSI Approval Letter
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
377TH WEAPONS SYSTEM SECURITY SQUADRON (AFGSC)
5 Aug 19
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
FROM: 377 WSSS/S3
SUBJECT: Special Security Instructions (SSI) Approval
1. SSIs are furnished to each Integrated Defense force member and posted sentry in accordance
with (IAW) AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, para 12.5.5. They define post limits,
communications available, physical security deficiencies on post, compensatory measures, entry
requirements, applicable special instructions and special equipment required.
2. The following Daily Posting SSIs are approved by the 377 WSSS Operations Officer and
supersede previous documents of the same name:
Guardian, SCS, SC, & AM, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
Cerberus 1-2, & 10, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
Romeo 1, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
Guardian 1 & 2, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
Scorpion 1-6, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
Coyote 1-4, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
3. TSgt Caleb Green, 377 WSSS/S3P, is responsible for tracking and dissemination of SSIs. For
further information, please contact TSgt Green at (505)846-6704, or caleb.green.2@us.af.mil.
COLE.MATTHEW Digitally signed by
COLE.MATTHEW.G.1362411447
.G.1362411447 Date: 2019.08.05 08:49:20 -06'00'
MATTHEW G. COLE, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

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export/(9 Apr 19) 377 WSSS Special-FPCON SSI Approval Letter.md
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# (9 Apr 19) 377 WSSS Special-FPCON SSI Approval Letter
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
377TH WEAPONS SYSTEM SECURITY SQUADRON (AFGSC)
9 Apr 19
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
FROM: 377 WSSS/S3
SUBJECT: Special Security Instructions (SSI) Approval
1. SSIs are furnished to each Integrated Defense force member and posted sentry in accordance
with (IAW) AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, para 12.5.5. They define post limits,
communications available, physical security deficiencies on post, compensatory measures, entry
requirements, applicable special instructions and special equipment required.
2. The following Special and Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Posting SSIs are approved
by the 377 WSSS Operations Officer and supersede previous documents of the same name:
DART, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Reflex 2-6, & 10, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Hawk 1-3, & 10, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Guardian, Backup SCS, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Guardian, WSTI Monitor, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
Charlie 1-4, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
3. TSgt Caleb Green, 377 WSSS/S5, is responsible for tracking and dissemination of SSIs. For
further information, please contact TSgt Green at (505)853-7551, or caleb.green.2@us.af.mil.
GIBBONS.ARTHUR Digitally signed by
.MARVIN.IV.128391 GIBBONS.ARTHUR.MARVIN.IV.
1283916894
6894 Date: 2019.04.09 09:48:41 -06'00'
ARTHUR M. GIBBONS IV, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer

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export/(CLASSIFIED) Area Supervisor Packet.md
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# (CLASSIFIED) Area Supervisor Packet
Area Supervisor Verbal Packet
1. Once the SGT is secured in the loading dock, what actions will the ISRT take?
-Lower pins at V5/V6
2. If the aircraft arrives Type-2 and departs Type-1, who will be responsible for obtaining/issuing all pertinent information from the Aircraft Commander?
-On duty FCC/FC
3. For arriving Type-2, what will be initiated once the aircraft/aircrew arrives at the pad?
-Entry Control procedures
4. Describe an FDB?
-Tamper protected enclosure that groups IDS equipment and sensors inputs into a single or several Intrusion Detection Panels and/or Portal Control Panel located throughout KUMMSC and the surrounding areas
5. Who will KCP notify of a downed aircraft?
-SSCC
6. For DART’s where will recalled personnel respond?
-KUMMSC armory
7. How long (at minimum) will the KUMMSC uninterrupted power supply (UPS) provide power for?
-4 hours
8. Who has the primary responsibility to man any Reflex Delta aircraft post?
-The on duty flight
9. The Reflex Delta kit will contain what?
-Four radios
-Six radio batteries
-One battery charger
-Twenty pagers
-VA Gate remote
10. What is the equipment for Watchdog posting?
-A radio with a headset for discrete monitoring and binoculars
11. Who will daily senor testing?
-On duty FCC/FC and/or Area Supervisor
12. How many attempts will an individual have to process through the metal detector?
-2
13. Where does a track or ground-based radar detector annunciate?
-SC Console
14. What is an SCS override? Who conducts them?
-Procedures that bypass system door logic to open special functions or single blast doors/gates
-SCS and a MUNS Controller
15. Who is notified once an override has been accomplished? What will they do?
-System Administrator
- Change the password within the next 24 hours OR the next duty day
16. What is a DPI?
-Door Position Indicator-A tamper protected BMS device which indicates the position of doors, vehicle gates/barriers, and blast doors
17. According to the SFG Tactical Assault Guide (TAG), at a minimum how many armored vehicles will be used for a KUMMSC recapture/recovery?
-1
18. What are the ISRT and ESRT response times?
-ISRT is immediately but not to exceed 3 minutes
-ESRT is immediately but not to exceed 5 minutes
19. A Photography Authorization Letter (PAL) will be authenticated by who?
-An E-5 or above assigned to the 377 SFG
20. Submit all Photography Authorization Letters to who?
-The Flight Line Constable 377 WSSS/S3
21. Photography of transient PL2 or higher aircraft is prohibited unless prior permission is granted by who?
-The Aircrew CC or designated representative
22. Who will be personally involved in ALL downed aircraft scenarios?
-377 WSSS/S3O, S3, and/or CC
23. Where is the downed aircraft kit maintained?
-S3 storage closet
24. The downed aircraft bags are sealed and accounted for on what form?
-AF Form 1473/Gun, Ammo, Equipment Inventory Log
25. For an aircraft accident resulting in a complete base response, all media personnel will be directed to where?
-The Incident Command Post
26. Protestors within the base perimeter will be met and instructed to turn back prior to arriving withing ______ (how many) feet of the outh fence line of the KUMMSC topside controlled area?
-100 ft
27. What is AFCIAR? Describe each measure.
-Assess- Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources
-Final Denial-The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
-Control-The goal is to optimize available weapon fire and maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the defined battle space
-Immediate Sufficient Duress- Those actions, proportional to the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to prevent thrft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon. Can be achieved through weapons fire, smoke, tear gas, stun grenade, or any other means possible.
-Assault-Actions taken by the security forces to neutralize hostile persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon(s)
-Restore Government Control-Physically regain possession of resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area
28. If a handheld radio is transmitted within 10 ft of a PL1 resource OR a vehicle radio within 25 ft?
-MUNS representative & 377 ABW Safety
29. When on 6-ring, personnel will do what prior to departing quarters?
-Make contact with their supervisor and inform them of the destination and a phone number to be reached at

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export/(CUI) 377 ABW NSI SOE - Updated 24 Nov 0930.md
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# (CUI) 377 ABW NSI SOE - Updated 24 Nov 0930
Remote Week
Day 1 - Mon 29 Nov 21
Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
1-1 0730 WG/CC Telecon Inbrief 3rd CR TC Fish N/A
1-2 1030 Remote Inspection Begins WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A No events before 1030L on Monday. Thanks!
1-3 1030 PRAP: Electronic Product review (on-going) DoD Safe IGIS Hubbard 377 MTF / 377 PRAP
1-4 1500 PRAP: End-of-Day Teams by invite IGIS Hubbard PRAP IG Team
Day 2 - Tue 30 Nov 21
Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
2-1 0800 Remote Inspection Continues WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
2-2 0800 PRAP: Electronic Product review (on-going) DoD Safe IGIS Hubbard 377 MTF / 377 PRAP
2-3 1030 PRAP: 377 AB Installation Monitor Interview Teams by invite IGIS Adams Ms Teri Anderson
2-4 1300 PRAP: Installation Chapel Interview DSN 781-8700 IGIS Adams 377 ABW Chaplin
2-5 1500 PRAP: End-of-Day Teams by invite IGIS Hubbard PRAP IG Team
Day 3 - Wed 1 Dec 21
Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
3-1 0800 Remote Inspection Continues WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
3-2 0800 PRAP: Electronic Product review (on-going) DoD Safe IGIS Hubbard 377 MTF / 377 PRAP
3-3 1030 PRAP: Installation SARC Interview DSN 781-8700 IGIS Adams 377 ABW SARC
3-4 1500 PRAP: End-of-Day Teams by invite IGIS Hubbard PRAP IG Team
Day 4 - Thu 2 Dec 21
Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
4-1 0800 Remote Inspection Continues WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
4-2 0800 PRAP: Electronic Product review (on-going) DoD Safe IGIS Hubbard 377 MTF / 377 PRAP
4-3 1000 Pre-departure Meeting 3rd CR/Telecon IGX Preston N/A
4-4 1500 PRAP: End-of-Day Teams by invite IGIS Hubbard PRAP IG Team
4-5 1530 PRAP: Remote Out Brief Teams by invite IGIS Hubbard 377 ABW MTF CC
Day 5 - Fri 3 Dec 21
Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
5-1 0800 ADVON Departs WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
Day 6 - Sat 4 Dec 21
Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
6-1 0800 Workcenter Setup WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
Day 7 - Sun 5 Dec 21
Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
7-1 1210 Main body arrives (Group 1) Kirtland AFB IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
7-2 1405 Main body arrives (Group 2) Kirtland AFB IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
7-3 1500 EAL Validation / Team Meeting WC 377 IG Finch N/A
7-4 1530 Oath ALL non-Global Strike IG Inspectors WC TC Fish N/A
http://safe.apps.mil/http://safe.apps.mil/http://safe.apps.mil/http://safe.apps.mil/
Monday
Day 8 - Mon 6 Dec 21
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC DTRA STRAT
8-1 0800 Stockpile Safety Briefing KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
8-2 0800 Wing Nuclear Surety Program review SEW IGIM Nelson  
8-3 0800 Facilities Work Order Review CES IGIS Elbert  
8-4 0800 SFS CC Inbrief 377 SFG IGIS Grogan Austin/Alsup Pinkham
8-5 0800 CES CC Inbrief CES IGIS Neal  
8-6 0800 MUNS Plans and Scheduling MUNS IGIM Edwards  
8-7 0830 PRAP: MTF In-brief 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
8-8 0830 PRAP: Installation PRAP Monitor In-brief 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
8-9 0900 SF Stan-Eval Program Review (CII) 377 SFG IGIS Bostic/Naquin Alsup Pinkham
8-10 0900 Security Support Planning & Threat 377 SFG IGIS Palalay Austin
8-11 0900 SF Blotter Review 377 SFG IGIS Grogan  
8-12 0900 LRS CC Inbrief LRS Cmd Bldg IGIS Sandridge  
8-13 0900 Fire Suppression Systems KUMMSC IGIS Stephens  
8-14 0900 Emergency Backup Generator Test KUMMSC IGIS D. Smith  
8-15 0900 EOD Management/Quality Assurance Review EOD IGIS Daley  
8-16 0900 Stockpile Inspection KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
8-17 0900 Electronic Inspection Record Card Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
8-18 1000 In-field Vehicle Inspections Entire Base IGIS Sandridge  
8-19 1000 PRAP: CMA/PRAP Monitor Interview (Lead/Primary PRAP clinic) 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
8-20 1030 PRAP: Unit Monitor/CO Interview 898 MUNS IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
8-21 1200 EOD Training Program Review EOD IGIS Daley
11-13 1300 2435 Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
8-22 1300 PRAP: CMA/PRAP Monitor Interview (MH clinic) 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
8-23 1300 Fire Prevention Folders Fire Station IGIS Stephens  
8-24 1300 Haul Routes CES IGIS Elbert  
8-25 1400 PRAP: Unit Monitor/CO Interview 377 MXS IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak Klingensmith
8-26 1400 PRAP: MTF Deployment Health Interview (if not covered in BOMC interview) (min 1 tech and 1 provider) 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard Duran
8-27 1400 Lightning Protection System Demostration Test KUMMSC IGIS D. Smith
8-28 1600 PRAP: MTF/CC Daily 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy
8-29 1600 PRAP: Installation PRAP Daily 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson
8-30 1600 Team Chief meeting with Branch Chiefs IG Workcenter IGX Preston
&"Arial,Bold"&12&K000000
&10As of &T &D &"Arial,Bold"&14 377 ABW NSI SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
&P of &N
Tuesday
Day 9 - Tue 7 Dec 21
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC DTRA STRAT
9-1 0800 NARS Program Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
9-2 0800 Supply Support Spares Review KUMMSC IGIM Little  
9-3 0800 Wing NCE Program review SEW IGIM Nelson  
9-4 0800 Security Support Planning & Threat (On-going) 377 SFG IGIS Palalay Austin
9-5 0800 Hoists and Cranes KUM MSC IGIS Elbert  
9-6 0800 SF Training Program Review (CII) 377 SFG IGIS Bostic/Naquin Alsup Pinkham
9-7 0800 PRAP: Program Review (on-going) MTF IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran/Chorniak
9-8 0800 MUNS Plans and Scheduling and Documentation MUNS IGIM Edwards  
9-9 0830 PRAP: Unit Monitor/CC Interview 377 SFS IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
9-10 0900 PRAP: Patient Tracers 377 MTF (various) IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
9-11 0900 Wing EMR Program review SEW IGIM Nelson  
9-12 0900 F&ES Management and Admin Fire Station IGIS Stephens  
9-13 0900 In-Field Vehicle Inspections Entire Base IGIS Sandridge  
9-14 0900 EOD Equipment Program EOD IGIS Daley  
9-15 0900 Static Observation KUMMSC IGIS D. Smith  
9-16 0900 Branch Chief & Team Chief Meeting IG Workcenter IGX Fish  
9-17 0900 Technical Operation: LLCE BX1 KUMMSC IGIM Little   Klingensmith
9-18 0900 Technical Operation: GM WX8 KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
9-19 0900 SF Post Visits (Days and Mids) KUMMSC IGIS Naquin Austin/Alsup Pinkham
9-20 1000 EOD Broken Arrow Practical Eval EOD IGIS Daley  
9-21 1000 Armory Review (Facilities, Armories/Comm Prgm Review) 377 SFG IGIS Grogan  
9-22 1000 UCMT/UPRT Program KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck
9-23 1300 PRAP: CMA/PRAP Monitor Interview (Dental) 377 MDG (Dental) IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
9-24 1300 PRAP: Unit Monitor/CC Interview 377 WSSS IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
9-25 1300 Wing RSO Program review MD GP IGIM Nelson  
9-26 1300 F&ES Training KUMMSC IGIS Stephens  
9-27 1300 Electronic System Security KUMMSC IGIS Naquin Austin Pinkham
9-28 1330 Generator Records Review CE IGIS D. Smith  
9-29 1400 Lightning Protection Records Review CE IGIS D. Smith  
9-30 1400 Daily Wing CC Update 377th WG CR TC Fish  
9-31 1600 PRAP: MTF/CC Daily 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy  
9-32 1600 PRAP: Installation PRAP Daily 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson  
9-33 1600 Team Chief meeting with Branch Chiefs IG Workcenter IGX Preston  
&"Arial,Bold"&12&K000000
&10As of &T &D &"Arial,Bold"&14 377 ABW NSI SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
&P of &N
Wednesday
Day 10 - Wed 8 Dec 21
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC DTRA STRAT
10-1 0800 Facilities Work Order Review CES IGIS Elbert  
10-2 0800 SF Training Program Review (CII) On-Going 377 SFG IGIS Bostic/Naquin  
10-3 0830 PRAP: Program Review (on-going) 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran/Chorniak Klingensmith
10-4 0900 Muns Control Program Review KUMMSC IGIM Little  
10-5 0900 AAAL Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck
10-6 0900 Armory Review (Facilities, Armories/Comm Prgm Review) 377 SFG IGIS Grogan Alsup Pinkham
10-8 0900 MSG Nuclear Surety Program review EOD IGIM Nelson  
10-9 0900 Emergency Communications Center Fire Station IGIS Stephens  
10-10 0900 MNCL Validation/Overdue NCE Schedule Mx review/Records Review VM Bldg IGIS Sandridge  
10-11 0900 EOD Op Nuc Response (Render Safe Procedures/Bay Ops - Team A) EOD IGIS Daley  
10-12 0900 Technical Operation: UCMT/UPRT KUMMSC IGIM Little  
10-13 0900 Technical Operation: GM/LLCE WX0 KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
10-14 0900 SF Post Visits (Days/Mids) KUMMSC IGIS Naquin Austin
10-15 1000 PRAP: Installation SARC/Chapel Follow-up (If needed) Various IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
10-16 1000 Pass and ID Program Reveiw 377 SFG IGIS Palalay  
10-17 1000 MUNS Nuclear Surety Program review MUNS IGIM Nelson  
10-18 1200 EOD Op Nuc Response (Render Safe Procedures/Bay Ops - Team B) EOD IGIS Daley  
10-19 1300 PRAP: Patient Tracers 377 MTF (various) IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
10-20 1300 Haul Routes CES IGIS Elbert  
10-21 1300 Physical Security 377 SFG IGIS Grogan Alsup Pinkham
10-22 1300 FES Operations (Fire Suppression Equipment) Fire Station IGIS Stephens  
10-23 1300 WSSS Nuclear Surety Program review WSSS IGIM Nelson  
10-24 1300 NWTP Review KUMMSC IGIM Little   Klingensmith
10-25 1330 PRAP: Assignment Process (Career Development) 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
10-26 1400 SFG Nuclear Surety Program review SFS IGIM Nelson  
10-27 1400 Daily Wing CC Update 377th WG CR TC Fish  
10-29 1600 PRAP: MTF/CC Daily 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy  
10-30 1600 PRAP: Installation PRAP Daily 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson  
10-31 1600 Team Chief meeting with Branch Chiefs WC IGX Preston  
&"Arial,Bold"&12&K000000
&10As of &T &D &"Arial,Bold"&14 377 ABW NSI SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
&P of &N
Thursday
Day 11 - Thu 9 Dec 21
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC DTRA STRAT
11-1 0800 Fire Suppression Systems (Maintenance) CEO IGIS Stephens
11-2 0830 PRAP: Program Follow-ups (If needed) Vairous GOS PRAP Team Duran/Chorniak
11-3 0900 EOD Opt'l Nuc Response (Cont RSP & Packaging Tech Op) EOD IGIS Daley   Klingensmith
11-4 0900 MUNS Support Program Review KUMMSC IGIM Little  
11-5 0900 11N WSA TODA Inspection KUMMSC IGIM Little  
11-6 0900 TTT&HE KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
11-7 0900 NCE Inspection & Program Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
11-8 0900 Techncial Operation: BX3 GM/LLCE KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
11-9 0900 SF Post Visits (Days/Mids) KUMMSC IGIS Naquin Alsup
11-10 1200 EOD T.O.s Program Review EOD IGIS Daley  
11-11 1300 FES Special Weapons Ex CEF IGIS Stephens  
11-12 1400 Daily Wing CC Update 377 WG CR TC Fish  
11-13 1600 PRAP: MTF/CC Daily 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy  
11-14 1600 PRAP: Installation PRAP Daily 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson  
11-15 1600 Team Chief meeting with Branch Chiefs IG Workcenter IGX Preston  
11-16 1630 Report Writing/Murder Board/Deliberation IG Workcenter IGX St Romain/Preston
&"Arial,Bold"&12&K000000
&10As of &T &D &"Arial,Bold"&14 377 ABW NSI SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
&P of &N
Friday-Sunday
Day 12 - Fri 10 Dec 21
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC
12-1 0800 Report Writing/Murder Board/Deliberation Cont WC IGX St Romain/Preston
12-2 1400 Daily Wing CC Update/Final DAR 377 WG CR TC Fish
12-3 1600 Sign Report IG Workcenter IGX Preston
12-4 TBD Vehicle Turn-in IG Workcenter IGX St Romain/Preston
12-5 1501 Main Body Depart Kirtland AFB KAFB IGX St Romain/Preston
Day 13 - Sat 11 Dec 21
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC
13-1 0800 Out-brief with Grades 377 WG CR TC Fish
13-2 1256 Leadership Depart Kirtland AFB KAFB IGX St Romain/Preston
&"Arial,Bold"&12&K000000
&10As of &T &D &"Arial,Bold"&14 377 ABW NSI SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
&P of &N

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export/(CUI) AFMAN 31-101, V2, AA&E GM1.md
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export/(CUI_SP_PHYS) AF 116 Deviation - CCTV Purchases v3.md
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# (CUI_SP_PHYS) AF 116 Deviation - CCTV Purchases v3
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export/(DCN) Kilo 2.md
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# (DCN) Kilo 2
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Kilo 2
Version 17-1
Explosive Detection Dog (EDD)
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Provide explosive detection capabilities to prevent the damage to or
possible destruction of Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Aircraft, Air
Force resources , and personnel.
 (DCNI) An MWD/EDD team will be provided in support of SAAMs. In accordance
with the Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) Installation Defense Plan (IDP) 31-101,
explosive searches in support of Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) missions will
be conducted according to standard MWD search procedures. The Aircraft
Courier, Logistics Support Area (LSA) Pad Security Supervisor (Mustang-1), and
senior MWD handler on scene must work together to ensure correct clearing of
affected areas, aircraft, and ground equipment.
 (DCNI) Ensure both you and your MWD/EDD alpha are prepared for duty and
have appropriate SF gear in accordance with the SFG Gear Checklist.
 (DCNI) Ensure one MWD/EDD team sweeps the POV and GOV parking lots at
the Squadron Operations building. Sweep GOV parking lot prior to mission brief.
Ensure parking lot guards are posted to monitor the area once the sweep is
complete.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) The only authorized entry point into the Pad-5 controlled area is the
controlled area entry point located at the swing arm gate on ordinance street.
 (DCNI) All vehicles entering Pad-5 will process through the swing gate on
Ordnance Street with the exception of on-duty SF. All vehicles will be searched
and screened by Mongoose-2. (TCP). Kilo-2 (MWD Team) will sweep all
vehicles and equipment entering the East TCP. If an unknown vehicle or person
approaches Pad 5 via any route other than the East TCP, simple challenge
procedures will be used to identify personnel or vehicles and the intent.
 Ensure the EDD team is in place north of Pad-5 when the aircrew arrives after their
vehicle has been swept. Aircrew baggage will be swept by an EDD north of PAD-5
just outside the painted red line.
 (DCNI) After completing the pad sweep, proceed to the East side controlled area
traffic control point (TCP) swing-gate (Mongoose-2 's location) to assist with
inspecting vehicles requesting entry to Pad-5 at the East TCP swing-gate. Ensure
you park your vehicle out of the line of fire from Mongoose-2's turret mounted
machine gun.
POST LIMITS:
o (DCNI) Not to exceed 5 minutes from Pad 5, the adjacent taxiway, runway and the
primary/alternate convoy routes or as otherwise directed by Cobra-1/Mustang-1.
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
radio communication capability.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open circle)
on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to channel
6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable
radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when
transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by
unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
ammunition mixed at a 4 to 1 ratio and also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of
9mm hollow point ammunition.
 (DCNI) You will handle and utilize for detection a certified MWD Explosive Detection
Dog and ensure SSCC obtains your MWD’s name and tattoo number for
documentation.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
EQUIPMENT:
 Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
when directed by higher authority.
 All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
prior to movement for an outbound mission.
USE OF FORCE:
 (DCNI) The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive,
and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter
their actions to neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
 INBOUND CONVOY:
o (DCNI) Immediately after the briefing, proceed directly to Pad 5 and initiate
an MWD/EDD sweep of all standby MUNS vehicles, AGE equipment and
the surrounding area (parking lot, taxiway and Pad 5 aircraft parking area).
o (DCNI) After completing the sweep, proceed to Mongoose-2's location to
assist with sweeping vehicles requesting entry to the Pad-5 controlled
area.
o (DCNI) At the conclusion of the mission and when directed by Cobra-
1/Mustang-1, proceed to KUMMSC GOV parking lot and await further
instruction .
 OUTBOUND CONVOY:
o (DCNI) Immediately after the briefing, proceed directly to Pad-5 and
initiate an EDD sweep of standby MUNS vehicles, AGE equipment, and the
surrounding area (parking lot and taxiway)
o (DCNI) After completing the sweep, proceed to Mongoose-2's location to
assist with sweeping vehicles requesting entry to the Pad-5 controlled
area.
o (DCNI) At the conclusion of the mission and when directed by Cobra-
1/Mustang-1, proceed to KUMMSC GOV parking lot and await further
instruction.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
o (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize
the intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
o (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander
or a senior battle staff representative.
o (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest
priority until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their
actions to gain unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
o (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken
to deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody
of a seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or
vehicle containing PL1 resources.
 RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
o (DCNI) PNAF Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security
challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent
security seams that could develop if PNAF area entry procedures are
changed as the weapons move (or the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent
extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon, the description of
the PNAF exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Encl
9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
o (DCNI) Once the PNAF aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated
PNAF limited (restricted) area than a single limited and exclusion area is
established. Therefore, the limited and exclusion area verification and
inspection will occur at the single entry control point at all times once the
weapons enter the PNAF restricted area. For personnel not authorized
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC
must contact the SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will
ensure compliance with the security requirements outlined in DoDM S-
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as DoDM S-5210.41-
M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
o (DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited
and exclusion areas established for alert parking areas where the
limited and exclusion area inspection and assignment of escorts occur
at the same entry point.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
PAD-5 ENTRY REQUIREMENTS
 (DCNI) All personnel entering the PAD 5 limited/exclusion area must have a valid
reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into Hot Cargo Pad 5 will be based on
the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for
aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential
and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other
agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring
entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the
PAD-5 ECP.
 (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant
surveillance prior to entering the PAD-5 limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough
sweep is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be
conducted by SF personnel and an EDD team if available.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

975
export/(DCNI) 377 SFGI 31-113 FINAL.md
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@ -1,975 +0,0 @@
# (DCNI) 377 SFGI 31-113 FINAL
BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER 377TH SFG INSTRUCTION 31-113
377 TH SECURITY FORCES GROUP
8 June 2016
Security
REMOTE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM, T-250
DIGITAL FACILITY SYSTEM
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
ACCESSIBILITY: This publication is only available directly from the OPR.
RELEASABILITY: Access to this publication is restricted: this publication is unclassified
Department of Defense (DoD) Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information/For Official Use
Only (U//DCNI/FOUO). This publication may not be released to foreign nationals; requests
for accessibility must be approved by the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).
OPR: 377 WSSS/S5 Certified by: 377 WSSS/CC
(Lt Col James K. Meier)
[Pages: 26]
This publication implements the 377th Security Forces Group (SFG) Remote Target Engagement
System (RTES) T-250 Digital Facility System (DFS). This group instruction is applicable to all
personnel within the 377th SFG to all It describes the responsibilities of the RTES operator, Flight
Chief (FC)/Flight Commander (FCC), Entry Controller, Combat Arms (CA), and Electronic
Security Systems (ESS) personnel. This operating instruction also covers the operation of the
RTES Operator Console, System Enable Disable Switch (SEDS) Console, Remote Duress Disable
(RDDS) Switch, and the Trainer/Simulator Console. This publication does not apply to Air Force
Reserve Command (AFRC) Units or to the Air National Guard (ANG). Refer recommended
changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using AF Form 847, Recommendation for
Change of Publication; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional
chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this
publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management
of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management
System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS). This publication may not be
supplemented or further implemented/extended. Requests for waivers must be submitted to the
OPR listed above for consideration and approval.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: Concept of Operations
1.1 System Overview
1.2 System Description
1.3 System Purpose
1.4 Rules of Engagement
CHAPTER 2: Individual Responsibilities
2.1. RTES Operator Duties
2.2. Security Control Supervisor (SCS) Duties
2.3. Entry Controller Duties
2.4. Alarm Monitor Duties
2.5. Area Supervisor Duties
2.6. Flight Chief/Flight Commander Duties
2.7. Combat Arms Duties
2.8. Electronic Security Systems/Cyber Transport Systems (CTS) Duties
CHAPTER 3: Operation of the RTES
3.1 Normal Start-up/Shut-down Operations
3.2 Emergency Shut-down
3.3 How to Conduct Joint Routine Verification (JRV).
3.4 How to Conduct Routine Verification (RV).
3.5 How to Enable RTES
3.6 When to Enable RTES
3.7 Locating the Threat
3.8 Arming and Firing the RTES
3.9 Safing and Disarming the RTES
CHAPTER 4: Safety and Duress of the RTES
4.1. Safety Requirements
4.2. Duress Procedures
CHAPTER 5: Simulator Operations and Certification
5.1. RTES Simulator
5.2. Certification
5.3. Uncertified Personnel
CHAPTER 6: System and System Component Failures
6.1. Work Order Priorities
6.2. Opening Work Orders
6.3. Closing Work Orders
6.4. Work Order Tracking Procedures
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment 1 - Glossary of References and Supporting Information
Attachment 2 - RTES Primary/Secondary Direction of Fire
Attachment 3 - Touch Screen Icons
Attachment 4 - Touch Screen Indicators
Attachment 5 - Equipment Malfunction/Work Order Priorities
Attachment 6 – Equipment Malfunction/Compensatory Measures
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
CHAPTER 1
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
1.1 System Overview.
1.1.1. RTES is an enhancement of the overall security system for protecting critical
assets. Their primary functions are to provide final denial fire, area denial, and deny
unauthorized personnel from avenues of approach to restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
1.1.2. (DCNI) RTES is employed by system operators to locate, identify, target and
engage an adversary attacking the Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance
Storage Complex (KUMMSC). Employment and operational direction of the RTES will
be the responsibility of the Security Forces (SF) on-scene commander. Close attention
will be paid to the effects of base operations when utilizing the RTES. Rules of
Engagement (ROE) in this instruction will specify when and how the RTES functions are
used.
1.2. (DCNI) System Description: The RTES employs the M240B machine gun with 200
rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing/tracer ammunition. The RTES consoles, and all the
M240B machine guns associated with them are not tied into the Automated/Advanced Entry
Control System (AECS). These weapons are mounted within ballistic shielded clamshells on
three hardened towers dispersed within the controlled area and two platforms within the
KUMMSC/limited area, covering the loading dock. The RTES is remotely operated from the
operator console located in the RTES Room (#150) adjacent to the Site Security Control Center
(SSCC). Each tower on topside is equiped with two weapon systems and associated cameras.
The two towers located within the loading dock are both equipped with a weapon system and an
associated camera. All tower locations with primary and secondary fields of fire can be found in
attachment 2 of this document.
1.3. System Purpose.
1.3.1. The purpose of the RTES is to:
1.3.1.1. Provide final denial fire before hostile unauthorized access can be gained
to controlled/restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
1.3.1.2. Achieve area denial fire of likely avenues of approach to
controlled/restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
1.3.1.3. Mitigate identified vulnerabilities that require posting of armed SF IAW
(DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN31-108V1, Nuclear Weapons Security Manual,
Enclosure 6 Para 3.d.(4).)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
1.4. Rules Of Engagement.
1.4.1. AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force, will be strictly adhered to during all
operations of the RTES.
1.4.2. The RTES operator will enable the system in the following situations:
1.4.2.1. Initiation of a COVERED WAGON due to a direct threat to KUMMSC.
1.4.2.2. With proper authentication from the posted SCS, Area Supervisor (AS),
FCC/FC or higher authority.
1.4.2.3. For pre-coordinated and authorized maintenance or during shift
changeover/JRV/RV.
1.4.3. SF on scene commander is responsible for the overall employment of the RTES
and will provide direction to the RTES operator. If available, positive identification
should be made from a post or patrol that has line of sight prior to utilizing the weapon.
A confirmed visual verification by an on-scene patrol will not deter the RTES operator
from enabling and engaging hostile forces if threat to life or resources is imminent.
1.4.4. Once the RTES operator has received direction from the AS/on-scene commander,
the SCS and RTES operator will turn on their respective SEDS keys to enable the system
to open applicable clamshells as necessary. It is recommended that only one tower with
the best tactical advantage be activated to avoid putting the other towers at risk of being
damaged. If the threat is deemed hostile by the on-scene commander and the operator
has received proper authorization, use of deadly force is authorized. The operator will
select the respective tower, arm the system and eliminate the threat.
1.4.5. When the operator has enabled the system, the weapon will remain on safe until
the operator is ready to engage an adversary.
1.4.6. The RTES operator will announce “weapons platform X up” to the Area
Supervisor and SCS when any platform is selected, and will potentially be fired.
1.4.7. At no time will both the RTES and RF be redirected from final denial coverage at
the same time during hostile situations. NOTE: At no time will the RTES be enabled
during flight, squadron or wing level exercises.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
CHAPTER 2
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1. RTES Operators will:
2.1.1. One operator will remain within the confines of the RTES Room (#150) unless
relieved by a certified operator.
2.1.1.1. Two operators will be posted for duty during each shift.
2.1.1.2. One operator may leave to utilize facilities at any time except when there
is hostile activity.
2.1.1.3. When the RTES is inoperative, a two-person Cerberus-4/4a will be
posted in the loading dock. Also, when there is a Department of Energy (DoE)
mission, a four-man team will be comprised of the RTES operators and Cerberus-
4/4a located in the loading dock.
2.1.2. Comply with the requirements of this instruction, Special Security Instructions
(SSI), applicable supplements, and operator checklists.
2.1.3. Obtain a detailed briefing and changeover with the off-going RTES operator.
2.1.3.1. Changeover will consist of a visual inspection by the operator to ensure
there are no line breaks, exposed wires, all monitors are functional, SSIs are in the
room, console and surrounding room is kept clean, and all controls are functional.
2.1.4. Conduct JRV and routine verifications to ensure all RTES equipment is operating
properly.
2.1.4.1. JRV Quick Reaction Checklist (QRC) # H-1 will be conducted at the
following times:
2.1.4.1.1. As operator(s) arrive on post.
2.1.4.1.2. Any time the system has been enabled or the weapon has been
used.
2.1.4.1.3. Following start-up of the system.
2.1.4.1.4. After maintenance has been performed on any RTES
component (arm, weapon, System Enablement/Disablement Switch, etc.).
2.1.4.1.5. Anytime the operator doubts the reliability of the RTES system.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
2.1.4.2. RVs will be conducted in the following situations:
2.1.4.2.1. Once an RTES operator returns to the RTES room.
2.1.4.2.2. When there has been a change in the power source (i.e.
switching from commercial to generator). Steps for completing RVs are
defined in section 3.4 and in applicable QRCs.
2.1.5. Take inventory of all RTES equipment and report deficiencies or required work
orders to the SCS. The Alarm Monitor will obtain the Job Control Number from the
898 MUNS Control Center and maintain the Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form
781a, Maintenance Discrepancy and work document. Notify the SCS of the names of the
personnel making the corrective action.
2.1.6. If any component of the system fails, do not touch the System enable/disablement
switch or touch screens due to safety reasons. Exception: If the RTES is in use due to
an attack, select another tower and continue under the direction of the SF on scene
commander.
2.1.7. Do not utilize the live RTES system for any exercises.
2.1.8. Operators will be armed IAW the Installation Defense Plan (IDP) Post Priority
Chart.
2.2. Security Controller Supervisor will:
2.2.1. Act as the SEDS Panel Operator located at SCS Console.
2.2.2. Monitor the RTES operator when the system is enabled/disabled.
2.2.3. Annotate all work orders in the SF Blotter. Additionally, enter the names of the
persons making the corrective action and the corrective action(s).
2.2.4. The SCS will notify ESS and CTS of any work orders opened/closed. ESS/CTS
response times are outlined in Attachment 9 located in 377 WSSS SOP 31-101, Vol 4.
KUMMSC AECS.
2.2.5. Notify the AS, FC/FCC when a work order has been opened/closed.
2.3. The KUMMSC Entry Controller will:
2.3.1. Maintain control over the RDDS.
2.3.2. Monitor the radio for signs of duress from inside SSCC/RTES Room. Also,
initiate the RDDS switch enable upon passive or active duress upon the RTES Controller
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7
(AECS duress switch activation/failing to acknowledge radio/verbal duress) or as
directed by higher authority.
2.4. The Security Controller will:
2.4.1. Monitor all alarms and activations of the RTES control room or towers/loading
dock.
2.4.2. Dispatch to any unannounced alarm activation involving any RTES systems or
components.
2.5. Area Supervisor will:
2.5.1. Ensure posts/patrols are implementing temporary compensatory measures until
permanent compensatory measures are in place or the work order has been closed.
2.5.2. Employ RTES to gain a tactical advantage over adversaries.
2.6. Flight Chief/Flight Commander will:
2.6.1. Become familiar with the requirements of AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense
(FOUO), AFI 31-117, 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide (TAG), AFMAN 31-108,
Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, and applicable supplements.
2.6.2. Evaluate the operators on their use of the RTES system, knowledge of local
procedures, and response to hostile situations by conducting area exercises. (Ensure flight
RTES certified operators are given opportunity to use the RTES Simulator to maintain
skills.).
2.7. 377 SFG/Security Support Squadron/CA will:
2.7.1. Conduct maintenance on the M240B machine guns in accordance with the
applicable technical order and commercial manuals.
2.7.2. Change out M240B machine guns as necessary. Change out the M240B drive
spring for each weapon at least quarterly in conjunction with a routine inspection.
2.7.3. (FOUO) Zero all M240B machine guns at a full distance range from 350 meters
prior to the weapon system being mounted.
2.7.4. Respond upon request from CTS personnel in the event a M240B machine gun
needs to be unloaded, loaded, or the weapon itself is damaged during work orders.
2.7.5. Clear expended casings and links from all RTES platforms prior to the RTES
Operator closing clamshells after firing the weapon system.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
8
2.8. Electronic Security Systems/Cyber Transport Systems.
2.8.1. ESS will act as System Administrators for the RTES.
2.8.2. Conduct sensor testing of all alarms associated with RTES in accordance with
DoD S-5210.41-M-V2_AFMAN 31-108, Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, V2
Enclosure 3.
2.8.3. Respond upon request from CTS personnel in the event a M240B machine gun
needs to be unloaded, loaded, or the weapon itself is damaged during work orders.
2.8.4. If a failure of the system affects the platform or the remote electronics, CTS will
notify the standby CA personnel.
2.9. ESS NCO will:
2.9.1. Coordinate preventive maintenance scheduling with appropriate agencies.
2.9.2. Develop a tailored local training program for RTES system operators. Training
may be conducted on-duty, in a formal classroom environment or a combination of both.
2.9.2.1. Initial Certification:
2.9.2.1.1. Initial Certification is conducted after an individual completes
local training but before performing duties as an RTES Operator.
2.9.2.2. Trainees:
2.9.2.2.1. Trainees pursuing initial RTES Operator certification can
perform duties and operate the RTES system under the direct supervision
of a Duty Position Evaluation – certified RTES Operator.
2.9.2.2.2. The trainee must have initiated training documentation for the
duty position (AF Form 623A, On the Job Training Record) prior to
beginning hands on training. NOTE: At no time will the trainee be left
alone to operate the RTES.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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CHAPTER 3
Operation of the RTES
3.1. Normal Start-up/Shut-down Operations: The RTES is designed to operate continuously,
including across shift changes, and other than maintenance purposes there is no reason to shut
down the system.
3.1.1. Power-on the RTES console.
3.1.1.1. Wait until the initial “splash screen” appears on the touch screen monitor.
3.1.1.2. View diagnostics and report errors to ESS/CTS personnel.
3.1.2. Powering off the Console: If the RTES program is shut down inadvertently or for
maintenance, the following steps will re-boot the Operator Console:
3.1.2.1. RTES operator will perform a diagnostics check.
3.1.2.2. RTES operator presses “Exit Kiosk” button.
3.1.2.3. Then, follow normal shut down procedures for a Microsoft Windows-
based computer.
3.1.3. Any time the system needs to be shut down, contact ESS.
3.1.4. Power-off the RTES console only if absolutely necessary and deemed credible by
either ESS or SCS.
3.2. (DCNI) Emergency Shut-Down: In the event of smoke or fire inside the SSCC or
evacuation of KUMMSC, the RTES operator will shut down the RTES prior to evacuation.
3.2.1. The operators will shut down the system and ensure the keys are maintained with
the operators.
3.3. How to conduct a JRV:
3.3.1. Conduct a hardware test by touching the hardware test button on the touch screen.
The hardware test function will ensure all equipment that the operator interfaces with
works properly. If the equipment does not work then open the appropriate work order.
3.3.2. The SCS and RTES operator will enable the system utilizing step 3.5.
3.3.3. The SCS will notify the Entry Control Point (ECP) that the RTES operator will be
conducting a JRV. The ECP will receive an audible alarm once the system is enabled.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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3.3.4. The RTES operator for every shift will open all clamshells and verify that all
weapons automatically queue to their final denial position by comparing the touch screen
with the appropriate checklist. If the final denial lines do not match Attachment #2, open
up a work order.
3.3.5. The RTES operator will select each tower in turn and will check the pan and tilt
functions of each weapon system. This will be done by moving the weapon to the
extreme left, right, up and down. Care must be taken not to sweep the weapon across
personnel and assets. At no time will the operator track non-hostile personnel/assets with
the live system. The RTES operator will check the wide angle, infrared and scope to
verify that all cameras are focused and working properly. If the weapon fails to operate
correctly the RTES operator will inform the SCS and open a work order.
3.3.6. After checking each weapons pan and tilt function the operator will close that
weapons clamshell before moving on to the next weapon system. The operator will
ensure the clamshell fully closes and the weapon shows closed on the operator console.
If the weapon fails to operate correctly, contact the SCS and initiate a work order.
3.3.7. Have the SCS press the O-Stop buttons to verify operability.
3.3.8. Once all clamshells have been closed, the RTES operator will disable the system.
3.3.9. The RTES operator will verify the operator console is not showing any error
messages. If the console shows any error messages, the RTES operator will contact the
SCS and initiate a work order.
3.3.10. The RTES operator will notify SCS the JRV is complete and report any
discrepancies. The SCS will record the JRV in the SF blotter.
3.4. How to Conduct RVs:
3.4.1. Conduct a hardware test by touching the hardware test button on the touch screen.
The hardware test function will ensure all equipment the operator interfaces with works
properly. If the equipment does not work then open the appropriate work order.
3.4.2. The RTES operator will verify the operator console is not showing any error
messages. If the console shows any error messages, the RTES operator will contact the
SCS and initiate a work order.
3.4.3. The RTES operator will notify SSCC that the RV is complete and report any
discrepancies. The SCS will record the RV in the SF blotter.
3.5. How to Enable RTES:
3.5.1. The RTES operator and the SCS enable RTES by turning the SEDS keys to
“SYSTEM ENABLE”. The red ENABLED light will indicate the system is activated in
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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conjunction with the red background of the RTES monitor. The RTES touch screen
background turns red and the camera and weapon shot selection buttons appear.
3.6. When to Enable RTES:
3.6.1. The SCS determines if the threat is credible and briefs the appropriate Internal
Security Response Team and AS. The AS will determine if a response from RTES is
warranted. When to enable the RTES is defined in section 1.4, ROE.
3.7. Locating Threat.
3.7.1. To locate the threat from the platform, press the “platform icon,” or swipe 50% or
more of the “platform monitor.” The weapon and cameras will begin to move and aim at
that platform’s Primary Direction of Fire (PDF). Each tower is assigned its own PDF by
programmed default.
3.7.2. The RTES operator will notify the AS which tower is currently selected by calling
out “WEAPONS PLATFORM X UP” over the radio. This allows the AS to know the
status of the RTES at all times and deploy appropriately.
3.7.3. Track and acquire targets by viewing the monitor to the right of the touch screen
and utilize controls to verify target on the main screen.
3.8. Arming and Firing the RTES.
3.8.1. The RTES operator presses the red ARM mechanical button beneath the touch
screen. After approximately two seconds, both the button on the RTES Arming Panel
and clamshell icon on the touch-screen will light red.
3.8.2. It is important for the RTES Operator at this time to determine the best approach
for engaging the target successfully. If the target is moving, either the tracking method of
engagement, or the ambush method of engagement should be used. Whether the target is
stationary or moving, the operator should evaluate distance to the target and wind, speed
and direction from the tower and aim appropriately.
3.8.3. (FOUO) The topside weapons are sighted for a 350 meter zero. This means if the
target is approximately 350 meters from the tower, the crosshairs of the scope shall be
placed at the center of mass on the target.
3.8.4. Select the number of shots by using the “Shot” button on the touch screen, there
are three selections, Single Fire, Burst Fire, and Full Auto.
3.8.5. Grasp the hand controller with both hands, placing each index finger on its
respective firing button.
3.8.6. Pan and tilt the weapon and operate the camera zoom to acquire the threat.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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3.8.7. Set the crosshairs on the target aim point.
3.8.8. Press and hold the trigger enable button located on the top left of the hand
controller. To fire the weapon, press and hold the trigger button located on the top right
of the hand controller. This will fire the weapon for the number of rounds selected. If
Auto is selected the weapon will fire a two-second burst. If the trigger button is not
depressed for the entire two seconds, the entire burst will not be accomplished.
3.8.9. When the RTES operator is assessing the engagement, the operator may select
different platform cameras to determine if the threat was neutralized.
3.8.10. If the threat was not neutralized (or additional threats appear), repeat steps above.
(3.8.4.-3.8.9.)
3.8.11. In the event additional hostilities are expected, press “Close All Clamshells” to
safeguard the weapons until needed.
3.8.12. If a weapon was fired and hostilities have ceased, DO NOT press the “Close All
Clamshells” until maintenance has been completed and CA has removed all brass from
inside.
3.9. Safing and Disarming the RTES.
3.9.1. The operator will push the “Weapon Safe” button to disarm the selected platform.
3.9.2. The operator may also deselect the tower in use by selecting another platform to
disengage the weapon. The newly selected tower will not be armed until the ARM
mechanical button is pushed.
3.9.3. Press “Close All Clamshells” touch screen button.
3.9.4. The SCS will turn the SEDS key switch to disable.
3.9.5. SCS will notify CTS, ESS, and CA to inspect all towers for any damage. CA will
ensure that all guns are reloaded.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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CHAPTER 4
SAFETY AND DURESS OF THE RTES
4.1. Safety Requirements.
4.1.1 The primary safety feature of the RTES is the dual-system
authorization/enablement concept. The RTES will always be disabled. DO NOT enable
the system unless for a JRV, maintenance or when directed by ESS personnel, AS, or
competent authority.
4.1.2. If during maintenance operations a critical malfunction occurs that could damage
the system or harm personnel (such as clamshell closing on maintenance personnel), the
SEDS operator will immediately press the Emergency-Stop (E-stop) button. The E-stop
will disable all power to the RTES tower and remain disabled until the E-stop is returned
to its normal state.
4.1.3. The RTES operator will maintain in constant contact with ESS/CTS personnel via
a voice speaker system in each tower. This system is a two way intercom that allows
maintenance personnel to direct the RTES operator during maintenance operations. If
trouble is indicated by ESS/CTS personnel the SEDS operator will immediately press the
E-stop button.
4.1.4. With the exception of real world contingencies, the operator will only open the
clam shells during authorized and coordinated maintenance. The maintainer will lock out
the operator on that particular RTES tower to ensure the operator cannot close the clam
shell or engage the trigger. As soon as maintenance is completed, the maintainer will
allow the operator access to that tower, close the clam shell, and check the diagnostics to
ensure everything is still working properly. Disable the RTES via the SEDS console as
soon as all maintenance has been completed.
4.1.5. During JRVs, the SCS and Entry Controller will maintain readiness to disable the
RTES if the need arises.
4.2. Duress Procedures.
4.2.1. (DCNI) The SCS will act as the SEDS Operator. The responsibility of the SEDS
Operator is to act as part of the 2-person concept in activating RTES. In the event the
RTES operator performs an unauthorized function while the system is active, the SCS has
system disable control via the E-Stop button/O- Stop buttons. The system will remain
disabled until the E-Stop/O-Stop is returned to its normal state.
4.2.2. (DCNI) Duress in the SSCC: If there is duress in the SSCC or the RTES
operator is performing an unauthorized action in coordination with the SCS, the
KUMMSC Entry Controller has system disable control via the RDDS. The RTES will be
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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disabled until the RDDS is returned to its normal state. NOTE: The RTES may need to
be rebooted since the RDDS removes all electrical power to the remote electronics.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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CHAPTER 5
SIMULATOR OPERATIONS
5.1 The RTES Simulator.
5.1.1. The RTES trainer console is located in the WSSS Squadron Operations Building
#27494, Room R-1.
5.1.2. (DCNI) The RTES simulator allows the operator to remain proficient with the
system. It has eight scenarios the operator can perform. The simulator accurately depicts
the interior and exterior of KUMMSC to provide as much realism as possible.
5.1.3. The RTES simulator does not require the SCS to activate the system.
5.1.4. The operator may exit the scenario and view the statistics of rounds fired and
enemy kills at any time.
5.1.5. The simulator will be used by 377 SFG/Standardization and Evaluations (SFMQ)
section personnel to certify and evaluate an individual’s ability to remain qualified on the
RTES. FC/FCC can coordinate through ESS to gain access to this room for their certified
RTES operators to train when needed.
5.2. Certification.
5.2.1. Must be a SFmember with a response force leader certification at a minimum.
5.2.2. Take and pass RTES training course conducted by ESS.
5.2.3. Must pass with 80% on written/verbal 377 SFG/SFMQ.
5.2.4. Practical will be conducted on simulator by 377 SFG/SFMQ. Trainees must pass
four (4) scenarios out of (8) and not miss any critical steps.
5.3. Uncertified personnel.
5.3.1. Uncertified individuals may not operate any portion of the system unless in Phase
II training and under the supervision of a certified RTES controller, ESS NCOIC or
SFMQ.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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CHAPTER 6
SYSTEM AND SYSTEM COMPONENT FAILURES
6.1 Work Order Priorities: The following briefly describes the work order priorities and
maintenance response times. For a complete list of work order priorities and compensatory
measures refer to Attachment #5 and #6 of this instruction.
6.1.1. (DCNI) Priority 1: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel will respond within 1
hour. Once CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel arrive on scene the RTES operator
will give them an in-depth briefing of the problem. CTS and CA will report to their
respective duty shops to get any tools and equipment needed to perform their
maintenance duties.
6.1.2. (DCNI) Priority 2: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel will respond within 24
hours. Follow the same procedures listed in Para. 6.1.1.
6.1.3. (DCNI) Priority 3: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel should respond by the
next duty day, but not later than 72 hours after the malfunction is reported.
6.2. Opening Work Orders.
6.2.1. All work orders will be annotated in the SF Blotter and the AFTO Form 781a,
Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document. The Remote Display Area Operator
(RDAO) and Local Display Area Operator (LDAO) will maintain a copy of the RTES
AFTO Form 781a as well.
6.2.2. For safety reasons, if any component of the system fails, do not touch the SEDS or
touch screens. Exception: If the RTES is in use due to a threat or attack on
KUMMSC, select another tower and continue under the direction of the SF on scene
commander. Immediately notify SCS of the failure and the SCS will open a work order
via Munition Control. If the failure affects the platform of the remote electronics, SCS
will notify the stand-by CA personnel. SCS will notify ESS personnel of all RTES work
orders.
6.3. Closing Work Orders.
6.3.1. The RTES operator enters the names of the persons completing the work and the
corrective action on the AFTO Form 781a. The RTES operator will notify SCS when the
work has been completed, identify the names of the persons who completed the work and
the corrective actions taken.
6.3.2. The SCS will notify the AS, FC/FCC and ESS personnel that the work order has
been closed.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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6.3.3. The SCS will enter the names of the persons making corrective action and the
corrective action(s) taken in the SF Blotter.
6.4. Work order Tracking Procedures.
6.4.1. The SCS will notify ESS of any work orders opened/closed during the course of
duty day. Priority 2 and 3 work orders opened or closed during the no-duty hours will be
reported to the ESS no later than the next duty day. Priority 1 work orders opened or
closed during no-duty hours will be reported to ESS and CA standby personnel
immediately.
DUSTIN G. SUTTON, Col, USAF
Commander, 377 SFG
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACHMENT 1
GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION
References
AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (FOUO) IC #3, 3 February 2016
AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel,2 February 2016
AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 1 March 2008
DoD 5210.41M , AFMAN 31-108V1/V2/V3 AFGSC SUP Nuclear Weapons Security Manual:
Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements, 7 March 2013
KAFB IDP 31-101 IC #1, Integrated Defense Plan, 9 March 2016
Air Force Technical Order 31S9-4-135-2, Change #3, 31 March 2015
Prescribed Forms
No forms are prescribed by this publication
Adopted Forms
AF Form 797, Job Qualification Standard Continuation/Command JQS
AFTO Form 781A, Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document
AF Form 53, Security Force Desk Blotter
AF Form 623A, On the Job Training Record
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AECS - Advanced Entry Control System
AFMAN - Air Force Manual
AFRIMS - Air Force Records Information Management System
AFTO - Air Force Technical Order
ANG - Air National Guard
AS - Area Supervisor
CA - Combat Arms
CTS - Cyber Transport Systems
DCNI – Department of Defense Controlled Nuclear Information
DFS - Digital Facility System
DOD - Department of Defense
DOE - Department of Energy
ECP - Entry Control Point
ESS - Electronic Security Systems
E-STOP - Emergency Stop Button
FOUO - For Official Use Only
FC - Flight Chief
FCC - Flight Commander
IDP - Installation Defense Plan
JRV - Joint Routine Verification
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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KUMMSC - Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex
LDAO - Local Display Area Operator
OPR - Office of Primary Responsibility
PDF - Primary Direction of Fire
QRC - Quick Reaction Checklist
RDAO - Remote Display Area Operator
RDDS - Remote Duress Disable Switch
RDS - Records Disposition Schedule
REC - Remote Electronics Cabinet
ROE - Rules of Engagement
RTES - Remote Target Engagement System
RV - Routine Verification
SCS - Security Control Supervisor
SFG - Security Forces Group
SSCC - Site Security Control Center
SEDS - System Enable-Disable Switch
SF - Security Forces
SFMQ – Security Forces Standardization and Evaluations
SSI - Special Security Instruction
TAG - Tactical Assault Guide
UPS - Uninterruptible Power Supply
Terms
ARMED - A weapon is armed in the RTES by pressing the WEAPON ARMED button on the
RTES Arming Panel. Prior to this action, SEDS must be enabled, and a platform must be
selected.
DISABLE - RTES is disabled when the SEDS switch is turned to the “DISABLE” position by
the SEDS Operator. Pressing the E-stop or RDDS will accomplish the same purpose.
ENABLE - RTES is enabled by the SEDS switch being turned to the “ENABLE” position by
both the RTES and the SEDS operators. This is the first step in allowing a weapon to be fired.
Remote Duress Disable Switch - This switch is in a remote location from the RTES Operator
Console, SEDS Console and the Training/Simulator Console. If pressed, the RDDS shuts down
power to all remote platforms.
RTES Consoles “States” - RTES Consoles are determined to be in one of two states. For the
Operational Console, Standby State provides a Diagnostics Mode and Operational State provides
full control of the mounted weapons. For the Trainer/Simulator Console, when the SEDS switch
is “DISABLED”, the Simulator mode is available. When the SEDS switch is “ENABLED”, the
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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Simulator mode goes away, and the RTES Training platform is under direct control of the
Operator.
SAFED - The state of the weapon when the gun safety actuator has engaged the weapon safety
on a platform. A weapon cannot be fired in the “WEAPON SAFED” mode.
SEDS E-Stop - The SEDS E-Stop produces an emergency stop. It stops clamshell motion and
disables the trigger actuator on all platforms and disables pan and tilt motion.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACHMENT 2
RTES PRIMARY/SECONDARY DIRECTION OF FIRE
Table A2.1. RTES Primary/Secondary Direction Of Fire.
Tower Primary Secondary RTES
Direction Direction Of Fire Coverage
Of Fire
Tower 1, V1AA N/A Towers 2&3
Platform 1
Tower 1, Golf N/A Towers 2&3
Platform 5 Sector
Tower 2, V2 N/A Towers 1&3
Platform 7
Tower 2, Foxtrot N/A Towers 1&3
Platform 6 Sector
Tower 3, V8 N/A Towers 1&2
Platform 3
Tower 3, Hotel N/A Towers 1&2
Platform 2 Sector
Loading Dock V5 B1&B2 REC 8
REC 4
Loading Dock V6 B1&B2 REC 4
REC 8
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACHMENT 3
TOUCH SCREEN ICONS
Figure A3.1. Touch Screen Indicators.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACHMENT 4
TOUCH SCREEN INDICATORS
Figure A4.1. Touch Screen Indicators.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACHMENT 5
(DCNI) EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION/WORK ORDER PRIORITY LISTING
(DCNI) Table 5.1. Equipment Malfunction/Work Order Priority Listing
Equipment Malfunction Notes P1 P2 P3
1 Failed Hardware Test X
Error on system displayed on a single Operator Console w/o a
2 weapons platform degrade X
3 All Operator consoles INOP X
4 SEDS Console X
5 Single Weapons Platform INOP 1 X
6 All Weapons Platforms INOP 1 X
7 Remote Duress Disable (RDD) Switch X
8 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) X
9 Targeting cameras inoperative (Scope, Wide Angle, Thermal) 1 X
10 Platform camera inoperative X
11 Trainer Console/Server/Weapons Platform X
12 Trainer Console/Server X
NOTE 1: CA will respond when requested by CTS/ESS.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACMENT 6
(DCNI) EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION/COMPENSATORY MEASURES
Table A6.1. (DCNI) Equipment Malfunction/Compensatory Measures
Equipment Malfunction Notes
1 Failed Hardware Test 1
2 Error on system displayed on a single Operator Console 1
3 All Operator consoles INOP 0
4 SEDS Console 0
5 Single Weapons Platform INOP 0
6 All Weapons Platforms INOP 0
7 RDD Switch 0
8 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) 0
9 Targeting cameras inoperative (Scope, Wide Angle, Thermal) 0
10 Platform camera inoperative 0
11 Trainer Console/Server/Weapons Platform 0
12 Trainer Console/Server 0
13 Simulator PTZ INOP 0
NOTE 0: No Compensatory Measures required.
NOTE 1: Utilize the other RTES Operator Console already manned by Romeo-1/2.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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# (DCNI) 377 SFGI 31-113, Remote Target Engagement System, T-250 Digital Facility System
BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER 377TH SFG INSTRUCTION 31-113
377 TH SECURITY FORCES GROUP
8 June 2016
Security
REMOTE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM, T-250
DIGITAL FACILITY SYSTEM
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
ACCESSIBILITY: This publication is only available directly from the OPR.
RELEASABILITY: Access to this publication is restricted: this publication is unclassified
Department of Defense (DoD) Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information/For Official Use
Only (U//DCNI/FOUO). This publication may not be released to foreign nationals; requests
for accessibility must be approved by the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).
OPR: 377 WSSS/S5 Certified by: 377 WSSS/CC
(Lt Col James K. Meier)
[Pages: 26]
This publication implements the 377th Security Forces Group (SFG) Remote Target Engagement
System (RTES) T-250 Digital Facility System (DFS). This group instruction is applicable to all
personnel within the 377th SFG to all It describes the responsibilities of the RTES operator, Flight
Chief (FC)/Flight Commander (FCC), Entry Controller, Combat Arms (CA), and Electronic
Security Systems (ESS) personnel. This operating instruction also covers the operation of the
RTES Operator Console, System Enable Disable Switch (SEDS) Console, Remote Duress Disable
(RDDS) Switch, and the Trainer/Simulator Console. This publication does not apply to Air Force
Reserve Command (AFRC) Units or to the Air National Guard (ANG). Refer recommended
changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using AF Form 847, Recommendation for
Change of Publication; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional
chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this
publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management
of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management
System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS). This publication may not be
supplemented or further implemented/extended. Requests for waivers must be submitted to the
OPR listed above for consideration and approval.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: Concept of Operations
1.1 System Overview
1.2 System Description
1.3 System Purpose
1.4 Rules of Engagement
CHAPTER 2: Individual Responsibilities
2.1. RTES Operator Duties
2.2. Security Control Supervisor (SCS) Duties
2.3. Entry Controller Duties
2.4. Alarm Monitor Duties
2.5. Area Supervisor Duties
2.6. Flight Chief/Flight Commander Duties
2.7. Combat Arms Duties
2.8. Electronic Security Systems/Cyber Transport Systems (CTS) Duties
CHAPTER 3: Operation of the RTES
3.1 Normal Start-up/Shut-down Operations
3.2 Emergency Shut-down
3.3 How to Conduct Joint Routine Verification (JRV).
3.4 How to Conduct Routine Verification (RV).
3.5 How to Enable RTES
3.6 When to Enable RTES
3.7 Locating the Threat
3.8 Arming and Firing the RTES
3.9 Safing and Disarming the RTES
CHAPTER 4: Safety and Duress of the RTES
4.1. Safety Requirements
4.2. Duress Procedures
CHAPTER 5: Simulator Operations and Certification
5.1. RTES Simulator
5.2. Certification
5.3. Uncertified Personnel
CHAPTER 6: System and System Component Failures
6.1. Work Order Priorities
6.2. Opening Work Orders
6.3. Closing Work Orders
6.4. Work Order Tracking Procedures
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment 1 - Glossary of References and Supporting Information
Attachment 2 - RTES Primary/Secondary Direction of Fire
Attachment 3 - Touch Screen Icons
Attachment 4 - Touch Screen Indicators
Attachment 5 - Equipment Malfunction/Work Order Priorities
Attachment 6 – Equipment Malfunction/Compensatory Measures
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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CHAPTER 1
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
1.1 System Overview.
1.1.1. RTES is an enhancement of the overall security system for protecting critical
assets. Their primary functions are to provide final denial fire, area denial, and deny
unauthorized personnel from avenues of approach to restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
1.1.2. (DCNI) RTES is employed by system operators to locate, identify, target and
engage an adversary attacking the Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance
Storage Complex (KUMMSC). Employment and operational direction of the RTES will
be the responsibility of the Security Forces (SF) on-scene commander. Close attention
will be paid to the effects of base operations when utilizing the RTES. Rules of
Engagement (ROE) in this instruction will specify when and how the RTES functions are
used.
1.2. (DCNI) System Description: The RTES employs the M240B machine gun with 200
rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing/tracer ammunition. The RTES consoles, and all the
M240B machine guns associated with them are not tied into the Automated/Advanced Entry
Control System (AECS). These weapons are mounted within ballistic shielded clamshells on
three hardened towers dispersed within the controlled area and two platforms within the
KUMMSC/limited area, covering the loading dock. The RTES is remotely operated from the
operator console located in the RTES Room (#150) adjacent to the Site Security Control Center
(SSCC). Each tower on topside is equiped with two weapon systems and associated cameras.
The two towers located within the loading dock are both equipped with a weapon system and an
associated camera. All tower locations with primary and secondary fields of fire can be found in
attachment 2 of this document.
1.3. System Purpose.
1.3.1. The purpose of the RTES is to:
1.3.1.1. Provide final denial fire before hostile unauthorized access can be gained
to controlled/restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
1.3.1.2. Achieve area denial fire of likely avenues of approach to
controlled/restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
1.3.1.3. Mitigate identified vulnerabilities that require posting of armed SF IAW
(DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN31-108V1, Nuclear Weapons Security Manual,
Enclosure 6 Para 3.d.(4).)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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1.4. Rules Of Engagement.
1.4.1. AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force, will be strictly adhered to during all
operations of the RTES.
1.4.2. The RTES operator will enable the system in the following situations:
1.4.2.1. Initiation of a COVERED WAGON due to a direct threat to KUMMSC.
1.4.2.2. With proper authentication from the posted SCS, Area Supervisor (AS),
FCC/FC or higher authority.
1.4.2.3. For pre-coordinated and authorized maintenance or during shift
changeover/JRV/RV.
1.4.3. SF on scene commander is responsible for the overall employment of the RTES
and will provide direction to the RTES operator. If available, positive identification
should be made from a post or patrol that has line of sight prior to utilizing the weapon.
A confirmed visual verification by an on-scene patrol will not deter the RTES operator
from enabling and engaging hostile forces if threat to life or resources is imminent.
1.4.4. Once the RTES operator has received direction from the AS/on-scene commander,
the SCS and RTES operator will turn on their respective SEDS keys to enable the system
to open applicable clamshells as necessary. It is recommended that only one tower with
the best tactical advantage be activated to avoid putting the other towers at risk of being
damaged. If the threat is deemed hostile by the on-scene commander and the operator
has received proper authorization, use of deadly force is authorized. The operator will
select the respective tower, arm the system and eliminate the threat.
1.4.5. When the operator has enabled the system, the weapon will remain on safe until
the operator is ready to engage an adversary.
1.4.6. The RTES operator will announce “weapons platform X up” to the Area
Supervisor and SCS when any platform is selected, and will potentially be fired.
1.4.7. At no time will both the RTES and RF be redirected from final denial coverage at
the same time during hostile situations. NOTE: At no time will the RTES be enabled
during flight, squadron or wing level exercises.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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CHAPTER 2
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES
2.1. RTES Operators will:
2.1.1. One operator will remain within the confines of the RTES Room (#150) unless
relieved by a certified operator.
2.1.1.1. Two operators will be posted for duty during each shift.
2.1.1.2. One operator may leave to utilize facilities at any time except when there
is hostile activity.
2.1.1.3. When the RTES is inoperative, a two-person Cerberus-4/4a will be
posted in the loading dock. Also, when there is a Department of Energy (DoE)
mission, a four-man team will be comprised of the RTES operators and Cerberus-
4/4a located in the loading dock.
2.1.2. Comply with the requirements of this instruction, Special Security Instructions
(SSI), applicable supplements, and operator checklists.
2.1.3. Obtain a detailed briefing and changeover with the off-going RTES operator.
2.1.3.1. Changeover will consist of a visual inspection by the operator to ensure
there are no line breaks, exposed wires, all monitors are functional, SSIs are in the
room, console and surrounding room is kept clean, and all controls are functional.
2.1.4. Conduct JRV and routine verifications to ensure all RTES equipment is operating
properly.
2.1.4.1. JRV Quick Reaction Checklist (QRC) # H-1 will be conducted at the
following times:
2.1.4.1.1. As operator(s) arrive on post.
2.1.4.1.2. Any time the system has been enabled or the weapon has been
used.
2.1.4.1.3. Following start-up of the system.
2.1.4.1.4. After maintenance has been performed on any RTES
component (arm, weapon, System Enablement/Disablement Switch, etc.).
2.1.4.1.5. Anytime the operator doubts the reliability of the RTES system.
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2.1.4.2. RVs will be conducted in the following situations:
2.1.4.2.1. Once an RTES operator returns to the RTES room.
2.1.4.2.2. When there has been a change in the power source (i.e.
switching from commercial to generator). Steps for completing RVs are
defined in section 3.4 and in applicable QRCs.
2.1.5. Take inventory of all RTES equipment and report deficiencies or required work
orders to the SCS. The Alarm Monitor will obtain the Job Control Number from the
898 MUNS Control Center and maintain the Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form
781a, Maintenance Discrepancy and work document. Notify the SCS of the names of the
personnel making the corrective action.
2.1.6. If any component of the system fails, do not touch the System enable/disablement
switch or touch screens due to safety reasons. Exception: If the RTES is in use due to
an attack, select another tower and continue under the direction of the SF on scene
commander.
2.1.7. Do not utilize the live RTES system for any exercises.
2.1.8. Operators will be armed IAW the Installation Defense Plan (IDP) Post Priority
Chart.
2.2. Security Controller Supervisor will:
2.2.1. Act as the SEDS Panel Operator located at SCS Console.
2.2.2. Monitor the RTES operator when the system is enabled/disabled.
2.2.3. Annotate all work orders in the SF Blotter. Additionally, enter the names of the
persons making the corrective action and the corrective action(s).
2.2.4. The SCS will notify ESS and CTS of any work orders opened/closed. ESS/CTS
response times are outlined in Attachment 9 located in 377 WSSS SOP 31-101, Vol 4.
KUMMSC AECS.
2.2.5. Notify the AS, FC/FCC when a work order has been opened/closed.
2.3. The KUMMSC Entry Controller will:
2.3.1. Maintain control over the RDDS.
2.3.2. Monitor the radio for signs of duress from inside SSCC/RTES Room. Also,
initiate the RDDS switch enable upon passive or active duress upon the RTES Controller
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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(AECS duress switch activation/failing to acknowledge radio/verbal duress) or as
directed by higher authority.
2.4. The Security Controller will:
2.4.1. Monitor all alarms and activations of the RTES control room or towers/loading
dock.
2.4.2. Dispatch to any unannounced alarm activation involving any RTES systems or
components.
2.5. Area Supervisor will:
2.5.1. Ensure posts/patrols are implementing temporary compensatory measures until
permanent compensatory measures are in place or the work order has been closed.
2.5.2. Employ RTES to gain a tactical advantage over adversaries.
2.6. Flight Chief/Flight Commander will:
2.6.1. Become familiar with the requirements of AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense
(FOUO), AFI 31-117, 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide (TAG), AFMAN 31-108,
Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, and applicable supplements.
2.6.2. Evaluate the operators on their use of the RTES system, knowledge of local
procedures, and response to hostile situations by conducting area exercises. (Ensure flight
RTES certified operators are given opportunity to use the RTES Simulator to maintain
skills.).
2.7. 377 SFG/Security Support Squadron/CA will:
2.7.1. Conduct maintenance on the M240B machine guns in accordance with the
applicable technical order and commercial manuals.
2.7.2. Change out M240B machine guns as necessary. Change out the M240B drive
spring for each weapon at least quarterly in conjunction with a routine inspection.
2.7.3. (FOUO) Zero all M240B machine guns at a full distance range from 350 meters
prior to the weapon system being mounted.
2.7.4. Respond upon request from CTS personnel in the event a M240B machine gun
needs to be unloaded, loaded, or the weapon itself is damaged during work orders.
2.7.5. Clear expended casings and links from all RTES platforms prior to the RTES
Operator closing clamshells after firing the weapon system.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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2.8. Electronic Security Systems/Cyber Transport Systems.
2.8.1. ESS will act as System Administrators for the RTES.
2.8.2. Conduct sensor testing of all alarms associated with RTES in accordance with
DoD S-5210.41-M-V2_AFMAN 31-108, Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, V2
Enclosure 3.
2.8.3. Respond upon request from CTS personnel in the event a M240B machine gun
needs to be unloaded, loaded, or the weapon itself is damaged during work orders.
2.8.4. If a failure of the system affects the platform or the remote electronics, CTS will
notify the standby CA personnel.
2.9. ESS NCO will:
2.9.1. Coordinate preventive maintenance scheduling with appropriate agencies.
2.9.2. Develop a tailored local training program for RTES system operators. Training
may be conducted on-duty, in a formal classroom environment or a combination of both.
2.9.2.1. Initial Certification:
2.9.2.1.1. Initial Certification is conducted after an individual completes
local training but before performing duties as an RTES Operator.
2.9.2.2. Trainees:
2.9.2.2.1. Trainees pursuing initial RTES Operator certification can
perform duties and operate the RTES system under the direct supervision
of a Duty Position Evaluation – certified RTES Operator.
2.9.2.2.2. The trainee must have initiated training documentation for the
duty position (AF Form 623A, On the Job Training Record) prior to
beginning hands on training. NOTE: At no time will the trainee be left
alone to operate the RTES.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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CHAPTER 3
Operation of the RTES
3.1. Normal Start-up/Shut-down Operations: The RTES is designed to operate continuously,
including across shift changes, and other than maintenance purposes there is no reason to shut
down the system.
3.1.1. Power-on the RTES console.
3.1.1.1. Wait until the initial “splash screen” appears on the touch screen monitor.
3.1.1.2. View diagnostics and report errors to ESS/CTS personnel.
3.1.2. Powering off the Console: If the RTES program is shut down inadvertently or for
maintenance, the following steps will re-boot the Operator Console:
3.1.2.1. RTES operator will perform a diagnostics check.
3.1.2.2. RTES operator presses “Exit Kiosk” button.
3.1.2.3. Then, follow normal shut down procedures for a Microsoft Windows-
based computer.
3.1.3. Any time the system needs to be shut down, contact ESS.
3.1.4. Power-off the RTES console only if absolutely necessary and deemed credible by
either ESS or SCS.
3.2. (DCNI) Emergency Shut-Down: In the event of smoke or fire inside the SSCC or
evacuation of KUMMSC, the RTES operator will shut down the RTES prior to evacuation.
3.2.1. The operators will shut down the system and ensure the keys are maintained with
the operators.
3.3. How to conduct a JRV:
3.3.1. Conduct a hardware test by touching the hardware test button on the touch screen.
The hardware test function will ensure all equipment that the operator interfaces with
works properly. If the equipment does not work then open the appropriate work order.
3.3.2. The SCS and RTES operator will enable the system utilizing step 3.5.
3.3.3. The SCS will notify the Entry Control Point (ECP) that the RTES operator will be
conducting a JRV. The ECP will receive an audible alarm once the system is enabled.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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3.3.4. The RTES operator for every shift will open all clamshells and verify that all
weapons automatically queue to their final denial position by comparing the touch screen
with the appropriate checklist. If the final denial lines do not match Attachment #2, open
up a work order.
3.3.5. The RTES operator will select each tower in turn and will check the pan and tilt
functions of each weapon system. This will be done by moving the weapon to the
extreme left, right, up and down. Care must be taken not to sweep the weapon across
personnel and assets. At no time will the operator track non-hostile personnel/assets with
the live system. The RTES operator will check the wide angle, infrared and scope to
verify that all cameras are focused and working properly. If the weapon fails to operate
correctly the RTES operator will inform the SCS and open a work order.
3.3.6. After checking each weapons pan and tilt function the operator will close that
weapons clamshell before moving on to the next weapon system. The operator will
ensure the clamshell fully closes and the weapon shows closed on the operator console.
If the weapon fails to operate correctly, contact the SCS and initiate a work order.
3.3.7. Have the SCS press the O-Stop buttons to verify operability.
3.3.8. Once all clamshells have been closed, the RTES operator will disable the system.
3.3.9. The RTES operator will verify the operator console is not showing any error
messages. If the console shows any error messages, the RTES operator will contact the
SCS and initiate a work order.
3.3.10. The RTES operator will notify SCS the JRV is complete and report any
discrepancies. The SCS will record the JRV in the SF blotter.
3.4. How to Conduct RVs:
3.4.1. Conduct a hardware test by touching the hardware test button on the touch screen.
The hardware test function will ensure all equipment the operator interfaces with works
properly. If the equipment does not work then open the appropriate work order.
3.4.2. The RTES operator will verify the operator console is not showing any error
messages. If the console shows any error messages, the RTES operator will contact the
SCS and initiate a work order.
3.4.3. The RTES operator will notify SSCC that the RV is complete and report any
discrepancies. The SCS will record the RV in the SF blotter.
3.5. How to Enable RTES:
3.5.1. The RTES operator and the SCS enable RTES by turning the SEDS keys to
“SYSTEM ENABLE”. The red ENABLED light will indicate the system is activated in
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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conjunction with the red background of the RTES monitor. The RTES touch screen
background turns red and the camera and weapon shot selection buttons appear.
3.6. When to Enable RTES:
3.6.1. The SCS determines if the threat is credible and briefs the appropriate Internal
Security Response Team and AS. The AS will determine if a response from RTES is
warranted. When to enable the RTES is defined in section 1.4, ROE.
3.7. Locating Threat.
3.7.1. To locate the threat from the platform, press the “platform icon,” or swipe 50% or
more of the “platform monitor.” The weapon and cameras will begin to move and aim at
that platform’s Primary Direction of Fire (PDF). Each tower is assigned its own PDF by
programmed default.
3.7.2. The RTES operator will notify the AS which tower is currently selected by calling
out “WEAPONS PLATFORM X UP” over the radio. This allows the AS to know the
status of the RTES at all times and deploy appropriately.
3.7.3. Track and acquire targets by viewing the monitor to the right of the touch screen
and utilize controls to verify target on the main screen.
3.8. Arming and Firing the RTES.
3.8.1. The RTES operator presses the red ARM mechanical button beneath the touch
screen. After approximately two seconds, both the button on the RTES Arming Panel
and clamshell icon on the touch-screen will light red.
3.8.2. It is important for the RTES Operator at this time to determine the best approach
for engaging the target successfully. If the target is moving, either the tracking method of
engagement, or the ambush method of engagement should be used. Whether the target is
stationary or moving, the operator should evaluate distance to the target and wind, speed
and direction from the tower and aim appropriately.
3.8.3. (FOUO) The topside weapons are sighted for a 350 meter zero. This means if the
target is approximately 350 meters from the tower, the crosshairs of the scope shall be
placed at the center of mass on the target.
3.8.4. Select the number of shots by using the “Shot” button on the touch screen, there
are three selections, Single Fire, Burst Fire, and Full Auto.
3.8.5. Grasp the hand controller with both hands, placing each index finger on its
respective firing button.
3.8.6. Pan and tilt the weapon and operate the camera zoom to acquire the threat.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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3.8.7. Set the crosshairs on the target aim point.
3.8.8. Press and hold the trigger enable button located on the top left of the hand
controller. To fire the weapon, press and hold the trigger button located on the top right
of the hand controller. This will fire the weapon for the number of rounds selected. If
Auto is selected the weapon will fire a two-second burst. If the trigger button is not
depressed for the entire two seconds, the entire burst will not be accomplished.
3.8.9. When the RTES operator is assessing the engagement, the operator may select
different platform cameras to determine if the threat was neutralized.
3.8.10. If the threat was not neutralized (or additional threats appear), repeat steps above.
(3.8.4.-3.8.9.)
3.8.11. In the event additional hostilities are expected, press “Close All Clamshells” to
safeguard the weapons until needed.
3.8.12. If a weapon was fired and hostilities have ceased, DO NOT press the “Close All
Clamshells” until maintenance has been completed and CA has removed all brass from
inside.
3.9. Safing and Disarming the RTES.
3.9.1. The operator will push the “Weapon Safe” button to disarm the selected platform.
3.9.2. The operator may also deselect the tower in use by selecting another platform to
disengage the weapon. The newly selected tower will not be armed until the ARM
mechanical button is pushed.
3.9.3. Press “Close All Clamshells” touch screen button.
3.9.4. The SCS will turn the SEDS key switch to disable.
3.9.5. SCS will notify CTS, ESS, and CA to inspect all towers for any damage. CA will
ensure that all guns are reloaded.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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CHAPTER 4
SAFETY AND DURESS OF THE RTES
4.1. Safety Requirements.
4.1.1 The primary safety feature of the RTES is the dual-system
authorization/enablement concept. The RTES will always be disabled. DO NOT enable
the system unless for a JRV, maintenance or when directed by ESS personnel, AS, or
competent authority.
4.1.2. If during maintenance operations a critical malfunction occurs that could damage
the system or harm personnel (such as clamshell closing on maintenance personnel), the
SEDS operator will immediately press the Emergency-Stop (E-stop) button. The E-stop
will disable all power to the RTES tower and remain disabled until the E-stop is returned
to its normal state.
4.1.3. The RTES operator will maintain in constant contact with ESS/CTS personnel via
a voice speaker system in each tower. This system is a two way intercom that allows
maintenance personnel to direct the RTES operator during maintenance operations. If
trouble is indicated by ESS/CTS personnel the SEDS operator will immediately press the
E-stop button.
4.1.4. With the exception of real world contingencies, the operator will only open the
clam shells during authorized and coordinated maintenance. The maintainer will lock out
the operator on that particular RTES tower to ensure the operator cannot close the clam
shell or engage the trigger. As soon as maintenance is completed, the maintainer will
allow the operator access to that tower, close the clam shell, and check the diagnostics to
ensure everything is still working properly. Disable the RTES via the SEDS console as
soon as all maintenance has been completed.
4.1.5. During JRVs, the SCS and Entry Controller will maintain readiness to disable the
RTES if the need arises.
4.2. Duress Procedures.
4.2.1. (DCNI) The SCS will act as the SEDS Operator. The responsibility of the SEDS
Operator is to act as part of the 2-person concept in activating RTES. In the event the
RTES operator performs an unauthorized function while the system is active, the SCS has
system disable control via the E-Stop button/O- Stop buttons. The system will remain
disabled until the E-Stop/O-Stop is returned to its normal state.
4.2.2. (DCNI) Duress in the SSCC: If there is duress in the SSCC or the RTES
operator is performing an unauthorized action in coordination with the SCS, the
KUMMSC Entry Controller has system disable control via the RDDS. The RTES will be
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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disabled until the RDDS is returned to its normal state. NOTE: The RTES may need to
be rebooted since the RDDS removes all electrical power to the remote electronics.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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CHAPTER 5
SIMULATOR OPERATIONS
5.1 The RTES Simulator.
5.1.1. The RTES trainer console is located in the WSSS Squadron Operations Building
#27494, Room R-1.
5.1.2. (DCNI) The RTES simulator allows the operator to remain proficient with the
system. It has eight scenarios the operator can perform. The simulator accurately depicts
the interior and exterior of KUMMSC to provide as much realism as possible.
5.1.3. The RTES simulator does not require the SCS to activate the system.
5.1.4. The operator may exit the scenario and view the statistics of rounds fired and
enemy kills at any time.
5.1.5. The simulator will be used by 377 SFG/Standardization and Evaluations (SFMQ)
section personnel to certify and evaluate an individual’s ability to remain qualified on the
RTES. FC/FCC can coordinate through ESS to gain access to this room for their certified
RTES operators to train when needed.
5.2. Certification.
5.2.1. Must be a SFmember with a response force leader certification at a minimum.
5.2.2. Take and pass RTES training course conducted by ESS.
5.2.3. Must pass with 80% on written/verbal 377 SFG/SFMQ.
5.2.4. Practical will be conducted on simulator by 377 SFG/SFMQ. Trainees must pass
four (4) scenarios out of (8) and not miss any critical steps.
5.3. Uncertified personnel.
5.3.1. Uncertified individuals may not operate any portion of the system unless in Phase
II training and under the supervision of a certified RTES controller, ESS NCOIC or
SFMQ.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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CHAPTER 6
SYSTEM AND SYSTEM COMPONENT FAILURES
6.1 Work Order Priorities: The following briefly describes the work order priorities and
maintenance response times. For a complete list of work order priorities and compensatory
measures refer to Attachment #5 and #6 of this instruction.
6.1.1. (DCNI) Priority 1: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel will respond within 1
hour. Once CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel arrive on scene the RTES operator
will give them an in-depth briefing of the problem. CTS and CA will report to their
respective duty shops to get any tools and equipment needed to perform their
maintenance duties.
6.1.2. (DCNI) Priority 2: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel will respond within 24
hours. Follow the same procedures listed in Para. 6.1.1.
6.1.3. (DCNI) Priority 3: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel should respond by the
next duty day, but not later than 72 hours after the malfunction is reported.
6.2. Opening Work Orders.
6.2.1. All work orders will be annotated in the SF Blotter and the AFTO Form 781a,
Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document. The Remote Display Area Operator
(RDAO) and Local Display Area Operator (LDAO) will maintain a copy of the RTES
AFTO Form 781a as well.
6.2.2. For safety reasons, if any component of the system fails, do not touch the SEDS or
touch screens. Exception: If the RTES is in use due to a threat or attack on
KUMMSC, select another tower and continue under the direction of the SF on scene
commander. Immediately notify SCS of the failure and the SCS will open a work order
via Munition Control. If the failure affects the platform of the remote electronics, SCS
will notify the stand-by CA personnel. SCS will notify ESS personnel of all RTES work
orders.
6.3. Closing Work Orders.
6.3.1. The RTES operator enters the names of the persons completing the work and the
corrective action on the AFTO Form 781a. The RTES operator will notify SCS when the
work has been completed, identify the names of the persons who completed the work and
the corrective actions taken.
6.3.2. The SCS will notify the AS, FC/FCC and ESS personnel that the work order has
been closed.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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6.3.3. The SCS will enter the names of the persons making corrective action and the
corrective action(s) taken in the SF Blotter.
6.4. Work order Tracking Procedures.
6.4.1. The SCS will notify ESS of any work orders opened/closed during the course of
duty day. Priority 2 and 3 work orders opened or closed during the no-duty hours will be
reported to the ESS no later than the next duty day. Priority 1 work orders opened or
closed during no-duty hours will be reported to ESS and CA standby personnel
immediately.
DUSTIN G. SUTTON, Col, USAF
Commander, 377 SFG
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACHMENT 1
GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION
References
AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (FOUO) IC #3, 3 February 2016
AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel,2 February 2016
AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 1 March 2008
DoD 5210.41M , AFMAN 31-108V1/V2/V3 AFGSC SUP Nuclear Weapons Security Manual:
Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements, 7 March 2013
KAFB IDP 31-101 IC #1, Integrated Defense Plan, 9 March 2016
Air Force Technical Order 31S9-4-135-2, Change #3, 31 March 2015
Prescribed Forms
No forms are prescribed by this publication
Adopted Forms
AF Form 797, Job Qualification Standard Continuation/Command JQS
AFTO Form 781A, Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document
AF Form 53, Security Force Desk Blotter
AF Form 623A, On the Job Training Record
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AECS - Advanced Entry Control System
AFMAN - Air Force Manual
AFRIMS - Air Force Records Information Management System
AFTO - Air Force Technical Order
ANG - Air National Guard
AS - Area Supervisor
CA - Combat Arms
CTS - Cyber Transport Systems
DCNI – Department of Defense Controlled Nuclear Information
DFS - Digital Facility System
DOD - Department of Defense
DOE - Department of Energy
ECP - Entry Control Point
ESS - Electronic Security Systems
E-STOP - Emergency Stop Button
FOUO - For Official Use Only
FC - Flight Chief
FCC - Flight Commander
IDP - Installation Defense Plan
JRV - Joint Routine Verification
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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KUMMSC - Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex
LDAO - Local Display Area Operator
OPR - Office of Primary Responsibility
PDF - Primary Direction of Fire
QRC - Quick Reaction Checklist
RDAO - Remote Display Area Operator
RDDS - Remote Duress Disable Switch
RDS - Records Disposition Schedule
REC - Remote Electronics Cabinet
ROE - Rules of Engagement
RTES - Remote Target Engagement System
RV - Routine Verification
SCS - Security Control Supervisor
SFG - Security Forces Group
SSCC - Site Security Control Center
SEDS - System Enable-Disable Switch
SF - Security Forces
SFMQ – Security Forces Standardization and Evaluations
SSI - Special Security Instruction
TAG - Tactical Assault Guide
UPS - Uninterruptible Power Supply
Terms
ARMED - A weapon is armed in the RTES by pressing the WEAPON ARMED button on the
RTES Arming Panel. Prior to this action, SEDS must be enabled, and a platform must be
selected.
DISABLE - RTES is disabled when the SEDS switch is turned to the “DISABLE” position by
the SEDS Operator. Pressing the E-stop or RDDS will accomplish the same purpose.
ENABLE - RTES is enabled by the SEDS switch being turned to the “ENABLE” position by
both the RTES and the SEDS operators. This is the first step in allowing a weapon to be fired.
Remote Duress Disable Switch - This switch is in a remote location from the RTES Operator
Console, SEDS Console and the Training/Simulator Console. If pressed, the RDDS shuts down
power to all remote platforms.
RTES Consoles “States” - RTES Consoles are determined to be in one of two states. For the
Operational Console, Standby State provides a Diagnostics Mode and Operational State provides
full control of the mounted weapons. For the Trainer/Simulator Console, when the SEDS switch
is “DISABLED”, the Simulator mode is available. When the SEDS switch is “ENABLED”, the
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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Simulator mode goes away, and the RTES Training platform is under direct control of the
Operator.
SAFED - The state of the weapon when the gun safety actuator has engaged the weapon safety
on a platform. A weapon cannot be fired in the “WEAPON SAFED” mode.
SEDS E-Stop - The SEDS E-Stop produces an emergency stop. It stops clamshell motion and
disables the trigger actuator on all platforms and disables pan and tilt motion.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACHMENT 2
RTES PRIMARY/SECONDARY DIRECTION OF FIRE
Table A2.1. RTES Primary/Secondary Direction Of Fire.
Tower Primary Secondary RTES
Direction Direction Of Fire Coverage
Of Fire
Tower 1, V1AA N/A Towers 2&3
Platform 1
Tower 1, Golf N/A Towers 2&3
Platform 5 Sector
Tower 2, V2 N/A Towers 1&3
Platform 7
Tower 2, Foxtrot N/A Towers 1&3
Platform 6 Sector
Tower 3, V8 N/A Towers 1&2
Platform 3
Tower 3, Hotel N/A Towers 1&2
Platform 2 Sector
Loading Dock V5 B1&B2 REC 8
REC 4
Loading Dock V6 B1&B2 REC 4
REC 8
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACHMENT 3
TOUCH SCREEN ICONS
Figure A3.1. Touch Screen Indicators.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ATTACHMENT 4
TOUCH SCREEN INDICATORS
Figure A4.1. Touch Screen Indicators.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
24
ATTACHMENT 5
(DCNI) EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION/WORK ORDER PRIORITY LISTING
(DCNI) Table 5.1. Equipment Malfunction/Work Order Priority Listing
Equipment Malfunction Notes P1 P2 P3
1 Failed Hardware Test X
Error on system displayed on a single Operator Console w/o a
2 weapons platform degrade X
3 All Operator consoles INOP X
4 SEDS Console X
5 Single Weapons Platform INOP 1 X
6 All Weapons Platforms INOP 1 X
7 Remote Duress Disable (RDD) Switch X
8 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) X
9 Targeting cameras inoperative (Scope, Wide Angle, Thermal) 1 X
10 Platform camera inoperative X
11 Trainer Console/Server/Weapons Platform X
12 Trainer Console/Server X
NOTE 1: CA will respond when requested by CTS/ESS.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
25
ATTACMENT 6
(DCNI) EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION/COMPENSATORY MEASURES
Table A6.1. (DCNI) Equipment Malfunction/Compensatory Measures
Equipment Malfunction Notes
1 Failed Hardware Test 1
2 Error on system displayed on a single Operator Console 1
3 All Operator consoles INOP 0
4 SEDS Console 0
5 Single Weapons Platform INOP 0
6 All Weapons Platforms INOP 0
7 RDD Switch 0
8 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) 0
9 Targeting cameras inoperative (Scope, Wide Angle, Thermal) 0
10 Platform camera inoperative 0
11 Trainer Console/Server/Weapons Platform 0
12 Trainer Console/Server 0
13 Simulator PTZ INOP 0
NOTE 0: No Compensatory Measures required.
NOTE 1: Utilize the other RTES Operator Console already manned by Romeo-1/2.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
26

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377 WSSS Duty Descriptions
(For Official Use Only)
RFL:
- Protects $5.9 billion in resources at Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex (KUMMSC)
- Responsible for the security of $2.9 billion worth of Air Base Wing Protection Level aircraft vital to national security
- Performs security checks of responsible locks/doors/alarm systems to identify evidence of tampering or forced entry
- Searches vehicles, challenges/identifies/detains unauthorized individuals w/in responsible controlled/restricted areas
SCAM:
- Secures Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex limited/exclusion areas; $5.9B PL1 assets
- Operates $6.5M Advanced Entry Control System (AECS); implements strict access controls for all two-person areas
- Monitors/operates facility cameras; documents all sensor alarm data; initiates and tracks alarm & facility work orders
- Implements applicable facility/alarm compensatory measures; completes appropriate checklists/notification matrices
FC and Assistant FC:
- Supervises 54 Airmen; responsible for securing $5.9B PL-1 assets/$134.8M PL-3 aircraft/$11M SDTD PL-3 facilities
- On-Scene Commander for Security Incidents/contingencies/DoE PL-1 Security Transports & TACAMO acft missions
- Executed SECAF-CSAF- directed NSI oversight insps f/nuclear-capable units & all MAJCOM IG Inspection Teams
- Provided oversight of SAF/IG exercises, policies & guidance; ensures security compliance f/$485B AF-wide assets
SCS:
- Provides C2 for 57 Airman securing $5.9B in PL1/PL2 assets/$134.8M in PL3 aircraft f/7 controlled/5 restricted areas
- Oversees all access controls for Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex two person areas
- On-duty liaison with 898 MUNS/58 SOW/150 FW/377 ABW for all security matters; ensuring checklist compliance
- Authors daily security blotter; oversees PRP suspensions/re-instatements; makes timely notifications to senior lders
KEC:
- Secures Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex limited/exclusion areas; $5.9B PL1 assets
- Conducts changeover; accounts for keys, visitor badges, verification badges and EALs; function tests X-ray machines
- Performs strict access controls to PL1 areas; validates credentials; searches hand-carried items, vehicles & personnel
- Executes daily PRP suspensions, re-instatements; initiates Security Incidents and completes all applicable checklists
Area Supervisor:
- Secures Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex & two-person area; $5.9B PL1 resources
- Supervises sec response force; oversees changeover actions; inspects equipment, weapons, vehicles/conducts checks
- Conducts daily proficiency exercises for SSCC & patrols; oversees limited & two-person access controls procedures
- Oversees DoE PL1N Secure Transport msns; leads Security Incident responses; executes emergency entry operations
RFM:
- Protects $5.9 billion in resources at Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex (KUMMSC)
- Provides circulation control for flight line restricted areas, base housing & $2.7B PL3 SPECOPS helos/fixed wing acft
- Responds to Security Incidents in two-person/restricted/controlled areas; conducts checks/RAMs for 11 PL 1-4 areas
- Conducts daily physical security inspections of topside controlled area; supports DoE Secure Transport PL 1 mission
NCOIC, ESS:
- Provides Electronic Security Systems management f/$6.5M Advanced Entry Control System deployed at KUMMSC
- Manages KUMMSC Intrusion Detection System false/nuisance alarms & ensures 100% DoD regulation compliance
- Ensures all software, hardware, policies, training and testing requirements associated w/AECS is conducted/complete
- Coordinates/Completes annual & quarterly IDS testing requirements for all deployed sensors/associated field devices
Flightline Constable:
- Ensures proper physical security standards are maintained and posting is in place for aircraft valued at > $2B dollars
- Coordinator for all flight line Restricted Area Entry Authority Lists and Restricted Area Photo Authorization Listings
- Protects $2.1B in PL1 resources at Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex (KUMMSC)
- Responsible for security of over $134.8 million worth of Protection Level 3 aircraft that are vital to national security
Operations Superintendent:
- Leads 315 SF performing PL1 and flight line msns on 52K acre base w/3 Wings, 150 msn partners & 21K personnel
- Oversees 7 distinct duty sections including AD & civilian staff fulfilling admin, operations & security support tasks
- Responsible f/$9M in vehicles & equipment across 36 posts/patrols to secure $5.9B in PL1 & $2.7B in PL2-3 assets
- Lead Wing security planner for all PL1/2/3 matters to include logistical movements, upgrade projects and exercises
Remote Target Engagement System:
- Operates $15M Remote Target Engagement System (RTES); implements strict access to likely avenues of approach
- Protects $5.9 billion in resources at Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex (KUMMSC)
- Responsible for providing final denial fire during contingency ops, deter unauthorized hostiles access to RA/LA/EA
- Performs visual inspection of RTES, ensuring no line breaks, exposed wires and all monitors/controls are functional
Acronyms:
SI-Security Incident, EC-Entry Controller, RA-Restricted Area, CA-Controller Area, LA-Limited Area,
SGT-Safe Guard Transport
(For Official Use Only)

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# (DCNI) 377 WSSS SOP Volume 1, WSSS Operations
Table 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
INFORMATION
BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER WSSS SOP 31-101, Volume 1 377TH WEAPONS SYSTEM SECURITY SQUADRON (WSSS) 22 February 2018
KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE (AFGSC)
Security Forces
WSSS OPERATIONS
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
ACCESSIBILITY: This publication is only available directly from the OPR.
RELEASABILITY: Access to this publication is restricted: this publication is classified Department of Defense (DoD) Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information/For Official Use Only (DCNI/FOUO). This publication may not be released to foreign nationals; requests for accessibility must be approved by the OPR.
OPR: 377 WSSS/S3O Certified by: 377 WSSS/S3 (Capt Roberto J. Cornier)
Supersedes: 377 WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol 1, 19 December 2016 [Pages: 43]
This 377 WSSS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) implements AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, AFMAN 31-108, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Manual and establishes guidance governing the authority, procedures, responsibilities, duties, guidance, standards, tasks and requirements for all WSSS operations. This SOP establishes procedures and requirements regarding flight duty positions, use of communications, duress/authentication responsibilities and training. This publication does not apply to Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) Units or to the Air National Guard (ANG). Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional’s chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm. See Attachment 1 for a Glossary of References and Supporting Information. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply
endorsement by the Air Force.
Table of Contents
CHAPTER 1:  FLIGHT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1.1. Overview ....................................................................................................................4
1.2. Flight Commander (FCC) and Flight Chief (FC) Administrative Functions..............4
1.3. FCC and FC SOPs .....................................................................................................4
1.4. Guardmount and Shift Change ...................................................................................5
1.5. FCC and FC Contingency Operating Procedures .......................................................9
1.6. Site Security Control Center (SSCC) .........................................................................9
1.7. Security Control Supervisor (SCS) Duties ...............................................................10
1.8. Activation and Relief Procedures for Alternate SSCC..............................................12
1.9. Security Controller (SC) Duties ...............................................................................12
1.10. Alarm Monitor (AM) Duties ..................................................................................13
1.11. KUMMSC Entry Control Point (ECP) Operations ................................................13
1.12. KUMMSC ECP Duties ..........................................................................................13
1.13. Area Supervisor (AS) .............................................................................................15
1.14. Response Force Leader (RFL)................................................................................16
1.15. Response Force Member (RFM) ............................................................................16
CHAPTER 2:  SECURITY FORCES (SF) COMMUNICATIONS
2.1. Overview ..................................................................................................................17
2.2. Procedures ................................................................................................................17
2.3. Radio Channels.........................................................................................................18
2.4. Duress and Authentication Procedures .....................................................................18
2.5. Duress Words ...........................................................................................................18
2.6. Authentication Codes ...............................................................................................19
2.7. Emergency Response Codes.....................................................................................19
CHAPTER 3:  KUMMSC CONTROLLED AREA (CA) OPERATIONS
3.1. Overview ..................................................................................................................21
3.2. KUMMSC Controlled Areas (CAs) ........................................................................ 21
3.3. Entry Requirements/Circulation Control ..................................................................22
3.4. Securing KUMMSC CAs .........................................................................................22
3.5. Compensatory Measures ..........................................................................................23
3.6. Unauthorized Individuals/Responding to Alarms in the CAs ..................................23
3.7. Key Control ..............................................................................................................23
3.8. Bomb Threat/Robbery and Evacuation Procedures ..................................................24
3.9. Emergency Response Entry/Egress ..........................................................................24
3.10. Emergency Response to Airfield and Runway.......................................................25
3.11. CA Training............................................................................................................25
CHAPTER 4:  SF TRAINING PROGRAM
4.1. Overview ..................................................................................................................26
4.2. Security Forces Education and Training Program (SFETP).....................................26
4.3. Security Forces Scheduling Program .......................................................................28
4.4. Security Forces Duty Officer Program (SFDO) .......................................................28
CHAPTER 5:  RECALL PROCEDURES
5.1. Overview ..................................................................................................................29
5.2. Definitions ...............................................................................................................29
5.3. Responsibilities.........................................................................................................29
5.4. Recall procedures .....................................................................................................29
5.5. Personnel Strength Procedures .................................................................................31
5.6. Communication Outage, Recall Procedures.............................................................31
6 ATTACHMENTS:
Attachment 1. Glossary of Reference and Supporting Information..................................32
Attachment 2. Security Force Response and Brevity Codes.............................................38
Attachment 3. WSSS Staff Call Signs ..............................................................................39
Attachment 4. CA Escort/Safety Briefing ........................................................................40
Attachment 5. Required Equipment .................................................................................41
Attachment 6. Standard Operating Procedure ..................................................................43
CHAPTER 1
FLIGHT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
1.1. (DCNI) Overview. This chapter establishes the duties and responsibilities for Flight Commanders (FCC), Flight Chiefs (FC), Area Supervisors (AS), Security Control Supervisors (SCS), Security Controllers/Alarm Monitors (SCAM), Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance And Storage Complex (KUMMSC) Entry Controllers (KEC), Response Force Leaders (RFL) and Response Force Members (RFM) during normal security, contingencies and increased Force Protection Condition (FPCON) measures. It also outlines the procedures for conducting guardmount. FCCs and FCs are responsible for implementing the procedures contained herein.
1.2. Flight Commander (FCC) and Flight Chief (FC)
1.2.1. (DCNI) Flight Commander (FCC). When available, an officer will oversee the supervision and management of each shift. FCCs are responsible for the training, equipping, conduct and welfare of the flight both on and off duty. They are responsible for knowing each person assigned to the flight, especially their strengths and weaknesses. They work closely with the FC in handling time consuming and difficult problems of command interest. On-duty FCCs are the direct representatives of the 377 WSSS/CC. The intent is to have a commissioned officer on duty at all times in support of nuclear missions. When there is not a commissioned officer available for posting or assigned to the flight, a certified FC will take the position as the FCC and a subordinate NCO, certified in the Flight Chief position will assume the role as the FC. S3/S3O will maintain an on call roster of available commissioned officers.
1.2.2. (DCNI) Flight Chief (FC). FCs are also direct representatives of the 377 WSSS/CC. FCs are directly responsible to the FCC. FCs will ensure all assigned personnel are trained and equipped to accomplish security operations. FCs are also responsible for the conduct and welfare of all assigned flight personnel both on and off duty. They must know each person assigned to the flight, especially their strengths and weaknesses. They must be on the alert for adverse morale trends and take steps to correct all incorrect actions. A Duty Position Evaluation (DPE) certified FC will be on duty (armed and equipped) at all times. When there is not a certified FCC assigned or available, two certified FCs do not need to be posted. The certified FC will assume the role as FCC and a subordinate NCO, certified in the Flight Chief position will assume the FC in support of the FCC. While not required, it is desired that the subordinate NCO is FC certified.
1.3. FCC and FC Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
1.3.1. Ensure all critically certified posts are manned by certified personnel.
1.3.2. Ensure all personnel assigned as vehicle drivers are licensed and certified to operate their assigned Government Owned Vehicle (GOV). Additionally, ensure those personnel driving on the flightline have a current AF IMT 483, Certificate of
Competency and a valid state issued driver’s license.
1.3.3. When vehicles and equipment shortages exist, FCCs and FCs are responsible for ensuring adequate distribution to achieve maximum effectiveness until the shortage can be corrected. All RF vehicles must be armored. RF and Initial Backup Force (IBF) vehicles should have off-road capability, working land mobile radio and, when possible, a working Public Address (PA) system or bullhorn.
1.3.4. Ensure operational deficiencies identified during your shift are reported to the appropriate office/agency and in the AF Form 53, Security Forces Blotter.
1.3.5. While in training for a critical certification position, uncertified individuals will be posted with a certified individual and under direct supervision at all times.
1.3.6. (FOUO) Duty rosters for all flights, convoys and PNAF posting will be produced utilizing the standardized excel spreadsheet. Each roster will maintain the required information via columns for Name, Call Sign or Post, Certifications held, required weapons for the corresponding post, required equipment necessary from the armory for corresponding post and radio number. Posting and weapons configurations will be listed on all duty rosters IAW the post priority chart contained within the IDP. Utilizing the excel spreadsheet allows for automatic generation of duty rosters once all pertinent information is loaded into the data table. Ensure the information in the spreadsheet remains current per the MQL, S3T and SFMQ certification rosters. Holiday duty rosters will use the same template to ensure certified/non-certified personnel are posted correctly. Contact S3O for questions or concerns regarding the duty roster excel spreadsheet.
1.4. Guardmount and Shift Change.
1.4.1. Prior to completing changeover, the on-coming and off-going FCC and/or FC will meet face-to-face and discuss any pass-ons, discrepancies within their area of responsibility (AOR), anticipated activities/operations and any other information deemed necessary.
1.4.1.1. Only SrA and above who have been properly trained and are authorized to bear firearms will conduct clearing barrel attendant duties. Clearing barrel
attendants’ training will be documented on the AF Form 797, Job Qualification Standard (JQS) and they must be knowledgeable of clearing procedures for all firearms loaded and unloaded at the clearing area. The clearing barrel attendant must not engage in any other duties or functions during the period of weapons handling. This requirement does not apply to personnel engaged in combat, weapons qualification training, or training exercises simulating combat.
1.4.2. (DCNI) All posts are subject to inspection of their equipment, bags etc. prior to
Guardmount IAW the 377 SFG Checklist to ensure unauthorized items cannot be introduced
into the limited area. Ten percent (10%) of posted members will be selected for equipment
inspections per shift, and ALL posted members will be inspected as a whole, at least once
per 2-week cycle. Additionally, all KUMMSC security and support forces will process all
hand-carried items to include their equipment, bags, etc. through the X-ray machine at the ECP, and proceed through the metal detector.
1.4.2.1. Upon discovery of missing or damaged equipment, items must be replaced as soon as reasonably possible. Immediately coordinate with SSPTS/S4 personnel to facilitate replacement and accomplish an AF Form 1168, Statement of Suspect/Witness/Complaint to cover explanations for the loss or damage.
1.4.3. (DCNI) The FCC and/or FC will conduct guardmount for each shift. All personnel will be present at the KUMMSC armory with sufficient time to facilitate weapons issue prior to guardmount.
1.4.4. During guardmount determine the readiness of personnel, to include their appearance and mental and physical condition. Ensure personnel are properly equipped and trained. Conduct roll call, announcements, security status briefing, weapons inspection and post assignments. Open ranks inspection should occur at least once per work cycle and be annotated in the security blotter.
1.4.4.1. FCC and FC will comply with and ensure uniformity of all personnel. Refer to 377 WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol 1, WSSS Operations, Attachment 5 for required, standardized and authorized wear of equipment/gear.
1.4.4.2. Aircrew patches will be displayed on the front Velcro panel of the IOTV or plate carrier. Aircrew patches will have the Security Forces badge, Name, Rank and USAF embroidered on it only.
1.4.4.3. Flight patches must be approved by 377 WSSS/S3 or 377 WSSS/S3O in writing and will be worn on the IOTV or plate carrier on the Velcro molle attachment on the back just under the drag handle. Do not wear unapproved patches on either the ABU, OCP uniform, IOTV or plate carrier.
1.4.4.4. Airman Battle Shirt (ABS) offers flame-resistant protection and exceptional comfort under armor. Wear of the ABS must be with either an ABU blouse, IOTV or plate carrier on over the ABS at all times. At no time will an ABS be worn without one of the aforementioned outerwear over it (i.e. at the BX, Shoppette, Dining Facility, etc.). Additionally, a Velcro nametape and rank patch will be worn on the right sleeve.
1.4.4.5. Morale T-shirts are authorized and encouraged, but must be worn IAW AFI 36-2903, Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel.
1.4.5. If available, use the S3OS “Controlled Guardmount Slides” to ensure required items are briefed at guardmount. If guardmount slides are unavailable ensure all requirements are briefed IAW AFI 31-118, Security Forces Standards and Procedures.
1.4.6. Check all personnel for signs of alcohol use or other indicators identifying an individual may be unfit for duty.
1.4.7. Conduct Pre-AUoF Duty Briefing as designated by the SFG/AUoF Office.
1.4.8. Prior to going on break, brief all personnel on break safety consisting of; travel outside the local area, driving while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, etc.
1.4.9. Immediately upon assuming post, ensure all posts and patrols conduct a security status and communication check with SSCC.
1.4.10. Ensure a joint post inspection is conducted involving both on-coming and off- going personnel. This inspection will include a check of their assigned vehicle (if applicable), status of post supplies and cleanliness of their post. If applicable to a specific post, the post changeover/accountability checklist will be included in the SSIs and will be used. If possible, all identified discrepancies will be corrected prior to relief. Those not corrected will be annotated in the blotter. 377 WSSS/S4V will be immediately notified of any vehicle discrepancies. Ensure all AF Form 1168s are completed by all personnel involved when discrepancies not previously detected are discovered. Statements will be forwarded to S3OS and S4V.
1.4.10.1. If a vehicle is determined to be damaged by accident or vandalism, the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) will be contacted for processing and an SF Vehicle Accident report will be initiated.
1.4.11. (FOUO) FCCs and FCs will conduct post checks on each post and patrol once per shift, unless daily operations prevent it. Post checks will evaluate duty performance, general and specific job knowledge, attitude, behavior and morale. At a minimum the following will be checked:
1.4.11.1. Vehicles for condition and cleanliness and documentation via AF Form 1800, Operator’s Inspection Guide and Trouble Report.
1.4.11.2. Work areas for cleanliness, serviceability and equipment.
1.4.11.3. Ensure security force members have appropriate equipment and standardization of gear (i.e. rank/name tapes on combat shirts/plate carriers).
1.4.11.4. Ensure security force members are knowledgeable of the job required, post briefings, response procedures, etc. Check post SSIs for accuracy and serviceability and inform S5 of any discrepancies.
1.4.12. (FOUO) Each flight will conduct at least one (1) flight-level exercise per shift, at least one (1) RF and final denial exercise per cycle, and one (1) IBF exercise per cycle. Be knowledgeable of RF employment, weaponry, armament and special equipment.
1.4.12.1. (DCNI) Security exercises will be tailored to the local Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment (NSTCA) and conducted in a safe manner. Document each exercise in the blotter.
1.4.12.2. The following security exercises should be conducted on a random basis at least once per shift:
1.4.12.2.1. (FOUO) Flight Level Exercise. Flight Commanders or Flight Chiefs/SF Supervisors will conduct daily (minimum of one) flight level exercises.
1.4.12.2.2. (FOUO) Proficiency Exercises. SF supervisors (i.e. Area Supervisors) will conduct daily (minimum of one per station) proficiency exercises for ESS operators at local, redundant, and remote security system locations.
1.4.12.3. (FOUO) A minimum of one of the following security exercises will be conducted on a random basis throughout a work cycle:
1.4.12.3.1. (FOUO) RF Configuration Exercise 1.4.12.3.2. (FOUO) Emergency Response Exercise 1.4.12.3.3. (FOUO) Recapture and Recovery Exercise
NOTE: Work Cycle is defined as the days a flight works between breaks. (i.e. Work: Monday/Tuesday, Break: Wednesday/Thursday; the flight’s cycle would be the corresponding Monday/Tuesday or days worked)
1.4.12.4. (FOUO) The following security exercises will be conducted on a random basis at least once a month:
1.4.12.4.1. (FOUO) IBF Configuration Exercise 1.4.12.4.2. (FOUO) Final Denial Exercise 1.4.12.4.3. (FOUO) Flight line Detection Exercise
1.4.12.5. The following security exercises are types of exercises that can be implemented for daily, cycle, or monthly exercises:
1.4.12.5.1. (FOUO) Unauthorized Individual Entering the Restricted Area.
1.4.12.5.2. (FOUO) Unauthorized Entry into Two-Person Area.
1.4.12.5.3. (FOUO) Unplanned Power Outage.
1.4.12.5.4. (FOUO) Helicopter Denial. 1.4.12.5.5. (FOUO) Emergency Response (ER). 1.4.12.5.6. (FOUO) Definite threat at the ECP.
1.4.12.5.7. (FOUO) IBF Response.
1.4.12.5.8. (FOUO) ECP Entry Denial.
1.4.12.5.9. (FOUO) Overt Attack with IBF Response.
1.4.12.5.10. (FOUO) Controlled Area Alarms
1.4.12.5.11. (FOUO) Partial and Total Radio Outage (Communication Loss)
1.5. FCC and FC Contingency Operating Procedures.
1.5.1. (FOUO) FCC, FC and/or appropriate AS will respond to all Security Incidents or Covered Wagon situations to assume on-scene command and oversee resolution of the incident. The flightline External Security Response Team (ESRT) will respond immediately to all incidents on the flightline not to exceed five (5) minutes and assume initial on-scene command until the arrival of FCC or FC.
1.5.2. (FOUO) Termination authority for a Security Incident is the on-duty FCC and/or FC. The termination authority for a Covered Wagon is the 377th Air Base Wing Commander (ABW/CC) through Kirtland Command Post (KCP).
1.5.3. (DCNI) The FCC and/or FC will meet all arriving REFLEX DELTA (RD) aircraft, obtain and authenticate crew orders as an Entry Authority List (EAL) and oversee implementation of all appropriate security measures.
1.5.4. (DCNI) Flight leadership will meet with the TCC (Tactical Convoy Commander) at the golf course for DoE SGT (Safeguard Transport) missions to act as a liaison for the command element until the mission is complete. In addition, if an incident occurs within KUMMSC, the on duty FC/FCC will be on-scene commander and if an incident occurs topside, DoE will be the on-scene commander.
1.6. Site Security Control Center (SSCC).
1.6.1. (DCNI) SSCC and Munitions Control (MC) are the command and control centers for all operations involving KUMMSC. During normal operations, all three (3) certified security controllers will remain within the confines of the SSCC. However, the SCS may enter MC during contingencies, e.g., to get the command codes, when necessary to meet mission requirements and perform emergency function such as opening the Cubical Unlocking Device (CUD) box, and checking KUMMSC Power Box in MC.
1.6.2. The security positions (SCS, SC/AM) are considered critical and require formal certification by the 377 SFG Standardization and Evaluation (SFG/SFMQ) section and completion of local AECS training conducted by WSSS/S3S prior to performing duties.
1.6.3. (DCNI) Unescorted Entry: All on-duty flight, SF staff personnel and senior squadron leadership are authorized unescorted entry into SSCC. On duty SF will not
assume escort duties. SF staff personnel and senior squadron leadership may also escort personnel into SSCC. All other personnel requesting entry into SSCC must possess a valid AF 1199, Computer Generated Restricted Area Badge, and have a valid reason for entry. The valid reason will be determined by senior squadron leadership, FCC/FC or SCS prior to entering.
1.6.4. (FOUO) Escorted Entry: The SCS will verify the need for entry. There will be no more than six (6) personnel (including SF personnel) within SSCC at one time unless approved by the SCS.
1.7. SCS Duties. The SCS will:
1.7.1. Be responsible for overall supervision of personnel posted in SSCC. They will keep senior flight leadership and squadron leadership advised of all security matters.
1.7.2. Act as a liaison between MC and SSCC and ensure all problems are resolved by the respective squadrons.
1.7.3. (FOUO) Direct SF during normal and emergency operations. Operate communication consoles and equipment and ensure security communications checks of
all on-duty security forces (including SSPTS/KUMMSC armorer) are conducted randomly not to exceed every 30 minutes.
1.7.4. (FOUO) Utilize the security reporting and alerting system to up-channel the appropriate reports (Security Incident/Covered Wagon, etc.) to the KCP.
1.7.5. Ensure locations of all security forces and resources, (i.e. aircraft) are plotted on the plotting board within SSCC and BDOC. SSCC will contact BDOC with all aircraft plots at shift change and notify them of any changes during shift.
1.7.6. Implement QRCs (Quick Reaction Checklist) and ensure all required notifications are made in accordance with the notification matrix located within the SSCC. Note: The SCS or SC/AM will make all required notifications.
1.7.7. Ensure two-person areas and blast door opening/closing procedures are strictly adhered to.
1.7.8. Be knowledgeable of procedures for the Safeguard Transport/Remote Control Unit (SGT/RCU), as written in the Installation Defense Plan (IDP) Appendix 3 to Annex Z.
1.7.9. (FOUO) Conduct duress checks with BDOC, ECP, MC, WSSS Armory and SF Armory. Ensure that the BDOC re-enables MC, SCS, and SC/AM upon completion of the testing with a minimum of a 5 second delay between enabling. Maintain constant communication with all control centers during the entire test. Annotate checks in the SF blotter. Duress checks will be accomplished as soon as possible after conducting changeover; however, duress checks will be a secondary priority during actual
contingencies or other day-to-day operations (weapons issue/turn-in) that prevent these checks from being accomplished. The reason for delay in conducting duress checks does
not have to be annotated in the SF blotter provided they are conducted immediately after termination of the delay.
1.7.10. (FOUO) Annotate AUoF/PRP changes made during the shift in the blotter. Follow the appropriate QRC pertaining to AUoF/PRP actions. This includes suspension, permanent decertification, and Discrete Control Area (DCA) changes and reinstatements. The Local form 164, Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Notification and Removal Log, will be verified against AECS while completing all AUoF/PRP changes. Ensure the Local form 164 is updated accordingly. Note: Use notification matrix for AUoF/PRP suspension/reinstatements. Personnel in training for SCS may take AUoF/PRP notifications with a certified SCS assisting and verifying.
1.7.11. Conduct area purge verification at the end of the shift. This will be done by checking all MUNS pre-notes and work areas, having the KUMMSC Entry Controller (KEC) verify the AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log, and account for all visitor badges. Once verification of all nonessential personnel has been completed, annotate in the blotter.
1.7.12. Ensure that before personnel enter the exclusion area, SF members conduct a purge of the interlock behind B-7 or B-14 with the SVA (acting as the Entry Controller) to ensure the area is ready to accept assets. Personnel with unescorted access and their hand- carried items will be subject to inspection upon entering or exiting the exclusion area by the SVA. All escorted personnel and their hand-carried items will be inspected upon entering and exiting the exclusion area. Escorted personnel and selected unescorted personnel will be placed into a hold area just outside the exclusion area. SF personnel will conduct an inspection of personnel via transfrisker or hand search and an inspection of
individuals’ hand-carried items. After personnel have been inspected, the SVA will validate the individuals on the EAL and they will proceed to the cleared area.
1.7.13. Ensure an Exclusion Verification List (EVL) check is conducted at the beginning of each shift and/or after the MUNS end of duty day check. Ensure this check is annotated in the blotter.
1.7.14. Day Flight SCS will ensure the Topside Area Supervisor (AS) conducts a physical security inspection of the topside controlled area. Ensure all discrepancies are annotated in the SF blotter and notifications are made to S3.
1.7.15. Mid Flight SCS will ensure a topside patrol conducts a lighting check of the topside controlled area. They will also ensure the ECP conducts a lighting check of the loading dock. The Topside AS will conduct a physical security inspection of the topside controlled area. All flightline patrols will conduct a lighting check of their area of responsibility. The Flightline Area Supervisor will check Pad-5. Ensure all discrepancies are annotated in the blotter and notifications are made to the Flightline Constable or Physical Security Monitor.
1.7.16. (DCNI) Ensure an ISRT physically conducts four (4) hour checks of blast doors B-7/B-14 and the MUNS Armory. A blotter entry is required. Note: Closed Circuit Television/Immediate Visual Assessment (CCTV/ IVA) is not sufficient.
1.7.17. (DCNI) Notify S3O utilizing the notification matrix when you receive any mission information (SGT/PNAF/RD) from MUNS or KCP.
1.7.18. Ensure expired EALs are removed and forwarded to S5 or shredded NLT the next duty day.
1.7.19. Know all permanent deviations, technical deviations and temporary deviations affecting restricted areas.
1.8. Activation and Relief Procedures for Alternate SSCC.
1.8.1. (DCNI) Upon activation of the Alternate SSCC (located in the BDOC) during an emergency or increased FPCON to Charlie or higher, one (1) certified SC/AM or SCS will be posted at BDOC. Upon posting, or if the situation lasts long enough that relief is required, the on-coming controller assuming duties will ensure changeover is completed upon assuming post.
1.9. SC Duties.
1.9.1. Direct SF during normal and emergency security operations.
1.9.2. Review all paperwork (AF Form 340, Sensor Alarm Data and AFTO Form 781A, Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document) for accuracy and ensure an adequate quantity is available for the upcoming shift.
1.9.3. If required, ensure an AF Form 340 is accomplished to record all sensor alarm data received in SSCC.
1.9.4. Operate communications consoles and equipment.
1.9.5. Control the radio net and dispatch all forces as required in all QRCs. Plot post/patrol locations for all responses.
1.9.6. (FOUO) Conduct a security status/communications check with all post and patrols not to exceed 30 minutes including the 377 SSPTS/KUMMSC armorer.
1.9.7. Update the aircraft plotting boards with on-coming flightline patrols, to reflect the location of all priority aircraft, tail number and type of aircraft in each area. Include the aircraft located in the all hangars. Updates will be made as required thereafter.
1.9.8. Obtain the current vehicle status and mileage of all SF vehicles being operated at KUMMSC and the flightline area at the beginning of each shift. Ensure this information is annotated on the blotter back page and notify S4V of any discrepancies.
1.9.9. (DCNI) Ensure adequate compensatory measures are implemented in case of failures, malfunctions or emergencies. Know all permanent deviations, technical deviations and temporary deviations in effect at KUMMSC. Ensure only the fact that compensatory measures are initiated is annotated in the blotter and not the actual
compensatory measure itself.
1.9.10. Use the appropriate QRCs for every security situation.
1.10. AM Duties.
1.10.1. If required, ensure an AF Form 340 is accomplished to record all sensor alarm data received in SSCC.
1.10.2. Each shift’s AM will ensure the EVL is accomplished reflecting the status of the cubicles and maintenance bays.
1.10.3. Ensure adequate compensatory measures are implemented in case of failures, malfunctions or emergencies and annotated in the blotter.
1.10.4. Know all permanent deviations, technical deviations and temporary deviations affecting restricted, limited and exclusion areas.
1.10.5. Monitor the CCTV system and blast door openings/closings.
1.10.6. (DCNI) Control entry into the two-person areas. Note: When personnel depart the bay areas at any time, ensure all sensor fields are secure. Do not allow the two- person team to depart the area until a valid alarm reset is achieved. Verify with the SVA that a stay behind threat check was completed and ensure the SRT conducts a joint accountability for personnel in the interlock to counter the stay behind threat.
1.10.7. (DCNI) Verify, initiate and track all work orders affecting KUMMSC with MC via the AFTO Form 781A prior to relief. All new AFTO Form 781As must be coordinated with S3S.
1.11. KUMMSC Entry Control Point (ECP) Operations.
1.11.1. (DCNI) The EC controls entry/exit to and from KUMMSC. The minimum required manning for the ECP is two (2) certified KUMMSC Entry Controllers (KECs). The FCC and/or FC will designate the individual with supervisory command/control for ECP operations via duty roster. Normally, one (1) EC within the ECP monitors the CCTV, AECS, x-ray monitor and communication equipment. The second EC processes personnel and vehicles.
1.11.2. The EC is considered a critical duty position and completion of local AECS training/Duty Position Evaluation (DPE) prior to performing duties is required.
1.12. KUMMSC ECP Duties.
1.12.1. Deny unauthorized access of personnel and/or items into the limited/exclusion area. NOTE: Refer to Enclosure 3 To Tab A To Appendix 1 To Annex Z To KAFB IDP 31-101. Protection Level 1 Restricted Area Entry and Circulation Control.
1.12.2. (FOUO) Up-channel alarm activation/Security Incidents/Covered Wagon situation(s) to appropriate office (SSCC/BDOC/KCP) and initiate ECP lockdown as needed.
1.12.3. If required, ensure an AF Form 340 is accomplished to record all sensor alarm data received in the ECP.
1.12.4. When scanning inbound/outbound hand-carried items, ensure all items are identified. Verify inspectable items via x-ray. If items cannot be identified, reverse the x-ray machine and have the owner and EC hand search the item.
1.12.5. (DCNI) Items such as electronic circuit boards or unusual looking tools will be closely scrutinized and treated as a possible threat until further investigation. Contact MC for authorization and clarification of questionable items entering/departing KUMMSC.
1.12.6. Limited Area Screening Procedures. All escorted personnel and their hand-
carried items will be inspected upon entering and exiting KUMMSC limited area. This
will be done utilizing the walk through magnetometers and x-ray machines. If the
magnetometers and/or x-ray machines are inoperative or not available, utilize handheld
transfriskers on all personnel and hand search all hand-carried items. Upon the first metal
detector alarm activation, direct individual to remove and identify all items causing the
alarm. After EC identifies all items, instruct the individual to reprocess through the metal
detector. If an individual fails the second attempt through the metal detector, the EC will
use the transfrisker.
1.12.7. (DCNI) All individuals granted unescorted entry authority and their hand carried
items will be subjected to search upon entering the limited area by processing their hand
carried items through the x-ray machine and walk through the magnetometers. A security
measure will be in place to subject those individuals granted unescorted entry authority and
their hand carried items to inspection for readily detectable prohibited materials and
contraband items upon exiting the KUMMSC limited area by conducting one 30 minute
outbound inspection of selected personnel and their hand carried items, per 8 hour shift.
During 12 hour shifts, conduct two 30 minute outbound inspections of selected personnel
and their hand carried items.
1.12.8. Conduct thorough searches of vehicles entering KUMMSC. Note: Ensure the driver completes all personnel entry procedures (i.e. metal detector, RAB/Pin/Bio) before returning to vehicle before entry into loading dock.
1.12.9. Ensure an up to date Local form 164 is maintained in the ECP.
1.12.10. If Entry Controllers discover an AF 1199, Restricted Area Badge (RAB) during screening procedures that cannot be distinguished (i.e. faded photograph or information scratched off), that is damaged which affects the badge’s functionality, or otherwise unserviceable, the bearer will not be granted unescorted entry into the Limited Area.
1.12.11. Ensure entry requirements are met for the escort official/escortee(s).
1.12.12. Ensure escort briefing is given in the presence of a certified EC prior to allowing entry into the limited area.
1.12.13. Ensure, prior to raising a barrier, an on scene patrol advises appropriate control center the barrier is clear from any vehicle traffic/obstruction.
1.12.13.1. (FOUO) During RF or IBF responses, ensure the responding patrol verifies their status with SSCC prior to having barriers dropped for responding patrols.
1.12.14.(DCNI) Escortees will not be allowed to drive vehicles into the KUMMSC restricted area.
1.12.15. Record entry and exit times of escortee(s) on AF FM 1109 and retrieve Visitor Badge from escortee(s) upon exit.
1.12.16.(FOUO) Unannounced Emergency Vehicles. Should an unannounced emergency vehicle arrive at V1AA, the ECP will immediately contact SSCC to verify the emergency. SSCC will dispatch a patrol to V1AA to stand-by. On-duty security forces must verify an emergency condition exists prior to allowing entry. Note: Entry will not be allowed based upon emergency lights and sirens alone. Once the emergency is confirmed, emergency entry procedures apply.
1.12.17. Notify SSCC of situations requiring work orders.
1.12.18. In the event of an AECS failure, the KECP will process all personnel using the MRABL.
1.12.19.1. EC will:
1.12.19.1.1. Collect personnel’s RAB and CAC.
1.12.19.1.2. Verify the individuals RAB and CAC with the MRABL and Local form 164. Once all methods of identification are verified the individual will be granted entry.
1.13. Area Supervisor (AS).
1.13.1. Area Supervisors consist of the Topside Area Supervisor, Underground Area Supervisor and Flightline Area Supervisor. The AS will provide command/control during emergency operations and initiate special functions when applicable.
1.13.1.1. Ensure Daily Visual Inspections (DVI)/Physical Security Inspections (PSI) are conducted in accordance with the S5/PSI checklist found in all AS SSIs. These checks are to be conducted every shift and annotated in the blotter.
1.13.1.2. Area Supervisors are responsible for conducting post checks, equipment checks and exercises as required.
1.13.2. (DCNI) When Department of Energy (DoE) personnel arrive at V1AA, the Topside AS will make contact with the DoE Convoy Commander, verify his/her credentials against the provided DoE Courier Listing (DCL) authenticated by a SF E-5 or above, located in the Topside AS SSIs. Ensure the DoE Convoy Commander vouches for security of all personnel and vehicles prior to granting entry. If the DoE Convoy Commander is not listed within the DCL, have SSCC verify identity through MC and/or DoE control centers.
1.14. Response Force Leader (RFL).
1.14.1 (DCNI) Respond to any controlled/limited area alarms/incidents within the Squadron Operations building, Utility Building (UB), KUMMSC, and/or the flightline. Squadron Operations alarm points are the SF Armory, C2B, F1 and the Enrollment Center. ISRT/ESRT response times are as follows:
1.14.1.1. (DCNI) ISRT: Immediate response not to exceed 3 minutes.
1.14.1.2. (DCNI) ESRT: Immediate response not to exceed 5 minutes.
1.14.2. (DCNI) Respond to all exclusion area alarms/incidents. Response time is met once IVA is obtained via CCTV and underground ISRT is in place at the low side of the appropriate blast door (B-7/B-14/B-15).
1.15. Response Force Member (RFM).
1.15.1. (DCNI) Respond to any controlled/restricted/limited area alarms/incidents within the Squadron Operations building, Utility Building (UB), KUMMSC, and/or the flightline as a fire team member. Squadron Operations alarm points are the SF Armory, C2B, F1 and the Enrollment Center. The member must respond within the established response time and follow the command of the response force leader.
1.15.2. (DCNI) Respond to all exclusion area alarms/incidents. Response time is met once IVA is obtained via CCTV and underground ISRT is in place at the low side of the
appropriate blast door (B-7/B-14/B-15).
CHAPTER 2
SECURITY FORCES (SF) COMMUNICATIONS
2.1. (FOUO) Overview. The SF communications system consists of base stations within SSCC, ECP, BDOC and Alternate BDOC (Bldg #20452, SSPTS) as well as portable radios, vehicle radios, underground intercom system, landlines and manual signal techniques. The SSCC is the command and control center for all security activities. All personnel assigned SF duties are required to become knowledgeable and comply with the contents of this chapter.
2.2. (FOUO) Procedures. The primary means of communication are two-way radios. Landlines and intercom are secondary means of communication. Manual signal techniques will be used as alternate means of communication when necessary or possible. The following procedures will be used when operating a SF radio:
2.2.1. Obscene or unprofessional language will not be tolerated. Use concise and professional speech.
2.2.2. Use proper SF response and brevity codes IAW Attachment 2 or Job Knowledge book.
2.2.3. Prior to transmitting to another post and/or unit, request “Direct” communications from SSCC unless otherwise directed by SSCC during actual/exercise contingencies.
2.2.4. (DCNI) 377 SFS personnel dispatched to assist the KUMMSC security forces will switch to channel “8” and advise SSCC of their status and intention to fall under SSCC operational control.
2.2.5. Before departing one net to begin transmitting on another, users are required to obtain permission from the respective control center (either SSCC or BDOC).
2.2.6. (FOUO) The appropriate control center will initiate a passive duress on a post or patrol failing to answer the radio after three (3) attempts. The duress will be announced using the term “Code 15”, followed by the call sign of the post or patrol under duress. This is only a passive duress, but should be treated with the same degree of importance as an active duress.
2.2.7. (FOUO) No one will transmit using a two-way radio or any electronic transmitting device such as a cell phone, within 10 feet of a Protection Level 1 (PL1) resource. No one will transmit using a vehicle mounted radio within 25 feet of a PL1 resource. If a transmission within unauthorized distances occurs, report the occurrence to 377 ABW Safety (SEW) as soon as possible.
2.2.8. (FOUO) Unless approved by S3 office, mobile phones are not authorized on post and will not be used for the transmission of sensitive information during security forces responses.
2.3. (FOUO) Radio Channels. There are 10 different radio channels associated with the SF communications system (see Table 2.1. below).
Table 2.1. (FOUO) Radio Channels
Channel #1 LE-1 Primary Police Services
Channel #2 LE-2 Secondary for Police Services
Channel #3 SP-1 N/A
Channel #4 SP-2 N/A
Channel #5 MUNS MUNS Operations
Channel #6 R/D-1 Repeater Down, Line of Sight only, no encryption
Channel #7 R/D-2 Repeater Down, Line of Sight only, no encryption
Channel #8 SF-1 Primary for Security
Channel #9 SF-2 Secondary for Security/Alternate SAAM Ops
Channel #10 PAD OPS PNAF/SAAM Operations
Channel #11 SFG Group Talk
2.3.1. (FOUO) Land Mobile Radio (LMR) Encryption Capability. The LMR system is capable of encrypted transmission. Each two-way portable radio is equipped with encryption/decryption modules. The LMR system is not authorized for transmission of classified material/information.
2.3.2. (FOUO) During commercial power loss, all base stations lose encryption capability. In an event of such a power outage, all base stations must be re-keyed by an authorized representative from SSPTS/S4A. The order of precedence for re-keying is base stations,
on-duty patrols/posts radios in order of post priority, standby radios in the armory and leadership/staff radios.
2.3.3. Telephones. Telephones/landlines are considered secondary means of communications if they are available.
2.3.4. (DCNI) Intercoms. Located throughout KUMMSC and the topside gate area, these intercoms are used to contact the responsible control center from a particular door, gate or area. From the workstation, the operator can call any intercom within the facility. The distributed intercoms operate by pressing a button on the intercom box. The individual intercom is programmed to ring at the workstation.
2.3.5. Do not discuss classified information over or near an intercom station.
2.4. (FOUO) Duress and Authentication Procedures. FCC and/or FCs will ensure their personnel are knowledgeable and trained on the purpose and use of current duress words, emergency entry codes and authentication procedures.
2.5. (FOUO) Duress Words. A duress word is used during normal conversation to indicate duress. SFS/Plans and Programs (SFS/S5) is responsible for developing and distributing the primary, alternate and exercise duress words. All SF personnel must be knowledgeable of the current duress words.
2.5.1. (FOUO) The duress words are valid for six (6) months from date of activation. Actual or suspected compromise of the primary duress word will activate the alternate duress word as the new primary. SFS/S5 will establish new duress words (primary and alternate) the next duty day and notify all required agencies and personnel of the new words. Duress words are maintained as “For Official Use Only” (FOUO).
2.5.2. (FOUO) 377 SFS/S5 should also develop an exercise duress word for training situations. The exercise duress word will be changed when the primary and alternate duress words are changed. Note: PNAF specific duress words will be developed by Convoy Commander prior to each mission; see WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol 3, Prime Nuclear Airlift Force/Convoy Security.
2.6. (FOUO) Authentication Codes. SF personnel will utilize the Security Forces authentication code to initiate and terminate all actual or exercise incidents or otherwise determine if a post is under duress.
2.6.1. (FOUO) Personnel will be given two (2) attempts to properly authenticate.
2.6.2. (FOUO) After the second misauthentication, the SSCC or BDOC as appropriate will follow all QRCs and initiate duress procedures on the post/patrol. SSCC or BDOC will dispatch additional response forces to the post/patrol’s location to determine the cause for misauthentication and verify the security status of personnel involved.
2.6.3. (FOUO) If the location of the post/patrol is not known, SSCC or BDOC as appropriate will direct all posts/patrols to initiate sweeps of their areas to find and ascertain the status of the missing post/patrol.
2.7. (FOUO) Emergency Response Codes. 377 SFS/S5 will develop and distribute the emergency response code to all affected agencies/personnel. SF and emergency response agencies (fire department, explosive ordnance disposal and medical) will use an emergency response code (similar to the sign/countersign system) to expedite emergency entry into restricted areas. An SF member will pass one (1) portion of the sign/countersign to each emergency response vehicle; in turn the emergency responding vehicles will pass the remainder of the code for authorized emergency entry. For example: five (5) is the ERC for the day; the SF member controlling entry would pass the ERC by extending three (3) fingers on one (1) hand and the agency requesting emergency entry would respond by extending two (2) fingers on one (1) hand (completing a total of five (5)). Note: Do not use half of the emergency response code if the number is an even number. This prevents someone mirroring your actions to gain entry.
2.7.1. (FOUO) Utilizing the Emergency Response Code. Individuals utilizing the emergency response code will be given only one (1) chance to authenticate. If an incorrect response to the emergency response code is given, the emergency response vehicle(s) and personnel will be challenged. The driver who passed the wrong response code will be separated from the vehicle to ascertain their identity and to determine if a duress situation exists. If no duress is indicated, their identity will be verified by contacting the appropriate agency or responsible control center. If all is in order, the
vehicle and personnel will be allowed to proceed. If a duress situation is indicated, notify SSCC and take appropriate actions.
2.7.2. (FOUO) A separate Alert Response Code (ARC) will be used for all REFLEX DELTA missions. It is used in the same manner as the ERC described in para 2.7. above. Refer to REFLEX DELTA Plan, July 2013 for more information.
CHAPTER 3
KUMMSC CONTROLLED AREA (CA) OPERATIONS
3.1. (DCNI) Overview. There are seven (7) Controlled Areas (CA) associated with KUMMSC. Each of these areas has been identified as a CA IAW AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense. This chapter establishes responsibilities and procedures for the orderly processing and admission of personnel into the CAs associated with KUMMSC. The following paragraphs identify the location, entry requirements and associated security measures.
3.2. KUMMSC Controlled Areas.
3.2.1. (DCNI) Enrollment Center. The Enrollment Center is located at the southeast end of the Squadron Operations (Squad Ops) building (Bldg #27494). This room contains the Enrollment Master Station (EMS) and is protected by Balance Magnetic Switch (BMS) and Passive Infrared (PIR) sensors and a duress switch.
3.2.2. (DCNI) WSSS Armory. The WSSS armory is located at the southwest end of Squad Ops. This room is used to store weapons and ammunition and is normally manned. The Armory is protected by PIR and BMS sensors and duress switches. Note: Further CA requirements for the WSSS Armory can be found in SFI 31-229, Armory Operations.
3.2.3. (DCNI) F-1 Communications Room. F-1 is located at the southwest end of Squad Ops. This room contains Field Distribution Boxes (FDB) 11 and 11A and is protected by BMS and PIR sensors.
3.2.4. (DCNI) C2B Land Mobile Radio (LMR) Communications Room. C2B is located at the northeast end of Squad Ops. This room contains LMR equipment and is protected by BMS sensors.
3.2.5. (DCNI) Utility Building (UB). UB (Bldg #27497) is located at the southwest end of the Squad Ops Government Vehicle (GOV) parking lot. This facility contains the KUMMSC emergency generator and FDB 10/10A. This facility is protected by BMS sensors.
3.2.6. (DCNI) KUMMSC Topside CA. The KUMMSC Topside CA extends from the CA boundary to the entry/exit tunnels of KUMMSC. Personnel will enter the area through V1B (pedestrian walkway) or V1AA/V1AB (vehicle entry/exit). This area is protected by 1.2 miles of barbed wire fence and a vehicle denial cable; it has camera coverage and is continuously patrolled.
3.3. Entry Requirements/Circulation Control for KUMMSC Controlled Area.
3.3.1. (DCNI) Only personnel with an open area #8 on their AF Form 1199, Computer Generated Restricted Area Badge (RAB), or listed on an authorization letter will be granted unescorted entry into a KUMMSC CA. Note: For unescorted entry to the WSSS Armory, personnel are required to be on an authorization letter maintained by the armory and SSCC. All other personnel will be escorted in and logged in/out on an AF Form
1109.
3.3.1.1. (DCNI) RABs shall be worn in a readily identifiable location on the outer garment at all times.
3.3.1.2. (DCNI) Authorization letters for CA access are maintained within SSCC or 898 MUNS Control.
3.3.2. (DCNI) Prior to granting access to the CA within Squadron Operations Building or Utility Building, SSCC will authenticate with the individual (utilizing SF authentication procedures described in Chapter 2 of this SOP) and verify their status.
3.3.3. Escorted personnel will be signed in on the AF Form 1109 prior to entry and receive the Escort/Safety Briefing (Attachment 4). Escorted personnel may be subject to a random search for any unauthorized items.
3.3.4. Additional Entry Requirements/Circulation Control.
3.3.4.1. (DCNI) 898 MUNS Armory. Entry into the 898 MUNS Armory is controlled by 898 MUNS Control (MC). Note: Reference 898 MUNS OI 31-1 for additional requirements.
3.3.4.2. (DCNI) Enrollment Center EMS Database. Access to the Enrollment Center EMS database requires an authorized 377 WSSS Enrollment Official and an authorized 898 MUNS Enrollment Official (identified on the Enrollment Center Official authorization letter). SSCC will authenticate with both individuals to verify their status prior granting them access the EMS database.
3.3.4.2.1. (DCNI) Lone individuals are not authorized to access the EMS database. If the EMS database is accessed and a “Comm Restore LE to
Enroll” alarm is received, dispatch patrols immediately to challenge the individual.
3.3.4.3. (FOUO) Commercial Vehicle Entry. Commercial vehicle entry procedures do not apply to Controlled Area 8. Refer to the IDP for further guidance.
3.4. Securing KUMMSC CAs.
3.4.1. (DCNI) Once everyone has departed the CA, the SF official will contact SSCC to secure the room/alarms. SSCC will authenticate with the SF official and the alarms will be returned to secure mode.
3.4.1.1. (DCNI) Prior to departing the Enrollment Center, the EMS database must be logged-off and the communication switch that controls connection availability to the EMS computer will be turned to setting B, C or D. Once this is complete, the Enrollment Center official will contact SSCC to ensure a
“communications loss” alarm was received.
3.4.2. (DCNI) All alarms will be in secure mode anytime the CA is not manned.
3.5. Compensatory Measures.
3.5.1. (DCNI) When alarms are not operational, a patrol will conduct physical checks of the KUMMSC CAs, not to exceed every four (4) hours, and notify SSCC of the status of the areas.
3.5.2. (FOUO) During FPCON BRAVO or higher, checks of all KUMMSC CAs will be accomplished a minimum of once per shift when the alarms are operational. Note: For the SF Armory, these checks will not exceed every two (2) hours, when the armory is unmanned.
3.5.3. (DCNI) All checks will be recorded in the WSSS blotter. Note: Ensure the times are varied, so as to not set a pattern.
3.6. Unauthorized Individuals/Responding to Alarms in the CAs.
3.6.1. (DCNI) For all unauthorized/suspicious individuals and alarms within a CA, an armed response is required. Patrols will respond and establish 360-degree security, conduct sweeps and assess the alarm. Patrols will challenge and remove all individuals from the CA, identify them and ascertain reason for entry. Note: Patrols responding to the CA will make contact with SSCC for entry and authenticate prior to entry.
3.6.2. (DCNI) Individuals approaching the KUMMSC Topside CA from an unauthorized avenue of approach will be challenged, removed from the area and SSCC will be notified.
3.7. Key Control.
3.7.1. (DCNI) The Key and Lock Custodian will maintain keys to the CAs in a secured lock box within 377 WSSS/S3.
Note: The munitions keys are secured by the 898 MUNS Security Manager.
3.7.1.1. (FOUO) Keys maintained in the key box will be signed out/in on an AF Form 2432, Key Issue Log, to include the date and time of issue, serial number of the key and signature of individual issuing the key. Notify WSSS/S3 if a key is lost, misplaced or stolen and the affected lock will be replaced immediately.
3.7.1.2. (FOUO) Additional keys will be maintained with on-duty security patrols for access during alarm activations. These keys will be accounted for at the beginning of each shift by the on-coming patrols and annotated by SSCC in the blotter.
3.7.2. An appointment letter will be generated and signed by the WSSS/CC to identify the primary and alternate Key and Lock Custodians.
3.8. Bomb Threat/Robbery and Evacuation Procedures.
3.8.1. (FOUO) An AF Form 440, Bomb Threat Aid, will be posted by all government
phones IAW AFI 31-101. An AF Form 439, Robbery Checklist, will be posted in all CA six-part folders. This aid will be strictly followed for all verbal and telephonic threats.
3.8.2. (FOUO) Suspicious Package. If a suspicious package is discovered in or around a CA, do not transmit a radio within 25 feet and immediately notify SSCC. SSCC will initiate the appropriate Quick Reaction Checklist (QRC).
3.8.3. Robbery Procedures. Immediate actions to take during a robbery:
3.8.3.1. (FOUO) If an individual is attempting to gain/has gained unauthorized entry to a CA, immediately notify SSCC, challenge the individual and remove them from the area.
3.8.3.2. (FOUO) Conduct a 100% inventory of all resources in the CA and report all discrepancies to SSCC.
3.8.3.3. (FOUO) Provide SSCC with information displayed on the AF Form 439.
3.8.4. (FOUO) Evacuation Procedures. Evacuation of a CA will be initiated for all fire alarms and suspected explosive devices. Note: Squad Ops has three (3) major exits (east, south, and west doors). Follow all instructions of the on-scene incident commander.
3.8.4.1. Attempt to secure the CA if possible.
3.8.4.2. Log off enrollment terminals.
3.8.4.3. Ensure all visitors are accounted for and evacuated.
3.9. (FOUO) Emergency Response Entry/Egress. For emergency situations involving outside agencies (Fire Department, Medical, EOD, etc.) that require emergency entry:
3.9.1. (FOUO) Patrols will set-up a cordon around affected area and evacuate all personnel.
3.9.2. (FOUO) All personnel will enter/exit through the Entry Control Point (ECP) of the cordon.
3.9.3. (FOUO) Patrols will maintain observation/accountability of all emergency responders, as safely as possible. Once the emergency situation is clear, patrols will conduct a search of the affected area and emergency responders and equipment. All emergency responders/vehicles will be logged on an AF Form 1109.
3.10. (FOUO) Emergency Response to the Airfield and Runway. Incursion prevention is completed by obtaining a Flightline Driver’s License. All responding personnel will adhere to the flightline driving instructions and emergency lights on the flightline. Note: For further guidance on emergency response to the airfield and runway, refer to 377 WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol 2, Flightline Security.
3.11. (FOUO) Controlled Area Training. All personnel authorized unescorted entry into any CAs must receive initial/annual training from the applicable Controlled Area Monitor. Controlled Area Monitors receive annual training from 377 SFS/S5C Resource Protection office. Controlled Area Monitor training is documented and maintained by S3C personnel in
their Controlled Area book.
CHAPTER 4
SECURITY FORCES TRAINING PROGRAM
4.1. Overview. The SF training program ensures that all individuals are trained in specific tasks throughout their career. The training program consists of flight training, AF IMT 623A, On-The-Job Training Record Continuation Sheet, initial evaluations, trainee responsibilities, CDCs, upgrade, TDYs and unit scheduling program.
4.2. Security Forces Education and Training Program (SFETP).
4.2.1. FCC and/or FC will ensure an effective training program is implemented to encompass both the training of newly assigned personnel and completion of recurring training. All assigned personnel will be evaluated on basic tactics, searches, challenges and handcuffing procedures, and tactical deployment techniques prior to Duty Position Evaluation (DPE) testing.
4.2.2. FCC and/or FC will manage all upgrade training (UGT), CDC completion and remedial training programs IAW AFI 36-2646, Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Programs.
4.2.3. When manning permits, while in training for non-critical duty positions, uncertified individuals will be posted with a certified individual.
4.2.4. The electronic equivalent AF IMT 623, On-The-Job Training Record, located in AFTR, Air Force Training Record, will be used for formal documentation of all pertinent tasks and as a record of training accomplished for all personnel.
4.2.4.1. These records are required to be completed and turned in to SSPTS/S3T by the individual’s supervisor prior to the individual’s DPE.
4.2.5. Flight Training. The flight training program will be conducted as leader led training (LLT) as designated in the master training plan (MTP). This consists of individual and collective training efforts conducted on-post by flight members on daily and contingency tasks.
4.2.6. Initial Evaluation. The initial evaluation is a comprehensive review of the
trainee’s current and past training experiences, as well as an interview to get a feel of the trainee’s background. The trainee’s supervisor will conduct the initial evaluation within
the first 60 calendar days of the trainee’s arrival. Make an entry on the AF IMT 623A and ensure the trainee and supervisor sign and date. The initial orientation and evaluation can be conducted and documented on the same form and at the same time.
4.2.7. Immediate Supervisor Responsibilities. The immediate supervisor is responsible for the trainee's progress through UGT. They will issue and administer the CDC volumes and Unit Review Exercises (URE). The supervisor must also maintain contact with the UTM to ensure administrative UGT requirements are being met. Immediately notify the UTM in the case of any serious delay of the trainee's training progress and ensure the AF
IMT 623 is properly annotated.
4.2.8. Trainee Responsibilities. Individuals enrolled in UGT will complete training requirements on time. Trainees must:
4.2.8.1. Actively participate in all opportunities for upgrade and qualification training.
4.2.8.2. Obtain and maintain knowledge, qualifications, certifications, and attain the next skill level.
4.2.8.3. Budget on- and off-duty time to complete assigned training tasks, particularly CDC and self-study training requirements, within established time limits.
4.2.8.4. Request assistance from supervisor, trainer, and UTM when having difficulty with any part of training.
4.2.8.5. Acknowledge and document task qualification upon completion of training.
4.2.8.6. Understand their deployment/UTC, and home station requirements.
4.2.9. Mandatory Career Development Course (CDC) Program. Administer the mandatory CDC program IAW AFI 36-2201 Air Force Training Program.
4.2.10. Course Exam (CE). The supervisor will order the CE through the UTM upon completion of VREs/UREs. The supervisor and trainee will conduct a comprehensive review of all volumes prior to the CE and annotate on the 623A in AFTR. Upon completion of all requirements the trainee will complete a CE pretest. Individuals must have three passing scores of at least 90% to take the CE. Once three passing scores are obtained, the UTM will contact Base Training to schedule the CE. If trainee receives a score of 90% or better on the CE, the Commander may grant a one-day pass that may be used at the discretion of the flight leadership.
4.2.11. First and Second Time CDC Exam Failures. AFI 36-2201, Air Force Training Program provides specific guidance on exam failures. Upon a failure, representatives from the flight’s chain of command will report to 377 WSSS/CC, as directed, with all CDCs, training records and detailed training plan. Additionally, the CC, with help from the UTM or Base Training Manger will interview the supervisor and trainee to determine the reason for failure and evaluate all items as directed by AFI 36-2201 Table 6.1., CDC Administration.
4.2.12. Upgrade Actions. When a trainee completes all UGT requirements, CDC completion, minimum months in training, and attainment of the appropriate grade, their supervisor will recommend upgrade by making a 623A entry in AFTR and forwarding an upgrade request to the UTM. To determine eligibility for five (5) and seven (7) level upgrades, contact the UTM.
4.2.13. Temporary Duty (TDY). If the trainee is TDY during the time a course
examination is due, the supervisor will contact the UTM to request a course extension. FCs will request all course extensions in writing. The supervisor will then request a new CE when the trainee returns. In the event that a trainer is TDY for more than seven (7) days (this includes all leaves), the trainee’s supervisor or section NCOIC will appoint a temporary trainer until the permanent trainer returns.
4.3. Security Forces Scheduling Program.
4.3.1. The SSPTS/Scheduler is the central point of contact for all base agencies levying any requirements on security forces personnel. Training appointments, weapon firing, dental exams, etc., are examples of requirements that must be routed through the scheduler. Each flight/section is responsible for an appointment monitor who will be the point of contact for scheduling. Squadron-made appointments have priority over self-made appointments.
4.4. Security Forces Duty Officer Program (SFDO)
4.4.1. A SNCO or Officer will be assigned SFDO duties for a month at a time. The Security Forces Manager (SFM) will draft the schedule and ensure personnel are properly notified. SFDOs will conduct the following actions during their duties:
4.4.1.1. Attend each flight’s Guardmount.
4.4.1.2. Conduct post checks with each Airmen posted.
4.4.1.3. Observe any flight, Surety, squadron or group exercises being conducted during post checks.
4.4.2. Prior to their assigned month, SFDOs will meet with the Squadron Commander (CC) and SFM to gather special interest or focus items to be looked at during their duties. Ensure to review the previous month’s SFDO report prior to SFDO duty.
4.4.3. SFDO will complete a report at the conclusion of their duties and submit the report to the CC and SFM by the 15th of the month following their duties.
CHAPTER 5 RECALL PROCEDURES
5.1. Overview. This chapter establishes policies and procedures regarding the 377 WSSS pyramid recall and alerting system. Recalls provide the 377 WSSS/CC with the additional manpower strength to neutralize hostile threats and a means for sending reports up and down the chain of command. This chapter implements standardized recall procedures within the 377 WSSS, consistent with the 377 SFG and ABW Recall Plans. All personnel assigned to the 377 WSSS must be knowledgeable of these procedures.
5.2. Definitions.
5.2.1. (FOUO) Six-Ring Standby. Personnel must prepare themselves by assembling appropriate uniforms and equipment, and be capable of immediate response. Notified personnel will maintain the ability to answer the telephone within six (6) rings. Prior to departing quarters personnel will make contact with immediate supervisors and inform them of the destination and a phone number to be contacted. Consumption of alcohol, while on six-ring alert is strictly prohibited.
5.2.2. (DCNI) Alert Gear. For the purpose of the recall, alert gear is as follows: IOTV or plate carrier with plates and rifleman’s kit attached, Helmet w/cover and NVG mount attached, gas mask (M-50) w/protective lens and carrier, DD Form 1574 (gas mask inspection card), gas mask fit test, gas mask inserts (if required), Operational flashlight, handcuffs w/key OR flex cuffs, eye protection (goggles or ballistic eyewear), IFAK (tourniquet and Israeli bandage on person only).
5.3. Responsibilities.
5.3.1. (FOUO) FCC, FC and section superintendents are responsible for preparing and maintaining the current Pyramid Recall Roster for their flight/section. Note: The recall table and recall phases will be listed on all Pyramid Recall Rosters. Each flight/section’s recall roster will be updated no later than the last duty day of each month or as changes occur. A flight copy will be provided to each person assigned to the respective section or flight.
5.3.2. SSCC is responsible for providing Strength Reports (SRs) to the S1 when required.
5.4. Recall Procedures.
5.4.1. (FOUO) Squadron recalls will be implemented in accordance with QRCs, increased FPCONs or as directed by the 377 WSSS/CC or higher authority. The on-duty FCC and/or FC may direct the initiation of the IBF/SBF recall, as necessary.
5.4.2. Upon receipt of notification to initiate a recall, the control center receiving the notification will inform the remaining control centers (SSCC, BDOC, and Alternate BDOC if posted).
5.4.3. (FOUO) SSCC will be the primary control center for initiating squadron recalls. In the event SSCC is unable to initiate the recall, responsibility for initiating the recall will transfer to the BDOC. In the event BDOC is unable to initiate the recall, responsibility for initiating the recall will transfer to another office or agency as determined by FCC and/or FC or higher authority.
5.4.4. SSCC, or appropriate control center, will implement recall procedures using the Pyramid Recall Rosters. BDOC will make notifications utilizing ATHOC if necessary.
5.4.5. Each FCC/FC or section superintendent will make notifications back up with contact status not to exceed 30 minutes.
5.4.6. When contact is made, personnel will be told an unclassified reason for the recall, the type of recall and where to report.
5.4.7. The BDOC will activate the klaxon to recall dormitory residents:
5.4.7.1. (DCNI) Primary Klaxon. The primary klaxon is a steady tone. When the primary klaxon sounds, you must report with all appropriate alert gear to the SFS Armory, Bldg #20222.
5.4.7.2. (DCNI) Alternate Klaxon. The alternate klaxon has the same tone as the primary, however, it sounds on/off every five (5) seconds. When the alternate klaxon sounds, you must report with all appropriate alert gear to the Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) as soon as possible.
5.4.8. (DCNI) Recalls during normal business days/hours: For members responding from outside the KUMMSC area, the primary location for recalls will be the SFS Armory and the alternate location is the CATM facility. For personnel inside the KUMMSC area (KUMMSC, Squad Ops, Parking Area), respond to the KUMMSC armory with your alert gear for arming and posting. Battle Staff will be formed in the arming area by CC, SFM, S3O, S1 and S4. S3O will establish telephonic contact with the posting NCO at the primary or alternate arming points for coordination of responding fire teams.
5.4.9. (DCNI) Recalls during off duty days/hours: For members responding from outside the KUMMSC area, the primary location for recalls will be the SFS Armory and the alternate location is the CATM facility. Battle Staff will be formed at Alternate BDOC, Bldg #20452 by CC, SFM, S3O, S1 and S4. S3O will establish telephonic contact with the posting NCO at the primary or alternate arming points for coordination of responding fire teams.
5.4.10. All personnel responding to recalls will respond to the appropriate arming point or staging area wearing helmet, flak vest with level IV plates and protective mask attached to body, when possible. Although it is preferred to respond in uniform, responding personnel may wear civilian clothes to facilitate faster SF response to the situation.
Note: Ensure proper footwear is worn (i.e. no flip flops, slippers, etc).
5.4.11. Mission critical personnel responding from off-base will enter the installation
through the KAFB contractor gate off Gibson Road during FPCON Delta, unless otherwise directed by the Incident Commander. Entry is granted using a DBIDs authorized credential (i.e. Common Access Card (CAC)). Additionally, mission critical personnel are identified in DBIDS.
5.5. Personnel Strength Reporting Procedures.
5.5.1. (FOUO) SSCC will begin strength reporting as soon as possible and continue until all personnel are accounted for. This information will be up-channeled from S1 to SSCC. SSCC will report this information to the EOC, CAT, and BDOC as necessary.
5.5.2. S1 will obtain the total number of military assigned, TDY, on leave and in hospital/on quarters. Report this information along with an updated number of personnel who have been contacted/notified of the recall to the applicable control center or Battle Staff.
5.5.3. Recalling Personnel from TDY/Leave Status. TDY/leave personnel will be recalled only by order of the 377 WSSS/CC or higher authority.
5.6. Communication Outage (COMM OUT), Recall Procedures.
5.6.1. In the event that a squadron recall is initiated during a communications outage (no access to electronic recall rosters and no hard line phone access), recall notifications will be made face-to-face utilizing pyramid recall rosters.
5.6.2. If individual does not answer the door at the time of recall, leave a note on the door with reporting instructions and proceed to the next individual on the recall roster.
5.6.3. Report back up the chain of command if contact has not been made.
JOSEPH J. PARSONS, Lt Col, USAF
Commander
ATTACHMENT 1
GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION
References
AFI 33-332, The Air Force Privacy and Civil Liberties Program, 12 January 2015 AFI 36-2618, The Enlisted Force Structure, 27 February 2009
AFI 36-2646, Security Forces Training & Standardization Evaluation Programs, 12 January 2017
AFI 36-2201, Air Force Training Program, 15 September 2010
AFI 36-2903, Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel, 18 July 2011 AFI 36-2905, Fitness Program, 21 October 2013
AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 1 March 2008
AFI 31-118, Security Forces Standards and Procedures, 5 March 2014
DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, V1/V2/V3 Nuclear Weapons Security Manual, 15 June 2017, AFGSCSUP 21 February 2014
DoDM 5210.42_AFMAN 13-501, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP),
09 March 2017
KAFB Integrated Defense Plan 31-101, 20 February 2018
Prescribed Forms
No forms are prescribed by this publication
Adopted Forms
AF Form 164, Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Notification and Removal Log
AF Form 340, Sensor Alarm Data
AF IMT 483, Flightline Competency Certification
AF Form 797, Job Qualification Standard (JQS) Continuation/Command JQS
AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log
AF Form 1168, Statement of Suspect/Witness/Complaint
AF 1199CG, Computer Generated Restricted Area Badge
AF Form 1800, Operator’s Inspection Guide and Trouble Report
AF IMT 623, On-The-Job Training Record
AF IMT 623A, On-The-Job Training Record Continuation Sheets AFTO Form 781A, Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document AFTR, Air Force Training Record
Abbreviations and Acronyms
ABDOC – Alternate Base Defense Operations Center
ABW – Air Base Wing
AECS – Advanced Entry Control System AFGSC – Air Force Global Strike Command AFMAN – Air Force Manual
AFRC – Air Force Reserve Command
AFRIMS – Air Force Records Information Management System
AFSC – Air Force Specialty Code
AM – Alarm Monitor
ANG – Air National Guard AOR – Area of Responsibility AS – Area Supervisor
BDOC – Base Defense Operations Center
CATM – Combat Arms Training and Maintenance
CC – Commander
CE – Course Exam
CDC – Career Development Course
COMM OUT – Communication Outage
CUD – Cubical Unlocking Device
DCL – Department of Energy Courier Letter
DCNI – Department of Defense Controlled Nuclear Information
DoD – Department of Defense
DoE – Department of Energy
DPE – Duty Position Evaluation
DV – Distinguished Visitor DVI – Daily Visual Inspection EAL – Entry Authority List EC – Entry Controller
ECP – Entry Control Point
EVL – Exclusion Verification List
ER – Emergency Response
ERC – Emergency Response Code
ESRT – External Security Response Team
FC – Flight Chief
FCC – Flight Commander
FOUO – For Official Use Only FPCON – Force Protection Condition FTM – Flight Training Monitor GOV – Government Owned Vehicle
HMMWV – High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
HHQ – Higher Headquarters
IAW – In Accordance With
ISRT – Internal Security Response Team IVA – Immediate Visual Assessment KEC – Kirtland Entry Control
KCP – Kirtland Command Post
KUMMSC – Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex
LMR – Land Mobile Radio
MC – Munitions Control
MFR – Memorandum for Record
MPH – Miles Per Hour
MTP – Master Training Plan
NSTCA – Nuclear Security Threat Capability Assessment
NVG – Night Vision Device
NWSS – Nuclear Weapons Surety Standards
OPR – Office of Primary Responsibility
OI – Operating Instruction
PA – Public Address
PL – Protection Level
PNAF – Primed Nuclear Airlift Force PRP – Personal Reliability Program PSI – Physical Security Inspection QRC – Quick Reference Checklist RCU – Remote Controlled Unit
RD – Reflex Delta
RDS – Records Disposition Schedule
RF – Response Force
RFL – Response Force Leader RFM – Response Force Member S1 – Unit Personnel Office
S3 – Operations Officer
S5 – Plans and Programs Section
S3O – Operations Superintendent
SAAM – Special Assignment Airlift Mission
SBF – Subsequent Backup Force
SC – Security Controller
SCS – Security Control Supervisor
SEC – Senior Entry Controller
SF – Security Forces
SFETP – Security Forces Education and Training Plan
SFG – Security Forces Group
SFMQ – Security Forces Standardization Evaluation Section
SGT – Safeguard Transport
SOP – Standard Operating Procedure SSCC – Site Security Control Center SSPTS – Security Support Squadron SSI – Special Security Instruction SVA – Sole Vouching Authority
TDY – Temporary Duty
TM – Training Monitor
TPC - Two-Person Control
TTC - Tactical Convoy Commander
TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UB – Utility Building
UGT – Upgrade Training
URE – Unit Review Exercise
VCNCO – Vehicle Control Noncommissioned Officer
VRE – Volume Review Exercise
WSSS – Weapons System Security Squadron
ATTACHMENT 2
SECURITY FORCES RESPONSE AND BREVITY CODES
A2. Response Codes.
A2.1. (FOUO) The codes in the following table will be used by SSCC and responding patrols during situations where brevity and discreet information is sent/received to and from responding patrols and dispatchers:
(FOUO) Table A2.1.
SECURITY FORCE RESPONSE AND BREVITY CODES
Code 1 Routine Response
Code 2 Urgent Response
Code 3 Emergency Response
Code 4 Wants and Warrants
Code 5 Traffic Stop
Code 6 Latrine Break
Code 7 Meal Break
Code 8 Suspect in Custody
Code 8A Suspect of Opposite Sex in Custody
Code 9 Change Frequency
Code 10 All in Order (not to be used in normal security status check)
Code 11 Domestic Disturbance
Code 12 Traffic Accident
Code 13 Officer Needs Immediate Assistance; Emergency
Code 14 Unannounced Alarm Activation
Code 15 Duress Indication (applicable post or location)
Code 16 Explosive Device
ATTATCHMENT 3
WSSS STAFF CALL SIGNS
A3. Staff Call Signs.
A3.1. (FOUO) The call signs listed in the following table will be used by SSCC for short and concise radio transmissions with 377 WSSS Staff Offices.
(FOUO) Table A3.1. 377 WSSS Staff Call Signs
Call Sign Duty Position Call Sign Duty Position
Guardian-6 Commander Predator-1 NCOIC, Operations
Guardian-3 Operations Officer Predator-2 NCOIC, Plans and Programs
Guardian-3A Operations Superintendent Predator-3 NCOIC, Sensors
Guardian-9 Security Forces Manager Predator-4 Flightline Constable
Diamond-1 First Sergeant Predator-5 NCOIC, Nuclear Surety
Guardian-4 Superintendent S4/S5 Predator-6 Physical Security
Predator-7 System Administrator
Predator-8 Vehicle Control NCO
Predator-9 Resource Advisor/Supply
CONTROLLED AREA ESCORT/SAFETY BRIEFING
A4. Controlled Area Escort/Safety Briefing
A4.1. (FOUO) The briefing listed below will be used when providing a safety/escort briefing for individuals being escorted into KUMMSC Controlled Areas.
- This area is designated as a Controlled Area and you must be escorted at all times.
-Cell phones, cameras or any other recording devices are prohibited and must remain outside the area.
-Ensure you have properly filled out all required information on the AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log.
-Do not lose sight of your designated escort or depart the area without first notifying your escort.
-Any hand-carried items you bring into this area may be subject to search by your designated escort.
-Any hazmat in the area must be briefed.
-DO NOT handle anything without authorization from your escort official.
-If we need to evacuate the area, exit the building through the nearest available exit.
-If evacuation is necessary all personnel must depart the area.
-If you are the last person exiting the area SECURE THE DOOR BEHIND YOU.
-All visitors must stay with their escort if possible and meet at the evacuation point unless otherwise directed by your escort official.
-All evacuated visitors must stand by at the directed evacuation point until accounted for and released by your escort official or the Fire Chief.
-Are there any questions or concerns at this time?
ATTACHMENT 5 REQUIRED EQUIPMENT
A5.1. (DCNI) REQUIRED ITEMS (asterisk items are subject to inspection): All gear will be clean and serviceable at all times.
A5.1.1. *Tactical ballistic vest w/plates and Rifleman’s Kit attached.
A5.1.2. *Helmet w/NVG mount attached.
A5.1.3. *Gas mask w/protective lens and carrier.
A5.1.3.1. *Eye glass inserts, as required (via fit test print out).
A5.1.3.2. *Fit test results.
A5.1.3.3. *DD Form 1574, Inspection/serviceability card (properly filled out with up- to-date-inspection).
A5.1.4. *Operational flashlight.
A5.1.5. *Handcuffs w/key and Flex cuffs.
A5.1.6. *M9 Holster.
A5.1.7. *Canteen w/ proper gas mask cap.
A5.1.8. *Hearing protection.
A5.1.9. *Eye protection (goggles or ballistic eyewear).
A5.1.10. *Inclement weather gear (as needed). A5.1.11. *Job knowledge handbook (if available). A5.1.12. *Common access card (CAC).
A5.1.13. *Whistle.
A5.1.14. *Current civilian and GOV driver’s license.
A5.1.15. *Gloves.
A5.1.16. *Restricted Area Badge (RAB) (serviceable w/ holder or lanyard).
A5.1.17. *Current flightline competency card.
A5.1.18. *Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) (Tourniquet & Israeli bandage on person and will be located on the right side of your gear).
A5.1.19. Multi mission pack, issued A bag or Ruck Sack.
ATTACHMENT 6
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR PLATE CARRIER
A6. STANDARD SET-UP A6.1. REQUIRED POUCHES
A6.1.1. (FOUO) Each Security Forces member is required to attach the following pouches to his/her plate carrier:
A6.1.1.1. Enough M-4 Pouches to carry 6 magazines
A6.1.1.2. Radio Pouch A6.1.1.3. Handcuff Pouch A6.1.1.4. Utility Pouch
A6.1.1.5. Tourniquets will be located on the right side of your gear.
A6.1.1.6. M-9 pouch (if applicable)
A6.1.1.7. Pouches will be affixed in any fashion that is comfortable to the wearer as long as they are accessible and functional.
A6.2. ACCOUTREMENTS
A6.2.1. RANK AND NAMETAPE/AIRCREW PATCH
A6.2.1.1. Name and Rank will be displayed on the front Velcro panel of the vest. Issued Aircrew patches will be displayed on the front Velcro panel of the IOTV or plate carrier. Aircrew patches will have the Security Forces badge, Name, Rank and USAF embroidered on it only. If Aircrew patch has not yet been issued, a Velcro rank centered above a
nametape is authorized.
https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm
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# (DCNI) 377 WSSS STEP CODES (02 May 2018)
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
377 WSSS STEP CODE LISTING FOR OUTBOUND OPERATIONS
Current as of 02 May 2018
COMPLETION
BROWN (Alt)
YELLOW
GREEN
TIME
RED
(DCNI) ACTION(S) ACCOMPLISHED
5 1 16 24 Facility lockdown complete
24 10 23 29 (Initiate/Terminate) MM‐7/14 *
23 24 36 1 (Initiate/Terminate) MC‐2 *
19 16 14 20 Initiate pad sweeps
4 38 1 28 Terminate pad sweeps
31 18 21 14 Units in place
15 29 33 8 Aircraft seal is broken
18 13 25 32 Initiate aircraft sanitation
36 35 4 9 Terminate aircraft sanitation
2 34 2 12 Type I security established
22 8 12 11 Exclusion area pre‐screening complete
26 31 9 16 Initiate route sweeps
10 12 18 35 Initiate courier briefing
14 22 39 13 Courier accepts Type‐I security
13 26 34 23 Terminate courier briefing
8 30 3 2 Initiate shipper's briefing *
7 6 32 38 Terminate shipper's briefing *
21 39 35 3 Terminate route sweeps
39 25 28 31 Convoy route is secure
28 23 17 6 SAAM Coordinator declares, "Ready to receive"
9 36 5 4 Convoy CC requests permission to initiate movement
20 7 38 33 Permission to initiate movement granted by ABW/CC
30 9 30 21 Authenticate to have V1‐AA/AB opened and EC‐1/2 initiated
37 27 13 27 Initiate movement/convoy composition (Authenticate this step)
35 32 8 36 Checkpoint reached (Authenticate this step)
1 20 6 30 Authenticate number of vehicles & personnel entering Pad‐5 with Mustang‐10
6 11 10 37 Terminate movement (Authenticate this step)
38 2 37 25 Upload initiated *
17 19 31 15 Units in place for 360° coverage of aircraft upon taxi/take off
29 15 15 26 Approximately 30 minute from upload complete *
16 14 7 10 Upload complete *
32 33 20 18 Lower taxiway cables
3 3 27 34 Aircraft preparing to depart (lower ropes/stanchions)
12 37 29 19 Aircraft take off complete
25 5 24 22 Aircraft aborted takeoff/returning (all forces respond & position f/inbound ops)
33 17 22 5 TCPs block traffic
11 21 11 7 Use alternate route
27 28 26 39 Visual of aircraft on approach to the airfield
34 4 19 17 Aircraft landed
(*) MUNS calls in this step
Note: Step codes are created and maintained by the 377 WSSS/S5. This is a controlled item for official use only. Copies and distribution must be
for official use only and approved by the 377 WSSS/S3. Do NOT duplicate or modify in anyway.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
377 WSSS STEP CODE LISTING FOR INBOUND OPERATIONS
Current as of 02 May 2018
COMPLETION
ORANGE (Alt)
SILVER
BLACK
BLUE
TIME
(DCNI) ACTION(S) ACCOMPLISHED
3 18 6 10 Initiate pad sweeps
17 7 2 4 Terminate pad sweeps
33 20 1 7 Units in place
15 8 27 32 Type‐I security established
9 16 9 39 Units in Place for 360° coverage of aircraft upon landing/taxing
32 24 25 24 Lower taxiway cables
12 14 36 35 Exclusion area pre‐screening complete
34 3 15 20 Visual of aircraft on approach to the airfield
27 6 39 12 Aircraft landed
20 34 21 38 Initiate courier briefing
25 2 37 29 Courier accepts Type‐I security
7 30 16 22 Terminate courier briefing
5 36 33 11 Initiate shipper's briefing *
19 32 28 16 Terminate shipper's briefing *
1 10 4 8 Download initiated *
6 23 32 5 Approximately 30 minute from download completion *
31 35 18 34 Initiate route sweeps
22 12 19 33 Prepare facility for lockdown *
29 38 30 3 Facility lockdown complete
28 37 38 13 Loading Dock SVA declares "Ready to receive" *
8 4 17 9 Terminate route sweeps
18 25 10 37 Convoy route is secured
35 11 34 31 Download complete *
24 21 12 27 Convoy CC requests permission to initiate movement
21 9 23 2 Permission to initiate movement granted by Wing/CC
38 26 13 28 Initiate movement/convoy composition (Authenticate this step)
10 19 11 15 Checkpoint reached (Authenticate this step)
39 5 5 6 Authenticate to have V1‐AA/AB opened and EC‐1/2 initiated
23 39 20 18 Authenticate number of vehicles & personnel entering KUMMSC with SSCC
13 29 26 36 Terminate movement (Authenticate this step)
30 28 3 25 (Initiate/terminate) MC‐2 *
2 13 14 19 (Initiate/terminate) MM‐7/14 *
16 27 8 17 TCPs block traffic
37 31 22 26 Use alternate Route
(*) MUNS calls in this step
Note: Step codes are created and maintained by the 377 WSSS/S5. This is a controlled item for official use only. Copies and distribution must be
for official use only and approved by the 377 WSSS/S3. Do NOT duplicate or modify in anyway.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

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# (DCNI) A-1 Unannounced Alarm
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-1 October 2015
UNANNOUNCED ALARM ACTIVATION
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation/Type of Alarm:
2 Acknowledge Alarm
3 Immediate Visual assessment of alarm through CCTV (if applicable)
IVA Via:
4 Notify all posts/patrols of situation and dispatch
5 Initiate Security Incident QRC A#6 (If applicable)
6 360 established (If applicable)
7 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, KCP
8
Patrols on scene: S-1_______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
S-4______, S-5______, Other _______
9 Sweeps initiated
10 Suspect(s) handcuffed (If applicable)
11 Suspect removed from area (If applicable)
12 Obtain description and all pertinent information (If applicable)
13 Have BDOC dispatch a Police Unit (If applicable)
14 Search of suspect(s) initiated (If applicable)
15 Search completed (If applicable)
16 Suspect turned over to LE patrols (If applicable)
17 Sweeps terminated
18 Secondary sweeps initiated
19 Secondary sweeps terminated
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20 Exterior sweeps initiated (if applicable)
21 Exterior sweeps terminated (if applicable)
22 Request termination
23 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
24 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) A-10 ASCOT AC Arrival-Departure
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-10 October 2015
ASCOT A/C Arrival/Departure
“Reference: 377 ABW KAFB ASCOT Support Plan”
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Sweep Pad 5 two hours prior to arrival.
2 Record Arrival/Departure times in the blotter, and document the
Security briefing from the Flight Chief/Commander in the blotter.
3 Ensure Coyote units block the intersection of Randolph road and the
Taxiway via the swing gates and drop the anti-vehicle cable on the
Taxiway Northwest of PAD 5 for arrivals and departures.
4 Ensure the Flight Chief or Flight Commander meets the A/C upon
arrival, conducts a security brief IAW local standardized checklist with
the A/C Commander, and issues a radio to the RAF security team via
1297.
5 Ensure Coyote 1 maintains a 5 minute response capability to the A/C.
6 Coordinate with SFS for courtesy storage of RAF weapons in the SFS
armory if needed. (Note: courtesy storage of weapons will NOT be in
the WSSS armory)
7 Ensure Coyote units conduct a minimum of 4 hour checks on the A/C
and RAF security personnel.
8 Ensure radio communications status checks are conducted IAW
established procedures.
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# (DCNI) A-11 UAS
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-11 January 2017
UNAUTHORIZED UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (KUMMSC/FLIGHTLINE)
STATUS TIME ACTION POST
1 Situation:
2 Notify posts/patrols of situation and have same use SALUTE report
to relay all pertinent information
3 Dispatch patrols to search for drone operator
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC to initiate their search for
operator. Notify S3O, S3, CC and KCP IAW notification matrix.
5 Notify FAA Air Traffic Control Tower of situation and last known
location of drone.
6 If drone operator is located, patrols will detain individual(s).
7 Confiscate SD card/video and/or photos. Confiscate drone and
obtain FAA Small UAS Certificate of Registration from operator.
Ensure this information is annotated in blotter.
UAS IN THE VICINITY OF KUMMSC:
8 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
9
Topside patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____,
S-4_____, S-5_____
10 Direct ECP to initiate lockdown
11 IBF standing by for dispatch
12 Notify Sandia Security (845-3114) of UAS
IN THE EVENT THE UAS BECOMES HOSTILE:
13 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7
14 Advise all posts/patrols NOT to open fire unless fired upon
15 Notify all posts/patrols of Covered Wagon, FPCON Delta actions
and initiate a Squadron Level Recall
16 Declare Covered Wagon and notify KCP as follows:
“This is (Rank Name) with the 377 WSSS, initiate Covered Wagon
#____ and Force Protection Condition Delta at (time) Zulu.”
KCP Controller:_________________________________
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NOTIFY HQ AFGSC AT DSN 94-781-9788 OR SECTERA 781-
7015 IF UNABLE TO COME IN CONTACT KCP and initiate QRC
#B-6
17 Initiate SCS-1 and activate terrorist push button
18 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
19
Initiate IBF to Rally Point ______
20 Initiate Follow-On-BF
21 Maintain contact with post/patrols engaging UAS
IN THE EVENT THE UAS DEPARTS:
22 If UAS departs continue notifications and stand by for further
direction from Incident Commander
IN THE EVENT THE UAS HAS LANDED:
23 If UAS has landed, check for UAS Certificate of Registration
24 Upon removal of UAS initiate purge of all post/patrols areas of
responsibility
25 Request termination from incident commander
26 Notify all post/patrols of termination
27
Terminate purge
Results:
UAS ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
28
Flightline patrols on scene: C-1_____, C-2_____, C-3_____,
C-4_____
29 Notify Sunport Aviation Police (505-328-5070) of UAS
30 BDOC will send UAS Report to:
David Jones in Albuquerque: david.a.jones@faa.gov
SA Kenny Maldonado in Dallas: Kenny.Maldonado@faa.gov
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 Refer to KAFB IDP as needed:
Tab B to Appendix 6 to Annex C (Page 140) (PL 1, 2, 3 Areas)
Tab C to Appendix 6 to Annex C (Page 143) (Main Base Non-Restricted Areas)
Tab A to Appendix 10 to Annex Z (Page 468) (PL 1 Movements/SAAM Aircraft)
 Refer to FAA LEO Guidance Chart below as needed
 If notified of UAS by FAA or FAA/ABQ Sunport then also contact:
Dave Jones, Principal Operations Inspector
ABQ FSDO
505-764-1211
David.A.Jones@faa.gov <mailto:David.A.Jones@faa.gov>
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# (DCNI) A-12 Active Shooter Hostage
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-12 January 2016
Active Shooter/Hostage Situation
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
Notified By:_________________ Time:___________
Location/Direction of travel of shooter:_____________________
Description/number of subject(s)
Sex:_____ Race:_____ Height:_____ Weight:_____
Clothing:______________ Identifying features:________________
Vehicle information:_____________________________________
Weapon(s):______________ DIM count:_____________
*If explosives are involved initiate Bomb threat QRC A-3*
2 Notify/Dispatch all post and patrols
Establish topside 360
Cordon affected area
ECP:__________ TCPs:_____________
*Instruct to make immediate entry do NOT wait for 360*
3 Initiate Covered Wagon (QRC A-7)/FPCON DELTA/Group level
Exercise
4 Accomplish initial notifications to KCP, BDOC, S3O, S3, CC
Additional agency to contact if NOT done so by BDOC:
___AFOSI
___S2I Hostage Negotiator
___Local Law Enforcement
___Fire Department
___Staff Judge Advocate
___Public Affairs
___Medical
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5 Lockdown Facility/Squadron operations building
If shots fired at KUMMSC/Squad Ops
Instruct personnel to close/barricade themselves behind office doors
If shots fired and shooter is in close proximity of
KUMMSC/Squad Ops (Example Golf Course)
Lock all doors, do not allow personnel to leave the Bldg. Initiate one
point of entry, with personnel checking ID’s(armed if possible)
6
Patrols on scene: S-1_______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
S-4______, S-5______, C-1_______, C-2_______, C-3_______,
C-4______, Other _______
8 Upon termination establish crime scene
*separate witnesses/Identify evidence if possible*
9 Once crime scene is secure, coordinate medical response to scene
and establish medical evacuation point.
10 Medical Transport Information
Time:____ Name of crew:_______________________
Name(s) of victims transported:____________________________
Location transported:___________________
11 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
If Hostages are present
12 Special Demands/Request from shooter:
13 Contact S2I Hostage Negotiator
Name:__________
14 Establish an Inner/Outer perimeter
15 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
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# (DCNI) A-13 Gate runner
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-13 January 2016
Gate Runner/Unauthorized Entry Checklist
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
Notified By:_________________ Time:___________
Description:___________________________________________
Color:_______ Make:_________ Model:________ LP#:_______
Last known direction of travel:_____________________________
Personnel description:___________________________________
#Occupants:_____ Ethnicity:_________ Sex:____
2 **Initial Notifications (S3O, S3, WSSS/CC) within 5 min of initiation
of incident.**
Notify all posts/patrols of situation:_________
Notify all posts/patrols of vehicle description:________
Notify all posts/patrols of the personnel/subject(s)
description:______
After description is obtained:
Dispatch topside patrols to establish topside 360 as well as TCP’s
at Highball 2 and Highball 4:
S1:______ S2:______ S3:______ S4:______ S5:______
Dispatch Coyote 1 and 2 to chokepoints 1 and 2 if BDOC has not
already done so.
Chokepoint 1: ________ Chokepoint 2: ________
Have each responding patrol confirm situation/dispatch by restating
type of incident and location.
3 AFTER ACTION NOTIFICATIONS:
Refer to Notification Matrix:_____________________________
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4 BLOTTER:
Ensure incident is annotated in the blotter (use applicable canned
entry).
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# (DCNI) A-1a Unannounced Alarm-Misauthentication in Two-Person Area
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-1a October 2015
UNANNOUNCED ALARM ACTIVATION/MISAUTHENTICATION IN TWO-PERSON
AREA
STATUS TIME ACTION
Situation:
Acknowledge Alarm
Immediate visual assessment (IVA) of alarm through CCTV
Notify all posts/patrols of situation and dispatch
Initiate Security Incident QRC #A-6
360 established
Accomplish initial notifications to MUNS Control, BDOC, S3O, S3,
KCP
Patrols on scene: S-1_______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
S-4______, S-5______, Cr-2/3______, Cr-4______,
Other#______
PERSONNEL ARE IN THE AFFECTED AREA (EXTRACTION):
Contact SVA and instruct all personnel to go into the interlock
Close all appropriate doors and open B7/14 for ISRT entry
Request blast door override (Obtain override codes from 2-Person
box)
Override blast doors
Extract all personnel from interlock and verify status
Sweeps initiated with subsequent two-person team
_____Terminated
Results:
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Request termination
Notify all posts/patrols of termination
PERSONNEL ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE AFFECTED AREA (And alarm received is
a tamper or creates a penetration pattern):
Instruct MUNS Control to generate Two-Person team
Request blast door override (Obtain override codes from 2-Person
box)
Override blast doors
Sweep to alarm point initiated
_____Terminated
Results:
Initiate appropriate up channel report if unauthorized individuals are
discovered
Area search initiated by ISRT and MUNS Two-Person team
_____Terminated
Results:
MUNS Two-Person team secures all classified material (if
applicable)
Request termination
Notify all posts/patrols of termination
Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
MISAUTHENTICATION IN TWO-PERSON AREA:
Contact SVA and instruct all personnel to get into the position of
disadvantage (prone/face down)
Instruct MUNS Control to generate Two-Person team (if personnel
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are in cell area)
Request blast door override (Obtain override codes from 2-Person
box)
Override blast doors
Extract all personnel from interlock into Brandt Hall and verify status
with individual who mis-authenticated (SVAs will be armed – do not
seize weapons for verification of status)
Sweeps initiated with subsequent two-person team
_____Terminated
Results:
If status verification is confirmed all secure, brief personnel on proper
procedures and release
If status verification is in question, extract all personnel to topside
patrols
MUNS Two-Person team secures all classified material (if
applicable)
Request termination
Notify all posts/patrols of termination
Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
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# (DCNI) A-2 CCTV Failure
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-2 October 2015
CCTV FAILURE
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Notify all posts/patrols of situation/dispatch RF patrols
3 All RF patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____,
S-4_____, S-5______, Cr-2/3______, Cr-4______
4 Initiate appropriate JCN, (QRC #D-15)
Priority-1 (Within Two-person area/4 or more cameras)
Priority-2 (Outside the Two-Person area/3 or more cameras)
5 Accomplish initial notifications to S3O, S3, KCP and BDOC
6 MUNS escort team on scene (if applicable)
7 CTS personnel on scene
8 Cameras(s) fixed/verified as operational
9 JCN closed out, (QRC #D-15)
10 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
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# (DCNI) A-3 Bomb Threat Suspicious Package
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-3 October 2015
BOMB THREAT/SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Notifications received from:
2 Complete AF Form 440, BOMB THREAT AID, (if applicable)
3 Notify all posts/patrols of situation and instruct them to conduct
sweeps of their areas
4 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6, if threat affects PL 1-3
resources
5 Establish a cordon around the affected area.
500 feet for briefcase size
1000 feet for barrel/vehicle size
1000 feet for unknown size
ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL CORDONS AS NECESSARY IF ARMS,
AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVE (AAE) FACILITIES ARE
AFFECTED
6 Evacuate all personnel within affected area
Instruct BDOC to dispatch a MWD.
7 Instruct owner/user agencies to search their respective areas
8 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, KCP
9
MWD unit on scene:___________
10 Search initiated
_____Terminated
Results:
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ACTUAL DEVICE FOUND
11 Description/locations of device
12 Notify all posts/patrols to not transmit within 25ft of device
13 Declare Covered Wagon, (QRC #A-7), if device is affecting PL 1-3
resources
14 Notify EOD at (6-2229) of the situation. During non-duty hours,
KCP will contact EOD
15 Notify Fire Department (6-8220)
16
Obtain wind speed and directions(6-9722)/(6-8220)
_________/__________
17 Plot ECP/TCP
18 EOD on scene
19 Fire Department on scene
20 Device safe/removed
21 Request termination through KCP
22 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
IF DEVICE IS LOCATED AT ECP
1 Description/location of device:
2 Notify all posts/patrols not to transmit within 25ft of device
3 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7
4 Close B-1 through B-4
5 ECP ALL Lockdown
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6 Direct the ECP to accomplish the following:
_____Challenge all suspects and remove to Sally Port
_____Assist with the evacuation of all non-essential personnel
_____Remove keys, combinations and log off of AECS terminal
_____Fall back to defensive fighting position in the loading dock
7
Obtain wind speed and directions(6-9722)/(6-8220)
_____________/____________
8 Plot ECP/TCP
9 Notify EOD at (6-2229) of the situation. During non-duty hours,
KCP will contact EOD
10 Notify Fire Department
11 Suspect(s) have been removed from the area (if applicable)
12 Search of suspect initiated
______Terminated
Results:
13 Suspect turned over to SFS patrols
14 EOD on scene
15 Fire Department on scene
16 Device safe/removed
17 Initiate purge of the affected area
_____Terminated
Results:
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18 Notify all posts/patrols to conduct sweeps of AoR
_____Terminated
Results:
19 Request termination of Covered Wagon through KCP
20 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
21 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
IF DEVICE IS LOCATED ON THE FLIGHTLINE
1 Description/Location of device:
2 Instruct all posts/patrols not to transmit within 25ft of the device
3 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7, if device is affecting PL 1-3
resources
4 Notify EOD at (6-2229) of the situation. During non-duty hours,
KCP will contact EOD
5 Notify Fire Department
6 Instruct 58 SOW and 377 Base Ops to perform the following:
_____Relocate aircraft adjacent to the cordon (if practical)
_____Initiate evacuation of affected buildings
_____Conduct search of all aircraft to locate additional devices
7
Obtain wind speed and direction(6-9722)/(6-8220)
__________/____________
8 Plot ECP/TCP
9 EOD on scene
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10 Fire Department on scene
11 Device safe/removed
12 Initiate purge of affected area
_____Terminated
Results:
13 Request termination of Covered Wagon through KCP
14 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
15 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
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# (DCNI) A-4 Unplanned Power Outage
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-4 October 2015
UNPLANNED POWER OUTAGE (KUMMSC)
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Dispatch patrols to Utility Building, Vehicle Barn, Sub-Power Station,
and Rooms 158 and 160
3 Declare Security Incident, (QRC #A-6)
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC, KCP
5 All patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3______, S-4_____
S-5_____, Cr-2/3______, Cr-4______
Ensure 360 is established Topside/Utility Building
6 Sweeps of Vehicle Barn and Sub-Power station, Rooms 158 and 160
initiated
____Terminated
Results:
7 Sweeps initiated Utility Building
____Terminated
Results:
8 Status of generator:
Note: If generator is not operational, contact CE (6-8222) and
initiate an Emergency Work Order. Prep for the MEP-9
9 If investigation reveals probable or actual hostile, initiate Covered
Wagon, (QRC #A-7)
10 CE on scene: (if applicable)
Reason for outage:
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11 Commercial power restored
12 Request termination
13 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
14 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
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# (DCNI) A-5 Comm Outage
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-5 October 2015
COMMUNICATION OUTAGE (PARTIAL/TOTAL)
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Send a runner to notify topside patrols and to activate Alt/SSCC
3 Dispatch patrol to check antenna outside of C2B and establish 360 of
Squad Ops
4 Dispatch Cerberus-2/3 to check antenna cable from B-5 to B-3
5 Dispatch Cerberus-4 to check antenna cable from V-3 to B-1
6 Declare Security Incident, (QRC #A-6), if total communication outage
Note: Topside 360 is required by QRC #A-6
7 Activate Alt SSCC by posting certified SCS/System Admin at BDOC
8 BDOC initiates initial notifications to WSSS S3O, S3, CC, and KCP
9 All patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3______, S-4_____
Cr-2/3_____, Cr-4______
10 Check of Antenna complete
Results:
11 Sweeps of C2B initiated
_____Terminated
Results:
12 Check of antenna cable from B-5 to B-3 complete
Results:
13 Check of antenna cable from V-3 to B-1 complete
Results:
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14 Initiate Emergency Work Order through Kirtland C4 (6-1091)
W/O #_______________________
15 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7, if investigation reveals
probable/actual hostile actions
16 Comm Maintenance personnel on scene
17 Communications restored
18 Cause of Comm outage:
19 Request termination
20 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
21 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
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# (DCNI) A-6 Security Incident
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-6 October 2015
SECURITY INCIDENT
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Notify all posts/patrols and dispatch as necessary
3 Declare Security Incident and notify KCP as follows:
“This is (Rank Name) with the 377 WSSS, initiate Security Incident
#____ at (time) Zulu.”
KCP Controller:_________________________________
NOTIFY HQ AFGSC AT DSN 94-781-9788 OR SECTERA 781-7015
IF UNABLE TO COME IN CONTACT KCP
4 360 established
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC
6 All patrols on scene: C-1_____, C-2_____, C-3_____, C-4_____
S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____, S-5_____, SFS_____,
Cr-2/3_____, Cr-4_____
7 Sweeps initiated
______Terminated
Results:
8 Suspect(s) discovered
9 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7, if probable or actual hostile
10 Suspect(s) detained
11 Suspect(s) removed from the area
12 Search of suspect(s) initiated
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______Terminated
Results:
13 Suspect(s) turned over to SFS patrol
14 Obtain all pertinent information:
Rank/Name:
Squadron/Off Sym:
(Civ base affiliation)
Duty Phone:
Name of supervisor/phone number:
15 Secondary sweeps initiated
_____Terminated
Results:
16 Exterior sweeps initiated
_____Terminated
Results:
17 Situation determined non-hostile
18 Request termination
19 Notify KCP of termination
KCP Controller:
20 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
21 Complete Security Incident and verify number with BDOC
22 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
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# (DCNI) A-7 Covered Wagon
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-7 October 2015
COVERED WAGON
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Notify all posts/patrols and dispatch as necessary
3 Dispatch IBF to Rally Point______
4 If SGT is in the dock, activate SGT/RCU procedures(if applicable)
5 Initiate all downstairs actions:
______ECP ALL Lockdown
______Don all alert gear
______Cr-2/3/4 in final denial positions
______Close vault door
______Initiate MUNS mass arming
______SCS-1 and activate Terrorist Push Button
6 Declare Covered Wagon and notify KCP as follows:
“This is (Rank Name) with the 377 WSSS, initiate Covered Wagon
#____ and Force Protection Condition Delta at (time) Zulu.”
KCP Controller:_________________________________
NOTIFY HQ AFGSC AT DSN 94-781-9788 OR SECTERA 781-7015
IF UNABLE TO COME IN CONTACT KCP and initiate QRC #B-6
Reference FPCON Delta from FPCON QRC and Checklist Binder as
necessary
7 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC
Note: BDOC, initiate SFG recall and dormitory klaxon
8 360 established
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9 Contact BDOC and notify them of the following:
______Situation requiring a BF
______Name and call sign of the RF leader
______Radio channel and routes of travel to KUMMSC
______Post Alt SSCC with first available certified controller/System
Admin
Name of Controller______________ Time on Scene_________
______Request medical personnel as necessary
Note: If contact cannot be made with BDOC, switch to LE
frequency and direct all SFS post/patrols to Code 9 to the
appropriate frequency
10 Status of Follow-On-BF
11 All patrols on scene: C-1_____, C-2_____, C-3_____, C-4_____
S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____, S-5_____, SFS_____,
Cr-2/3_____, Cr-4_____
12 Instruct MUNS control to obtain their half of the override codes and
standby for Blast Door Override procedures (if situation is within the
Two-Person Area. Initiate QRC #A-10)
13 Notify MUNS Control of the following:
______Situation
______Shut down the air handlers if gas is suspected
______Ensure senior MUNS representative has a radio and is in
contact with SSCC
MUNS Rep_______________________ # of Personnel_______
14 IBF on scene Rally Point
______IBF en-route
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-7 Page 2 of 4
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-7 October 2015
Ensure IBF responds via separate routes, (if possible)
Routes:____________/_____________/_______________
15 Situation Update:
Note: Provide additional updates to leaders as necessary
16 Assault initiated
_____Terminated
Results:
17 If suspect(s) surrender, immediately detain and remove from affected
area
18 Area sweep initiated
_____Terminated, with:
Friendlies KIA___________
Enemies KIA____________
EPW____________
19 Follow-On-BF formed
20 Follow-On-BF en route, (as necessary)
21 Follow-On-BF on scene:
________/________, ________/________, ________/_________
________/________, ________/________, ________/_________
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-7 Page 3 of 4
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-7 October 2015
22 Secondary sweeps initiated
_____Terminated
Results:
23 Exterior sweeps initiated
_____Terminated
Results:
24 Request termination of Covered Wagon through KCP
25 Termination received
26 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
27 Reset Terrorist Push Button
28 Deactivate SCS-1
29 Direct flightline patrols to accomplish 100% RAB purge of their AORs
30 Complete Covered Wagon Log and verify number with BDOC
31 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) A-8 Empty Quiver
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-8 October 2015
EMPTY QUIVER
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Dispatch forces to conduct immediate recapture operations.
Note: Establish Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD).
3 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7
4 Contact/instruct BDOC to close all gates and to notify local LE
agencies to assist with road blocks.
5 Accomplish initial notifications to S3O, S3 and CC and contact FBI
via KCP
Note: FBI becomes lead investigative agency once Empty
Quiver has been confirmed
6 Notify KCP of a potential Empty Quiver/Covered Wagon utilizing the
following:
“This is (Rank Name) with the 377 WSSS, initiate Covered Wagon
#____, Force Protection Condition Delta and we are requesting an
Empty Quiver at (Time) Zulu.”
Relay the following to KCP regarding Empty Quiver:
_____Location of incident
_____Type of Weapon/Component
_____Casualties
_____Property damage
_____Type of operation
_____Description of Event
_____Measures being conducted to recover materials
_____Suspected route of escape
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-8 Page 1 of 2
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-8 October 2015
KCP Controllers Name:________________________________
7 Notify appropriate emergency response agencies:
______Fire Department
______EOD
______Medical Service
8 In the event that weapons are airlifted contact the FAA tower and
instruct them to track A/C and obtain the following:
_____Type of aircraft
_____Markings
_____Direction of travel
9 Once government control of resource is regained and hostilities are
confirmed terminated, establish an exclusion area (if applicable) with
available units.
When available, ensure a certified Entry Controller (KEC) is posted
for ECP. Entry/Exit to and from the exclusion area is prohibited
until a certified EC is on scene.
10 Integrity of the resource been verified (as applicable)
Results:
11 Request termination of Covered Wagon, FPCON Delta and Empty
Quiver through KCP
12 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) A-9 Unauthorized Aircraft
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-9 October 2015
UNAUTHORIZED AIRCRAFT LANDING/HELICOPTER DENIAL (KUMMSC)
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Dispatch all appropriate patrols
3 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
4 Dispatch flightline patrols to Rally Point_______
5 Direct ECP to initiate ECP All Lockdown
6 Close B-1 through B-4
7 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC, KCP
8 Patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____,
S-4_____, S-5_____, Cr-2/3_____, Cr-4_____
9 Advise all posts/patrols NOT to open fire unless fired upon by A/C or
occupants
10 IBF on scene Rally Point and standing by for dispatch
11 Direct topside patrol to signal A/C pilot to shut down engines (if
possible)
12 Notify Sandia Security (845-3114) of the unauthorized A/C
13 Challenge all personnel in A/C
14 Suspect(s) detained and removed from the restricted/controlled area
Reason for Landing:
15 Suspect(s) turned over to SFS patrols
16 A/C sweeps initiated
______Terminated
Results:
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-9 Page 1 of 2
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
A-9 October 2015
17 Request termination
18 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
19 Coordinate removal of A/C with KCP
20 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) AM (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Guardian
Version 19-1
Alarm Monitor
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) You are the Alarm Monitor (AM), responsible for acknowledging, assessing,
provide initial visual assessment (IVA), and ensure dispatch of RF to Topside/KUMMSC
alarm annunciations. You are also responsible for controlling entry into the Two-Person
Area in accordance with all appropriate checklists. You are NOT part of the response force or
back-up force but will support those forces as needed to facilitate their response.
• (DCNI) Ensure a minimum of 2 blast doors are secured between the Loading Dock and the
storage cells, and at least one blast door between the Loading Dock and the Site Security
Control Center (SSCC).
• (DCNI) If these blast door configuration rules cannot be met, ensure all Response Force
personnel are aware of the configuration violation and are posted in final denial positions.
• (DCNI) Acknowledge, assess, and ensure dispatch of Response Forces to alarm
annunciations and mis-authentications. Declare security situations as required.
• (DCNI) Use applicable Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC) and make notifications for all
Security Incidents and other contingency operations.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
Alarm Monitor, 19-1, Jul 19
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) Within the confines of SSCC unless relieved by another certified SCAM or by a
certified Security Control Supervisor (SCS). The AM may enter MUNS Control (MC) to
obtain the system override codes when the use of these procedures is required or during
changeover to check with MC on planned activities that may occur during your shift.
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) Your primary means of communication are your communication consoles and
equipment. Secondary means will be hand-held portable radios.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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Alarm Monitor, 19-1, Jul 19
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
SSCC EVACUATION:
• (DCNI) In the event SSCC needs to be evacuated, the following needs to be completed:
• (DCNI) All classified materials, portable radios and assigned weapons need to be taken
out of the office.
• (DCNI) Note: If classified material cannot be removed, ensure 100%
accountability is conducted upon return to SSCC.
• (DCNI) Log off of all AECS consoles
• (DCNI) SSCC will communicate with BDOC via Alternate SSCC.
• (DCNI) Conduct a 100% purge of SSCC and report findings to Guardian-1/2.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• (DCNI) Shift change will be conducted within the confines of SSCC and MC.
• Inspect your workstation and ensure it is free from trash and clutter, clean and fully
operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
• Conduct a radio check to ensure that the desk remote associated with your console is
operational.
• (DCNI) Conduct AECS changeover using Joint Routine Verification.
• (DCNI) Account for all publications IAW the changeover binder.
• Account for the pass-on book.
• Ensure that all paperwork for off-going shift is complete and accounted for.
• Check with MC for planned activities that may affect your shift.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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Alarm Monitor, 19-1, Jul 19
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Initiating and tracking all work orders and JCNs.
• (DCNI) Ensure the joint end-of-day check with MUNS personnel is conducted and the
Storage Cell Check is conducted when TPC area duties are complete.
• (DCNI) Operate communications consoles and equipment.
• (DCNI) Implement security reporting and alerting systems when required.
• (DCNI) Document all openings and closings of cubicles and maintenance bays on the
required forms.
• Conduct JRV/changeover in accordance with all applicable checklists located within SSCC.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
and any O-6 and above. You will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing by
stating “Sir/Ma’am, Guardian is all secure and ready for inspection.”
• (DCNI) Be knowledgeable of and comply with alarm activation procedures, compensatory
measures and personnel entry and internal controls.
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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Alarm Monitor, 19-1, Jul 19
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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# (DCNI) AM
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Guardian
Version 17-1
Alarm Monitor
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) You are the Alarm Monitor (AM), responsible for acknowledging,
assessing, provide initial visual assessment (IVA), and ensure dispatch of RF to
Topside/KUMMSC alarm annunciations. You are also responsible controlling
entry into the Two-Person Area in accordance with all appropriate checklists. You
are NOT part of the response force or back-up force but will support those forces
as needed to facilitate their response.
 (DCNI) Ensure a minimum of 2 blast doors are secured between the Loading
Dock and the storage cells, and at least one blast door between the Loading
Dock and the Site Security Control Center (SSCC).
 (DCNI) If these blast door configuration rules cannot be met, ensure all
Response Force personnel are aware of the configuration violation and are
posted in final denial positions.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
 (DCNI) Acknowledge, assess, and ensure dispatch of Response Forces to alarm
annunciations and mis-authentications. Declare security situations as required.
 (DCNI) Use applicable Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC) and make notifications
for all Security Incidents and other contingency operations.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Within the confines of SSCC unless relieved by another certified SCAM
or by a certified Security Control Supervisor (SCS). The AM may enter MUNS
Control (MC) to obtain the system override codes when the use of these
procedures is required or during changeover to check with MC on planned
activities that may occur during your shift.
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) Your primary means of communication are your communication consoles
and equipment. Secondary means will be hand-held portable radios.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition and
an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 (DCNI) The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in
accordance with AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117,
Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
 (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate,
decisive, and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent
unauthorized access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination
deter their actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
 You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
The ONLY exception is when present in the Site Security Control Center. This
gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm or
situation.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
situations or when directed by higher authority.
SSCC EVACUATION:
 (DCNI) In the event SSCC needs to be evacuated, the following needs to be
completed:
 (DCNI) All classified materials, portable radios and assigned weapons need
to be taken out of the office.
 (DCNI) Note: If classified material cannot be removed, ensure 100%
accountability is conducted upon return to SSCC.
 (DCNI) Log off of all AECS console
 (DCNI) SSCC will communicate with BDOC via Alternate SSCC.
 (DCNI) Conduct a 100% purge of SSCC and report findings to Guardian-1/2.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 (DCNI) Shift change will be conducted within the confines of SSCC and MC.
 Inspect your workstation and ensure it is free from trash and clutter, clean and fully
operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Conduct a radio check to ensure that the desk remote associated with your console
is operational.
 (DCNI) Conduct AECS changeover using Joint Routine Verification.
 (DCNI) Account for SSIs, Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC), 377 WSSS Notification
Brevity Matrix, Authorizations book, KUMMSC Upgrade Concept of Operations
Guidance and mission calendar.
 Account for the pass-on book.
 Ensure that all paperwork for off-going shift is complete and accounted for.
 Check with MC for planned activities that may affect your shift.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Initiating and tracking all work orders and JCNs.
 (DCNI) Operate communications consoles and equipment.
 (DCNI) Implement security reporting and alerting systems when required.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
 (DCNI) Document all openings and closings of cubicles and maintenance bays on
the required forms.
 Conduct JRV/changeover in accordance with all applicable checklists located within
SSCC.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 and above. You will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Guardian is all secure and ready for
inspection.”
 (DCNI) Be knowledgeable of and comply with alarm activation procedures,
compensatory measures and personnel entry and internal controls.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment
may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

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# (DCNI) B-1 (Security Patrol Duress)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-1 October 2015
SECURITY PATROL DURESS (ACTIVE/PASSIVE)
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation
2 Notify all post/patrols to “Code 9/___”
3 Notify all post/patrols of the situation
4 Dispatch applicable patrols and instruct patrols to conduct sweeps of
respective area
ACTIVE DURESS:
5 Initiate security incident (QRC #A-6)
6 Initiate challenge
7 Reason for duress
If actual hostile initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and Hostage
Situation, (QRC #B-9)
8 Accomplish initial notification to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
9 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
10 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
PASSIVE DURESS:
11 Initiate challenge
12 Reason for duress
If actual hostile initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and Hostage
Situation, (QRC #B-9)
13 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
14 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) B-10 (AMOS)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-10 October 2015
ALARM MONITOR OPERATOR STATUS (AMOS)
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Initiate applicable “Bravo Series” QRC for duress
3 Notify all posts/patrols to “Code 9/____”
4 Notify all posts/patrols of situation and dispatch to original alarm
point as well as office that failed to acknowledge alarm
5 Initiate Security Incident (QRC #A-6)
6 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
7 Patrols on scene responsible monitoring office:
S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
S-4_______, S-5_______ Cr-2/3________, Cr-4_______
Patrols on scene for alarm point:
S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
S-4_______, S-5_______ Cr-2/3________, Cr-4_______
8 360 established
9 Attempt telephonic contact with appropriate office and authenticate
status (DO NOT HANG UP)
10 If actual duress situation exists, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7)
and hostage situation (QRC #B-9) if applicable
11 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) B-11 (KUMMSC Armory Duress)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-11 October 2015
KUMMSC ARMORY DURESS
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Notify all posts/patrols to “Code 9_____”
3 Notify all posts/patrols of duress and dispatch as necessary
4 Initiate Security Incident (QRC #A-6)
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
6 All patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____,
SFS_____
7 360 established
8 Attempt telephonic contact with KUMMSC Armory. (DO NOT
HANG UP)
If negative contact is made, direct patrols to make immediate entry.
9 If contact is made, instruct a member of the Armory to step out with
CAC card and have patrol ascertain status
10 Instruct patrol to conduct interior sweeps of the KUMMSC Armory.
Authenticate with SSCC via armory open line.
______Terminated
Results:
If probable or actual hostile, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7)
and Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9), if applicable
11 Request termination
12 Notify all post/patrols of termination
13 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) B-2 (ECP Portal Duress)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-2 October 2015
ECP PORTAL DURESS
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Duress received from ECP portal #______
2 Conduct Immediate Visual Assessment (IVA), dispatch all
posts/patrols and notify them of Duress.
Location_______________
3 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6, and initiate ECP ALL lockdown
If hostilities are present, initiate Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7
4
Notify all posts/patrols to Code 9/____ (If applicable)
5 Initiate challenge of all personnel between D-1 through T-4
6 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
7
Patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____,
S-5_____, Cr-2/3_____, Cr-4_____, SFS_____
8 Obtain identity of personnel within the booth. Remove individual to
the Sally Port and conduct officer safety pat down
9 Authenticate for Mini EC-1. Instruct ECP to initiate Special Function
Prior to Activating Mini EC-1, verify with a Topside SRT that all
vehicles are clear of Vehicle Ram Barriers.
10 Topside patrols removed all individuals from the controlled area
11 Instruct ECP to reset Mini EC-1 after all personnel have been
removed from the restricted area
Prior to Deactivating Mini EC-1, verify with a Topside SRT that
all vehicles are clear of Vehicle Ram Barriers.
12 Sweeps of affected area initiated
______Terminated
Results:
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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13 Search of suspected individuals initiated
______Terminated
Results:
14 Request termination if deemed non-hostile. Ensure AF IMT 1168 is
accomplished
15 If situation determined to be hostile, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC
#A-7) and Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9)
16 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) B-3 (ECP Duress)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-3 October 2015
ECP DURESS (ACTIVE/PASSIVE)
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation
ACTIVE DURESS:
2 Initiate ECP ALL lockdown procedures
Disable ECP console and cameras
3 Notify all post/patrols of appropriate “Code 9/___”
4 Notify and dispatch posts/patrols as necessary
5 Initiate Security Incident (QRC #A-6)
6 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
7 Patrols on scene: S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
S-4_______, S-5_______ Cr-2/3________, Cr-4_______ and
SFS____________
8 360 established
9 Attempt telephonic contact with ECP (DO NOT HANG UP)
10 Authenticate and initiate Mini EC-1
Prior to Activating Mini EC-1, verify with a Topside SRT that all
vehicles are clear of Vehicle Ram Barriers.
11 Authenticate status of ECP
Advise one member from ECP to step into Sally Port and make
contact with sweep team
12 If ECP is not secure or negative contact is made, make immediate
entry
If hostile actions occur, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and
Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9) if applicable
13 Conduct sweeps of interior and exterior of ECP
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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______Terminated
Results:
14 Authenticate with member of the sweep team to verify status via
open telephone
15 Enable ECP Console and Cameras
16 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
17 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) B-4 (SSCC MC Duress)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-4 October 2015
SSCC/MC DURESS
STATUS TIME ACTION
Situation:
SSCC DURESS (BDOC ACTIONS):
Disable SSCC (Duress switch must be active)
IN ALL OTHER CASES CONTACT SYSTEM ADMIN (3-2143/
6-5038) OR REFER TO NOTIFICATION MATRIX
Notify all post/patrols of appropriate “Code 9/___”
Dispatch patrols as necessary
Declare a Security Incident, QRC #A-6
Accomplish initial notifications to S3O, S3, and KCP
Patrols on scene: S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
S-4_______, S-5_______ Cr-2/3________, Cr-4_______
360 established
Attempt telephonic contact with SSCC (DO NOT HANG UP)
If SSCC is not secure or negative contact is made, make immediate
entry
If secure, BDOC will relay status and pertinent information of
individual stepping out
Cerberus-2/3 will make contact and verify status of individual
Conduct sweeps of interior and exterior of SSCC, MC and RTES
______Terminated
Results:
If probable or actual hostile, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and
Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9)
Authenticate status of SSCC with Cerberus-2/3 via open telephone
Enable SSCC
BDOC will instruct all post/patrols “Code 9/__” and ensure SSCC
reassumes control of net
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-4 October 2015
Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
MC DURESS (SSCC ACTIONS):
Disable MC
Dispatch patrols as necessary
Declare a Security Incident, QRC #A-6
Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
Patrols on scene: S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
S-4_______, S-5_______ Cr-2/3________, Cr-4_______
360 established
Attempt telephonic contact with MC (DO NOT HANG UP)
If MC is not secure or negative contact is made, make immediate
entry
If secure, SSCC will relay status and pertinent information of
individual stepping out
Cerberus-2/3 will make contact and verify status of individual
Conduct sweeps of interior and exterior of MC, SSCC, and RTES
______Terminated
Results:
If probable or actual hostile, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and
Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9)
Authenticate status of MC with Cerberus-2/3 via open telephone
Enable MC
Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) B-5 (MUNS Armory Duress)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-5 October 2015
MUNS ARMORY DURESS
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Notify and dispatch all posts/patrols as necessary
3 Secure B-1 through B-4
4 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
6 Patrols on scene: Cr-2_____, Cr-3______, Cr-4_____,
S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____, S-5_____,
SFS_____
7 Topside 360 established
8 Attempt telephonic contact with MUNS Armory. (DO NOT HANG
UP)
9 If non-hostile terminate duress once ISRT has made face to face
contact with MUNS armorer and conducted a sweep of affected area
10 If determined hostile, declare Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and
Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9) if applicable
11 Request termination
12 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
13 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) B-6 (Wing Command Post Duress)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-6 October 2015
WING COMMAND POST DURESS
STATUS TIME ACTION
Situation:
Notify all posts/patrols of the situation and to increase security
vigilance
Accomplish initial notifications to S3O, S3, and CC
Assist BDOC as necessary
Once BDOC has notified SSCC that KCP is secure, notify all
posts/patrols of termination
If declared hostile, initiate Covered Wagon procedures (QRC #A-7)
Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) B-7 (BDOC Duress)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-7 October 2015
BDOC DURESS
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Switch to LE primary frequency and instruct SFS patrols to “Code
9/____”
3 Notify all SFS patrols of duress
4 Direct SFS Flight Chief to dispatch patrols and assist as necessary
5 Accomplish initial notifications to S3O, S3, and KCP
6 Patrols on scene: SFS_______/________, SFS______/______
SFS______/______, SFS______/______, SFS______/______
7 Attempt telephonic contact with BDOC. (DO NOT HANG UP)
8 Notify SFS Flight Chief of status and standby for sweeps to be
initiated
9 If situation is determined non-hostile, request termination
10 If hostile actions have occurred, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7)
and Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9) if applicable
11 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) B-8 (Enrollment Center Duress)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-8 October 2015
ENROLLMENT CENTER DURESS
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Notify all posts/patrols of duress and dispatch
3 Initiate Security Incident (QRC #A-6)
4 Patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2______, S-3_____,
S-4_____, S-5_____, SFS______
5 360 established
6 Attempt telephonic contact with Enrollment Center (6-4762) and
authenticate status (DO NOT HANG UP)
If negative contact is made, direct patrols to make immediate entry.
7 If hostile, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and Hostage
Situation (QRC #B-9) if applicable
8 Patrols make face to face contact with Enrollment Center officials
9 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
10 Sweeps initiated on Enrollment Center
______Terminated
Results:
11 Responding patrol will authenticate with SSCC via open line in
Enrollment Center
12 Reason for Duress:
13 Request termination
14 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
15 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) B-9 (Hostage Situation)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-9 October 2015
HOSTAGE SITUATION
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
*If hostage situation is affecting PL1N, the presence of hostages
will not deter from the immediate recapture/recovery
operations.*
If known, relay the following information to BDOC:
Demands:
# of Hostages/Names:
# of Suspects/Names:
Weapons/Armament/Explosives:
2 Declare Covered Wagon, (QRC #A-7) if applicable
3 Notify all posts/patrols and dispatch as necessary
4 Establish 360
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
6 Direct evacuation of non-essential personnel
7 Building/Areas to be evacuated:
Location:____________ Location:____________
Location:____________ Location:____________
Location:____________ Location:____________
Location:____________ Location:____________
Location:____________ Location:____________
Location:____________ Location:____________
Location:____________ Location:____________
Location:____________ Location:____________
Location:____________ Location:____________
Location:____________ Location:____________
______Evacuation complete
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
B-9 October 2015
8 ECP Location:______________
Patrols/TCPs Cordon sentries posted:
TCP Location:_________________
TCP Location:_________________
TCP Location:_________________
TCP Location:_________________
TCP Location:_________________
TCP Location:_________________
TCP Location:_________________
9 Hostage negotiation team formed
10 Situation update:
11 Assault initiated
DIM Count____
Detained____
______Terminated
Results:
12 Area Sweep initiated
_____Terminated
Results:
13 Request termination
14 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
15 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) Backup SCS (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Guardian
Version 19-1
Backup SCS
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) You are responsible for acting as Alternate SSCC, acknowledging, assessing, and
ensuring dispatch of Response Forces (RF) to topside alarm annunciations when SSCC is not
able to. You are NOT part of the response force or back-up force but will support those
forces as needed to facilitate their response.
• (DCNI) Use the topside alarm sector map (Attachment 3) to coordinate responses by
Scorpion patrols to suspicious Perimeter Surveillance Radar System (PSRS) alarm
annunciations.
• (DCNI) Dispatch RF as needed to resolve any alarm situation, as directed.
• (DCNI) Use applicable Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC) and make notifications for all
Security Incidents and other contingency operations.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
Guardian, Backup SCS, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Ensure all topside patrols are actively patrolling their respective patrol zones
(Attachment 1) and monitoring avenues of approach. Ensure all topside patrols are
displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to potential aggressors. Ensure a
minimum of one Scorpion patrol remains within the topside controlled area at all times.
• (DCNI) If leaving the control center after being properly relieved by a certified SC/AM or
SCS, all required gear must be worn.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) Within the confines of BDOC unless relieved by another certified SC/AM or SCS.
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
Force Personnel.
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
Guardian, Backup SCS, 19-1, Feb 19
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armory with both
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
SSCC EVACUATION:
• (DCNI) In the event SSCC needs to be evacuated, the following needs to be completed:
• (DCNI) All classified materials, portable radios and assigned weapons need to be taken
out of the office.
• (DCNI) Note: If classified material cannot be removed, ensure 100% accountability
is conducted upon return to SSCC.
• (DCNI) Log off of all AECS consoles
• (DCNI) SSCC will communicate with BDOC via Alternate SSCC.
• (DCNI) Conduct a 100% purge of SSCC and report findings to Guardian-1/2.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• Shift change will be conducted within the confines of BDOC.
• (DCNI) Conduct a radio check to ensure the remote console at the Law Enforcement Desk
associated with your console is operational.
• (DCNI) Conduct AECS changeover using Joint Routine Verification (JRV, QRC)
• (DCNI) Account for SSIs, Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC), 377 WSSS Notification
Brevity Matrix and KUMMSC Upgrade Concept of Operations Guidance.
• (DCNI) Account for the pass-on book.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
Guardian, Backup SCS, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Check with MC for planned activities that may affect your shift.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around limited areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and surveillance
of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
• (DCNI) Ensure each Scorpion patrol conducts a walking patrol within one of the sectors
defined within Attachment 2. These walking patrols will be accomplished by each Scorpion
patrol within a different sector at different times. Additional walking patrols per Scorpion
unit per shift are encouraged. Radio SSCC and inform them of the applicable sector,
initiation, and termination of the walking patrols.
• (DCNI) Ensure all walking patrols are randomly executed throughout the shift and are
adequately spread throughout different sectors to maximize coverage.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF
Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and offer a post
briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Guardian is all secure and ready for inspection.”
• (DCNI) Be knowledgeable of and comply with alarm activation procedures, compensatory
measures and personnel entry and internal controls.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
Guardian, Backup SCS, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5

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# (DCNI) C-1 Emergency Response (KUMMSC)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-1 October 2015
EMERGENCY RESPONSE (KUMMSC)
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
Location:
Note: If fire is behind B-5, secure the vault door to SSCC
2 Dispatch all posts/patrols as necessary
3 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
4 Initiate IBF response to Rally Point_____
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
6 All posts/patrols on scene: V1AA____________, V-2______,
V-8______, HB-2_____, HB-4_____, ECP______
7 360 established
8 IBF on scene Rally Point_______
FIRE:
9 IF FIRE IS BEHIND B-3/4 (BRANDT HALL)
Cerberus-2/3 on scene
Actions:
Cerberus-4 in final denial
IF FIRE IS IN LOADING DOCK
Cerberus-4 on scene
Actions:
Cerberus-2/3 in final denial
Note: Verify that Type 1 resources are not located within the area
10 If HAZMAT is required, initiate QRC #C-8.
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Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-1 October 2015
11 Obtain the following from the Fire Department:
______Cordon size
______Wind speed and direction
______Number of vehicles and personnel responding (if possible)
12 Obtain number of personnel within the facility via evacuation report/AF
IMT 1109
MUNS________
SF____________
Other_________
13 Contact MUNS Control if the facility will be evacuated
______Shelter in place
______Evacuate. Number of personnel evacuating___________
Note: Ensure evacuees proceed to cafeteria. Ensure cafeteria has
been purged before handing off.
14 Authenticate for an EC-ALL/MC-2 as determined by the OSC
________EC-ALL initiated
Prior to Activating EC-ALL, verify all vehicles are clear of Vehicle
Ram Barriers.
________MC-2 initiated
15 Notify MUNS Control of the situation and to prepare for Blast Door
Override
Obtain Blast Containment Alarm information from MUNS control.
Authority to enter a potentially contaminated zone must be
approved by the 377 ABW/CC prior to opening the affected blast
doors
(Tritium release does not require 377 ABW/CC authority prior to
entry)
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Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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16 Fire Department on Scene V1AA
Number of vehicles within the area________
Number of personnel in the area___________
FD trail vehicle__________
Maintain an accurate count
Maintain positive control of all evacuees until they can be
questioned and properly processed out of the Restricted/Limited
Area and an AF IMT 1109 is completed. (if SFS patrolman responds
ensure he/she follows these actions)
17 Sign/Counter-Sign conducted
Results:
18 Fire Department on scene loading dock
19 Area declared safe by Fire Department
Cause of fire:
20 EOD on scene Loading Dock (if applicable)
21 EOD declares area safe (if applicable)
22 Request termination
23 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
24 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
25 Area purge initiated
Results:
Note: Notify the Area Supervisor/on scene SFS patrolman to purge
the evacuee holding area and initiate statements (AF 1168s) if
required.
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-1 October 2015
26 Dispatch additional topside patrols to V1AA to assist with vehicle
searches
27 Search all emergency responders and all individuals logged out on the
AF Form 1109 prior to departure
If Emergency responders must depart the area due to an
emergency, ensure that an SFS patrolman follows the emergency
response vehicle in order to conduct a search and annotate the AF
Form 1109
SECURITY FORCES EVACUATION:
28 Notify BDOC to dispatch the remaining IBF patrols as the FBF as
directed by the OSC.
29 Instruct BDOC/Posting NCO to recall a system administrator and
activate Alternate/SSCC.
30 Inform BDOC to make all notifications
31 If possible, take all classified material when evacuating. If classified
cannot be removed, ensure 100% accountability is conducted upon
return to SSCC.
32 Recall a system administrator to take control of blast doors from BDOC
33 Log off of all AECS consoles
34 Take all portable radios
35 SSCC assumes command and control from alternate location.
36 Upon termination return to KUMMSC, Cr-1/2/3/4, ECP and SSCC will
initiate a purge of the facility
37 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) C-10 Natural Disaster-Inclement weather
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-10 October 2015
NATURAL DISASTER/INCLEMENT WEATHER
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
NATURAL DISASTER:
2 Contact base weather (6-9707) for information on weather related
disasters
3 Notify all posts/patrols. Advise them to check all physical security
safeguard for damage
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
5 Coordinate with Guardian 1/2 to establish compensatory measures
(if applicable)
Compensatory measures implemented. Contact outside agencies as
necessary (Kirtland C-4, CE, Fire Department, etc.):
INCLEMENT WEATHER/SNOW REMOVAL:
6 Advise all mobile patrols of extreme weather conditions and state the
following.
______Utilize caution while driving
______Do not leave the paved surface
7 Dispatch response forces to provide a topside 360 all flight line forces
should be positioned to provide optimal security observation
Patrols may only leave static posts for security responses or if
directed by Flight Chief/Commander or higher authority
8 All mobile patrols on scene:
S-1_____________, S-2______________, S-3______________
S-4_____________, S-5______________, C-1______________
C-2_____________, C-3______________, C-4______________
9 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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10 Instruct a topside patrol to conduct hourly checks of the entry/exit
tunnel
11 If entry/exit tunnels become impassable, contact KCP and request
CHENEGA be en-route to initiate snow removal.
If required, Dispatch Scorpion-2 to V1AA and stand by for CHENEGA
(ensure Scorpion-2 positively identifies the driver and conducts a
search of the vehicle)
_____CHENEGA on scene
12 Dispatch Cerberus-1 to the loading dock to observe CHENEGA
personnel do not depart course or vehicle as they travel through the
dock
Search of CHENEGA vehicle and personnel conducted
Results:
13 Ensure patrols are on scene, refer to QRC# 3 EC-ALL
14 CHENEGA actions complete
15 Ensure CHENEGA departs the area appropriately
16 If Low Water Bridge is flooded or impassable due to snow, contact
KCP and advise them the primary route is impassable.
KCP Controller Name:_________________________________
(Make a blotter entry)
17 Termination
18 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) C-11 National Defense Area
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-11 October 2015
NATIONAL DEFENSE AREA
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
3 Contact additional response agencies (if applicable):
______Fire Department
______Local law enforcement
______Hazmat
______EOD
______OSI
______FBI
4 At the direction of the 377 WSSS/CC, contact KCP and notify of the
situation and request authorization form the 377 ABW/CC to establish
an NDA
5 377 ABW/CC authorizes the establishment of NDA
SAAM coordinator can authorize the establishment of NDA if a Type-I
movement is in progress
6 Notify the land owner (if possible) and brief them on the situation and
reason for establishing a NDA
*377 ABW/PA will distribute appropriate briefing to state during
the establishment of the cordon
7 Brief A/C CC to establish temporary boundary and place NDA signs
8 NDA established
Location: ___________ NDA terminated: _____________
9 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) C-1a Emergency Response (Flghtline)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-1a October 2015
EMERGENCY RESPONSE (FLIGHTLINE)
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Received From:
Situation:
Location:
2 Dispatch patrols as necessary
3 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
5 All posts/patrols on scene: C-1_______, C-2______, C-3______,
C-4_______ , G-1/2________
6 360 established around affected area
7 Cordon established
Location of ECP:
Cordon Size:
8 Obtain the following from the Fire Department (if adjusted by IC):
______Cordon size
______Wind speed and direction
______Number of vehicles responding (if possible)
9 Fire Department on Scene ECP
Number of vehicles within the affected area________
Number of personnel in the affected area___________
Maintain an accurate count
PL1/2 RESOURCES IN AREA:
10 Sign/Counter-Sign conducted
Results:
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11 If nuclear resources/explosive devices are involved, notify EOD via
KCP
12 Fire Department declared area safe
Fire Department makes recommendation to declare area safe,
but official determination is up to on-scene commander.
13 If HAZMAT in area, refer to QRC #C-8
If medical response is necessary, initiate QRC #C-2/2a.
Albuquerque Ambulance Service on scene________: (if applicable)
14 Search of all emergency responders complete and all individuals
logged out on the AF Form 1109 prior to departure
If emergency responders must depart the area due to an
emergency, ensure that an SFS patrol follows the emergency
response vehicle in order to conduct a search and annotate the
AF Form 1109
15 Direct all patrols to conduct a purge of the affected area
Ensure all personnel and vehicles have departed and that no
unauthorized material has been left or removed
16 Sweeps complete
17 Request termination
18 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
19 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) C-1b Emergency Response (Pad-5)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-1b October 2015
EMERGENCY RESPONSE (TYPE-1/PAD-5)
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Received From:
Situation:
Location:
2 Dispatch patrols as necessary
3 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
Declare potential Broken Arrow, QRC #C-3 (if applicable)
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
5 All posts/patrols on scene: Mustang-2______, Mustang-3_______,
Mustang-4______, Mongoose-1______, Mongoose-2_______,
Mongoose-3______, Mongoose-4______
6 Contact Fire Department/online source to obtain the following:
_________Cordon Size
_________Wind speed and direction__________/____________
7 ECP/TCP’s established
Location of ECP____________
Cordon Size_______________
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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8 Fire Department on Scene ECP
Number of vehicles within the area_________
Number of personnel in the area___________
Maintain an accurate count
9 Sign/Counter-Sign conducted
Results:
10 HAZMAT, QRC #C-8, EOD, QRC #A-3, and Albuquerque
Ambulance Services, QRC #C-2 on scene (if applicable)
______EOD declares area safe
______HAZMAT declares area safe
______Fire department evacuated all injured personnel
EOD/HAZMAT makes recommendation to declare area safe, but
official determination is up to on-scene commander.
11 Search of all emergency responders complete and all individuals
logged out on the AF Form 1109 prior to departure
If emergency responders must depart the area due to an
emergency, ensure that an SFS patrol follows the emergency
response vehicle in order to conduct a search and annotate the
AF Form 1109
12 Conduct purge of the affected area
______Terminated
13 Ensure a cursory check and a count of all personnel and injured is
conducted on AAS Vehicle’s at the CCP
14 All injured personnel removed from the affected area
15 Request termination
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16 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
17 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) C-2 Medical Emergency Response
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-2 October 2015
MEDICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE (AAS) KUMMSC
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Received From:
Situation:
Location:
2 Verify there is an actual emergency at KUMMSC
3 Dispatch all posts/patrols
Note: Dispatch Guardian-1/2 to the ECP
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
5 Patrols on scene:
S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______, S-4______, S-5_______,
Cr-2/3______, Cr-4_______, Guardian-1/2______, Coy-1______
6 360 established
7 SSCC will contact Guardian-1/2 and notify them of number of vehicles
and occupants responding.
Number of vehicles_______________
Number of occupants_____________
8 Ensure AAS is stopped at the cordon ECP
9 Ensure Guardian-1/2 makes face to face contact with driver to verify
their status
10 Ensure prior to allowing entry into cordon, EC logs necessary
information on AF Form 1109.
11 IF EMERGENCY IS AT KUMMSC
Conduct a check and a count of all personnel and injured prior to
personnel departing V-2 or V-8 and delivering to AAS
ENSURE AAS DOES NOT ENTER RESTRICTED AREA
AAS can respond to V-2 or V-8 (whichever is the extraction point)
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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If a check cannot be conducted prior to personnel departing V-2
or V-8, an SFS patrol will follow the emergency response vehicle
to the hospital to accomplish search and log personnel on AF
Form 1109
12 IF EMERGENCY IS NOT AT KUMMSC
Ensure patrol on scene awaiting emergency personnel conducts a
check and count of all personnel including injured.
13 Fire Department/Flight Medicine extracts personnel from restricted
area to AAS at V-2 or V-8.
14 All injured personnel removed by AAS
15 Termination received
16 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
17 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) C-3 Broken Arrow
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-3 October 2015
BROKEN ARROW
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
SGT van number (if applicable):__________________________
Convoy: _____________________________________________
Type of A/C and Tail Number (if applicable):________________
Fuel remaining: ___________Line #: ______________________
# of resources:____________ # of personnel affected_________
Location/Grid coordinates:_______________________________
2 Dispatch/notify all posts/patrols
ON BASE:
3 Evacuate all non-essential personnel (if applicable)
4 Declare appropriate up channel report (If applicable): Security
Incident (QRC #A-6), Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7)
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
6 2500 foot cordon established
Location of ECP:
Cordon Size:
7 Evacuation complete
8 All TCP posted:
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-3 October 2015
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
9 Crisis Action Team formed
10 Dead, Injured, Missing (DIM) Count
Dead: _____________________
Injured: ___________________
Missing: ____________________
11 Fire Department (QRC #C-1/1a/1b) actions initiated
Fire Department declares area safe: ______________
EOD (QRC #A-3) on scene (if applicable)
EOD declares area safe: ________________________
HAZMAT (QRC #C-8) on scene (if applicable)
HAZMAT declares area safe (if applicable): ___________
EOD makes recommendation to declare area safe, but official
determination is up to on-scene commander.
12 Initiate withdrawal.
13 Recovery operations initiated (if applicable)
Area declared safe: __________________
OFF BASE:
14 INITIATE NATIONAL DEFENSE AREA, QRC #C-13
377 ABW/CC is the only person authorized to establish a NDA. 377
ABW/CV may establish an NDA if contact cannot be made
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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with 377 ABW/CC
15 Initiate recall
16 Form response teams. Gain permission from 377 ABW/CC prior to
departing installation
17 Declare appropriate up channel report (If applicable): Security
Incident (QRC #A-6), Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7)
18 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
19 If an aircraft is involved initiate downed aircraft procedures, QRC #C-4
20 2500 foot cordon established
Location of ECP:
Cordon Size:
21 Evacuation complete
22 All TCP posted:
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
23 National Defense Area formed, QRC #C-12
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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24 Crisis Action Team formed
25 Dead, Injured, Missing (DIM) Count
Dead: _____________________
Injured: ___________________
Missing: ____________________
26 Fire Department (QRC #C-1/1a/1b) actions initiated
Fire Department declares area Safe: ______________
EOD (QRC #A-3) on scene (if applicable)
EOD declares area safe: ________________________
HAZMAT (QRC #C-8) on scene (if applicable)
HAZMAT declares area safe (if applicable): ___________
EOD makes recommendation to declare area safe, but official
determination is up to on-scene commander.
27 Initiate withdrawal
28 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
29 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) C-4 Downed Aircraft
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-4 October 2015
DOWNED AIRCRAFT/PRECAUTIONARY LANDING
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Receive notification of a downed aircraft or precautionary landing,
do not make any verbal commitments to provide security manning
support until Squadron leadership has been fully briefed on the
situation
2 Gather the following information:
________Grid coordinate in Lat/Long or MGRS:
________Estimated distance and direction from KAFB:
________Is the site accessible by road:
________Time of incident:
________Reason for landing:
________Precautionary Landing or Hard Landing
________Injuries
3 Ensure 58 MOC notified 377 ABW KCP
If not, immediately direct the 58 MOC to contact the KCP to initiate
ABW notifications and official request for assistance from the Air
Base Wing
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, S4, CC and KCP
5 Ensure flight leadership selects an NCO team leader and up to 2
additional Airmen to secure the aircraft. Team members will all have
M4s. Ensure the personal cell phone numbers for all team members
are annotated.
NCO:______________________ Contact #_________________
Amn:______________________ Contact #_________________
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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Amn:______________________ Contact #_________________
6 Dispatch a topside patrol to the Armory to retrieve the keys to the
Operations storage room and obtain a downed aircraft kit. Stage the
kit near the Armory or Flight Chief’s office. Ensure the NCO checks
out the satellite phone from the armory via AF FM 1297
7 Go to the O-drive, O:\++SECURITY++\58 SOW Precautionary
Landing Site Directions and conduct the following:
_______Pull up the PowerPoint presentation describing driving
directions to the applicable site
_______Familiarize yourself with the driving directions and aerial
photographs
_______Ensure your flight leadership is informed on the site
locations and directions
8 Ensure team leaves with a fully fueled 4 X 4 with a mobile two-way
radio/sat phone
9 Confirm with Operations staff personnel and the Commander
whether the team will drive to the site or be flown out by 58 SOW
aircraft. (Note: Unless completely inaccessible by vehicle, teams
will drive to the site to ensure vehicle availability for emergency
purposes.)
10 If flying out, coordinate with the 58 WOC on the time and location
for departure and facilitate the team’s availability for on-time
departure
11 Prior to allowing the team to depart base, has permission been
granted from the 377 WSSS/CC and 377 ABW/CC
12 Ensure the team/team leader has done the following prior to
departing base:
_______ Phone numbers to local Law Enforcement Agency
responsible for the area
_______ Rules of Engagement/Safety brief
_______ Accurate instructions to the site, do they understand the
directions?
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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_______ SSIs
_______ One additional radio battery per team member
_______ Secure the downed aircraft response kit and conduct an
inventory of its contents
_______ All team members will take their personal cell phones as
an alternate means of communication
_______ Conduct 30 minute status checks
13 Request termination
14 Notify leadership of termination
15 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) C-5 SF Vehicle Accident-Deadlined vehicle
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-5 October 2015
SF VEHICLE ACCIDENT/DEADLINED VEHICLE
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
2 Instruct patrol(s) not to move the vehicle(s) until an investigation has
been conducted
(If safety for personnel and equipment is a factor, the Flight Chief or
higher may authorize movement of the vehicle)
3 Contact Fire Department, QRC #C-1/1a/1b, if there are any injuries
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, S4, CC and KCP
5 Instruct Flight Chief to obtain AF Form 1168 from all personnel
involved and witnesses
6 Instruct vehicle operator to accomplish the SF Form 91
7 Forward all information to SSCC for blotter entry
8 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
DEADLINED VEHICLE:
9 Deadlined vehicle Reg: Ending mileage:
New vehicle reg: New vehicle mileage:
10 ADDITIONAL REQUIRED INFORMATION:
Transfer all equipment from deadlined vehicle to new vehicle.
Ensure operator annotates AF Form 1800 (Deadlined and New
Vehicle) with all pertinent data.
If the vehicle needs to be towed, notify VCO to initiate the
appropriate action.
11 Accomplish blotter entry
12 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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# (DCNI) C-6 In-Flight Emergency
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-6 October 2015
IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCY
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Notified by:
Type of A/C:
Tail #:
Call Sign:
Nature of emergency:
Number of personnel on board:
Fuel Remaining:
Line #s (if applicable):
If coming from overseas, notify customs via KCP
Landing on Runway:
ETA:
2 Notify all posts/patrols of in-flight emergency
3 Dispatch Coyote-1 to the east side of Bldg #333 and standby
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
5 Obtain wind speed and direction
6 Fire Department, QRC #C-1a, on scene.
Fire Chief’s Name:_____________________________________
Further instructions from Fire Chief:
7 In-Flight emergency terminated
8 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
9 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) C-7 Ground Emergency
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-7 October 2015
GROUND EMERGENCY
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
Location:
2 Notify and dispatch all posts/patrols
3 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
4 Obtain wind speed and direction:
5 Patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____,
S-5_____, C-1_____, C-2_____, C-3_____, C-4_____,G-1/2_____
6 Fire Department, QRC #C-1/1a/1b, on scene.
Evacuation point:
Further instructions from Fire Chief:
7 Cordon established:
Location: ________________ Location: ____________________
Location: ________________ Location: ____________________
Location: ________________ Location: ____________________
Location: ________________ Location: ____________________
8 All non-essential personnel removed to evacuation point
Number of personnel removed: ____________________
Evacuation Point: _______________________________
9 Verify termination from fire chief
10 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
11 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) C-8 HAZMAT
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-8 October 2015
HAZMAT
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Situation:
Location:
2 Notify and dispatch all posts/patrols of HAZMAT situation. Instruct
all affected patrols to don all pertinent alert gear
3 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
4 Obtain wind speed and direction
5 Cordon established
Location: _____________________Location: ________________
Location: _____________________Location: ________________
Location: _____________________Location: ________________
6 Patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____, S-
5_____, C-1_____, C-2_____, C-3_____, C-4_____,G-1/2_____
7 Fire Department on scene
Location: _____________________________
8 HAZMAT on scene.
Location: ______________________________
Name of HAZMAT Team Lead: _____________
Evacuation point: ________________________
Further instructions from HAZMAT team lead:
9 Instruct BDOC to initiate evacuation procedures
Ensure non-essential personnel are evacuated.
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
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Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-8 October 2015
Number of personnel evacuated:____________
10 Hazmat declares area safe
11 Request termination
12 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
13 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) C-9 SSCC Evacuation
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
C-9 October 2015
SSCC/BDOC EVACUATION
STATUS TIME ACTION
1 Receive permission for evacuation from 377 ABW/CC
Notify BDOC to dispatch the remaining IBF patrols and the FBF as
directed by the OSC.
2 Instruct BDOC to recall a certified SC/AM and activate
Alternate/SSCC.
3 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
Note: Recall a System Administrator to take control of AECS
from BDOC (Do not evacuate until sys adm is on scene BDOC)
4 Take all of the following items:
__________Classified material
__________All portable radios
__________Assigned weapons
Note: If classified cannot be removed, ensure 100%
accountability is conducted upon return to SSCC.
5 Log off of all AECS consoles
6 Upon termination return to KUMMSC, Cerberus-2/3/4, ECP and SSCC
will initiate a purge of the facility
BDOC EVACUATION:
7 Disable X-Ray Video capability
8 Instruct BDOC to log off of AECS consoles
9 Switch to LE frequency and instruct LE patrols to “Code 9/__” and
direct senior patrolmen to take charge of forces until Alt/BDOC is
established
10 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
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# (DCNI) CHARLIE 1
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
CHARLIE-1/A/B/C
Version 17-1
KUMMSC BACKUP FORCE
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) You are the Charlie Back-up Force Leader and are responsible for all
Charlie Backup forces to include Charlie 2, 3, and 4. You will respond to KUMMSC
and follow the direction of Guardian1/2, or Scorpion 1. If Guardian 1/2 or Scorpion 1
is incapacitated you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
radio communication capability.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The Leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
ammunition and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
The Alpha member will be armed with an M4/203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
ammunition and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition and
10 rounds of High Explosive ammunition and 2 rounds of White Star ammunition.
The Bravo member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm and with
an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive,
and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter
their actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
or situation.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while respond to
real world and exercise incidents.
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
situations or when directed by higher authority.
 (DCNI) You will also carry 4 Smoke, 4 non-lethal stun hand grenades and 6 CS Gas
Grenades on your post.
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
resources.
DoE SAFE GUARD TRANSPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
 DoE Secure Transport arrivals, you will coordinate your efforts with Scorpion 1.
Assist Scorpion 1 with the following:
 (DCNI) Cerberus 10 will relay the tractor, trailer, convoy CC, vehicle
registrations, and Convoy CC credential information via radio or intercom.
 When DoE arrives at V1AA:
 (DCNI) Verify all the credentials of all convoy personnel entering the topside
controlled area against the DoE Courier Listing.
 (DCNI) If any information does not match, have Site Security Control Center
(SSCC) verify DoE affiliation through MUNS control and the DoE Control
Center.
 (DCNI) Ensure all vehicle information matches previously supplied
information relayed from Cerberus 10.
 (DCNI) Verify the Convoy Commander’s security status and ensure he
vouches for the security of all personnel/vehicles and ensure he vouches that
all arriving convoy vehicles have been sanitized and remained under constant
positive control.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
DOD CONVOY OPERATIONS:
 (DCNI) For inbound or outbound convoy mission, be prepared to assist Scorpion 1
with manual barrier procedures at V1AA.
 (DCNI) Maintain situational awareness of the convoy movement and ensure you are
aware which version of the step code will be used along with specific step codes
applicable to your post.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
 (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the
surrounding area.
 (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion
1.
 (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA
you/Scorpion 1 will:
 (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
 (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
 (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully
pass the correct counter-sign.
 (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and
ascertain reason for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
 (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of
foul play or duress.
 (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist
Scorpion 1 with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well
as those personnel staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to
physically document the number of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You
should not rely on memory to record this information.
 (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged
out of the topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur
regardless of the fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the
AF Form 1109. The annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual
vehicles and vehicle occupants to depart through V1AB.
 (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency
response vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband
materials. Upon discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS
personnel for official determination of “contraband.”
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location,
emergency responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this
case, responders will not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE
Patrol should be pre-positioned outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the
subsequent emergency location. The patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and
annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the subsequent emergency location. Make
contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is knowledgeable with respect to
this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not already in their
possession).
FACILITY EVACUATION:
 (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over
evacuees as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the
exception of hand-held radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not
allowed. If hand-held classified material is present, search the content to verify it is
classified material. Log all evacuees on an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive
control over evacuees until the situation is resolved or they are otherwise released
by the Incident Commander.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV)
parking lot west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased
to avoid congregation of all patrols.
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash,
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
 (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377
WSSS blotter.
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
 (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building
(UB), C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
 (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted
through the use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside
patrol in the event the card readers are not operational.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
 (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will
make telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name
and badge number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If
AECS is not operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted
Area Badge Listing (MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside
patrol to meet the individual at the applicable location and verify the identity of the
personnel requesting access. If there appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a
challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out, notify SSCC and allow entry.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring
avenues of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to
potential aggressors.
 (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible
concealment in and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such
areas for observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections
and checks of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
 (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour
checks are conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e.
Armory, Utility Building, C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
 (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not
congregate for longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or
Flight Chief.
 (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
 (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle
denial barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post
and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie-1 is all secure and ready for
inspection.”
 (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective
Foot Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate
your walking patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate
coverage of the surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and
termination of all walking patrols.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System
(PSRS) alarm annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map.
Upon arriving at the applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and
report your findings back to SSCC.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

334
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# (DCNI) CHARLIE 2
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
CHARLIE-2/A/B/C
Version 17-1
KUMMSC BACKUP FORCE
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding
to contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 3, and 4. If the situation
demands you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
radio communication capability.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The Leader and Charlie member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds
of 5.56mm ammunition and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point
ammunition. The Alpha member will be armed with an M4/203 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow point ammunition
and 10 rounds of High Explosive ammunition and White Star ammunition. The
Bravo member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm and with an
M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive,
and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter
their actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
to real world and exercise incidents.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
situations or when directed by higher authority.
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
resources.
DoE SAFE GUARD TRANSPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
 DoE Secure Transport arrivals, you will coordinate your efforts with Scorpion 1.
Assist Scorpion 1 with the following:
 (DCNI) Cerberus 10 will relay the tractor, trailer, convoy CC, vehicle
registrations, and Convoy CC credential information via radio or intercom.
 When DoE arrives at V1AA:
 (DCNI) Verify all the credentials of all convoy personnel entering the topside
controlled area against the DoE Courier Listing.
 (DCNI) If any information does not match, have Site Security Control Center
(SSCC) verify DoE affiliation through MUNS control and the DoE Control
Center.
 (DCNI) Ensure all vehicle information matches previously supplied
information relayed from Cerberus 10.
 (DCNI) Verify the Convoy Commander’s security status and ensure he
vouches for the security of all personnel/vehicles and ensure he vouches that
all arriving convoy vehicles have been sanitized and remained under constant
positive control.
DOD CONVOY OPERATIONS:
 (DCNI) For inbound or outbound convoy mission, be prepared to assist Scorpion 1
with manual barrier procedures at V1AA.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
 (DCNI) Maintain situational awareness of the convoy movement and ensure you are
aware which version of the step code will be used along with specific step codes
applicable to your post.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
 (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the
surrounding area.
 (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion
1.
 (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA
you/Scorpion 1 will:
 (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
 (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
 (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully
pass the correct counter-sign.
 (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and
ascertain reason for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
 (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of
foul play or duress.
 (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist
Scorpion 1 with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well
as those personnel staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to
physically document the number of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You
should not rely on memory to record this information.
 (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged
out of the topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur
regardless of the fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the
AF Form 1109. The annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual
vehicles and vehicle occupants to depart through V1AB.
 (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency
response vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband
materials. Upon discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS
personnel for official determination of “contraband.”
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
 (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location,
emergency responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this
case, responders will not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE
Patrol should be pre-positioned outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the
subsequent emergency location. The patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and
annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the subsequent emergency location. Make
contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is knowledgeable with respect to
this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not already in their
possession).
FACILITY EVACUATION:
 (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over
evacuees as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the
exception of hand-held radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not
allowed. If hand-held classified material is present, search the content to verify it is
classified material. Log all evacuees on an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive
control over evacuees until the situation is resolved or they are otherwise released
by the Incident Commander.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV)
parking lot west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased
to avoid congregation of all patrols.
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash,
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
 (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377
WSSS blotter.
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
 (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building
(UB), C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
 (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted
through the use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside
patrol in the event the card readers are not operational.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
 (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will
make telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name
and badge number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If
AECS is not operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted
Area Badge Listing (MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside
patrol to meet the individual at the applicable location and verify the identity of the
personnel requesting access. If there appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a
challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out, notify SSCC and allow entry.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring
avenues of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to
potential aggressors.
 (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible
concealment in and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such
areas for observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections
and checks of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
 (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour
checks are conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e.
Armory, Utility Building, C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
 (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not
congregate for longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or
Flight Chief.
 (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
 (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle
denial barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post
and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 2 is all secure and ready for
inspection.”
 (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective
Foot Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate
your walking patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate
coverage of the surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and
termination of all walking patrols.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
 (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System
(PSRS) alarm annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map.
Upon arriving at the applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and
report your findings back to SSCC.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

333
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@ -1,333 +0,0 @@
# (DCNI) CHARLIE 3
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
CHARLIE-3/A/B/C
Version 17-1
KUMMSC BACKUP FORCE
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding
to contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 2, and 4. If the situation
demands you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
radio communication capability.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The Leader and Charlie member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds
of 5.56mm ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19 hollow-point ammunition.
The Alpha member will be armed with an M4/203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition and 10
rounds of High Explosive ammunition and White Star ammunition. The Bravo
member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm and an M9 with 30
rounds of hollow point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive,
and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter
their actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
to real world and exercise incidents.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
situations or when directed by higher authority.
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
resources.
DoE SAFE GUARD TRANSPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
 DoE Secure Transport arrivals, you will coordinate your efforts with Scorpion 1.
Assist Scorpion 1 with the following:
 (DCNI) Cerberus 10 will relay the tractor, trailer, convoy CC, vehicle
registrations, and Convoy CC credential information via radio or intercom.
 When DoE arrives at V1AA:
 (DCNI) Verify all the credentials of all convoy personnel entering the topside
controlled area against the DoE Courier Listing.
 (DCNI) If any information does not match, have Site Security Control Center
(SSCC) verify DoE affiliation through MUNS control and the DoE Control
Center.
 (DCNI) Ensure all vehicle information matches previously supplied
information relayed from Cerberus 10.
 (DCNI) Verify the Convoy Commander’s security status and ensure he
vouches for the security of all personnel/vehicles and ensure he vouches that
all arriving convoy vehicles have been sanitized and remained under constant
positive control.
DOD CONVOY OPERATIONS:
 (DCNI) For inbound or outbound convoy mission, be prepared to assist Scorpion 1
with manual barrier procedures at V1AA.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
 (DCNI) Maintain situational awareness of the convoy movement and ensure you are
aware which version of the step code will be used along with specific step codes
applicable to your post.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
 (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the
surrounding area.
 (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion
1.
 (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA
you/Scorpion 1 will:
 (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
 (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
 (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully
pass the correct counter-sign.
 (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and
ascertain reason for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
 (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of
foul play or duress.
 (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist
Scorpion 1 with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well
as those personnel staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to
physically document the number of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You
should not rely on memory to record this information.
 (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged
out of the topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur
regardless of the fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the
AF Form 1109. The annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual
vehicles and vehicle occupants to depart through V1AB.
 (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency
response vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband
materials. Upon discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS
personnel for official determination of “contraband.”
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
 (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location,
emergency responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this
case, responders will not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE
Patrol should be pre-positioned outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the
subsequent emergency location. The patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and
annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the subsequent emergency location. Make
contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is knowledgeable with respect to
this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not already in their
possession).
FACILITY EVACUATION:
 (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over
evacuees as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the
exception of hand-held radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not
allowed. If hand-held classified material is present, search the content to verify it is
classified material. Log all evacuees on an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive
control over evacuees until the situation is resolved or they are otherwise released
by the Incident Commander.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV)
parking lot west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased
to avoid congregation of all patrols.
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash,
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
 (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377
WSSS blotter.
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
 (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building
(UB), C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
 (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted
through the use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside
patrol in the event the card readers are not operational.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
 (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will
make telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name
and badge number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If
AECS is not operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted
Area Badge Listing (MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside
patrol to meet the individual at the applicable location and verify the identity of the
personnel requesting access. If there appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a
challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out, notify SSCC and allow entry.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring
avenues of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to
potential aggressors.
 (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible
concealment in and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such
areas for observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections
and checks of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
 (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour
checks are conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e.
Armory, Utility Building, C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
 (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not
congregate for longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or
Flight Chief.
 (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
 (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle
denial barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post
and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 3 is all secure and ready for
inspection.”
 (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective
Foot Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate
your walking patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate
coverage of the surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and
termination of all walking patrols.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
 (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System
(PSRS) alarm annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map.
Upon arriving at the applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and
report your findings back to SSCC.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

340
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# (DCNI) CHARLIE 4
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
CHARLIE-4/A/B/C
Version 17-1
KUMMSC BACKUP FORCE
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding
to contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 2, and 3. If the situation
demands you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
radio communication capability.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The Leader and Charlie member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds
of 5.56mm ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of hollow-point ammunition. The
Alpha member will be armed with an M4/203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of hollow-point ammunition and 10 rounds of
High Explosive ammunition and 2 rounds of White Star ammunition. The Bravo
member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm and an M9 with 30
rounds of hollow-point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive,
and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter
their actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
to real world and exercise incidents.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
situations or when directed by higher authority.
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
resources.
DoE SAFE GUARD TRANSPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
 DoE Secure Transport arrivals, you will coordinate your efforts with Scorpion 1.
Assist Scorpion 1 with the following:
 (DCNI) Cerberus 10 will relay the tractor, trailer, convoy CC, vehicle
registrations, and Convoy CC credential information via radio or intercom.
 When DoE arrives at V1AA:
 (DCNI) Verify all the credentials of all convoy personnel entering the topside
controlled area against the DoE Courier Listing.
 (DCNI) If any information does not match, have Site Security Control Center
(SSCC) verify DoE affiliation through MUNS control and the DoE Control
Center.
 (DCNI) Ensure all vehicle information matches previously supplied
information relayed from Cerberus 10.
 (DCNI) Verify the Convoy Commander’s security status and ensure he
vouches for the security of all personnel/vehicles and ensure he vouches that
all arriving convoy vehicles have been sanitized and remained under constant
positive control.
DOD CONVOY OPERATIONS:
 (DCNI) For inbound or outbound convoy mission, be prepared to assist Scorpion 1
with manual barrier procedures at V1AA.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
 (DCNI) Maintain situational awareness of the convoy movement and ensure you are
aware which version of the step code will be used along with specific step codes
applicable to your post.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
 (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the
surrounding area.
 (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion
1.
 (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA
you/Scorpion 1 will:
 (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
 (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
 (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully
pass the correct counter-sign.
 (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and
ascertain reason for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
 (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of
foul play or duress.
 (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist
Scorpion 1 with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well
as those personnel staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to
physically document the number of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You
should not rely on memory to record this information.
 (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged
out of the topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur
regardless of the fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the
AF Form 1109. The annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual
vehicles and vehicle occupants to depart through V1AB.
 (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency
response vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband
materials. Upon discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS
personnel for official determination of “contraband.”
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location,
emergency responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this
case, responders will not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE
Patrol should be pre-positioned outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the
subsequent emergency location. The patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and
annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the subsequent emergency location. Make
contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is knowledgeable with respect to
this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not already in their
possession).
FACILITY EVACUATION:
 (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over
evacuees as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the
exception of hand-held radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not
allowed. If hand-held classified material is present, search the content to verify it is
classified material. Log all evacuees on an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive
control over evacuees until the situation is resolved or they are otherwise released
by the Incident Commander.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV)
parking lot west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased
to avoid congregation of all patrols.
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash,
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
 (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377
WSSS blotter.
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
 (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building
(UB), C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
 (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted
through the use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside
patrol in the event the card readers are not operational.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
 (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will
make telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name
and badge number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If
AECS is not operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted
Area Badge Listing (MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside
patrol to meet the individual at the applicable location and verify the identity of the
personnel requesting access. If there appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a
challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out, notify SSCC and allow entry.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring
avenues of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to
potential aggressors.
 (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible
concealment in and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such
areas for observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections
and checks of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
 (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour
checks are conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e.
Armory, Utility Building, C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
 (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not
congregate for longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or
Flight Chief.
 (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
 (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle
denial barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post
and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 4 is all secure and ready for
inspection.”
 (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective
Foot Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate
your walking patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate
coverage of the surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and
termination of all walking patrols.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System
(PSRS) alarm annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map.
Upon arriving at the applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and
report your findings back to SSCC.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

310
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@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
# (DCNI) COYOTE 12
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 12
Version 17-1
Reflex Delta Billet Entry Controller
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 You are the Entry Controller (EC) for all Reflex Delta missions and will stay within 25
feet of the established entry control point of the PL1 restricted area unless properly
relieved.
 Additionally, in conjunction with Coyote 13 (Reflex Delta Close Bound Sentry), you
comprise a 2-man Internal Security Response Team. Coordinate with Coyote 13 to
ensure adequate coverage of the restricted area’s interior. To the greatest extent
possible, remain 180° apart with respect to the restricted area boundary.
 (DCNI) You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial Backup Force IBF and will not
respond to KUMMSC contingency operations.
 The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
immediate response capability to the area inside the perimeter in order to defeat an
adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
 You will control entry and access to Reflex Delta aircraft using authenticated Entry
Authority Lists (EAL). For personnel desiring entry, compare the provided
identification credentials against the information listed on the authenticated EAL. All
information must match or entry is not authorized.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
 Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the orange radio
communication box.
 A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
to Coyote 4’s area.
POST LIMITS:
 You will stay within 25 feet of the established entry control point of the PL1 restricted
area unless properly relieved.
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmission using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1
resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who will
contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition
and M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
DOD UNCLASSIFED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Ensure those entering the roped restricted area must be on an authenticated EAL or
authenticated Aircrew orders.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body
above the waistline.
 Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
topside controlled area
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot
cargo pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline
photography letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If
photographers do not possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area
badge) with the proper open area, they must be annotated on a properly
authenticated EAL or be escorted by someone with the proper open area.
3
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare
the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 12 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. You will
assume entry control duties and Coyote 13 will assume Close Boundary Sentry
duties.
 In conjunction with Coyote 14, make contact with the Aircraft commander as soon as
possible to obtain EAL information.
 Acceptable EAL information will come in Aircrew Orders or an Interim EAL
template.
 Aircrew Orders are provided by the pilot or mission commander and if used,
must contain the following information:
 Name
 Rank
 Organization
 Last 6 of Social Security Number or Controlled Picture Identification
Number
 Badge number
 Dates of Visit
 Clearance Status
 Expiration Date
 If the Crew Orders do not contain all information listed above, you may hand-
write in the missing information, if practical. If hand-writing the information in on
the Aircrew Orders would make them unreadable, use the Interim EAL template.
 If Aircrew Orders are not available, use the Interim EAL template. Fill in all the
blocks on the template to include all members of the aircrew.
DOD UNCLASSIFED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
 Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
 If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
 Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, Coyote-1 will take the both
documents and make copies for distribution as follows.
 One copy for Coyote 1(Flightline Area Supervisor)
 One copy for Coyote 14 (Reflex Delta Area Supervisor)
 One copy (original) for Coyote 12 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller)
 One copy for the Mission Commander
 One copy for SSCC
 You will use the authenticated EAL to control entry at the designated Entry Control
Point to the roped restricted area boundary.
 If personnel are being escorted into the restricted area, prior to allowing entry to
and exit from the restricted area, you must verify with escort officials that they
have completed an inspection of all vehicles and hand-carried items of those
they are escorting. NOTE: This entails two separate inspections; an inspection
prior to entry and an inspection prior to exit.
 The on-duty Flight Chief or Flight Commander will meet the mission commander and
deliver a local area security briefing as outlined in Attachment 15. If the Flight Chief
or Flight Commander are not available, Coyote 14 will brief the mission commander
on the contents of Attachment 15.
 The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
 The presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
concept within the roped restricted area boundary.
 You will ensure enforcement of the two-person concept before granting access to
the aircraft. Enforce the two-person control by using an EAL to identify two
authorized individuals prior to allowing entry. Certified 2-person control team
members are identified with an “X” next to their name on the Entry Authority List
provided by the aircrew.
5
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
vehicle pass.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted at the entry control point of the Reflex Delta restricted
area.
 If you have a vehicle, Inspect it using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from
trash, clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
 Account for SSIs, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
DOD UNCLASSIFED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
7
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

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# (DCNI) COYOTE 13
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 13
Version 17-1
Reflex Delta Close Bound Sentry
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 You are the flight line Close Boundary Sentry (CBS) for all Reflex Delta missions.
The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
immediate response capability to the area inside the perimeter in order to defeat an
adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
 Additionally, in conjunction with Coyote 12 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller), you
comprise a 2-man Internal Security Response Team. Coordinate with Coyote 12 to
ensure adequate coverage of the restricted area’s interior. To the greatest extent
possible, remain 180° apart with respect to the restricted area boundary.
 (DCNI) You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial Backup Force IBF and will not
respond to KUMMSC contingency operations.
 Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the orange radio
communication box.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
 (Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes, cones,
stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you have
enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20 stanchions, 4
RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered to Coyote 4’s
area.
 You must wear all required gear when responding to any situation or alarm. This
includes Flak Vest with Level IV ballistic plates, helmet, and gas mask with
appropriately filled out DD Form 1574/fit test.
 You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 If leaving your vehicle, all required gear must be worn.
POST LIMITS:
 You will remain within the restricted area perimeter and to the greatest extent
possible, remain 180° from Coyote 12 with respect to the restricted area boundary.
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
PL1 resource are prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC
who will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition
and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. You will
assume Close Boundary Sentry duties and Coyote 12 will assume entry control
duties
 The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
 The presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
concept within the roped restricted area boundary. When in effect, you will monitor
enforcement of the two-person concept
 SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Ensure those entering the roped restricted area must be on an authenticated EAL or
authenticated Aircrew orders.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body
above the waistline.
 Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
restricted areas.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
topside controlled area
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to hot cargo pads
(to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare
the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 13 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
vehicle pass.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted at the entry control point of the Reflex Delta restricted
area.
 If you have a vehicle, inspect it using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash,
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

303
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 14.md
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@ -1,303 +0,0 @@
# (DCNI) COYOTE 14
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 14
Version 17-1
Reflex Delta Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
(U) PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) You are the dedicated ISRT for all Reflex Delta missions which will be
located on the 377th ABW parking ramp. You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial
Backup Force IBF and will not respond to KUMMSC contingency operations.
 The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
immediate response capability to this perimeter in order to defeat an adversary
before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
 The ranking member of this team is the Reflex Delta Area Supervisor and
responsible to ensure all security requirements are maintained.
 Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the reflex delta kit.
 A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
to ` 4’s area.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
1
POST LIMITS:
 (U) You will stay within the 377 Air Base Wing restricted area unless properly
relieved.
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition
and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
2
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Ensure those entering the roped restricted area are on an authenticated EAL or
authenticated Aircrew orders.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their
body above the waistline.
 Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
topside controlled area
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access the hot cargo
pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
discrepancies are discovered.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
3
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 14 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. Coyote
12 will assume entry control duties and Coyote 13 will assume Close Boundary
Sentry duties.
 In conjunction with Coyote 12, make contact with the Aircraft commander as soon as
possible to obtain Entry Authority List (EAL) information.
 Aircrew Orders are provided by the pilot or mission commander and if used,
must contain the following information:
 Name
 Rank
 Organization
 Last 6 of Social Security Number or Controlled Picture Identification
Number
 Badge number
 Dates of Visit
 Clearance Status
 Expiration Date
 If the Crew Orders do not contain all information listed above, you may hand-
write in the missing information, if practical. If hand-writing the information in
on the Aircrew Orders would make them unreadable, use the Interim EAL
template.
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
 Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
4
 If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
 Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, Coyote-1 will take the both
documents and make copies for distribution as follows.
 One copy for Coyote 1(Flightline Area Supervisor)
 One copy for Coyote 14 (Reflex Delta Area Supervisor)
 One copy (original) for Coyote 12 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller)
 One copy for the Mission Commander
 One copy for SSCC
 Coyote 10 will use the authenticated EAL to control entry at the designated Entry
Control Point to the roped restricted area boundary.
 The on-duty Flight Chief or Flight Commander will meet the mission commander and
deliver a local area security briefing as outlined in Attachment 15. If the Flight Chief
or Flight Commander are not available, you will brief the mission commander on the
contents of Attachment 15.
 The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material. The
presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
concept within the roped restricted area boundary.
 (Certified 2-person control team members are identified with an “X” next to their
name on the Entry Authority List provided by the aircrew.
 SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
 If TPC material is onboard an unoccupied aircraft and cannot be removed, the
crew will secure the material in an approved onboard container. SF subsequently
ensure enforcement of the TPC rule upon granting access to the aircraft. Enforce
two-person control by using an EAL to identify two authorized individuals prior to
allowing entry.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
vehicle pass.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
5
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
 377th ABW Transient Ramp Restricted Area lights are controlled by a light box on a
pole to the east of building 333 (Base Operations). The light box contains several
individual switches and a master power switch. In order to turn these lights on and
off use only the individual switches, always leaving the master power switch turned
on.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted immediately adjacent to the roped restricted area
of the Reflex Delta on 377th ABW parking ramp.
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
 Account for SSIs, Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC), DOE courier listing, and AF
Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
6
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
7
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

246
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# (DCNI) COYOTE 7
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 7-7A
Version 17-1
Randolph Gate EC/Search
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) You are responsible for controlling entry/exit of all pedestrian/vehicle traffic
entering through the Randolph Gate. You will control entry utilizing KAFB Restricted
Area badge or home station AF FM 1199 against a properly authenticated EAL. You
will conduct a search of all vehicles entering the Randolph Gate.
 You will perform your duties in a highly vigilant manner consistent with the Nuclear
Weapons Security Standards.
 You will employ a Deter, Detect, Delay, Deny, and Defeat approach to your duties.
This approach is critical to the “Defense in Depth” strategy; you must detect and
defeat an adversary as far away from KUMMSC as possible.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Your post limits are within close proximately to effectively control entry
through the Randolph Gate.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The leader and alpha member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition as well as an M9 with 30 rounds of ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
to real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your immediate area and report any
discrepancies to SSCC.
 You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
SSCC.
 Ensure all personnel entering your ECP display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted
area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the outermost
garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body, above the waistline.
 Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
flight line restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area,
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
NMANG restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
KUMMSC topside controlled area
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot
cargo pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a
properly authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
 Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare
the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
 In the event of an installation gate runner you will immediately close your gate and
will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at the discretion of SSCC or higher authority.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 7-7A is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will immediately shut your gate and respond
in conjunction with Coyote 1. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing PL1 resources
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
 Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
 Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and challenge, initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid
flight line POV vehicle pass.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted at the Randolph Gate.
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
 Ensure that you sign the AF Form 1800.
 You will verify all current SSIs and EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have
been taken to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure
all documents are destroyed appropriately.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

246
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# (DCNI) COYOTE 8
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 8-8A
Version 17-1
Presidential Gate EC/Search
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) You are responsible for controlling entry/exit of all pedestrian/vehicle traffic
entering through the Presidential Gate. You will control entry utilizing KAFB
Restricted Area badge or home station AF FM 1199 against a properly authenticated
EAL. You will conduct a search of all vehicles entering the Presidential Gate.
 You will perform your duties in a highly vigilant manner consistent with the Nuclear
Weapons Security Standards.
 You will employ a Deter, Detect, Delay, Deny, and Defeat approach to your duties.
This approach is critical to the “Defense in Depth” strategy; you must detect and
defeat an adversary as far away from KUMMSC as possible.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Your post limits are within close proximately to effectively control entry
through the Presidential Gate.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition as well as an M9 with 30 rounds of ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure all member maintain ammunition and required equipment while respond to
real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your immediate area and report any
discrepancies to SSCC.
 You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
SSCC.
 Ensure all personnel entering your ECP display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted
area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the outermost
garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body, above the waistline.
 Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
flight line restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area,
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
NMANG restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
KUMMSC topside controlled area
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot
cargo pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a
properly authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
 Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare
the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
 In the event of an installation gate runner you will immediately close your gate and
will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at the discretion of SSCC or higher authority.
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 8-8A is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will immediately shut your gate and respond
in conjunction with Coyote 1. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing PL1 resources
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
 Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
 Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and challenge, initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid
flight line POV vehicle pass.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted at the Presidential Gate.
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
 Ensure that you sign the AF Form 1800.
 You will verify all current SSIs and EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have
been taken to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure
all documents are destroyed appropriately.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

297
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# (DCNI) COYOTE 9
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 9
Version 17-1
Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Act as an additional Internal Security Response Team for KAFB flightline,
also when directed respond as an additional part of the 15 personnel Initial Backup
Force (IBF) for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex
(KUMMSC).
 (DCNI) Provide immediate response capability as the ISRT for the KAFB flightline
restricted areas not to exceed 5 minutes or if assigned to a specific restricted area
when protection level resources are present in your area you must maintain a 3
minute response capability.
 Note: (DCNI) Response Times to KUMMSC
 (DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Within the KAFB flighline not to exceed 5 minutes from flightline restricted
areas. If assigned a specific restricted area your post limits are within that particular
restricted area you are assigned until properly relieved.
 (DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct BAF responses to Protection
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
Level 1 resources.
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
point ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
to real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your area, plot all aircraft with your
area and up-channel to SSCC.
 You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
SSCC.
 Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
 If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the
Flight Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flight line restricted areas display an
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their
body, above the waistline.
 Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
flight line restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area,
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
NMANG restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
KUMMSC topside controlled area
 Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot cargo
pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a
properly authenticated EAL for access to flight line restricted areas.
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 In conjunction with Coyote 1 and other coyote patrols, you will conduct a daily visual
check of all flight line physical security facilities, including boundary barrier systems,
gates, manholes, grates, and structures for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative
equipment. You will radio SSCC upon completion of this check. Reference
Attachments 13 and 14 of this instruction for guidance.
 Flight line Photography - Validate that all flight line photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flight line photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flight line Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
discrepancies are discovered.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
Ensure a minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are randomly
accomplished throughout the shift within your respective area. Radio SSCC and
inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the perimeter/RAB
checks. Exception: When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are present,
you will not be required to conduct RAB checks.
 In the event of a gate runner and you do not have protection level resources in your
respective area will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 9 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing PL1 resources.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
 Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
 Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
 150th FW NMANG Restricted Area
 There are fifteen light poles in the 150th FW NMANG restricted area. These light
poles each contain four to six lights; however, only two lights will be illuminated
on each pole at night. The purpose of this configuration is to have the other
lights act as emergency back-ups. The emergency back-up lights are operated
manually by way of a switches located an unlocked box at the base of each
individual light pole.
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 (DCNI) You could be dispatched to Pad 5 to initiate security operations until the
arrival of recalled personnel.
 (DCNI) You will assist with sweeps for Pad 5 prior to Aircraft arrival. In the event
the aircraft should reach Pad 5 before the entire response force is in-place, you will
be posted as a fire team until recalled personnel arrives.
REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
 A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
to Coyote 4’s area.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 (Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
vehicle pass.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted within the 150th NMANG restricted area.
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Ensure that you sign the AF Form 1800.
 You will verify all current EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have been taken
to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure all
documents are destroyed appropriately.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

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# (DCNI) Cerberus 1
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
CERBERUS 1
Version 17-1
KUMMSC Underground Area Supervisor
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Supervise all Security Forces operations as the Downstairs Area Supervisor
for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex
(KUMMSC).
 (DCNI) Respond to security incidents and emergencies as dispatched by command
and control elements.
 Conduct post check/visits with Cerberus 2/3/10, Romeo 1, and SSCC.
 (DCNI) During hostile situations, you will provide initial command and control for all
security incidents located within KUMMSC until arrival of back-up forces or
termination of all hostile elements.
 (DCNI) Provide armed response to security incidents within the KUMMSC entry
tunnel, exit tunnel, loading dock, and on the high side of B-1/2.
 (DCNI) Up-channel information to Guardian-1/2 as needed and notify SSCC of all
pertinent information.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Remain within the KUMMSC underground facility unless proper relieved.
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within 10ft of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) At a minimum, the leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210
rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm
hollow-point ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Ensure ECP & SSCC conduct a thorough review of the AF FM 164’s vs
ACES during their changeover.
 (DCNI) Conduct a check of Enclosure 12 once per hour during contingency
operations (tamper switch failure, etc.) or when instructed by SSCC.
 Assist Cerberus 10 with processing large escort groups. If the situation allows,
attempt to have the AF Form 1109 filled out prior to the escort group arrival. Ensure
all areas are clean, organized, free of clutter, and presentable.
 (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the restricted/limited area
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
 (DCNI) Ensure compliance with the two-person concept within exclusion areas. An
exclusion area will exist in Brandt Hall when Protection Level 1 resources are in
transit between A/B sides, or in route to the Loading Dock.
 (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually pump the blast doors.
Detailed instructions on how to pump the blast doors are located within the brown
tool box adjacent to B-3/4.
 Be familiar with process and procedures outlining manual operation for all the
vehicle doors and barriers.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 1 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
 RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest
priority until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their
actions to gain unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing PL1 resources.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
(U) ENTRY CONTROL PROCEDURES:
 (DCNI) Upon entry and exit of the facility, all personnel granted unescorted entry,
along with their hand-carried items, are subject to inspection by security personnel
for readily detectable prohibited materials and contraband items.
 (DCNI) EXEMPTIONS: Because of early expiration of service life, possible damage
to equipment, possible injury to personnel, accountability, exposure to hazardous
materials, need-to-know basis, or equipment needing continuous humidity
protection, the following items are exempt from inspection:
 (DCNI) Hermetically sealed munitions supplies and equipment (e.g., limited life
components, explosive ejector cartridges).
 (DCNI) Munitions supplies and equipment in heat sealed barrier bags (e.g.,
humidity indicators, missile components, etc).
 (DCNI) Munitions containers with intact shipping or storage seals (e.g.,
deployment kits and classified munitions).
 (DCNI) Limited Life Components in non-commercial closed wooden or
cardboard containers with affixed shipping documents.
 (DCNI) All personnel will place hand-carried items in a plastic bins for screening via
X-Ray.
 (DCNI) Ensure Cerberus 10 verifies the items via X-Ray monitor and ensure all
hand-carried items are identified. If items cannot be identified, the X-Ray will be
reversed and the owner and EC will accomplish a hand-on verification of the item
unless it is considered a possible threat.
 (DCNI) Items such as electronic circuit boards or unusual looking tools will be
closely scrutinized and treated as a possible threat until further investigation proves
otherwise. Contact munitions control for authorization and clarification of
questionable items entering/departing the area.
 (DCNI) Personnel will be directed through the metal detector. If the detector
annunciates, the individual will be directed to identify any items that may be causing
the alarm. Any identified items removed from their person will be processed through
the X-ray for screening.
 (DCNI) Instruct the individual to re-process through the metal detector, subsequent
metal detector alarms will be investigated with a hand-held trans frisker until positive
identification of all items can be made.
 (DCNI) For inbound vehicle processing, only the vehicle driver will be allowed within
a vehicle during vehicle entry of KUMMSC. Exception: DoE SGT/SST vehicles and
vehicles associated with emergency responses. Passengers will dismount at V-2
and process the facility as pedestrians.
 (DCNI) A single member of the Loading Dock ISRT (Cerberus 4 if posted) may be
dispatched to the Sally Port to assist with vehicle inspections. Vehicle inspections
will not occur until the driver has been processed through the booths and has re-
entered the Sally Port from D-7
 (DCNI) Ensure systematic and thorough inspections of all vehicles entering or
exiting the facility are conducted. Vehicles will be inspected for unauthorized
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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personnel, readily detectable prohibited contraband items, explosive devices,
contraband, etc. Each vehicle will be given at least a visual inspection of readily
accessible areas such as driver and passenger compartments, cargo carrying area,
engine compartment, and undercarriage.
 (DCNI) Ensure the use of flashlights and undercarriage mirrors as needed to
accomplish undercarriage inspections.
 (DCNI) Outbound vehicles may contain passengers. Ensure the slot number (and
visitor’s badges, if applicable) of persons exiting the facility via vehicle at V-6 is
obtained from Cerberus-4 (if posted). Make sure the orange cards are removed
from the badge binder.
 (DCNI) For escorted personnel, ensure the escort briefing is given in the presence
of a certified EC prior to allowing entry into the restricted area. Escorts will process
first and stand by on the low side of the booths for escortee processing. Those
requiring escort will be screened and verified via EAL, signed in via AF Form 1109
Visitor Register Log, and issued an 1199CG Visitor’s Badge.
 (DCNI) All escorts and escortee(s) will process through the booths. Booths will be
manually unlocked for escortee(s), escorts will process booths normally. The Sally
Port will not be used as a staging area.
 (DCNI) Record entry and exit times of escorted personnel and retrieve 1199 CG
Visitor’s Badge from escorted personnel upon departure from KUMMSC.
 (DCNI) Ensure Cerberus 4 obtains the visitor’s badge(s) for escorted personnel
departing the facility via vehicle at V-6 if applicable.
DoE SST/SGT, DEPARTURE, AND RON PROCEDURES:
 (DCNI) Prior to proceeding down the entry tunnel, topside patrols will verify DoE
credentials against the DoE Agent Listing and verify that DoE vehicles have been
sanitized and remained under constant observation.
 (DCNI) Do not inspect inbound or outbound DoE Vehicles transporting Type I or
Type II cargo, to include decoy and support vehicles.
 (DCNI) DoE vehicles entering or exiting KUMMSC cold or entering/exiting for
MUNS training operations (no Type I or Type II cargo) will be searched.
 (DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher
authority.
 (DCNI) If DoE vehicles are processing the facility for something other than a
Type I or Type II mission (training event), they must be inspected. Follow
standard vehicle inspection procedures in these cases.
 (DCNI) During loading dock upload and download operations, when B1-4 are open,
ensure all final denial positions are posted in Brandt Hall and Cerberus 4 (if posted)
is posted on V-5 and V-6. Also ensure D-12 and D-13 are chained.
 (DCNI) Ensure the retaining pins on V5 and V6 have been lowered when hot
SGTs/SSTs are present. Performing this action will prevent external control of the
bi-fold doors by the ECP as well as inadvertent/unauthorized openings.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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 (DCNI) If SGT/SST is remaining overnight (RON), ensure checks are conducted on
SGTs/SSTs every 4 hours, or every 2 hours when the CCTV is inoperative. Check
the seal number on the rear door, the locks, and the security lights on the rear of the
trailer.
 (DCNI) SGTs are equipped with three warning lights on the rear and front of the
trailer. The lights on the front are located in the upper right corner and the lights
on the rear are located on the upper left side or centered across the top. The
lights, from left to right, dictate:
 (DCNI) Alarm Monitor (AM) Light (amber). The left light, as you are looking
at the trailer, indicates the status of the SGT internal security system. This
will illuminate when the internal security system of the SGT has been
activated. The light will remain flashing for 100 seconds after activation.
 (DCNI) Temperature Alarm (TA) Light (amber). The center light, as you are
looking at the trailer, indicates the internal temperature status of the SGT.
This will illuminate when the temperature is too hot or too cold.
 (DCNI) Fire Alarm (FA) Light (amber). The right light, as you are looking at
the trailer, will illuminate to signify a fire condition in the SGT or when
temperature conditions inside indicate conditions are prevalent for an internal
fire.
 (DCNI) NOTE: Notify SSCC immediately if any light is illuminated or
flashing.
LOADING DOCK OPERATIONS:
 (DCNI) Ensure D12 and D13 are chained. Maintain accountability of personnel and
vehicles within the loading dock at all times.
INTER AREA/COVOY MOVEMENT PROCEDURES:
 (DCNI) During inter area movements; ensure all final denial positions are posted in
Brandt Hall until the movement is terminated.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES:
 (DCNI) During an emergency response, maintain visual and accountability of Fire
Department (FD) personnel upon their arrival into your area. Ensure all personnel
and vehicles have been inspected prior to exiting the limited area. After FD departs,
coordinate a purge of all areas entered by FD personnel, to include all administration
areas. Relay status of all areas to SSCC upon completion of purges. NOTE: If a
fire exists in the administration areas, notify SSCC and attempt to extinguish
the fire using available fire extinguishers.
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
 When emergency evacuation is warranted:
 (DCNI) Ensure non-essential personnel are clear of administration areas.
 (DCNI) Special Function MC2 will be initiated. All personnel must depart in an
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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orderly fashion.
 (DCNI) Direct all evacuating personnel through B1-4. In conjunction with
Cerberus 4 (if posted), route evacuating personnel to V-6.
 (DCNI) Ensure personnel are not departing with ANY hand carried items.
NOTE: The only authorized items are classified material and/or radio. All
other items will be confiscated immediately and abandoned in place.
 (DCNI) Unless obstructions don’t allow exit through V6, all evacuating personnel
will exit loading dock through V6. If the situation allows, have all evacuating
personnel swipe out at V6. Topside patrols will accomplish AF Form 1109
annotations for all evacuating personnel.
MANUAL PROCEDURES FOR BI-FOLD DOORS:
 (DCNI) Be familiar with procedures to manually open V5 and V6. The bi-fold doors
will require manual procedures when contingency operations exist or if directed by
SSCC or flight leadership. To manually open the doors:
 (DCNI) Ensure the locking pins are raised.
 (DCNI) Locate the manual override valve located on the piping adjacent to the
doors. Turn the valve handle so that it points directly up or directly down. The
valve handle should parallel to (in line with) the pipe it’s attached to.
 (DCNI) Push or pull the doors open or closed.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Inspect your post and ensure it is free from trash, clean, organized and fully
operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Visit all underground posts immediately after shift change to ensure proper
changeovers have taken place. Make sure applicable changeover checklists have
been used and all items have been accounted for.
 (DCNI) Ensure all ballistic barrier are in operational condition, check barrier for:
 (DCNI) Maneuverability (ensure they roll).
 (DCNI) Cleanliness (armored glass is clean).
 (DCNI) Operability (raise and lower).
 (DCNI) Serviceability (no cracks, no graffiti).
 (DCNI) Note: Report discrepancies to SSCC or flight leadership immediately.
 (DCNI) Ensure a lighting check in conducted and relay any discrepancies
immediately to SSCC.
 (DCNI) Ensure Cerberus 2/3 have accounted for the vault door combination and
available flexi cuffs/flexi cuffs cutter.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

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# (DCNI) Cerberus 10
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cerberus 10 / 10a
Version 17-1
KUMMSC Entry Control Point
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Positively control entry/exit to Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance
Storage Complex (KUMMSC) by processing personnel and vehicles IAW applicable
instructions and up channel suspicious activity to SSCC.
 (DCNI) Deny unauthorized access to KUMMSC.
 (DCNI) Provide immediate armed response to any threats affecting Entry Control
Point (ECP) operations.
 (DCNI) Perform Advanced Entry Control System (AECS) duties IAW applicable
instructions (WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol. 4).
 (DCNI) Ensure all inbound/outbound hand carried items are processed through the
X-Ray machine at the ECP. If the X-Ray machine is in-operable, all hand carried
items will be hand searched.
 (DCNI) Perform all Remote Duress Disable Switch (RDDS) duties as required IAW
377 SFGI 31-113.
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POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Within the ECP area starting at the high side of T-3/T-5/V-4 and extending
into the loading dock not to exceed V-7
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
radio communication capability.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within 10ft of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
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DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
The ONLY exception is when present in the KUMMSC Entry Control Center. This
gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm or
situation.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
when directed by higher authority.
PERSONNEL PROCESSING:
 (DCNI) Entry into KUMMSC Limited Area shall require positive action from a single
and authorized individual inside the ECP or SSCC. The AECS shall not, by itself,
allow entry into the Limited Area.
 (DCNI) Prior to allowing entry to T-3, obtain name and status of personnel
requesting entry via stentofon, landline, or face-to-face.
o UNESCORTED ENTRY:
 (DCNI) Allow access thru T-3 for personnel requesting unescorted
entry after obtaining name and status.
 (DCNI) Ensure personnel place all hand carried items on X-Ray
machine and process thru metal detector. Personnel processing have
two attempts to pass metal detector. After failing second attempt,
personnel will be trans-frisked IAW Metal Detector Alarm.
 (DCNI) Personnel will proceed to M-1 through M-4 for further
processing.
 (DCNI) If personnel are authorized and secure, they will be cleared to
proceed.
 (DCNI) If an M-1 through M-4 alarm is received, reference applicable
“E Series” QRCs.
o ESCORTED ENTRY:
 (DCNI) An escort official will not escort more than six (6)
individuals into limited/exclusion areas.
 (DCNI) Prior to allowing entry to T-3, you will obtain the following
from the escort official:
 Name and status of escort official.
 Name(s)/EAL number/purpose and duration of visit/status of
escortee(s).
 (DCNI) Have escort official read the escort briefing to
escortee(s) in the presence of a certified EC.
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 (DCNI) Have escort official gather one form of photo identification (i.e.
CAC, driver’s license, RAB, or passport) from each escortee(s) and
pass them to the EC.
 (DCNI) Have escort official process IAW unescorted entry procedures.
 (DCNI) Once escort official has processed thru the booths, EC
will unlock one of the booths to allow escort official to prepare to
receive escortee(s).
 (DCNI) Verify all escortee(s) photo identification against the
appropriate EAL and log them onto the AF Form 1109 (Visitor’s
Register Log).
 (DCNI) Process each escortee individually by allowing access thru T-3
and positively identify the individual via their credential.
 (DCNI) Have escortee(s) process hand carried items via the X-Ray
machine and process thru the metal detector.
 (DCNI) After escortee(s) have successfully processed the metal
detector, issue them a visitor’s badge and direct them to the escort
official.
 (DCNI) After all escortee(s) have been processed, have escort official
sign the AF Form 1109 and have them process thru the designated
booth.
 (DCNI) The escort official will process thru T-4 prior to any escortee(s)
being granted access to T-4.
 (DCNI) The EC will then initiate the process via AECS to unlock T-4 to
allow entry for escortee(s).
INSPECTOR GENERAL/DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA)
INSPECTORS ENTRY:
 (DCNI) Once inspector personnel arrive at T-3, a certified EC will make face-
to-face contact and verify the following information:
o (DCNI) The EC will validate their credentials against the appropriate EAL
before granting access thru T-3.
 (DCNI) All inspectors/individuals are granted escorted/unescorted
entry to all limited areas based on the EAL and a valid AF Restricted
Areas Badge, DD Form 2/2 AF/Common Access Card or a government
issued photo ID.
 (DCNI) DTRA Identification Badge (badge is white containing the
following information on front of badge: the acronym “DTRA” and
“Defense Threat Reduction Agency” spelled out at the top; a number;
the bearer’s photograph to the right of the number; and the bearer’s
name at the bottom. The badge number is on the back of the badge in
the lower right hand corner.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) Once verification process has occurred, all inspectors will be logged in on
the AF Form 1109 for accountability purposes only (i.e. emergency evacuation).
 NOTE: ENSURE ENTRY/EXIT TIMES ARE RECORDED ON THE 1109.
 NOTE: The escort official column will not be filled out for inspector personnel.
 (DCNI) At this point, inspectors may be allowed access thru T-3.
 (DCNI) All inspectors must process hand carried items via the X-Ray machine and
process thru the metal detector.
o (DCNI) After inspector(s) have successfully processed thru the metal
detector, they will then proceed to the designated booth.
o (DCNI) The EC will then initiate the process via AECS to unlock T-4 to allow
entry for inspectors.
VEHICLE INPROCESSING:
 (DCNI) For inbound vehicle processing, only the vehicle driver will be allowed within
a vehicle during vehicle entry of KUMMSC. NOTE: The vehicle driver cannot be
an escortee.
 (DCNI) Ensure a Topside patrol is on scene at V1-AA/V1-AB to verify that all
vehicles are clear of vehicle ram barriers. Cerberus-10 will verify with the Topside
patrol via radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of the barriers. After
verification that barriers are clear, utilize CCTV to ensure all vehicles are clear of
barriers. NOTE: Ensure that distinct radio transmissions are used to verify
that barriers have been cleared (i.e. Scorpion-1 this is Cerberus-10, is V1-AB
clear? Cerberus-10 this is Scorpion-1, V1-AB is clear.)
 (DCNI) Passengers/escortee(s) will dismount at V-2 and process the facility as
pedestrians with exception of DoE SGT/SST vehicles, PL1 convoy vehicles and
vehicles associated with emergency response situations.
 (DCNI) A single member of the ECP or Loading Dock ISRT (Cerberus 4 if posted)
will be dispatched to the Sally Port to conduct the vehicle inspection. Vehicle
inspection will not occur until the driver has been processed through the booths and
has re-entered the Sally Port from D-7.
 (DCNI) Conduct systematic and thorough inspections of all vehicles entering or
exiting the facility with the exception of authorized vehicles exempt from search.
Look for unauthorized personnel, readily detectable prohibited contraband items,
explosive devices, contraband, etc. Each vehicle will be given at least a visual
inspection of readily accessible areas such as driver and passenger compartments,
cargo carrying area, engine compartment, and undercarriage.
 (DCNI) Use your flashlight and undercarriage mirror as needed to accomplish
undercarriage inspections.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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VEHICLE OUTPROCESSING:
 (DCNI) Outbound vehicles may contain passengers. Cerberus-4 (if posted) or an
EC, in conjunction with the ECP, will verify each passenger has properly processed
out of the facility via V-6 AECS card reader. If passengers were escorted, ensure
EC or Cerberus-4 receives all visitors’ badges. EC will then ensure all personnel are
logged out via AF Form 1109.
 (DCNI) Ensure a Topside SRT is on scene at V1-AA/V1-AB to verify that all vehicles
are clear of vehicle ram barriers after departure from the controlled area. After
verification that barriers are clear, utilize CCTV to ensure all vehicles are clear of
barriers. The Topside SRT will verify with Cerberus-10 via radio transmission that all
vehicles are clear of the barriers.
DoE CONVOY ENTRY/EXIT PROCEDURES:
 (DCNI) Confirm with a designated Topside patrol that OST personnel identity was
verified via DOE issued picture identification and the Certification List of
DOE/NNSA/OST Personnel (FA 9026) and DoE vehicles have been
sanitized/remained under constant observation via Convoy Commander.
 (DCNI) The DoE team’s access to limited/exclusion areas are under escort of DoD
personnel. NOTE: On-duty SF personnel will not act as escort officials for DoE
personnel.
 (DCNI) DoE vehicles entering or exiting for MUNS training operations will not be
searched unless deemed necessary as directed by Wing Commander or designated
representative. These searches will be conducted in the Sally Port.
 (DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher
authority. When securing special functions, ensure that the patrols located at
V-2/V-8 verify via radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of barriers.
After notification that all vehicles are clear, verify through CCTV before
securing barriers.
o (DCNI) TYPE I CONVOY PROCEDURES:
 (DCNI) Do not inspect inbound or outbound DoE Vehicles associated
with Type I cargo, to include decoy and support vehicles.
 (DCNI) Loaded SGTs may be searched while within limited/exclusion
areas, but only when the cargo is in the custody of DoD
representatives.
o (DCNI) TYPE II CONVOY PROCEDURES:
 (DCNI) DoE vehicles associated with Type II cargo, requesting entry
into KUMMSC, will be searched if a search is deemed necessary
 (DCNI) If search is deemed necessary, Type II cargo may be
searched only within limited/exclusion areas and when cargo is in
custody of DoD representative.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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ON BASE MILITARY CONVOY PROCEDURES:
 (DCNI) For on base military convoys, only the tow vehicle and driver/passengers
will be authorized unimpeded entry/exit to and from Loading Dock after receiving
pre-authentication from Convoy Commander.
 (DCNI) EC will retrieve badge information from tow vehicle driver/passengers to
change Discrete Controlled Area (DCA) to appropriate location.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
 (DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher
authority. When securing special functions, ensure that the patrols located at
V-2/V-8 verify via radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of barriers.
After notification that all vehicles are clear, verify through CCTV before
securing barriers.
 (DCNI) Maintain visual accountability of Fire Department (FD) personnel within the
Sally Port/ECP area.
 (DCNI) After FD departs, purge the ECP and Sally Port if FD had access to those
areas and relay status of the purge to SSCC upon completion. NOTE: If a fire
exists in the ECP or Sally Port area, immediately notify SSCC and attempt to
extinguish the fire using available fire extinguishers.
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
 When emergency evacuation is warranted:
 (DCNI) Ensure personnel are not departing with ANY hand carried items.
NOTE: The only authorized items are classified material and/or radio. All
other items will be confiscated immediately and abandoned in place. AF FM
52 WILL NOT be accomplished due to the nature of the emergency.
 (DCNI) Unless obstructions don’t allow exit through V-6, all evacuating
personnel to exit loading dock through V-6. If the situation allows, have all
evacuating personnel swipe out at V-6. Topside patrols will accomplish AF Form
1109 annotations for all evacuating personnel.
ECP EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
 When emergency evacuation is warranted:
 (DCNI) If time/safety permits, EC personnel will log off the AECS console.
 (DCNI) If time/safety does not permit, upon return to ECP, purge ECP, conduct a
complete changeover using changeover checklist, and conduct a routine
verification of the system using JRV.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY OPERATIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, one member of the
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ECP will provide Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD) at V-5. Coordinate with
Topside Area Supervisor/SSCC for termination of ISD to minimize fratricide.
 (DCNI) Remaining ECP personnel should man the weapons ports.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing PL1 resources.
X-RAY/METAL DETECTOR PROCEDURES:
 (DCNI) All personnel will place hand-carried items in a plastic bins for screening via
X-Ray.
 (DCNI) Verify the items via X-Ray monitor and ensure all hand-carried items are
identified. If items cannot be identified, reverse the X-Ray machine, have the owner
and EC accomplish a hand-on verification of the item unless it is considered a
possible threat.
 (DCNI) Items such as electronic circuit boards or unusual looking tools will be
closely scrutinized and treated as a possible threat until further investigation proves
otherwise. Contact munitions control for authorization and clarification of
questionable items entering/departing the area.
 (DCNI) All personnel should remove all metallic items prior to passing through the
metal detector. Any items removed from their person will be processed through the
X-ray for screening.
 (DCNI) NOTE: Unless the X-ray is broken, the EC will not conduct a simple
hand-on search of these items, they will always be processed through the X-
ray.
 (DCNI) Direct personnel through the metal detector. If the detector annunciates,
direct the individual to identify any items that may be causing the alarm. Any
identified items removed from their person will be processed through the X-ray for
screening.
 (DCNI) Instruct the individual to re-process through the metal detector, subsequent
metal detector alarms will be investigated with a hand-held transfrisker until positive
identification of all items can be made.
ITEMS EXEMPT FROM SEARCH:
 (DCNI) Because of early expiration of service life, possible damage to equipment,
possible injury to personnel, accountability, exposure to hazardous materials, need-
to-know basis, or equipment needing continuous humidity protection, the following
items are exempt from inspection:
 (DCNI) Hermetically sealed munitions supplies and equipment (e.g., limited life
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
8
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
components, explosive ejector cartridges).
 (DCNI) Munitions supplies and equipment in heat sealed barrier bags (e.g.,
humidity indicators, missile components, etc).
 (DCNI) Munitions containers with intact shipping or storage seals (e.g.,
deployment kits and classified munitions).
 (DCNI) Limited Life Components in non-commercial closed wooden or
cardboard containers with affixed shipping documents.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Conduct a joint changeover using the changeover checklist with the off-going EC.
You will conduct daily inspections and checks of your area.
 Receive a briefing from the off-going SEC concerning past, current, and planned
events and review the pass-on book and work orders. Contact the Alarm Monitor to
verify open work orders for accuracy. Refer to Joint Routine Verification.
 (DCNI) Ensure the inbound X-Ray machine, outbound X-Ray machine, and metal
detector is tested at each shift change using the applicable testing device.
 (DCNI) Conduct a check of all communications lines and a radio status check with
SSCC.
 (DCNI) Account for all checklist books and verify that each individual checklist is
present and accounted for. Ensure checklists are clean and ready for use i.e., all
dry erase markers are cleaned from the plastic sheet.
 (DCNI) Verify the graphics display monitor to ensure all portals and special
functions are in the appropriate state. Refer to WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol. 4.
 (DCNI) Conduct a joint routine verification of AECS with the off-going EC by
obtaining the system status. Verify the system is operating on primary comm. Refer
to WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol. 4.
 If there are discrepancies with any of the above items, both the on-coming and off-
going FCC/FC will be contacted. If the discrepancy cannot be corrected prior to off-
going departing, an informational blotter entry will be made. Once off-going
personnel have been relieved, the on-coming personnel are responsible for all items
associated with this position.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Monitor and maintain situational awareness of all CCTV, AECS, X-ray
computer, and communication equipment.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above, you will report the status of your post
and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 10 is all secure, and ready
for inspection.”
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
9
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
compensatory measures.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
10
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

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# (DCNI) Cerberus 2,3
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cerberus 2 & Cerberus 3
Version 17-1
KUMMSC Internal Security Response Teams
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Respond to Security Incidents and emergencies as the Internal Security
Response Teams for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage
Complex (KUMMSC). You comprise a portion of the 13/5 Response Force (RF) or
15/5 Response Force if Scorpion 6 is posted.
 (DCNI) During hostile situations, provide final denial security at blast doors B-3 and
B-4 until arrival of back-up forces or termination of all hostile elements.
 (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to any alarm annunciations or Security Incidents on
the high side of B-3/4 within 3 minutes.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Behind blast doors B3/4 except during emergency response (fire/medical),
loading dock operations and logistics movements. Maintain a 3 minute response
capability to all alarm activations or Security Incidents occurring on the high side of
B3/4.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
COMMUNICATIONS:
 All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) Three members will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball
and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point
ammunition. One member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm
linked armor piercing/tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm
hollow-point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
The ONLY exception is when present in the Site Security Control Center or the
Art Room. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond
to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type IV
plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
when directed by higher authority.
 You must wear all required gear when responding to any situation or alarm. This
includes Flak Vest with Level IV ballistic plates, helmet, and gas mask with
appropriately filled out DD Form 1574/fit test.
 If leaving any of these areas mentioned above, all required gear must be worn.
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest
priority until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their
actions to gain unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing PL1 resources.
DoE SAFE GUARD TRANSPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
 (DCNI) During loading dock upload and download operations, when B1-4 are open,
post in Brandt Hall final denial positions.
INTER AREA MOVEMENT:
 (DCNI) During inter area movement you will be posted in Brandt Hall final denial
positions until movement is terminated.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
 (DCNI) During an emergency response, maintain visual and accountability of Fire
Department (FD) personnel upon their arrival into Brandt Hall. After FD departs,
purge entire area to include all administration areas. Relay status of all areas to
SSCC upon completion of purge. NOTE: If a fire exists in the administration
areas, notify SSCC and attempt to extinguish the fire using available fire
extinguishers.
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
 When emergency evacuation is warranted:
 (DCNI) Ensure non-essential personnel are clear of administration areas.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) MC2 will be initiated. All personnel must depart in an orderly file
formation.
 (DCNI) With the exception of classified material and radios, evacuating
personnel are not authorized to transport any hand-carried items out of the
facility. All other items will be immediately confiscated and abandoned in
place.
 (DCNI) Direct all evacuating personnel through B1-4. In conjunction with
Cerberus 4, route evacuating personnel to V6. If the situation allows, have all
evacuating personnel swipe out at V6.
 (DCNI) Pass evacuees off to topside patrols for additional processing.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 (DCNI) Shift change will be conducted in the ART room.
 Inspect your post and ensure it is free from trash, clean, organized and fully
operational (ballistic barriers) prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 (DCNI) Ensure the ballistic barriers are in operational condition, check barriers
for:
(DCNI) Maneuverability (ensure they roll)
(DCNI) Cleanliness (armored glass is clean)
(DCNI) Operability (raise and lower)
(DCNI) Serviceability (no cracks, no graffiti)
(DCNI) NOTE: Report discrepancies to SSCC or flight leadership
immediately.
 Account for SSIs, vault door combination and available flexi cuffs/flexi cuffs cutter.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the restricted/limited area
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
 (DCNI) Ensure compliance with the two-person concept within exclusion areas. An
exclusion area will exist in Brandt Hall when Protection Level 1 resources are in
transit between A/B sides, or in route to the Loading Dock.
 (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually pump the blast doors.
Detailed instructions on how to pump the blast doors are located within the brown
tool box adjacent to B-3/4.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 2/3 is all secure and ready for
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
inspection, do you request a post briefing?”
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

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# (DCNI) Cerberus 4
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
Cerberus 4/4a
Version 17-1
Loading Dock Internal Security Response Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Provide an immediate response capability to KUMMSC as part of the 13/5
Response Force or 15/5 Response Force if Scorpion 6 is posted and neutralize any
threats attempting to gain unauthorized access to PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to any alarm annunciations or Security Incidents on
the low side of B-1 and B-2 within 3 minutes.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) Cerberus-4/4a will remain within the confines of the loading dock and Sally
Port/ECP area, bound on either end by V5 and V6 unless otherwise directed and/or
properly relieved.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1
resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who will
contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The Leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition. Your
member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm linked armor
piercing/tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
or situation.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
when directed by higher authority.
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
resources.
DoE SGT/SST ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES
 (DCNI) During loading dock upload and down load operations, ensure D12 and D13
have been chained shut. Unless otherwise directed, post on V5 and V6 until
completion of the operation.
 (DCNI) Lower the door retaining pins on V5 and V6 when hot SGTs/SSTs are
present. Performing this action will prevent external control of the bi-fold doors by
the ECP as well as inadvertent/unauthorized openings.
 (DCNI) If SGT/SST is remaining overnight (RON), check SGTs/SSTs every 4 hours,
or every 2 hours when the CCTV is inoperative. Check the seal number on the rear
door, the locks, and the security lights on the rear of the trailer.
 (DCNI) SGTs are equipped with three warning lights on the rear and front of the
trailer. The lights on the front are located in the upper right corner and the lights on
the rear are located on the upper left side or centered across the top. The lights,
from left to right, dictate:
 (DCNI) Alarm Monitor (AM) Light (amber). The left light, as you are looking at the
trailer, indicates the status of the SGT internal security system. This will illuminate
when the internal security system of the SGT has been activated. The light will
remain flashing for 100 seconds after activation.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
 (DCNI) Temperature Alarm (TA) Light (amber). The center light, as you are looking
at the trailer, indicates the internal temperature status of the SGT. This will
illuminate when the temperature is too hot or too cold.
 (DCNI) Fire Alarm (FA) Light (amber). The right light, as you are looking at the
trailer, will illuminate to signify a fire condition in the SGT or when temperature
conditions inside indicate conditions are prevalent for an internal fire.
 (DCNI) NOTE: Notify SSCC immediately if any light is illuminated or flashing.
DOD CONVOY OPERATIONS:
 (DCNI) Post on V5 and V6 and ensure D12 and D13 are chained. Maintain
accountability of personnel and vehicles within the loading dock at all times.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
 (DCNI) Maintain visual and accountability of Fire Department (FD) personnel upon
their arrival into the loading dock area. Ensure your count is consistent with the
numbers passed along by topside patrols prior to FD entry through V2.
 (DCNI) Ensure all personnel and vehicles have been inspected prior to exiting the
limited area.
 (DCNI) After FD departs, purge entire loading dock area to include the restroom,
paint shed, sally port, etc. Relay status of the loading dock purge to SSCC upon
completion. NOTE: If a fire exists in the loading dock, notify SSCC and immediately
and attempt to extinguish using available fire extinguishers.
FACILITY EVACUATION:
 (DCNI) Ensure loading dock is clear of all non-essential personnel.
 (DCNI) An MC2 special function will be initiated. All personnel must depart in an
orderly/file formation.
 (DCNI) With the exception of classified material and radios, evacuating personnel
are not authorized to transport any hand-carried items out of the facility. All other
items will be immediately confiscated and abandoned in place.
 (DCNI) Direct all personnel to exit loading dock through V6. If the situation allows,
have all evacuating personnel swipe out at V6.
 (DCNI) Pass evacuees off to topside patrols for additional processing.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
SHIFT CHANGE:
 (DCNI) Shift change will be conducted in the loading dock, at B2.
 (DCNI) Inspect your post and ensure it is free from trash, clean, organized and fully
operational (ballistic barriers) prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 (DCNI) Ensure the ballistic barrier are in operational condition, check barrier for:
 (DCNI) Maneuverability (ensure they roll).
 (DCNI) Cleanliness (armored glass is clean).
 (DCNI) Operability (raise and lower).
 (DCNI) Serviceability (no cracks, no graffiti).
 (DCNI) Report discrepancies to SSCC or flight leadership immediately.
 (DCNI) Conduct a lighting check and relay any discrepancies immediately to SSCC.
 (DCNI) Check the SGT Remote Control Unit (RCU) antenna located approximately
8-10 feet in front of B1, hanging off the air handler duct-work. This antenna relays
the status of the SGT/SST trailer to SSCC. Check to ensure the antenna is not bent,
broken, or tampered with. Note: If the antenna appears to be unserviceable, DO
NOT TOUCH IT; notify SSCC immediately.
 (DCNI) Ensure manual pins for V-5/6 are not in-place (in the “up” configuration).
This is important because when the pins are in-place (“down”), the ECP has no
control of opening V5/V6. Note: If an SGT/SST is in the loading dock, the pins must
be placed in the “down” configuration. The “down” configuration manually secures
the loading dock (See Attachment 9.2 for facility schematics).
 Account for SSIs and ensure you ask off-going personnel for any applicable pass-
ons. Brief your oncoming relief on significant event occurring during your shift.
ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES:
 (DCNI) Check Enclosure 12 once per hour during contingency operations (tamper
switch failure, etc.) or when instructed by SSCC.
 (DCNI) Assist entry controllers with vehicle processing/searching as directed.
When vehicles are departing the loading dock, ensure the vehicle and all associated
hand-carried items are search prior to vehicle departure past V6.
 (DCNI) Collect the visitor’s badges for all escorted personnel departing the
facility via vehicle at V6. Ensure the visitor’s badges are brought back to the
ECP at the earliest opportunity.
 (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the restricted/limited area
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
display an AF Form 1199CG, Air Force Entry Control Card (Restricted Area Badge)
on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the outermost garment
somewhere on the upper portion of their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC
access.
 (DCNI) Ensure compliance with the 2-person concept when an exclusion zone
exists within the Loading Dock Area. An exclusion zone will exist when Protection
Level 1 resources are present within the loading dock area.
 (DCNI) A Protection Level 1 resource(s) secured within a DoE Safe Guard
Transport Trailer does not constitute an exclusion zone. In this situation, only the
interior of the trailer becomes an exclusion zone requiring the 2-person concept.
The loading dock is considered a restricted/limited area.
 (DCNI) Conduct daily inspections and checks of your area. Be vigilant for things
out of the ordinary, out of place, and for signs of foul play.
 (DCNI) Be familiar with procedures on how to manually pump open the blast doors
1-4. Detailed instructions/checklists on how to pump the blast doors are located
behind the clear plastic document frames adjacent to the blast doors. The tools
needed to pump B1-2 are located within the brown tool box adjacent to D13. An
additional tool box is located within the interlock for doors 3-4.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel,
Inspectors, SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above, you will report the
status of your post and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 4 is
all secure, and ready for inspection.”
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
MANUAL AND PROCEDURES FOR BI-FOLD DOORS
 (DCNI) The bi-fold doors will require manual procedures when contingency
operations exist or if directed by SSCC or Flight Leadership. To manually open
the doors:
 (DCNI) Ensure the locking pins are raised.
 (DCNI) Locate the manual override valve located on the piping adjacent to the
doors. Turn the valve handle so that it points directly up or directly down. The
valve handle should parallel to (in line with) the pipe it’s attached to.
 (DCNI) Push or pull the doors open or closed.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

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# (DCNI) Cerberus-1 (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cerberus-1
Version 19-1
KUMMSC Underground Area Supervisor/
Internal Security Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Supervise all Security Forces operations as the Downstairs Area Supervisor for the
Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC). You
comprise a portion of the Response Force (RF).
• (DCNI) Respond to security incidents and emergencies as dispatched by command and
control elements.
• (DCNI) During hostile situations, you will provide initial command and control for all security
incidents located within KUMMSC until arrival of back-up forces or termination of all hostile
elements. Additionally, provide final denial security at blast doors B-3 and B-4 until arrival of
back-up forces or termination of all hostile elements.
• (DCNI) Up-channel information to Guardian-1/2 as needed and notify SSCC of all pertinent
information.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) Remain within the KUMMSC underground facility unless proper relieved. Remain
on the high side of B-3/4 if acting as required member of 4-person fire team. If additional
manning is provided, the leader may traverse the entire facility, as long as a 4-person fire team
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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Cerberus-1, 19-1, Jul 19
is constantly present on the high side of B-3/4.
COMMUNICATION:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball
and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
point ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
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USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
recover a PL1 resource.
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Ensure ECP & SSCC conduct a thorough review of the AF FM 164s vs AECS
during their changeover (if applicable).
• (DCNI) Ensure the joint end-of-day check with MUNS personnel is conducted and the
Storage Cell Check is conducted when TPC area duties are complete.
• (DCNI) Assist the KUMMSC ECP with operations, when at least four (4) ISRT personnel
are posted behind B-3/4 (not including yourself).
• (DCNI) Conduct the local and remote daily exercises for the AM/SCS in conjunction with
the Topside Area Supervisor.
• (DCNI) Conduct a check of Enclosure 12 once per hour during contingency operations
(tamper switch failure, etc.) or when instructed by SSCC.
• Assist Cerberus 10 with processing large escort groups. If the situation allows, attempt to
have the AF Form 1109 filled out prior to the escort group arrival. Ensure all areas are clean,
organized, free of clutter, and presentable.
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the restricted/limited area display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the
outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
required for KUMMSC access.
• (DCNI) Ensure compliance with the two-person concept within exclusion areas. An
exclusion area will exist in Brandt Hall when Protection Level 1 resources are in transit
between A/B sides, or in route to the Loading Dock.
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually pump the blast doors. Detailed
instructions on how to pump the blast doors are located within the brown tool box adjacent to
B-3/4.
• Be familiar with process and procedures outlining manual operation for all the vehicle doors
and barriers.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing by
stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 1 is all secure, and ready for inspection.”
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
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RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
representative.
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
access to any PL1 resources.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
ENTRY CONTROL PROCEDURES:
• (DCNI) Upon entry and exit of the facility, all personnel granted unescorted entry, along
with their hand-carried items, are subject to inspection by security personnel for readily
detectable prohibited materials and contraband items.
• (DCNI) EXEMPTIONS: Because of early expiration of service life, possible damage to
equipment, possible injury to personnel, accountability, exposure to hazardous materials,
need-to-know basis, or equipment needing continuous humidity protection, the following
items are exempt from inspection:
• (DCNI) Hermetically sealed munitions supplies and equipment (e.g., limited life
components, explosive ejector cartridges).
• (DCNI) Munitions supplies and equipment in heat sealed barrier bags (e.g., humidity
indicators, missile components, etc).
• (DCNI) Munitions containers with intact shipping or storage seals (e.g., deployment kits
and classified munitions).
• (DCNI) Limited Life Components in non-commercial closed wooden or cardboard
containers with affixed shipping documents.
• (DCNI) All personnel will place hand-carried items in a plastic bins for screening via X-
Ray.
• (DCNI) Ensure Cerberus 10 verifies the items via X-Ray monitor and ensure all hand-
carried items are identified. If items cannot be identified, the X-Ray will be reversed and the
owner and EC will accomplish a hand-on verification of the item unless it is considered a
possible threat.
• (DCNI) Items such as electronic circuit boards or unusual looking tools will be closely
scrutinized and treated as a possible threat until further investigation proves otherwise.
Contact munitions control for authorization and clarification of questionable items
entering/departing the area.
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• (DCNI) Personnel will be directed through the metal detector. If the detector annunciates,
the individual will be directed to identify any items that may be causing the alarm. Any
identified items removed from their person will be processed through the X-ray for
screening.
• (DCNI) Instruct the individual to re-process through the metal detector, subsequent metal
detector alarms will be investigated with a hand-held trans frisker until positive identification
of all items can be made.
• (DCNI) For inbound vehicle processing, only the vehicle driver will be allowed within a
vehicle during vehicle entry of KUMMSC. Exception: DoE SGT vehicles and vehicles
associated with emergency responses. Passengers will dismount at V-2 and process the
facility as pedestrians.
• (DCNI) Ensure systematic and thorough inspections of all vehicles entering or exiting the
facility are conducted. Vehicles will be inspected for unauthorized personnel, readily
detectable prohibited contraband items, explosive devices, contraband, etc. Each vehicle will
be given at least a visual inspection of readily accessible areas such as driver and passenger
compartments, cargo carrying area, engine compartment, and undercarriage.
• (DCNI) Ensure the use of flashlights and undercarriage mirrors as needed to accomplish
undercarriage inspections.
• (DCNI) Outbound vehicles may contain passengers. Ensure the slot number (and visitor’s
badges, if applicable) of persons exiting the facility via vehicle at V-6 is obtained from
Loading Dock ISRT (if posted). Make sure the orange cards are removed from the badge
binder.
• (DCNI) For escorted personnel, ensure the escort briefing is given in the presence of a
certified EC prior to allowing entry into the restricted area. Escorts will process first and
stand by on the low side of the booths for escortee processing. Those requiring escort will be
screened and verified via EAL, signed in via AF Form 1109 Visitor Register Log, and issued
an 1199CG Visitor’s Badge.
• (DCNI) All escorts and escortee(s) will process through the booths. Booths will be
manually unlocked for escortee(s), escorts will process booths normally. The Sally Port will
not be used as a staging area.
• (DCNI) Record entry and exit times of escorted personnel and retrieve 1199 CG Visitor’s
Badge from escorted personnel upon departure from KUMMSC.
• (DCNI) Ensure an EC or the Loading Dock ISRT obtains the visitor’s badge(s) for escorted
personnel departing the facility via vehicle at V-6 if applicable.
DoE SGT, ARRIVAL, DEPARTURE, AND RON PROCEDURES:
• (DCNI) Prior to proceeding down the entry tunnel, topside patrols will verify DoE
credentials against the DoE Agent Listing and verify that DoE vehicles have been sanitized
and remained under constant observation.
• (DCNI) DoE vehicles carrying Type I cargo will not be inspected if the Convoy
Commander verifies that the vehicle has been sanitized and kept under constant
surveillance.
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• (DCNI) DoE vehicles entering or exiting KUMMSC cold or entering/exiting for MUNS
training operations (no Type I or Type II cargo) will be searched.
• (DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) If DoE vehicles are processing the facility for something other than a Type I or
Type II mission (training event), they must be inspected. Follow standard vehicle
inspection procedures in these cases.
• (DCNI) During loading dock upload and download operations, when B1-4 are open, ensure
all final denial positions are posted in Brandt Hall and Loading Dock ISRT (if posted) is
posted on V-5 and V-6. Also ensure D-12 and D-13 are chained.
• (DCNI) Ensure the retaining pins on V5 and V6 have been lowered when hot SGTs are
present. Performing this action will prevent external control of the bi-fold doors by the ECP
as well as inadvertent/unauthorized openings.
• (DCNI) If SGT is remaining overnight (RON), ensure checks are conducted on SGTs every
4 hours, or every 2 hours when the CCTV is inoperative. Check the seal number on the rear
door, the locks, and the security lights on the rear of the trailer.
• (DCNI) SGTs are equipped with three warning lights on the rear and front of the trailer.
The lights on the front are located in the upper right corner and the lights on the rear are
located on the upper left side or centered across the top. The lights, from left to right,
dictate:
• (DCNI) Alarm Monitor (AM) Light (amber). The left light, as you are looking at the
trailer, indicates the status of the SGT internal security system. This will illuminate
when the internal security system of the SGT has been activated. The light will
remain flashing for 100 seconds after activation.
• (DCNI) Temperature Alarm (TA) Light (amber). The center light, as you are
looking at the trailer, indicates the internal temperature status of the SGT. This will
illuminate when the temperature is too hot or too cold.
• (DCNI) Fire Alarm (FA) Light (amber). The right light, as you are looking at the
trailer, will illuminate to signify a fire condition in the SGT or when temperature
conditions inside indicate conditions are prevalent for an internal fire.
• (DCNI) NOTE: Notify SSCC immediately if any light is illuminated or flashing.
LOADING DOCK OPERATIONS:
• (DCNI) Ensure D12 and D13 are chained. Maintain accountability of personnel and
vehicles within the loading dock at all times.
INTER AREA/COVOY MOVEMENT PROCEDURES:
• (DCNI) During inter area movements; ensure all final denial positions are posted in Brandt
Hall until the movement is terminated.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES:
• (DCNI) During an emergency response, maintain visual and accountability of Fire
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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Department (FD) personnel upon their arrival into your area. Ensure all personnel and
vehicles have been inspected prior to exiting the limited area. After FD departs, coordinate a
purge of all areas entered by FD personnel, to include all administration areas. Relay status
of all areas to SSCC upon completion of purges. NOTE: If a fire exists in the
administration areas, notify SSCC and attempt to extinguish the fire using available
fire extinguishers.
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
• When emergency evacuation is warranted:
• (DCNI) Ensure non-essential personnel are clear of administration areas.
• (DCNI) Special Function MC2 will be initiated. All personnel must depart in an orderly
fashion.
• (DCNI) Direct all evacuating personnel through B1-4. In conjunction with the Loading
Dock ISRT (if posted), route evacuating personnel to V-6.
• (DCNI) Ensure personnel are not departing with ANY hand carried items. NOTE: The
only authorized items are classified material and/or radio. All other items will be
confiscated immediately and abandoned in place.
• (DCNI) Unless obstructions don’t allow exit through V6, all evacuating personnel will
exit loading dock through V6. If the situation allows, have all evacuating personnel
swipe out at V6. Topside patrols will accomplish AF Form 1109 annotations for all
evacuating personnel.
MANUAL PROCEDURES FOR BI-FOLD DOORS:
• (DCNI) Be familiar with procedures to manually open V5 and V6. The bi-fold doors will
require manual procedures when contingency operations exist or if directed by SSCC or
flight leadership. To manually open the doors:
• (DCNI) Ensure the locking pins are raised.
• (DCNI) Locate the manual override valve located on the piping adjacent to the doors.
Turn the valve handle so that it points directly up or directly down. The valve handle
should parallel to (in line with) the pipe it’s attached to.
• (DCNI) Push or pull the doors open or closed.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• Inspect your post and ensure it is free from trash, clean, organized and fully operational prior
to relieving off-going personnel.
• Visit all underground posts immediately after shift change to ensure proper changeovers have
taken place. Make sure applicable changeover checklists have been used and all items have
been accounted for.
• (DCNI) Ensure all ballistic barrier are in operational condition, check barrier for:
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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• (DCNI) Maneuverability (ensure they roll).
• (DCNI) Cleanliness (armored glass is clean).
• (DCNI) Operability (raise and lower).
• (DCNI) Serviceability (no cracks, no graffiti).
• (DCNI) Note: Report discrepancies to SSCC or flight leadership immediately.
• (DCNI) Ensure a lighting check in conducted and relay any discrepancies immediately to
SSCC.
• (DCNI) Ensure the vault door combination and available flexi cuffs/flexi cuffs cutters are
accounted for.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
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• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
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# (DCNI) Cerberus-10 (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cerberus 10
Version 19-1
KUMMSC Entry Control Point
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Positively control entry/exit to Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance
Storage Complex (KUMMSC) by processing personnel and vehicles IAW applicable
instructions and up channel suspicious activity to SSCC.
• (DCNI) Deny unauthorized access to KUMMSC.
• (DCNI) Provide immediate armed response to any threats affecting Entry Control Point
(ECP) operations.
• (DCNI) Perform Advanced Entry Control System (AECS) duties IAW applicable
instructions (WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol. 4).
• (DCNI) Ensure all inbound/outbound hand carried items are processed through the X-Ray
machine at the ECP. If the X-Ray machine is in-operable, all hand carried items will be
hand searched.
• (DCNI) Perform all Remote Duress Disable Switch (RDDS) duties as required IAW 377
SFGI 31-113.
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POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) Within the ECP area starting at the high side of T-3/T-5 and extending into the
loading dock not to exceed V-7. If one member is inside the loading dock conducting
checks, all processing must be paused until both members are attentive to their entry control
duties.
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball
and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
recover a PL1 resource.
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
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plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
PERSONNEL PROCESSING:
• (DCNI) Entry into KUMMSC Limited Area shall require positive action from a single
authorized individual inside the ECP or SSCC. AECS shall not, by itself, allow entry into
the Limited Area.
• (DCNI) Prior to allowing entry to T-3, obtain name and status of personnel requesting entry
via stentofon, landline telephone, or face-to-face communication.
• UNESCORTED ENTRY:
• (DCNI) Allow access thru T-3 for personnel requesting unescorted entry after
obtaining name and status.
• (DCNI) Ensure personnel place all hand carried items on X-Ray machine and
process thru metal detector. Personnel processing have two attempts to pass
metal detector. After failing second attempt, personnel will be trans-frisked IAW
Metal Detector Alarm.
• (DCNI) Personnel will proceed to M-1 through M-4 for further processing.
• (DCNI) If personnel are authorized and secure, they will be cleared to proceed.
• (DCNI) If an M-1 through M-4 alarm is received, reference applicable “E Series”
QRCs.
• ESCORTED ENTRY:
• (DCNI) An escort official will not escort more than six (6) individuals into
limited/exclusion areas.
• (DCNI) Prior to allowing entry to T-3, you will obtain the following from the
escort official:
 Name and status of escort official.
 Name(s)/EAL number/purpose and duration of visit/status of escortee(s).
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 (DCNI) Have escort official read the escort briefing to escortee(s) in the
presence of a certified EC.
• (DCNI) Have escort official gather one form of photo identification (i.e. CAC,
driver’s license, RAB, or passport) from each escortee and pass them to the EC.
• (DCNI) Have escort official process IAW unescorted entry procedures.
 (DCNI) Once escort official has processed thru the booths, EC will
unlock one of the booths to allow escort official to prepare to receive
escortee(s).
• (DCNI) Verify all escortee(s) photo identification against the appropriate EAL
and log them onto the AF Form 1109 (Visitor’s Register Log).
• (DCNI) Process each escortee individually by allowing access thru T-3 and
positively identify the individual via their credential.
• (DCNI) Have escortee(s) process hand carried items via the X-Ray machine and
process thru the metal detector.
• (DCNI) After escortee(s) have successfully processed the metal detector, issue
them a visitor’s badge and direct them to the escort official.
• (DCNI) After all escortee(s) have been processed, have escort official sign the
AF Form 1109 and have them process thru the designated booth.
• (DCNI) The escort official will process thru T-4 prior to any escortee(s) being
granted access to T-4.
• (DCNI) The EC will then initiate the process via AECS to unlock T-4 to allow
entry for escortee(s).
INSPECTOR GENERAL/DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA)
INSPECTORS ENTRY:
• (DCNI) Once inspector personnel arrive at T-3, a certified EC will make face-to-face
contact and verify the following information:
• (DCNI) The EC will validate their credentials against the appropriate EAL before
granting access thru T-3.
 (DCNI) All inspectors/individuals are granted escorted/unescorted entry to all
limited areas based on the EAL and a valid AF Restricted Areas Badge, DD
Form 2/2 AF/Common Access Card or a government issued photo ID.
 (DCNI) DTRA Identification Badge (badge is white containing the following
information on front of badge: the acronym “DTRA” and “Defense Threat
Reduction Agency” spelled out at the top; a number; the bearer’s photograph
to the right of the number; and the bearer’s name at the bottom. The badge
number is on the back of the badge in the lower right hand corner.
• (DCNI) Once verification process has occurred, all inspectors will be logged in on the AF
Form 1109 for accountability purposes only (i.e. emergency evacuation).
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• NOTE: ENSURE ENTRY/EXIT TIMES ARE RECORDED ON THE 1109.
• NOTE: The escort official column will not be filled out for inspector personnel.
• (DCNI) At this point, inspectors may be allowed access thru T-3.
• (DCNI) All inspectors must process hand carried items via the X-Ray machine and process
thru the metal detector.
• (DCNI) After inspector(s) have successfully processed thru the metal detector, they
will then proceed to the designated booth.
• (DCNI) The EC will then initiate the process via AECS to unlock T-4 to allow
entry for inspectors.
VEHICLE INPROCESSING:
• (DCNI) For inbound vehicle processing, only the vehicle driver will be allowed within a
vehicle during vehicle entry of KUMMSC. NOTE: The vehicle driver cannot be an
escortee unless it is a specialized vehicle requiring an escortee to operate.
• (DCNI) Ensure a Topside patrol is on scene at V1-AA/V1-AB to verify that all vehicles are
clear of vehicle ram barriers. Cerberus-10 will verify with the Topside patrol via radio
transmission that all vehicles are clear of the barriers. After verification that barriers are
clear, utilize CCTV to ensure all vehicles are clear of barriers. NOTE: Ensure that distinct
radio transmissions are used to verify that barriers have been cleared (i.e. Scorpion-1
this is Cerberus-10, is V1-AB clear? Cerberus-10 this is Scorpion-1, V1-AB is clear.)
• (DCNI) Passengers/escortee(s) will dismount at V-2 and process the facility as pedestrians
with exception of DoE SGT vehicles, PL1 convoy vehicles and vehicles associated with
emergency response situations.
• (DCNI) A single member of the ECP or Loading Dock ISRT (if posted) will be dispatched
to the Sally Port to conduct the vehicle inspection. Vehicle inspection will not occur until the
driver has been processed through the booths and has re-entered the Sally Port from D-7.
• (DCNI) Conduct systematic and thorough inspections of all vehicles entering or exiting the
facility with the exception of authorized vehicles exempt from search. Look for unauthorized
personnel, readily detectable prohibited contraband items, explosive devices, contraband, etc.
Each vehicle will be given at least a visual inspection of readily accessible areas such as
driver and passenger compartments, cargo carrying area, engine compartment, and
undercarriage.
• (DCNI) Use your flashlight and undercarriage mirror as needed to accomplish undercarriage
inspections.
VEHICLE OUTPROCESSING:
• (DCNI) Outbound vehicles may contain passengers. Loading Dock ISRT (if posted) or an
EC, in conjunction with the ECP, will verify each passenger has properly processed out of
the facility via V-6 AECS card reader. If passengers were escorted, ensure EC or Loading
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Dock ISRT receives all visitors’ badges. EC will then ensure all personnel are logged out via
AF Form 1109.
• (DCNI) Ensure a Topside SRT is on scene at V1-AA/V1-AB to verify that all vehicles are
clear of vehicle ram barriers after departure from the controlled area. After verification that
barriers are clear, utilize CCTV to ensure all vehicles are clear of barriers. The Topside SRT
will verify with Cerberus-10 via radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of the barriers.
DoE CONVOY ENTRY/EXIT PROCEDURES:
• (DCNI) Confirm with a designated Topside patrol that OST personnel identity was verified
via DOE issued picture identification and the Certification List of DOE/NNSA/OST
Personnel (FA 9026) and DoE vehicles have been sanitized/remained under constant
observation via Convoy Commander.
• (DCNI) The DoE team’s access to limited/exclusion areas are under escort of DoD
personnel. NOTE: On-duty SF personnel will not act as escort officials for DoE
personnel.
• (DCNI) DoE vehicles entering or exiting for MUNS training operations will not be searched
unless deemed necessary as directed by Wing Commander or designated representative.
These searches will be conducted in the Sally Port.
• (DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher authority.
When securing special functions, ensure that the patrols located at V-2/V-8 verify via
radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of barriers. After notification that all
vehicles are clear, verify through CCTV before securing barriers.
• (DCNI) TYPE I CONVOY PROCEDURES:
• (DCNI) DoE vehicles will not be inspected if the Convoy Commander verifies
that the vehicle has been sanitized and kept under constant surveillance.
• (DCNI) Loaded SGTs may be searched while within limited/exclusion areas, but
only when the cargo is in the custody of DoD representatives.
• (DCNI) TYPE II CONVOY PROCEDURES:
• (DCNI) DoE vehicles associated with Type II cargo, requesting entry into
KUMMSC, will be searched if a search is deemed necessary
• (DCNI) If search is deemed necessary, Type II cargo may be searched only
within limited/exclusion areas and when cargo is in custody of DoD
representative.
ON BASE MILITARY CONVOY PROCEDURES:
• (DCNI) For on base military convoys, only the tow vehicle and driver/passengers will be
authorized unimpeded entry/exit to and from Loading Dock after receiving pre-authentication
from Convoy Commander.
• (DCNI) EC will retrieve badge information from tow vehicle driver/passengers to change
Discrete Controlled Area (DCA) to appropriate location.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
• (DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher authority.
When securing special functions, ensure that the patrols located at V-2/V-8 verify via
radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of barriers. After notification that all
vehicles are clear, verify through CCTV before securing barriers.
• (DCNI) Maintain visual accountability of Fire Department (FD) personnel within the Sally
Port/ECP area.
• (DCNI) After FD departs, purge the ECP and Sally Port if FD had access to those areas and
relay status of the purge to SSCC upon completion. NOTE: If a fire exists in the ECP or
Sally Port area, immediately notify SSCC and attempt to extinguish the fire using
available fire extinguishers.
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
• When emergency evacuation is warranted:
• (DCNI) Ensure personnel are not departing with ANY hand carried items. NOTE: The
only authorized items are classified material and/or radio. All other items will be
confiscated immediately and abandoned in place. AF FM 52 WILL NOT be
accomplished due to the nature of the emergency.
• (DCNI) Unless obstructions don’t allow exit through V-6, all evacuating personnel to
exit loading dock through V-6. If the situation allows, have all evacuating personnel
swipe out at V-6. Topside patrols will accomplish AF Form 1109 annotations for all
evacuating personnel.
ECP EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
• When emergency evacuation is warranted:
• (DCNI) If time/safety permits, EC personnel will log off the AECS console.
• (DCNI) If time/safety does not permit, upon return to ECP, purge ECP, conduct a
complete changeover using changeover checklist, and conduct a routine verification of
the system using JRV.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY OPERATIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, one member of the ECP will
provide Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD) at V-5. Coordinate with Topside Area
Supervisor/SSCC for termination of ISD to minimize fratricide.
• (DCNI) Remaining ECP personnel should man the weapons ports.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
X-RAY/METAL DETECTOR PROCEDURES:
• (DCNI) All personnel will place hand-carried items in a plastic bins for screening via X-
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Ray.
• (DCNI) Verify the items via X-Ray monitor and ensure all hand-carried items are identified.
If items cannot be identified, reverse the X-Ray machine, have the owner and EC accomplish
a hand-on verification of the item unless it is considered a possible threat.
• (DCNI) Items such as electronic circuit boards or unusual looking tools will be closely
scrutinized and treated as a possible threat until further investigation proves otherwise.
Contact munitions control for authorization and clarification of questionable items
entering/departing the area.
• (DCNI) All personnel should remove all metallic items prior to passing through the metal
detector. Any items removed from their person will be processed through the X-ray for
screening.
• (DCNI) NOTE: Unless the X-ray is broken, the EC will not conduct a simple hand-on
search of these items, they will always be processed through the X-ray.
• (DCNI) Direct personnel through the metal detector. If the detector annunciates, direct the
individual to identify any items that may be causing the alarm. Any identified items removed
from their person will be processed through the X-ray for screening.
• (DCNI) Instruct the individual to re-process through the metal detector, subsequent metal
detector alarms will be investigated with a hand-held transfrisker until positive identification
of all items can be made.
ITEMS EXEMPT FROM SEARCH:
• (DCNI) Because of early expiration of service life, possible damage to equipment, possible
injury to personnel, accountability, exposure to hazardous materials, need-to-know basis, or
equipment needing continuous humidity protection, the following items are exempt from
inspection:
• (DCNI) Hermetically sealed munitions supplies and equipment (e.g., limited life
components, explosive ejector cartridges).
• (DCNI) Munitions supplies and equipment in heat sealed barrier bags (e.g., humidity
indicators, missile components, etc).
• (DCNI) Munitions containers with intact shipping or storage seals (e.g., deployment kits
and classified munitions).
• (DCNI) Limited Life Components in non-commercial closed wooden or cardboard
containers with affixed shipping documents.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• Conduct a joint changeover using the changeover checklist with the off-going EC. You will
conduct daily inspections and checks of your area.
• Receive a briefing from the off-going SEC concerning past, current, and planned events and
review the pass-on book and work orders. Contact the Alarm Monitor to verify open work
orders for accuracy. Refer to Joint Routine Verification.
• (DCNI) Ensure the inbound X-Ray machine, outbound X-Ray machine, and metal detector
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is tested at each shift change using the applicable testing device.
• (DCNI) Conduct a check of all communications lines and a radio status check with SSCC.
• (DCNI) Account for all checklist books and verify that each individual checklist is present
and accounted for. Ensure checklists are clean and ready for use i.e., all dry erase markers
are cleaned from the plastic sheet.
• (DCNI) Verify the graphics display monitor to ensure all portals and special functions are in
the appropriate state. Refer to WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol. 4.
• (DCNI) Conduct a joint routine verification of AECS with the off-going EC by obtaining the
system status. Verify the system is operating on primary comm. Refer to WSSS SOP 31-
101 Vol. 4.
• If there are discrepancies with any of the above items, both the on-coming and off-going
FCC/FC will be contacted. If the discrepancy cannot be corrected prior to off-going
departing, an informational blotter entry will be made. Once off-going personnel have been
relieved, the on-coming personnel are responsible for all items associated with this position.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Monitor and maintain situational awareness of all CCTV, AECS, X-ray computer,
and communication equipment.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
and any other O-6 or above, you will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing
by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 10 is all secure, and ready for inspection.”
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
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• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
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# (DCNI) Cerberus-2 (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cerberus2
Version 19-1
KUMMSC Internal Security Response Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Respond to Security Incidents and emergencies as the Internal Security Response
Teams for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
You comprise a portion of the Response Force (RF).
• (DCNI) During hostile situations, provide final denial security at blast doors B-3 and B-4
until arrival of back-up forces or termination of all hostile elements.
• (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to any alarm annunciations or Security Incidents on the high
side of B-3/4 within 3 minutes.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) Behind blast doors B3/4 except during emergency response (fire/medical), loading
dock operations and logistics movements. Maintain a 3 minute response capability to all
alarm activations or Security Incidents occurring on the high side of B3/4.
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
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• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) The leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition.
• (DCNI) Cerberus-2A will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm linked armor
piercing and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm
hollow-point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
recover a PL1 resource.
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
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• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
representative.
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
access to any PL1 resources.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
DoE SAFEGUARDS TRANSPORTER ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
• (DCNI) During loading dock upload and download operations, when B1-4 are open, post in
Brandt Hall final denial positions.
INTER AREA MOVEMENT:
• (DCNI) During inter area movement you will be posted in Brandt Hall final denial positions
until movement is terminated.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
• (DCNI) During an emergency response, maintain visual and accountability of Fire
Department (FD) personnel upon their arrival into Brandt Hall. After FD departs, purge
entire area to include all administration areas. Relay status of all areas to SSCC upon
completion of purge. NOTE: If a fire exists in the administration areas, notify SSCC
and attempt to extinguish the fire using available fire extinguishers.
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
• When emergency evacuation is warranted:
• (DCNI) Ensure non-essential personnel are clear of administration areas.
• (DCNI) MC2 will be initiated. All personnel must depart in an orderly file formation.
• (DCNI) With the exception of classified material and radios, evacuating personnel are
not authorized to transport any hand-carried items out of the facility. All other items
will be immediately confiscated and abandoned in place.
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• (DCNI) Direct all evacuating personnel through B1-4. In conjunction with Loading
Dock ISRT (if posted), route evacuating personnel to V6. If the situation allows, have all
evacuating personnel swipe out at V6.
• (DCNI) Pass evacuees off to topside patrols for additional processing.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• (DCNI) Shift change will be conducted in the ART room.
• Inspect your post and ensure it is free from trash, clean, organized and fully operational
(ballistic barriers) prior to relieving off-going personnel.
• (DCNI) Ensure the ballistic barriers are in operational condition, check barriers for:
• (DCNI) Maneuverability (ensure they roll)
• (DCNI) Cleanliness (armored glass is clean)
• (DCNI) Operability (raise and lower)
• (DCNI) Serviceability (no cracks, no graffiti)
• (DCNI) NOTE: Report discrepancies to SSCC or flight leadership immediately.
• Account for SSIs, vault door combination and available flexi cuffs/flexi cuffs cutter.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the restricted/limited area display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the
outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
required for KUMMSC access.
• (DCNI) Ensure compliance with the two-person concept within exclusion areas. An
exclusion area will exist in Brandt Hall when Protection Level 1 resources are in transit
between A/B sides, or in route to the Loading Dock.
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually pump the blast doors. Detailed
instructions on how to pump the blast doors are located within the brown tool box adjacent to
B-3/4.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing by
stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 2 is all secure and ready for inspection, do you request a post
briefing?”
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
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personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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# (DCNI) Charlie-1 (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
CHARLIE 1
Version 19-1
SUBSEQUENT BACKUP FORCE
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) You are the Charlie Back-up Force Leader and are responsible for all Charlie
Backup forces to include Charlie 2, 3, and 4. You will respond to KUMMSC and follow the
direction of Guardian1/2, or Scorpion 1. If Guardian 1/2 or Scorpion 1 is incapacitated you
will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
•
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) The leader and member(s) will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
ball and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
Force Personnel.
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armory with both
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
representative.
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
access to any PL1 resources.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
• (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the surrounding
area.
• (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion 1.
• (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA you/Scorpion 1
will:
• (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
• (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
• (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully pass the
correct counter-sign.
• (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and ascertain reason
for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
• (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of foul
play or duress.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist Scorpion 1
with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well as those personnel
staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to physically document the number
of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You should not rely on memory to record this
information.
• (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged out of the
topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur regardless of the
fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the AF Form 1109. The
annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual vehicles and vehicle occupants to
depart through V1AB.
• (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency response
vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband materials. Upon
discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS personnel for official
determination of “contraband.”
• (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location, emergency
responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this case, responders will
not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE Patrol should be pre-positioned
outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the subsequent emergency location. The
patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the
subsequent emergency location. Make contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is
knowledgeable with respect to this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not
already in their possession).
FACILITY EVACUATION:
• (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over evacuees
as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the exception of hand-held
radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not allowed. If hand-held classified
material is present, search the content to verify it is classified material. Log all evacuees on
an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive control over evacuees until the situation is resolved
or they are otherwise released by the Incident Commander.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) parking lot
west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased to avoid congregation
of all patrols.
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
• Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
• (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377 WSSS
blotter.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
• (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building (UB),
C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
• (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted through the
use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside patrol in the event
the card readers are not operational.
• (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will make
telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name and badge
number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If AECS is not
operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted Area Badge Listing
(MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside patrol to meet the individual at
the applicable location and verify the identity of the personnel requesting access. If there
appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out,
notify SSCC and allow entry.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring avenues
of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to potential
aggressors.
• (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such areas for observation and
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
• (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections and checks
of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
• (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour checks are
conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e. Armory, Utility Building,
C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
• (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not congregate for
longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or Flight Chief.
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area display an
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on
the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
required for KUMMSC access.
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle denial
barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF
Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post and offer a
post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie-1 is all secure and ready for inspection.”
• (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective Foot
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate your walking
patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate coverage of the
surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and termination of all
walking patrols.
• (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System (PSRS) alarm
annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map. Upon arriving at the
applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and report your findings back to
SSCC.
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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# (DCNI) Charlie-2 (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
CHARLIE 2
Version 19-1
SUBSEQUENT BACKUP FORCE
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding to
contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 3, and 4. If the situation demands
you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
•
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) The leader and member(s) will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
ball and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
Force Personnel.
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armory with both
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
representative.
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
access to any PL1 resources.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
• (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the surrounding
area.
• (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion 1.
• (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA you/Scorpion 1
will:
• (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
• (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
• (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully pass the
correct counter-sign.
• (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and ascertain reason
for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
• (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of foul
play or duress.
• (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist Scorpion 1
with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well as those personnel
staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to physically document the number
of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You should not rely on memory to record this
information.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged out of the
topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur regardless of the
fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the AF Form 1109. The
annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual vehicles and vehicle occupants to
depart through V1AB.
• (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency response
vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband materials. Upon
discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS personnel for official
determination of “contraband.”
• (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location, emergency
responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this case, responders will
not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE Patrol should be pre-positioned
outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the subsequent emergency location. The
patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the
subsequent emergency location. Make contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is
knowledgeable with respect to this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not
already in their possession).
FACILITY EVACUATION:
• (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over evacuees
as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the exception of hand-held
radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not allowed. If hand-held classified
material is present, search the content to verify it is classified material. Log all evacuees on
an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive control over evacuees until the situation is resolved
or they are otherwise released by the Incident Commander.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) parking lot
west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased to avoid congregation
of all patrols.
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
• Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
• (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377 WSSS
blotter.
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
• (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building (UB),
C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted through the
use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside patrol in the event
the card readers are not operational.
• (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will make
telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name and badge
number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If AECS is not
operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted Area Badge Listing
(MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside patrol to meet the individual at
the applicable location and verify the identity of the personnel requesting access. If there
appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out,
notify SSCC and allow entry.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring avenues
of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to potential
aggressors.
• (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such areas for observation and
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
• (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections and checks
of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
• (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour checks are
conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e. Armory, Utility Building,
C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
• (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not congregate for
longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or Flight Chief.
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area display an
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on
the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
required for KUMMSC access.
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle denial
barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF
Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post and offer a
post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 2 is all secure and ready for inspection.”
• (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective Foot
Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate your walking
patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate coverage of the
surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and termination of all
walking patrols.
• (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System (PSRS) alarm
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map. Upon arriving at the
applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and report your findings back to
SSCC.
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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# (DCNI) Charlie-3 (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
CHARLIE 3
Version 19-1
SUBSEQUENT BACKUP FORCE
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding to
contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 2, and 4. If the situation demands
you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
•
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) The leader and member(s) will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
ball and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
Force Personnel.
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armory with both
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
representative.
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
access to any PL1 resources.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
• (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the surrounding
area.
• (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion 1.
• (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA you/Scorpion 1
will:
• (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
• (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
• (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully pass the
correct counter-sign.
• (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and ascertain reason
for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
• (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of foul
play or duress.
• (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist Scorpion 1
with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well as those personnel
staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to physically document the number
of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You should not rely on memory to record this
information.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged out of the
topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur regardless of the
fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the AF Form 1109. The
annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual vehicles and vehicle occupants to
depart through V1AB.
• (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency response
vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband materials. Upon
discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS personnel for official
determination of “contraband.”
• (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location, emergency
responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this case, responders will
not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE Patrol should be pre-positioned
outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the subsequent emergency location. The
patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the
subsequent emergency location. Make contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is
knowledgeable with respect to this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not
already in their possession).
FACILITY EVACUATION:
• (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over evacuees
as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the exception of hand-held
radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not allowed. If hand-held classified
material is present, search the content to verify it is classified material. Log all evacuees on
an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive control over evacuees until the situation is resolved
or they are otherwise released by the Incident Commander.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) parking lot
west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased to avoid congregation
of all patrols.
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
• Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
• (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377 WSSS
blotter.
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
• (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building (UB),
C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted through the
use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside patrol in the event
the card readers are not operational.
• (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will make
telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name and badge
number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If AECS is not
operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted Area Badge Listing
(MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside patrol to meet the individual at
the applicable location and verify the identity of the personnel requesting access. If there
appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out,
notify SSCC and allow entry.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring avenues
of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to potential
aggressors.
• (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such areas for observation and
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
• (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections and checks
of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
• (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour checks are
conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e. Armory, Utility Building,
C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
• (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not congregate for
longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or Flight Chief.
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area display an
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on
the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
required for KUMMSC access.
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle denial
barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF
Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post and offer a
post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 3 is all secure and ready for inspection.”
• (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective Foot
Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate your walking
patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate coverage of the
surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and termination of all
walking patrols.
• (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System (PSRS) alarm
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map. Upon arriving at the
applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and report your findings back to
SSCC.
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7

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# (DCNI) Charlie-4 (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
CHARLIE 4
Version 19-1
SUBSEQUENT BACKUP FORCE
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding to
contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 2, and 3. If the situation demands
you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
•
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) The leader and member(s) will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
ball and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
Force Personnel.
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armory with both
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
representative.
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
access to any PL1 resources.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
• (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the surrounding
area.
• (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion 1.
• (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA you/Scorpion 1
will:
• (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
• (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
• (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully pass the
correct counter-sign.
• (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and ascertain reason
for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
• (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of foul
play or duress.
• (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist Scorpion 1
with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well as those personnel
staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to physically document the number
of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You should not rely on memory to record this
information.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged out of the
topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur regardless of the
fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the AF Form 1109. The
annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual vehicles and vehicle occupants to
depart through V1AB.
• (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency response
vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband materials. Upon
discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS personnel for official
determination of “contraband.”
• (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location, emergency
responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this case, responders will
not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE Patrol should be pre-positioned
outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the subsequent emergency location. The
patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the
subsequent emergency location. Make contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is
knowledgeable with respect to this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not
already in their possession).
FACILITY EVACUATION:
• (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over evacuees
as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the exception of hand-held
radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not allowed. If hand-held classified
material is present, search the content to verify it is classified material. Log all evacuees on
an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive control over evacuees until the situation is resolved
or they are otherwise released by the Incident Commander.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) parking lot
west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased to avoid congregation
of all patrols.
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
• Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
• (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377 WSSS
blotter.
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
• (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building (UB),
C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted through the
use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside patrol in the event
the card readers are not operational.
• (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will make
telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name and badge
number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If AECS is not
operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted Area Badge Listing
(MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside patrol to meet the individual at
the applicable location and verify the identity of the personnel requesting access. If there
appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out,
notify SSCC and allow entry.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring avenues
of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to potential
aggressors.
• (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such areas for observation and
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
• (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections and checks
of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
• (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour checks are
conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e. Armory, Utility Building,
C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
• (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not congregate for
longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or Flight Chief.
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area display an
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on
the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
required for KUMMSC access.
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle denial
barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF
Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post and offer a
post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 4 is all secure and ready for inspection.”
• (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective Foot
Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate your walking
patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate coverage of the
surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and termination of all
walking patrols.
• (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System (PSRS) alarm
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map. Upon arriving at the
applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and report your findings back to
SSCC.
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7

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# (DCNI) Cobra 1
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cobra 1
Version 17-1
Convoy Commander
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Provide command & control during logistics movements. Provide safe,
secure, and effective transportation for Protection Level 1 munitions within the
confines of Kirtland, AFB.
 (DCNI) Prepare and deliver a mission brief to all Air Base Wing logistics movement
participants.
 (DCNI) Conduct a Multi-Agency Rehearsal within 48 hours from a PL1 ground
movement. Ensure the following agencies are present:
 Convoy Commander
 Senior Security Representative
 Area Supervisor
 SAAM Coordinator
 Fire Department
 MUNS Supervision
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Trans Alert
 (DCNI) Prepare and deliver a detailed convoy briefing prior to the movement of a
resource. Ensure all required briefing items are included per DoDM S-5210.41- M
AFMAN 31-108 Volume 3.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) As determined by mission requirements. During the movement, remain with
visual range of the resource(s).
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
radio communication capability.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but
will enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be
advised that when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can
potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited.
Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1
resource is prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base
Wing Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) You will be armed with M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition with a 4
to 1 ratio. Additionally you will be armed with the M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow
point ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
 Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
when directed by higher authority.
 (DCNI) Ensure your vehicle is equipped with a PA, if not you will use a Bullhorn.
 All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
prior to movement for an outbound mission.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
INBOUND:
 (DCNI) Ensure all posted in support of PL1 resources are certified on PRP,
cleared to receive secret and fit for duty in the Convoy Mission Brief.
 (DCNI) Ensure route sweeps are conducted prior to convoy roll. Individuals
conducting sweeps must have a LMR while conducting sweeps of the route.
 (DCNI) Ensure all personnel are tactically prepared 30 minutes prior to A/C
landing and taxing.
 (DCNI) Ensure all forces are in place, and the route is swept and secure prior to
requesting permission to roll.
 (DCNI) When the download is complete, and the tow drivers are prepared to
depart, request permission to roll from the ABW/CC through the SAAM
Coordinator.
 (DCNI) Authenticate the composition of the convoy with Guardian once
movement has been initiated.
 (DCNI) Ensure checkpoints are called and authenticated by either
Cobra-2 or Cobra-3.
 (DCNI) Authenticate the number of personnel entering the exclusion area
of KUMMSC with Guardian.
OUTBOUND:
 (DCNI) Ensure all posted in support of PL1 resources are certified on PRP,
cleared to receive secret and fit for duty in the Convoy Mission Brief.
 (DCNI) Ensure route sweeps are conducted prior to convoy roll. Individuals
conducting sweeps must have a LMR while conducting sweeps of the route.
 (DCNI) Ensure all forces are in place, and the route is swept and secure prior to
requesting permission to roll.
 (DCNI) Once Mustang-1 declares that Pad-5 is ready to receive, request
permission to roll from the ABW/CC through the SAAM Coordinator.
 (DCNI) Authenticate the composition of the convoy with Guardian once
movement has been initiated.
 (DCNI) Ensure checkpoints are called and authenticated by either
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
Cobra-2 or Cobra-3.
 (DCNI) Authenticate the number of personnel entering the exclusion area
of Pad-5 with Mustang-10.
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
o (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize
the intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
o (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander
or a senior battle staff representative.
o (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest
priority until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their
actions to gain unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
o (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken
to deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody
of a seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or
vehicle containing PL1 resources.
PAD 5 RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA
o (DCNI) PNAF Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security
challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent
security seams that could develop if PNAF area entry procedures are
changed as the weapons move (or the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent
extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon, the description of
the PNAF exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Encl
9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
o (DCNI) Once the PNAF aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated
PNAF limited (restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is
established. Therefore, the limited and exclusion area verification and
inspection will occur at the single entry control point at all times once the
weapons enter the PNAF restricted area. For personnel not authorized
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC
must contact the SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will
ensure compliance with the security requirements outlined in DoDM S-
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as DoDM S-5210.41-
M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
o (DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited
and exclusion areas established for alert parking areas where the
limited and exclusion area inspection and assignment of escorts occur
at the same entry point.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
PAD-5 ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
 (DCNI) All personnel entering the PAD 5 limited/exclusion area must have a valid
reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into Hot Cargo Pad 5 will be based on
the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for
aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential
and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other
agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring
entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the
PAD-5 ECP.
 (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant
surveillance prior to entering the PAD-5 limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough
sweep is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be
conducted by SF personnel and an EDD team if available.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

180
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# (DCNI) Cobra 10
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cobra 10
Version 17-1
Convoy Entry Controller
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Control entry/exit of personnel and vehicles to the exclusion area.
 (DCNI) For any long halt situation you will create an ECP as directed by the
Convoy Commande r. It should be no closer than 10 feet no further than 60 feet
from the resource(s).
 (DCNI) You will search all personnel and their hand carried items prior to
allowing entry into the exclusion area utilizing a Transfrisker. If no Transfrisker is
available, conduct a simple frisk of individuals prior to allowing entry to the area.
All individuals will have their Restricted Area Badge cross checked against the
properly authenticated EAL. You will ensure name, rank, SSN and badge
number match. If any of the above listed items do not match, immediately deny
entry and notify Cobra-1.
 (DCNI) Any personnel requiring escorted entry into the area will be logged in on
the AF Form 1109 Visitor Register Log (Attachment 1), all hand carried items will
be searched and the individual will be searched utilizing a Transfrisker. The SVA
must be present at the ECP to allow entry to persons not on any of the EAL's and
vouch for those entering.
 (DCNI) Ensure all hand-carried items and persons are searched prior to any
individuals leaving the exclusion area.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Emergency responders must be preannounced. Emergency entry will be based
off a successful sign/countersign. Ensure you maintain strict accountability
during all situations. Prior to exiting, emergency responders will be searched
along with their vehicles and equipment. All emergency responders will be
signed in on an AF Form 1109 prior to exiting the area.
POST LIMITS:
 Posted with Cobra-1 during movement.
 Within the immediate area of designated Entry Control Point (ECP) once
an ECP is established.
COMMUNICATIONS:
 Primary means of communication is Two Way Portable Radio. Secondary
means of communication are available landlines within the immediate area.
Alternate means, manual signal techniques including voice, whistle, hand and
arm signals and flashlight. As a last resort, utilize weapons by firing 3 rounds in
rapid succession in a manner not to endanger lives or resources IAW 31-117.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25 ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 M4 and 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball/tracer ammunition mixed at a 4 to 1 ratio.
Additionally you will be armed with the M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow point
ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
 Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
situations or when directed by higher authority.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
 All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
prior to movement for an outbound mission.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance
with AFMAN 31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and
Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security Forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Account for ECP signs, AF Form 1109s, a transfrisker, and all other
equipment items prior to initiation of the movement.
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, on-duty SF must
begin the recapture immediately, without the added delay of requesting and
receiving permission from an installation authority such as the installation
commander or a senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Actions to recapture or recover a weapon shall be undertaken
immediately and will remain the primary mission and highest priority until
completed.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized nuclear weapon and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing nuclear weapons.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

227
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# (DCNI) Cobra 2
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cobra 2
Version 17-1
Convoy Lead Escort Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Provide lead escort security for Protection Level 1 Logistics Movements, to
the best of your estimation; maintain 75 feet between your Armored HMMWV and
the tow vehicle.
 (DCNI) Sweep primary and alternate routes upon initiation of the applicable Step
Code paying particular attention to items listed in the mission briefing. Maintain
situational awareness of the appropriate Step Code currently in use. See
Attachment 1 for Step Codes. Ensure TCP’s are established prior to initiating route
sweeps.
 (DCNI) Upon completion of your route sweeps for inbound operations, proceed to
the northeast corner of Pad-5 on Ordnance Street and maintain a sector of fire to the
northeast until Cobra 1 directs you to the south of Pad 5 to setup in a position to lead
75 feet in front of the tow vehicle(s).
 (DCNI) Upon completion of route sweeps for outbound ops, return to the KUMMSC
exit tunnel, and position yourself to monitor avenues of approach.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) Call out checkpoint progression to the Site Security Control Center as the
Tow Vehicle passes by the pre-determined points determined by the Convoy
Commander in the mission brief.
 (DCNI) Authenticate with SSCC at the corresponding checkpoints during movement
(use proper step).
 (DCNI) Post Restricted Area signs in case of long halt situations and take up a
security position to the 12 o'clock position to the convoy's forward direction.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) During movements, maintain a minimum of 75 feet in front of the tow vehicle.
During Pad 5 operations, monitor avenues of approach as directed by the Convoy
Commander.
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
radio communication capability.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but
will enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be
advised that when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can
potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS
 (DCNI) The Leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of
9mm hollow point ammunition.
 (DCNI) The Machine Gunner (Alpha member) will be armed with an M240B with
800 rounds of 7.62mm armor piercing and tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and
also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of 9mm hollow point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN, 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
 Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
when directed by higher authority.
 All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
prior to movement for an outbound mission.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
resources.
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA
 (DCNI) PNAF Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security challenge
because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are transferred from
loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams that
could develop if PNAF area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or
the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of
the weapon, the description of the PNAF exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41-
M_AFMAN 31-108, vol 3, Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 (DCNI) Once the PNAF aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated PNAF
limited (restricted) area than a single limited and exclusion area is established.
Therefore, the limited and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the
single entry control point at all times once the weapons enter the PNAF restricted
area. For personnel not authorized access into the exclusion area but have duty in
the restricted area, the EC must contact the SVA to ensure an escort is assigned.
This procedure will ensure compliance with the security requirements outlined in
DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as DoDM S-
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
 (DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and
exclusion areas established for alert parking areas where the limited and
exclusion area inspection and assignment of escorts occur at the same
entry point.
PAD-5 ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
 (DCNI) All personnel entering the PAD 5 limited/exclusion area must have a valid
reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into Hot Cargo Pad 5 will be based on
the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for
aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential
and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other
agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring
entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the
PAD-5 ECP.
 (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant
surveillance prior to entering the PAD-5 limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough
sweep is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be
conducted by SF personnel and an EDD team if available.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

236
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@ -1,236 +0,0 @@
# (DCNI) Cobra 3
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cobra 3
Version 17-1
Convoy Trail Escort Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Provide trail escort security for Protection Level 1 Logistics Movements.
Maintain a minimum of 75 feet between your Armored HMMWV and the tow
vehicle. Maintain Final Denial Fire capability at all times of resource(s) in transit.
 (DCNI) Sweep alternate and primary routes upon initiation of the applicable Step
Code paying particular attention to items listed in the mission briefing. Maintain
situational awareness of the appropriate Step Code currently in use. Ensure
TCP’s are in place prior to initiating route sweeps.
 (DCNI) Upon completion of your route sweeps for inbound operations, proceed
to the northeast corner of Pad-5 on Ordnance Street and maintain a sector of fire
to the northeast until Cobra 1 directs you to the south of Pad 5 to setup in a
position to trail 75 feet behind the tow vehicle(s).
 (DCNI) Upon completion of route sweeps for outbound ops, return to the
KUMMSC exit tunnel, and position yourself next to V-8 in preparation to trail 75
feet behind the tow vehicle(s).
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
 (DCNI) Post Restricted Area signs in case of long halt situations and maintain the
capability for final denial fire at all times to the 6 o'clock position of the convoy's
forward direction.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) During movements, maintain a minimum of 75 feet behind the tow vehicle.
During Pad 5 operations, monitor avenues of approach as directed by the Convoy
Commander.
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
radio communication capability.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but
will enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be
advised that when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can
potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The Leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and is also armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of
9mm hollow point ammunition.
 (DCNI) The Machine Gunner (Alpha member) will be armed with an M240B with
800 rounds of 7.62mm armor piercing and tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and
also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of 9mm hollow point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-117, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
 Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
when directed by higher authority.
 All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
prior to movement for an Outbound mission.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
resources.
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
 (DCNI) PNAF Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security challenge
because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are transferred from
loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams that
could develop if PNAF area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or
the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of
the weapon, the description of the PNAF exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41-
M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
 (DCNI) Once the PNAF aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated PNAF
limited (restricted) area than a single limited and exclusion area is established.
Therefore, the limited and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the
single entry control point at all times once the weapons enter the PNAF restricted
area. For personnel not authorized access into the exclusion area but have duty in
the restricted area, the EC must contact the SVA to ensure an escort is assigned.
This procedure will ensure compliance with the security requirements outlined in
DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as DoDM S-
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
 (DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and
exclusion areas established for alert parking areas where the limited and
exclusion area inspection and assignment of escorts occur at the same entry
point.
PAD-5 ENTRY REQUIREMENTS
 (DCNI) All personnel entering the PAD 5 limited/exclusion area must have a valid
reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into Hot Cargo Pad 5 will be based on
the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for
aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential
and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other
agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring
entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the
PAD-5 ECP.
 (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant
surveillance prior to entering the PAD-5 limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough
sweep is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be
conducted by SF personnel and an EDD team if available.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will
facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for
AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons.
NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide
standard, every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to
include actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are
not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

223
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@ -1,223 +0,0 @@
# (DCNI) Cobra 4
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cobra 4
Version 17-1
Convoy Trail Escort Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Provide trail escort security for Protection Level 1 Logistics Movements.
Maintain a minimum of 75 feet between your Armored HMMWV and the tow
vehicle. Maintain Final Denial Fire capability at all times of resource(s) in transit.
 (DCNI) Sweep alternate and primary routes upon initiation of the applicable Step
Code paying particular attention to items listed in the mission briefing. Maintain
situational awareness of the appropriate Step Code currently in use.
 (DCNI) Upon completion of your route sweeps for inbound operations, proceed
to the northeast corner of Pad-5 on Ordnance Street and maintain a sector of fire
to the northeast until Cobra 1 directs you to the south of Pad 5 to setup in a
position to trail 75 feet behind the tow vehicle(s).
 (DCNI) Upon completion of route sweeps for outbound ops, return to the
KUMMSC exit tunnel, and position yourself next to V-8 in preparation to trail 75
feet behind the tow vehicle(s).
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
 (DCNI) Post Restricted Area signs in case of long halt situations and maintain the
capability for final denial fire at all times to the 6 o'clock position of the convoy's
forward direction.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) During movements, maintain a minimum of 75 feet behind the tow
vehicle . During Pad 5 operations, monitor avenues of approach as directed by
the Convoy Commander.
COMMUNICATIONS:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
radio communication capability.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open circle)
on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to channel
6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable
radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when
transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by
unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The Leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of
9mm hollow point ammunition.
 (DCNI) The Machine Gunner (Alpha member) will be armed with an M240B with
800 rounds of 7.62mm armor piercing and tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and
also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of 9mm hollow point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-117, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
 Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
 (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
when directed by higher authority.
 All alert equipment will be donned for an Inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
prior to movement for an outbound mission.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
senior battle staff representative.
 (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
resources.
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
 (DCNI) PNAF Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security challenge
because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are transferred from
loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams that
could develop if PNAF area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or
the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of
the weapon, the description of the PNAF exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41-
M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
 (DCNI) Once the PNAF aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated PNAF
limited (restricted) area than a single limited and exclusion area is established.
Therefore, the limited and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the
single entry control point at all times once the weapons enter the PNAF restricted
area. For personnel not authorized access into the exclusion area but have duty in
the restricted area, the EC must contact the SVA to ensure an escort is assigned.
This procedure will ensure compliance with the security requirements outlined in
DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as DoDM S-
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
 (DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and
exclusion areas established for alert parking areas where the limited and
exclusion area inspection and assignment of escorts occur at the same entry
point.
PAD-5 ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
 (DCNI) All personnel entering the PAD 5 limited/exclusion area must have a valid
reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into Hot Cargo Pad 5 will be based on
the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for
aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential
and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other
agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring
entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the
PAD-5 ECP.
 (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant
surveillance prior to entering the PAD-5 limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough
sweep is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be
conducted by SF personnel and an EDD team if available.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

242
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# (DCNI) Cobra-1 (19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cobra 1
Version 19-1
Convoy Commander
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Provide command & control during logistics movements. Provide safe, secure, and
effective transportation for Protection Level 1 munitions within the confines of Kirtland,
AFB.
• (DCNI) Prepare and deliver a mission brief to all Air Base Wing logistics movement
participants.
• (DCNI) Conduct a Multi-Agency Rehearsal within 48 hours of a PL1 ground movement.
Ensure the following agencies are present:
• Convoy Commander
• Senior Security Representative
• Area Supervisor
• SAAM Coordinator
• Fire Department
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
Cobra-1, 19-1, Feb 19
• MUNS Supervision
• Trans Alert
• (DCNI) Prepare and deliver a detailed convoy briefing prior to the movement of a resource.
Ensure all required briefing items are included per DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108
Volume 3.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) As determined by mission requirements. During the movement, remain with visual
range of the resource(s).
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) You will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails, do not
deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and immediately
attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-1/Mustang-1
or higher authority.
• (DCNI) Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
• (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type IV
plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or when
directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) Ensure your vehicle is equipped with a PA, if not you will use a Bullhorn.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
Cobra-1, 19-1, Feb 19
• All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and prior to
movement for an outbound mission.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
Force Personnel.
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
recover a PL1 resource.
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
INBOUND:
• (DCNI) Ensure all posted in support of PL1 resources are certified under Arming and
Use of Force (AUoF), cleared to receive Secret, and fit for duty in the Convoy
Mission Brief.
• (DCNI) Ensure route sweeps are conducted prior to convoy roll. Individuals
conducting sweeps must have a LMR while conducting sweeps of the route.
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel are tactically prepared 30 minutes prior to A/C landing
and taxiing.
• (DCNI) Ensure all forces are in place, and the route is swept and secure prior to
requesting permission to roll.
• (DCNI) When the download is complete, and the tow drivers are prepared to depart,
request permission to roll from the ABW/CC through the SAAM Coordinator.
• (DCNI) Prior to movement, announce over radio, “When CDS is directed, it
becomes a top priority.
• (DCNI) Authenticate the composition of the convoy with Guardian once movement
has been initiated.
• (DCNI) Ensure checkpoints are called and authenticated by either Cobra-2
or Cobra-3.
• (DCNI) Authenticate the number of personnel entering the exclusion area of
KUMMSC with Guardian.
OUTBOUND:
• (DCNI) Ensure all posted in support of PL1 resources are certified under Arming and
Use of Force (AUoF), cleared to receive Secret, and fit for duty in the Convoy
Mission Brief.
• (DCNI) Ensure route sweeps are conducted prior to convoy roll. Individuals
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
Cobra-1, 19-1, Feb 19
conducting sweeps must have a LMR while conducting sweeps of the route.
• (DCNI) Ensure all forces are in place, and the route is swept and secure prior to
requesting permission to roll.
• (DCNI) Once Mustang-1 declares that the Aircraft Parking Area is ready to receive,
request permission to roll from the ABW/CC through the SAAM Coordinator.
• (DCNI) Prior to movement, announce over radio, “When CDS is directed, it
becomes a top priority.”
• (DCNI) Authenticate the composition of the convoy with Guardian once movement
has been initiated.
• (DCNI) Ensure checkpoints are called and authenticated by either Cobra-2
or Cobra-3.
(DCNI) Authenticate the number of personnel entering the exclusion area of
Aircraft Parking Area with Mustang-10.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
representative.
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
access to any PL1 resources.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
• (DCNI) Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Loading/unloading operations provide
a unique security challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams
that could develop if SAAM area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the
aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon,
the description of the SAAM exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3,
Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
(restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the
security requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as
well as DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
Cobra-1, 19-1, Feb 19
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion areas
established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area inspection and
assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
• (DCNI) All personnel entering the Aircraft Parking Area limited/exclusion area must have a
valid reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into the Aircraft Parking Area will be
based on the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for aircrew will
be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential and verified against the
crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other agencies will be based on the
individual possessing a valid government issued credential and verified against a properly
authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than
aircrew) will be prescreened at the Aircraft Parking Area ECP.
• (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant surveillance
prior to entering the Aircraft Parking Area limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough sweep
is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be conducted by SF
personnel and an EDD team if available.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
Cobra-1, 19-1, Feb 19
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books).
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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# (DCNI) Cobra-10 (19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cobra 10
Version 19-1
Convoy Entry Controller
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Control entry/exit of personnel and vehicles to the exclusion area.
• (DCNI) For any long halt situation you will create an ECP as directed by the Convoy
Commande r. It should be no closer than 10 feet no further than 60 feet from the
resource(s).
• (DCNI) You will search all personnel and their hand carried items prior to allowing entry
into the exclusion area utilizing a Transfrisker. If no Transfrisker is available, conduct a
simple frisk of individuals prior to allowing entry to the area. All individuals will have
their Restricted Area Badge cross checked against the properly authenticated EAL. You
will ensure name, rank, SSN and badge number match. If any of the above listed items
do not match, immediately deny entry and notify Cobra-1.
• (DCNI) Any personnel requiring escorted entry into the area will be logged in on the AF
Form 1109 Visitor Register Log, all hand carried items will be searched and the individual
will be searched utilizing a Transfrisker. The SVA must be present at the ECP to allow
entry to persons not on any of the EAL's and vouch for those entering.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
Cobra-10, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Ensure all hand-carried items and persons are searched prior to any individuals
leaving the exclusion area.
• (DCNI) Emergency responders must be preannounced. Emergency entry will be based
off a successful sign/countersign. Ensure you maintain strict accountability during all
situations. Prior to exiting, emergency responders will be searched along with their
vehicles and equipment. All emergency responders will be signed in on an AF Form
1109 prior to exiting the area.
POST LIMITS:
• Posted with Cobra-1 during movement.
• Within the immediate area of designated Entry Control Point (ECP) once
an ECP is established.
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition.
EQUIPMENT:
• Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and helmet will
be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-1/Mustang-1 or higher
authority.
• (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type IV
plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or when
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
Cobra-10, 19-1, Feb 19
directed by higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and prior to
movement for an outbound mission.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
Force Personnel.
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
recover a PL1 resource.
• Security Forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Account for ECP signs, AF Form 1109s, a transfrisker, and all other equipment
items prior to initiation of the movement.
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, on-duty SF must begin the
recapture immediately, without the added delay of requesting and receiving permission from
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
representative.
• (DCNI) Actions to recapture or recover a weapon shall be undertaken immediately and will
remain the primary mission and highest priority until completed.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized nuclear
weapon and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing nuclear weapons.
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
• (DCNI) Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Loading/unloading operations provide
a unique security challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams
that could develop if SAAM area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the
aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon,
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
Cobra-10, 19-1, Feb 19
the description of the SAAM exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3,
Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
(restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the
security requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as
well as DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion areas
established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area inspection and
assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
• (DCNI) All personnel entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area must have a
valid reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into the aircraft parking area
limited/exclusion area will be based on the individual possessing an open area 9 on their
1199CG Restricted Area Badge and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by
898 MUNS. Entry for aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government
issued credential and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG
or other agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring entry
into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the aircraft parking
area ECP.
• (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant surveillance
prior to entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough sweep is
conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be conducted by SF
personnel and an EDD team if available.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
Cobra-10, 19-1, Feb 19
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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# (DCNI) Cobra-2 (19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cobra 2
Version 19-1
Convoy Lead Escort Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Provide lead escort security for Protection Level 1 Logistics Movements. To the
best of your estimation, maintain 75 feet between your Armored HMMWV and the tow
vehicle.
• (DCNI) Sweep primary and alternate routes upon initiation of the applicable Step Code
paying particular attention to items listed in the mission briefing. Maintain situational
awareness of the appropriate Step Code currently in use. See Attachment for Step Codes.
Ensure TCPs are established prior to initiating route sweeps.
• (DCNI) Upon completion of your route sweeps for inbound operations, proceed to the
predetermined location near the aircraft parking location and maintain your sector of fire
until Cobra 1 directs you to setup to lead 75 feet in front of the tow vehicle(s).
• (DCNI) Upon completion of route sweeps for outbound ops, return to the KUMMSC exit
tunnel, and position yourself to monitor avenues of approach.
• (DCNI) Call out checkpoint progression to the Site Security Control Center (SSCC) as the
Tow Vehicle passes by the pre-determined points determined by the Convoy Commander in
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
Cobra-2, 19-1, Feb 19
the mission brief.
• (DCNI) Authenticate with SSCC at the corresponding checkpoints during movement (use
proper step).
• (DCNI) Post Restricted Area signs in case of long halt situations and take up a security
position to the 12 o'clock position to the convoy's forward direction.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) During movements, maintain a minimum of 75 feet in front of the tow vehicle.
During aircraft parking area operations, monitor avenues of approach as directed by the
Convoy Commander.
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS
• (DCNI) The leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition.
• (DCNI) Cobra-2A will carry an M240B with 800 rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing
and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
Force Personnel.
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
Cobra-2, 19-1, Feb 19
recover a PL1 resource.
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
neutralize an adversary.
EQUIPMENT:
• Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and helmet will
be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-1/Mustang-1 or higher
authority.
• (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type IV
plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations, or when
directed by higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and prior to
movement for an outbound mission.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
representative.
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
access to any PL1 resources.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
• (DCNI) Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Loading/unloading operations provide
a unique security challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
Cobra-2, 19-1, Feb 19
that could develop if SAAM area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the
aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon,
the description of the SAAM exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3,
Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
(restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the
security requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as
well as DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion areas
established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area inspection and
assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
• (DCNI) All personnel entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area must have a
valid reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into the aircraft parking area
limited/exclusion area will be based on the individual possessing an open area 9 on their
1199CG Restricted Area Badge and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by
898 MUNS. Entry for aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government
issued credential and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG
or other agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring entry
into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the aircraft parking
area ECP.
(DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant surveillance
prior to entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough sweep is
conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be conducted by SF
personnel and an EDD team if available.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
Cobra-2, 19-1, Feb 19
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5

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# (DCNI) Cobra-3 (19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Cobra 3
Version 19-1
Convoy Trail Escort Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Provide trail escort security for Protection Level 1 Logistics Movements.
Maintain approximately 75 feet between your Armored HMMWV and the tow vehicle.
Maintain Final Denial Fire capability at all times of resource(s) in transit.
• (DCNI) Sweep alternate and primary routes upon initiation of the applicable Step Code
paying particular attention to items listed in the mission briefing. Maintain situational
awareness of the appropriate Step Code currently in use. Ensure TCPs are in place prior
to initiating route sweeps.
• (DCNI) Upon completion of your route sweeps for inbound operations, proceed to the
predetermined location near the aircraft parking location and maintain your sector of fire
until Cobra 1 directs you to setup in a position to trail 75 feet behind the tow vehicle(s).
• (DCNI) Upon completion of route sweeps for outbound ops, return to the KUMMSC
exit tunnel, and position yourself next to V-8 in preparation to trail 75 feet behind the tow
vehicle(s).
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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Cobra-3, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Post Restricted Area signs in case of long halt situations and maintain the
capability for final denial fire at all times to the 6 o'clock position of the convoy's forward
direction.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) During movements, maintain a minimum of 75 feet behind the tow vehicle. During
aircraft parking area operations, monitor avenues of approach as directed by the Convoy
Commander.
COMMUNICATIONS:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) The leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition.
• (DCNI) Cobra-3A will carry an M240B with 800 rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing
and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
point ammunition.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
Force Personnel.
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
recover a PL1 resource.
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
neutralize an adversary.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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Cobra-3, 19-1, Feb 19
EQUIPMENT:
• Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and helmet will
be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-1/Mustang-1 or higher
authority.
• (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type IV
plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or when
directed by higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and prior to
movement for an outbound mission.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
representative.
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
access to any PL1 resources.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
• (DCNI) Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Loading/unloading operations provide
a unique security challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams
that could develop if SAAM area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the
aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon,
the description of the SAAM exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3,
Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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Cobra-3, 19-1, Feb 19
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
(restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the
security requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as
well as DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion areas
established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area inspection and
assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
• (DCNI) All personnel entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area must have a
valid reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into the aircraft parking area
limited/exclusion area will be based on the individual possessing an open area 9 on their
1199CG Restricted Area Badge and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by
898 MUNS. Entry for aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government
issued credential and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG
or other agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring entry
into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the aircraft parking
area ECP.
• (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant surveillance
prior to entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough sweep is
conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be conducted by SF
personnel and an EDD team if available.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and
are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of
the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will determine
how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of how to apply
the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
Cobra-3, 19-1, Feb 19
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 1
Version 17-1
Flightline Area Supervisor / External Security Response Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Respond as a part of the 15 personnel Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the
Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
 Note: (DCNI) Response Times to KUMMSC
 (DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC
 You are also the flightline Area Supervisor (AS) responsible for all flightline security
operations within the150th New Mexico Air National Guard (NMANG) restricted
area, 58th Special Operations Wing (SOW) restricted area, and 377th ABW
Transient Ramp restricted area. See Attachment 11-11.3 for flightline area
schematics.
POST LIMITS:
 Provide immediate armed response to any incident within your area of responsibility
and provide a back-up response for Coyote 2/3/4 and Coyote 5/10/11 (if posted).
 (DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct BAF responses to Protection
Level 1 resources.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Trips to the West side Shoppette and Subway are authorized. As the area
supervisor, you will manage patrols to ensure all IRST/ESRT requirements are
maintained. Those requirements are as follows:
 (DCNI) Each restricted area containing PL3 resources must have a 2-man
ISRT capable of immediate response to defeat an adversary before any
negative effects against a resource occurs.
 (DCNI) Additionally, restricted areas must have a 2-man ESRT, capable of
immediate response to defeat an adversary before any negative effects
against a resource occurs.
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within 10 feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25 feet of
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) At a minimum, the leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210
rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm
hollow-point ammunition. Member(s) may carry an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and 10 rounds of HE ammunition and 2 rounds
of white star ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition. Member(s) may also carry an M240B with 800 rounds of 7.62mm
linked armor piercing and tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm
hollow-point ammunition.
 (DCNI) You will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun hand
grenade and 2 CS gas grenades.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 With the approval of your flight leadership, be prepared to assist Law Enforcement
(LE) patrols for gate runner incidents. Coyote patrols with no protection level
resources in their respective areas will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all
flight-line entry points or at spike strip locations.
 Ensure posted internal SRTs have valid, authenticated EALs or Crew Orders for
aircraft assigned to their respective restricted areas.
 Properly authenticate Crew Orders or utilize the Interim Entry Authority List as
described below.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body
above the waistline.
 Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area.
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
restricted area.
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
topside controlled area.
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to hot cargo
pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 Conduct a daily visual check of Pad 5 and all flightline physical security facilities,
including boundary barrier systems, gates, manholes, grates, and structures, for
tampering, deterioration, and inoperative equipment. You will radio SSCC upon
completion of this check. Reference Attachments 12 and 13 of this instruction for
guidance.
 Flight line Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
discrepancies are discovered.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
 Ensure all patrols conduct minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks
are randomly accomplished throughout the shift by all Coyote patrols within their
respective areas. Radio SSCC and inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation,
and termination of the perimeter/RAB checks. Exception: When a restricted area is
closed and no individuals are present, you will not be required to conduct RAB
checks.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 1 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 Ensure patrols in your assigned area exit their vehicles to enter keypad codes for
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
gate activation.
(U) RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing PL1 resources.
(U) TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
Upon arrival of transit aircraft you will immediately make contact with the Aircraft
commander to obtain Entry Authority List (EAL) information.
 Acceptable EAL information can come in two forms; Aircrew Orders or an Interim
EAL template found at Attachment 14.
 Aircrew Orders are provided by the pilot or mission commander and if used,
must contain the following information:
 Name
 Rank
 Organization
 Last 6 of Social Security Number or Controlled Picture Identification
Number
 Badge number
 Dates of Visit
 Clearance Status
 Expiration Date
 If the Crew Orders do not contain all information listed above, you may
hand-write in the missing information, if practical. If hand-writing the
information in on the Aircrew Orders would make them unreadable, utilize
the Interim EAL template in Attachment 14.
 If Aircrew Orders are not available, use the Interim EAL template. Fill in all the
blocks on the template to include all members of the aircrew.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
(U) RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATIONS:
 150th FW NMANG Restricted Area
 There are fifteen light poles in the 150th FW NMANG restricted area. These light
poles each contain four to six lights; however, only two lights will be illuminated
on each pole at night. The purpose of this configuration is to have the other
lights act as emergency back-ups. The emergency back-up lights are operated
manually by way of a switches located an unlocked box at the base of each
individual light pole.
 58th SOW Restricted Area
 This are contains three hangars (1000, 1001, and 1002) with security lighting on
the sides of them. Hangars 1000 and 1001 have lights on the south, east and
west sides. Hangar 1002 has lights on all sides. The controls to turn these lights
on and off are located on the south side of each hangar. In order to turn the
lights on and off you must:
 Locate the appropriate light control box
 Open the door
 Enter 1234* on the numerical keypad
 Press either the green “Master On” button to turn on all lights for that zone,
or press the individual green buttons for the lights you wish to turn on.
There is a diagram depicting the various zones in each light box.
 377th ABW Transient Ramp Restricted Area
 The lights for this area are controlled by a light box on a pole to the east of
building 333 (Base Operations). The light box contains several individual
switches and a master power switch. In order to turn these lights on and off
use only the individual switches, always leaving the master power switch
turned on.
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 (DCNI) You will be dispatched to Pad 5 to initiate security operations until the arrival
of recalled personnel.
 (DCNI) Assist with sweeps for Pad 5 prior to Aircraft arrival. Coordinate with the
Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) to dispatch a MWD to aid with these
sweeps.
 (DCNI) In the event the aircraft should reach Pad 5 before the entire response force
is in-place, you will be posted as the Pad Supervisor and Coyote-1A will post as the
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
Pad Entry Controller until qualified WSSS personnel arrive. Inform the aircrew they
will retain security responsibility of the aircraft until required SF personnel are in
place.
(U) REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
 Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, you will be dispatched to the
Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the Reflex Delta Kit.
 Your patrols will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes, cones,
stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you have
enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20 stanchions, 4
RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered to Coyote 4’s
area.
 An additional ESRT, EC and CBS will be posted to secure these aircraft. They are
not counted as part of the KUMMSC IBF and will remain dedicated to this PL1
Aircraft. The ranking member on the ESRT will be the REFLEX DELTA area
supervisor.
 The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material. The
presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
concept with the roped restricted area boundary.
 SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
 If TPC material is onboard an unoccupied aircraft and cannot be removed, the
crew will secure the material in an approved onboard container. SF subsequently
ensure enforcement of the TPC rule upon granting access to the aircraft. Enforce
two-person control by using an EAL to identify two authorized individuals prior to
allowing entry.
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
 Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
 If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
 Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, you will take the both
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
documents and make copies for distribution as follows.
 One copy for Coyote 1
 One copy for Coyote 4
 One copy for the Flightline Constable
 The original crew orders will be filed in SSCC.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flight line and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flight line vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flight line vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
vehicle pass.
(U) SHIFT CHANGE:
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel. Additionally,
ensure each flight line IBF vehicle is properly inspected using the AF Form 1800.
 In addition to the individual vehicle inspections, you will conduct vehicle inspections
of all coyote patrols for any discrepancies and will ensure all vehicles are in good
repair (to include BAF standby HMMWVs). You will notify SSCC and flight
leadership of any vehicle discrepancies discovered.
 You will conduct shift in the GOV parking lot as part of early Guardmount. Return to
flightline after shift change is complete to relieve the remaining patrols.
 Ensure all flight line patrols conduct a purge of their respective areas immediately
after assuming post.
 You will verify all current EALs are accounted for and verify with off-going that all
have been taken to SSCC. You will check all patrols SSI binders to ensure current
EALs are accounted for and expired documents have been removed. Ensure all
documents are destroyed appropriately.
 One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
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DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: The KUMMSC environment may
require special considerations during a recapture scenario. Although the
AFGSC AFCIA-R process should always be considered the following
immediate actions may be used in addition to the AFCIA-R process.
Immediate Actions for KUMMSC recap scenario:
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
9
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

315
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@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
# (DCNI) Coyote 10
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 10
Version 17-1
Reflex Delta Entry Controller
&
Internal Security Response Team Member
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 You are the Entry Controller (EC) for all Reflex Delta missions and will stay within 25
feet of the established entry control point of the PL1 restricted area unless properly
relieved.
 Additionally, in conjunction with Coyote 11 (Reflex Delta Close Bound Sentry), you
comprise a 2-man Internal Security Response Team. Coordinate with Coyote 11 to
ensure adequate coverage of the restricted area’s interior. To the greatest extent
possible, remain 180° apart with respect to the restricted area boundary.
 (DCNI) You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial Backup Force IBF and will not
respond to KUMMSC contingency operations
 The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
immediate response capability to the area inside the perimeter in order to defeat an
adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
 You will control entry and access to Reflex Delta aircraft using authenticated Entry
Authority Lists (EAL). For personnel desiring entry, compare the provided
identification credentials against the information listed on the authenticated EAL. All
information must match or entry is not authorized.
 Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the orange radio
communication box.
 A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
to Coyote 4’s area.
POST LIMITS:
 You will stay within 25 feet of the established entry control point of the PL1 restricted
area unless properly relieved.
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition
and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammuniton.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
to real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Ensure those entering the roped restricted area must be on an authenticated EAL or
authenticated Aircrew orders.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body
above the waistline.
 Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
topside controlled area
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot
cargo pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
3
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline
photography letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If
photographers do not possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area
badge) with the proper open area, they must be annotated on a properly
authenticated EAL or be escorted by someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare
the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL
for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are
discovered.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 10 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. You will
assume entry control duties and Coyote 11 will assume Close Boundary Sentry
duties.
 In conjunction with Coyote 5, make contact with the Aircraft commander as soon as
possible to obtain EAL information.
 Acceptable EAL information will come in Aircrew Orders or an Interim EAL
template.
 Aircrew Orders are provided by the pilot or mission commander and if used,
must contain the following information:
 Name
 Rank
 Organization
 Last 6 of Social Security Number or Controlled Picture Identification
Number
 Badge number
 Dates of Visit
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
 Clearance Status
 Expiration Date
 If the Crew Orders do not contain all information listed above, you may hand-
write in the missing information, if practical. If hand-writing the information in on
the Aircrew Orders would make them unreadable, use the Interim EAL template.
 If Aircrew Orders are not available, use the Interim EAL template. Fill in all the
blocks on the template to include all members of the aircrew.
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
 Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
 If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
 Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, Coyote-1 will take the both
documents and make copies for distribution as follows.
 One copy for Coyote 1(Flightline Area Supervisor)
 One copy for Coyote 5 (Reflex Delta Area Supervisor)
 One copy (original) for Coyote 10 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller)
 One copy for the Mission Commander
 One copy for SSCC
 You will use the authenticated EAL to control entry at the designated Entry Control
Point to the roped restricted area boundary.
 If personnel are being escorted into the restricted area, prior to allowing entry to
and exit from the restricted area, you must verify with escort officials that they
have completed an inspection of all vehicles and hand-carried items of those
they are escorting. NOTE: This entails two separate inspections; an inspection
prior to entry and an inspection prior to exit.
 The on-duty Flight Chief or Flight Commander will meet the mission commander and
deliver a local area security briefing. If the Flight Chief or Flight Commander are not
available, Coyote 5 will brief the mission commander.
5
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
 The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
 The presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
concept within the roped restricted area boundary.
 You will ensure enforcement of the two-person concept before granting access to
the aircraft. Enforce the two-person control by using an EAL to identify two
authorized individuals prior to allowing entry. Certified 2-person control team
members are identified with an “X” next to their name on the Entry Authority List
provided by the aircrew.
 SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
vehicle pass.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted at the entry control point of the Reflex Delta restricted
area.
 If you have a vehicle, Inspect it using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from
trash, clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
 Account for SSIs, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
7
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

249
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# (DCNI) Coyote 11
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 11
Version 17-1
Reflex Delta Close Bound Sentry
&
Internal Security Response Team Member
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 You are the flight line Close Boundary Sentry (CBS) for all Reflex Delta missions.
The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
immediate response capability to the area inside the perimeter in order to defeat an
adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
 Additionally, in conjunction with Coyote 10 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller), you
comprise a 2-man Internal Security Response Team. Coordinate with Coyote 11 to
ensure adequate coverage of the restricted area’s interior. To the greatest extent
possible, remain 180° apart with respect to the restricted area boundary.
 (DCNI) You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial Backup Force IBF and will not
respond to KUMMSC contingency operations.
 Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the orange radio
communication box.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
 A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
to Coyote 4’s area.
 You must wear all required gear when responding to any situation or alarm. This
includes Flak Vest with Level IV ballistic plates, helmet, and gas mask with
appropriately filled out DD Form 1574/fit test.
 You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 If leaving your vehicle, all required gear must be worn.
POST LIMITS:
 You will remain within the restricted area perimeter and to the greatest extent
possible, remain 180° from Coyote 10 with respect to the restricted area boundary.
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 20ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition
and an M9 with 30 rounds 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
to real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. You will
assume Close Boundary Sentry duties and Coyote 10 will assume entry control
duties
 The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
 The presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-
person concept within the roped restricted area boundary. When in effect, you
will monitor enforcement of the two-person concept
 SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Ensure those entering the roped restricted area must be on an authenticated EAL or
authenticated Aircrew orders.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body
above the waistline.
 Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
topside controlled area
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot
cargo pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
discrepancies are discovered.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 11 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
vehicle pass.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted at the entry control point of the Reflex Delta restricted
area.
 If you have a vehicle, inspect it using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash,
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

321
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# (DCNI) Coyote 2
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 2
Version 17-1
Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Respond as a part of the 15 personnel Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the
Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
 (DCNI) Provide immediate response capability as the ISRT for the 150 NMANG
restricted area not to exceed 3 minutes when protection level resources are present
in your area.
 Note: (DCNI) Response Times to KUMMSC
 (DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) You are assigned to the 150 NMANG restricted area unless properly
relieved or as directed by Area Supervisor/Flight Chief/Flight Commander or higher.
 (DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct BAF responses to Protection
Level 1 resources.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
point ammunition. Member(s) may carry an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and 10 rounds of HE ammunition and 2
rounds of white star ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition.
 (DCNI) Member(s) may also carry an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm linked
armor piercing and tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
point ammunition.
 (DCNI) Member will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun
hand grenade and 2 CS gas grenades.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your area, plot all aircraft with your
area and up-channel to SSCC.
 You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
SSCC.
 Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
 If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the
Flight Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flight line restricted areas display an
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their
body, above the waistline.
 Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
flight line restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area,
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
NMANG restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
KUMMSC topside controlled area
 (DCNI) Open are 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot cargo
pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
authenticated EAL for access to flight line restricted areas.
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 In conjunction with Coyote 1 and other coyote patrols, you will conduct a daily visual
check of all flight line physical security facilities, including boundary barrier systems,
gates, manholes, grates, and structures for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative
equipment. You will radio SSCC upon completion of this check. Reference
Attachments 13 and 14 of this instruction for guidance.
 Flight line Photography - Validate that all flight line photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flight line photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flight line Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
discrepancies are discovered.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
 Ensure a minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are randomly
accomplished throughout the shift within your respective area. Radio SSCC and
inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the perimeter/RAB
checks. Exception: When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are present,
you will not be required to conduct RAB checks.
 In the event of a gate runner and you do not have protection level resources in your
respective area will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 2 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing PL1 resources.
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
 Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
 Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
 150th FW NMANG Restricted Area
 There are fifteen light poles in the 150th FW NMANG restricted area. These light
poles each contain four to six lights; however, only two lights will be illuminated
on each pole at night. The purpose of this configuration is to have the other
lights act as emergency back-ups. The emergency back-up lights are operated
manually by way of a switches located an unlocked box at the base of each
individual light pole.
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 (DCNI) You could be dispatched to Pad 5 to initiate security operations until the
arrival of recalled personnel.
 (DCNI) You will assist with sweeps for Pad 5 prior to Aircraft arrival. In the event
the aircraft should reach Pad 5 before the entire response force is in-place, you will
be posted as a fire team until recalled personnel arrives.
REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
 A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
to Coyote 4’s area.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
vehicle pass.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel. Ensure that you
sign the AF Form 1800.
 You will verify all current EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have been taken
to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure all
documents are destroyed appropriately.
 You will conduct shift change at the GOV parking lot after Coyote-1 assumes post
during early Guardmount and returns to the flightline.
 One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

319
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@ -1,319 +0,0 @@
# (DCNI) Coyote 3
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 3
Version 17-1
Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Respond as a part of the 15 personnel Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the
Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
 (DCNI) Provide immediate response capability as the ISRT for the 58th SOW
restricted area not to exceed 3 minutes when protection level resources are present
in your area.
 (DCNI) Note: Response Times to KUMMSC
 (DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) You are assigned to the 58th SOW restricted area unless properly relieved
or as directed by Area Supervisor/Flight Chief/Flight Commander or higher.
 (DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct BAF responses to Protection
Level 1 resources.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition. Member(s) may carry an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
tracer ammunition and 10 rounds of HE ammunition and 2 rounds of white star
ammunition and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
 (DCNI) Member(s) may also carry an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm linked
armor piercing and tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
point ammunition.
 (DCNI) Member will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun hand
grenade and 1 CS gas grenade.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your area, plot all aircraft with your
area and up-channel to SSCC.
 You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
SSCC.
 Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
 If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the
Flight Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body,
above the waistline.
 Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
flight line restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area,
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
NMANG restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
KUMMSC topside controlled area
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for the hot cargo pads (to include pad 5)
during PL1 logistical operations.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 In conjunction with Coyote 1 and other coyote patrols, you will conduct a daily visual
check of all flightline physical security facilities, including boundary barrier systems,
gates, manholes, grates, and structures for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative
equipment. You will radio SSCC upon completion of this check. Reference
Attachments 13 and 14 of this instruction for guidance.
 Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
discrepancies are discovered.
 (DCNI) (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their
associated compensatory measures.
 Ensure a minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are randomly
accomplished throughout the shift within your respective area. Radio SSCC and
inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the perimeter/RAB
checks. Exception: When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are present,
you will not be required to conduct RAB checks.
 In the event of a gate runner and you do not have protection level resources in your
respective area will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 3 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing PL1 resources.
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
 Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
 Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
 58th SOW Restricted Area
 This are contains three hangars (1000, 1001, and 1002) with security lighting on
the sides of them. Hangars 1000 and 1001 have lights on the south, east and
west sides. Hangar 1002 has lights on all sides. The controls to turn these lights
on and off are located on the south side of each hangar. In order to turn the
lights on and off you must:
 Locate the appropriate light control box
 Open the door
 Enter 1234* on the numerical keypad
 Press either the green “Master On” button to turn on all lights for that zone,
or press the individual green buttons for the lights you wish to turn on.
There is a diagram depicting the various zones in each light box.
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 (DCNI) You could be dispatched to Pad 5 to initiate security operations until the
arrival of recalled personnel.
 (DCNI) You will assist with sweeps for Pad 5 prior to Aircraft arrival. In the event
the aircraft should reach Pad 5 before the entire response force is in-place, you will
be posted as a fire team until recalled personnel arrives.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
 A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
to Coyote 4’s area.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and challenge, initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid
flight line POV vehicle pass.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel. Ensure that you
sign the AF Form 1800.
 You will verify all current EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have been taken
to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure all
documents are destroyed appropriately.
 You will conduct shift change at the GOV parking lot after Coyote-1 assumes post
during early Guardmount and returns to the flightline.
 One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

329
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@ -1,329 +0,0 @@
# (DCNI) Coyote 4
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 4
Version 17-1
Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) Respond as a part of the 15 personnel Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the
Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
 (DCNI) Provide immediate response capability as the ISRT for the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area not to exceed 3 minutes when protection level
resources are present in your area.
 (DCNI) Note: Response Times to KUMMSC
 (DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC.
POST LIMITS:
 (DCNI) You are assigned to the 377th ABW transient ramp restricted area unless
properly relieved or as directed by Area Supervisor/Flight Chief/Flight Commander
or higher.
 (DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct BAF responses to Protection
Level 1 resources.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
1
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 (DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition.
 (DCNI) Member(s) may carry an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
tracer ammunition and 10 rounds of HE ammunition and 2 rounds of white star
ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition. Member(s)
may also carry an M240B with 800 rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing and
tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
 (DCNI) Member will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun hand
grenade and 1 CS gas grenade.
EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
2
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your area, plot all aircraft with your
area and up-channel to SSCC.
 You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
SSCC.
 Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
 If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the
Flight Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flight line restricted areas display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body,
above the waistline.
 Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
flight line restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area,
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
NMANG restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
KUMMSC topside controlled area
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot cargo
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
3
pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
authenticated EAL for access to flight line restricted areas.
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 In conjunction with Coyote 1 and other coyote patrols, you will conduct a daily visual
check of all flight line physical security facilities, including boundary barrier systems,
gates, manholes, grates, and structures for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative
equipment. You will radio SSCC upon completion of this check. Reference
Attachments 13 and 14 of this instruction for guidance.
 Flight line Photography - Validate that all flight line photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flight line photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flight line Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
discrepancies are discovered.
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
 Ensure a minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are randomly
accomplished throughout the shift within your respective area. Radio SSCC and
inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the perimeter/RAB
checks. Exception: When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are present,
you will not be required to conduct RAB checks.
 In the event of a gate runner and you do not have protection level resources in your
respective area will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 4 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
 (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
4
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
 (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
containing PL1 resources.
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
 Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
 Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
 377th ABW Transient Ramp Restricted Area
 The lights for this area are controlled by a light box on a pole to the east of
building 333 (Base Operations). The light box contains several individual
switches and a master power switch. In order to turn these lights on and off use
only the individual switches, always leaving the master power switch turned on.
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 (DCNI) You could be dispatched to Pad 5 to initiate security operations until the
arrival of recalled personnel.
 (DCNI) You will assist with sweeps for Pad 5 prior to Aircraft arrival. In the event
the aircraft should reach Pad 5 before the entire response force is in-place, you will
be posted as a fire team until recalled personnel arrives.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
5
REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
 A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
to Coyote 4’s area.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flight line and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flight line vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flight line vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
 Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flight line POV
vehicle pass.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Ensure that you sign the AF Form 1800.
 You will verify all current EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have been taken
to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure all
documents are destroyed appropriately.
 You will conduct shift change at the GOV parking lot after Coyote-1 assumes post
during early Guardmount and returns to the flightline.
 One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
6
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
7
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

307
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# (DCNI) Coyote 5
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 5
Version 17-1
Reflex Delta External Security Response Team (ESRT)
PRIMARY DUTIES:
 (DCNI) You are the dedicated ISRT for all Reflex Delta missions which will be
located on the 377th ABW parking ramp. You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial
Backup Force IBF and will not respond to KUMMSC contingency operations.
 The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
immediate response capability to this perimeter in order to defeat an adversary
before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
 The ranking member of this team is the Reflex Delta Area Supervisor and
responsible to ensure all security requirements are maintained.
 Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the reflex delta kit.
 A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
to Coyote 4’s area.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
1
POST LIMITS:
 You will stay within the 377 Air Base Wing restricted area unless properly relieved.
COMMUNICATION:
 (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
 (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
 (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
 (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
 (DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
 The leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
ammunition. The alpha member will be armed with an M4/203 with 210 rounds of
5.56mm ammunition and 10 rounds of high explosive ammunition and 2 rounds of
white star ammunition. Also, both members will be armed with an M9 with 30
rounds of 9mm hollow point ammunition.
(U) EQUIPMENT:
 You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
 Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
to real world and exercise incidents.
(U) USE OF FORCE:
 The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force Personnel.
 The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
2
 Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
actions to neutralize an adversary
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
 Ensure those entering the roped restricted area are on an authenticated EAL or
authenticated Aircrew orders.
 Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their
body above the waistline.
 Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
restricted areas.
 Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
restricted area
 Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
transient ramp restricted area
 Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
restricted area
 (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
topside controlled area, and
 (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization the hot cargo pads (to include pad 5)
during PL1 logistical operations.
 Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
 Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
 Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
someone with the proper open area.
 Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
discrepancies are discovered.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
3
 (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
 When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 5 is all secure, and ready for
inspection.”
 You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
 Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. Coyote
10 will assume entry control duties and Coyote 11 will assume Close Boundary
Sentry duties.
 In conjunction with Coyote 10, make contact with the Aircraft commander as soon as
possible to obtain Entry Authority List (EAL) information.
 Aircrew Orders are provided by the pilot or mission commander and if used,
must contain the following information:
 Name
 Rank
 Organization
 Last 6 of Social Security Number or Controlled Picture Identification
Number
 Badge number
 Dates of Visit
 Clearance Status
 Expiration Date
 If the Crew Orders do not contain all information listed above, you may hand-
write in the missing information, if practical. If hand-writing the information in
on the Aircrew Orders would make them unreadable, use the Interim EAL
template.
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
 Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
 Printed name/rank of authenticator
 Signed name of the authenticator
 Date and time authenticated
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
4
 Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
 All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
 If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
 Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, Coyote-1 will take the both
documents and make copies for distribution as follows.
 One copy for Coyote 1(Flightline Area Supervisor)
 One copy for Coyote 5 (Reflex Delta Area Supervisor)
 One copy (original) for Coyote 10 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller)
 One copy for the Mission Commander
 One copy for SSCC
 Coyote 10 will use the authenticated EAL to control entry at the designated Entry
Control Point to the roped restricted area boundary.
 The on-duty Flight Chief or Flight Commander will meet the mission commander and
deliver a local area security briefing. If the Flight Chief or Flight Commander are not
available, you will brief the mission commander.
 The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material. The
presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
concept within the roped restricted area boundary.
 Certified 2-person control team members are identified with an “X” next to their
name on the Entry Authority List provided by the aircrew.
 SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
 If TPC material is onboard an unoccupied aircraft and cannot be removed, the
crew will secure the material in an approved onboard container. SF subsequently
ensure enforcement of the TPC rule upon granting access to the aircraft. Enforce
two-person control by using an EAL to identify two authorized individuals prior to
allowing entry.
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
 Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
 There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
labeled KAFB Form 47).
 The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
 The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
 Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
5
 Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
vehicle pass.
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
 377th ABW Transient Ramp Restricted Area lights are controlled by a light box on a
pole to the east of building 333 (Base Operations). The light box contains several
individual switches and a master power switch. In order to turn these lights on and
off use only the individual switches, always leaving the master power switch turned
on.
SHIFT CHANGE:
 Shift change will be conducted immediately adjacent to the roped restricted area
of the Reflex Delta on 377th ABW parking ramp.
 Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
 Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
 Account for SSIs, Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC), DOE courier listing, and AF
Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
AFCIA-R
 The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
nature as specific actions upon contact.
 (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
resources.
 (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
 Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
the defined battle-space.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
6
 (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
nuclear weapon.
 (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
 (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
7
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
during the flight’s duty day
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
Digitally signed by
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
Operations Officer
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION

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# (DCNI) Coyote-1 (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 1
Version 19-1
Flightline Area Supervisor / External Security Response Team
SAAM Response Force Leader / Security Response Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• The flightline Area Supervisor (AS) responsible for all flightline security operations within
the 150th Special Operations Wing (SOW) restricted area and the 58th SOW restricted area.
See Attachment 11-11.3 for flightline area schematics.
• (DCNI) Respond as a part of the Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the Kirtland Underground
Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC) and for Convoy/SAAM operations
(as required).
• Note: (DCNI) Response Times to outside your area.
• (DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC
PRIMARY DUTIES (SAAM):
• (DCNI) You are the Response Force (RF) Leader for Aircraft Parking Area Operations. The
RF will be capable of responding, neutralizing and/or containing the situation until it is
resolved or until arrival of the Initial Backup Force (IBF).
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• (DCNI) Assist Mustang-1 in supervision at the aircraft parking area during logistics
movements. If the Aircraft Parking Area Supervisor (Mustang-1) becomes incapacitated,
assume command and control of the Aircraft Parking Area Operations.
• (DCNI) BF Leader during logistical movements.
• (DCNI) Coyote (RF) and Viper (BF) members will switch roles after hearing proper step
code for BF/RF swap once movement is initiated for an Inbound mission and once resources
have entered the aircraft parking area for an Outbound mission.
• (DCNI) Maintain situational awareness of the convoy movement and ensure you are aware
which version of the step code will be used along with specific step codes applicable to your
post.
POST LIMITS:
• Provide immediate armed response to any incident within your area of responsibility and
provide a back-up response for Coyote 2/3/4 and Reflex 2/3/10 (if posted).
• (DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct IBF responses to Protection Level 1
resources.
• Trips to the West side Shoppette and Subway are authorized. As the area supervisor, you will
manage patrols to ensure all IRST/ESRT requirements are maintained. Those requirements
are as follows:
• (DCNI) Each restricted area containing PL3 resources must have a 2-man ISRT capable
of immediate response to defeat an adversary before any negative effects against a
resource occurs.
• (DCNI) Additionally, restricted areas must have a 2-man ESRT, capable of immediate
response to defeat an adversary before any negative effects against a resource occurs.
POST LIMITS (SAAM):
• (DCNI) Ensure you maintain the ability to respond to the aircraft parking area and bring
immediate fire to bear on the boundary of the restricted/limited/exclusion area and exposed
weapons.
• (DCNI) Ensure you are capable of responding to any emergency in the convoy to ensure
denial of access in no longer than 15 minutes.
COMMUNICATION:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
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• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) Coyote-1 & 1C will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition
• (DCNI) Coyote-1A will be armed with an M240B with 800 rounds of 7.62mm linked armor
piercing and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm
hollow-point ammunition.
• (DCNI) Coyote-1B will be armed with an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, 10 rounds of HE ammunition, 2 rounds of white
star ammunition, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
• (DCNI) The leader will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun hand
grenade and 2 CS gas grenades.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
• All alert equipment will be donned for an Inbound SAAM movement prior to A/C arrival and
prior to movement for an Outbound mission.
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USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
recover a PL1 resource.
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• With the approval of your flight leadership, be prepared to assist Law Enforcement (LE)
patrols for gate runner incidents. Coyote patrols with no protection level resources in their
respective areas will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points or at
spike strip locations.
• Ensure posted internal SRTs have valid, authenticated EALs or Crew Orders for aircraft
assigned to their respective restricted areas.
• Properly authenticate Crew Orders or utilize the Interim Entry Authority List as described
below.
• Ensure daily physical security checks are conducted.
• Ensure daily RAMs are conducted.
• Ensure 100% RAB checks are conducted after shift change, and whenever returning to the
area after leaving it unattended.
• Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF Form
1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the
outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body above the waistline.
• Open areas 4 and 19 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline restricted areas.
• Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW restricted area.
• Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th SOW restricted
area.
• (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC topside
controlled area.
• (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to hot cargo pads (to
include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
• Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly authenticated
EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
• Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in and
around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and surveillance of
site operations by unauthorized personnel.
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• Conduct a daily visual check of Pad 5 and all flightline physical security facilities, including
boundary barrier systems, gates, manholes, grates, and structures, for tampering,
deterioration, and inoperative equipment. You will radio SSCC upon completion of this
check. Reference attachments of this instruction for guidance.
• Flight line Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by ensuring
photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography letter signed by
the 377 SFS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not possess a Kirtland AFB Form
1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open area, they must be annotated on a
properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by someone with the proper open area.
• Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare the
photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
• Ensure all patrols conduct minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are
randomly accomplished throughout the shift by all Coyote patrols within their respective
areas. Radio SSCC and inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the
perimeter/RAB checks. Exception: When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are
present, you will not be required to conduct RAB checks.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing by
stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 1 is all secure, and ready for inspection.”
• Ensure patrols in your assigned area exit their vehicles to enter keypad codes for gate
activation.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES (SAAM):
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
• INBOUND CONVOY:
• (DCNI) You are the leader for the Initial Backup Force (IBF) during convoy movements.
In the event of hostilities you will direct the response of the IBF.
• (DCNI) Ensure that all the Coyote units have all required equipment and are properly
positioned.
• (DCNI) Verify taxiway ropes and stanchions are removed upon arriving at the aircraft
parking area.
• (DCNI) Upon A/C arrival, ensure flightline units properly block traffic on the access
roads located on the flightline and secure swing gates. Assist as necessary.
• (DCNI) When directed by Cobra-1, proceed to KUMMSC GOV parking lot and await
further instruction from Cobra-1. Ensure all IBF Fire Team Leaders (FTL) account for
their required equipment and turn in all appropriate items to the Armorer and the
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operation section; i.e., Special Security Instructions (SSls), NVGs, keys and gear (if
issued). In addition, ensure all response vehicles have no less than 75% fuel, and free of
trash.
• (DCNI) Upon initiation of proper step code for BF/RF swap, you and the rest of the
Coyote RF become the movements BF
• OUTBOUND CONVOY:
• (DCNI) Upon initiation of proper step code for BF/RF you and the rest of the Coyote BF
become the movement's RF.
• (DCNI) You are the leader for the Initial Backup Force (IBF) during convoy movements.
In the event of hostilities you will direct the response of the IBF.
• (DCNI) Ensure that all the Mongoose units have all required equipment and are properly
positioned.
• (DCNI) When the A/C is ready to depart, Block traffic and secures swing gates on South
Gate Road.
• (DCNI) After the A/C departs, stand by for 30 minutes. Return to Squad Ops once
directed by Mustang-1 or Cobra-1.
• (DCNI) When directed by Cobra-1 or Mustang-1, proceed to KUMMSC GOV parking
lot and await further instruction. Ensure all IBF Fire Team Leaders (FTL) account for
their required equipment and turn in all appropriate items to the Armorer and the
operation section; i.e., SSls, NVGs, keys and gear (if issued). In addition, ensure all
response vehicles have no less than 75% fuel, and free of trash.
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA (SAAM):
• (DCNI) Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Loading/unloading operations provide
a unique security challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams
that could develop if SAAM area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the
aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon,
the description of the SAAM exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3,
Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
(restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the
security requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as
well as DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion areas
established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area inspection and
assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
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AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS (SAAM):
• (DCNI) All personnel entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area must have a
valid reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into the aircraft parking area will be based
on the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge and be
verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for aircrew will be
based on the individual possessing a government issued credential and verified against the
crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other agencies will be based on the
individual possessing a valid government issued credential and verified against a properly
authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than
aircrew) will be prescreened at the aircraft parking area ECP.
• (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant surveillance
prior to entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough sweep is
conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be conducted by SF
personnel and an EDD team if available.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
• Upon arrival of transient aircraft you will immediately make contact with the Aircraft
commander to obtain Entry Authority List (EAL) information.
• EAL or Crew Orders are both acceptable.
• EAL will contain:
• Name, Rank (OFF/ENL/CIV), Controlled Picture ID number, Badge number,
Clearance Status, Dates of Visit, Expiration Date
• Note: A government issued photo ID with a controlled number (Driver’s License
Number, DoD Control Number, etc) is acceptable. Only enter the last 6 digits of
the DoD Control Number; all other media requires the full number.
• Crew orders will contain
• Name, rank, last six numbers of the SSAN, organization, clearance status, and
inclusive dates of travel, may be used as EALs for transit aircraft in lieu of the
procedures stated above. Compare a home base AF Form 1199, CAC, or other ID
(credential) with information contained on the crew order for positive
identification prior to allowing entry.
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EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
• Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a Security
Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5/GS-7 or above must authenticate the documents and
sign with the following information on the bottom of page 2 of the cover letter:
• Printed name/rank of authenticator
• Signed name of the authenticator
• Date and time authenticated
• Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
• All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the authenticator
will place their initials by the page numbers.
• If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
• Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, you will take the documents and make
copies for distribution as follows.
• Three (3) total. One (1) copy for the flightline area supervisor, one (1) copy for the
transient ramp ISRT, and the original crew orders will be filed in SSCC.
• REFLEX DELTA: Five (5) total. Original document for the Entry Controller, one (1)
copy for the ESRT, one (1) copy for the mission commander, one (1) copy for the SSCC,
and one (1) copy for BDOC.
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATIONS:
• 150th SOW Restricted Area
• There are fifteen light poles in the 150th SOW restricted area. These light poles each
contain four to six lights; however, only two lights will be illuminated on each pole at
night. The purpose of this configuration is to have the other lights act as emergency
back-ups. The emergency back-up lights are operated manually by way of a switches
located an unlocked box at the base of each individual light pole.
• 58th SOW Restricted Area
• This area contains three hangars (1000, 1001, and 1002) with security lighting on the
sides of them. Hangars 1000 and 1001 have lights on the south, east and west sides.
Hangar 1002 has lights on all sides. The controls to turn these lights on and off are
located on the south side of each hangar. In order to turn the lights on and off you must:
• Locate the appropriate light control box
• Open the door
• Enter 1234* on the numerical keypad
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• Press either the green “Master On” button to turn on all lights for that zone, or press
the individual green buttons for the lights you wish to turn on. There is a diagram
depicting the various zones in each light box.
• 377th ABW Transient Ramp
• The lights for this area are controlled by a light box on a pole to the east of
building 333 (Base Operations). The light box contains several individual
switches and a master power switch. In order to turn these lights on and off use
only the individual switches, always leaving the master power switch turned on.
SHORT NOTICE TYPE I AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
• (DCNI) You will be dispatched to the Aircraft Parking Area to initiate security operations
until the arrival of recalled personnel.
• (DCNI) Assist with sweeps of the Aircraft Parking Area prior to Aircraft arrival. Coordinate
with the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) to dispatch a MWD to aid with these
sweeps.
• (DCNI) In the event the aircraft should reach the Aircraft Parking Area before the entire
response force is in-place, you will be posted as the Pad Supervisor and Coyote-1A will post
as the Pad Entry Controller until qualified WSSS personnel arrive. Inform the aircrew they
will retain security responsibility of the aircraft until required SF personnel are in place.
REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
• Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, you will be dispatched to the 377
ABW Transient Ramp to meet the A/C.
• Ensure a sweep of the Alert Crew billets (Bldg #917) has been completed prior to aircrew
arrival. Note: If an explosive detection capable Military Working Dog (MWD) team is not
available, the Flightline ESRT will conduct the sweep of the building. This is not a tactical
sweep; patrols will be looking for obvious contraband or explosive items. All rooms and
cabinets must be searched. Use the master key provided by the lodging staff (located in the
east side billeting front desk, Bldg #22016) to conduct the sweep. Notify SSCC when sweep
has been initiated and completed.
• An additional EC and CBS will be posted to secure these aircraft. They are not counted as
part of the KUMMSC IBF and will remain dedicated to this PL1 Aircraft. The ranking
member on the ESRT will be the REFLEX DELTA area supervisor.
• The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
• (DCNI) A No-Lone Zone (NLZ) will be established whenever Two-Person Control
(TPC) material is present on the aircraft. The NLZ will include the restricted area
perimeter around the aircraft when unoccupied. When the aircraft is occupied by an
authorized two-person concept team as identified on the EAL, the NLZ will shrink to
the interior of the aircraft. In either case, the SF entry controller will have entry
control responsibility for the aircraft and restricted area.
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• (DCNI) When granting initial access to an unoccupied aircraft containing TPC material, the
Entry Controller (EC) will enforce two-person control by using the EAL to identify two
authorized individuals prior to allowing entry into the NLZ.
• (DCNI) Authorized two-person teams will be identified on the EAL by a dollar sign
“$” next to their names. The Mission Commander may authorize access to personnel
not on the EAL as long as the “$” individual is the first to enter and they have a
second individual with them that has an “X” next to their name on the EAL.
• (DCNI) Official flightline personnel, such as fuel handlers, firefighters, and Transient Alert
personnel may be granted close boundary access during launch and recovery operations when
the alert crew is onboard the aircraft or to respond to immediate emergencies without the
alert crew present.
FLIGHTLINE VEHICLE OPERATIONS:
• Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline as long as they are
operated outside of Restricted Areas and display appropriate passes.
• Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV vehicle
pass.
• All flightline patrols are encouraged to conduct periodic checks of vehicles on the flightline
(POVs and GOVs) in order to ensure drivers are authorized, and have appropriate paperwork
available (i.e. Flightline driver licenses, GOVs licenses, POV Passes).
FPCON CHARLIE OR HIGHER PROCEDURES
• Ensure all Coyote patrols immediately rally to KUMMSC and follow the instructions of
Scorpion-1, Guardian-1/2 and the SSCC to ensure proper coverage of the area.
• Ensure Coyote-2 and Coyote-4 post their respective Highball locations (2 & 4), initiate traffic
control procedures and close the corresponding gates.
• Ensure SSCC has initiated recall procedures in order to man appropriate flightline patrols as
needed.
• Ensure all required UA-HMMWVs from the Security Forces Quad are retrieved by Coyote
units as they come inbound, to assist in posting.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean, fueled, and
fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel. Additionally, ensure each flight line
IBF vehicle is properly inspected using the AF Form 1800.
• In addition to the individual vehicle inspections, you will conduct vehicle inspections of all
coyote patrols for any discrepancies and will ensure all vehicles are in good repair (to include
BAF standby HMMWVs). You will notify SSCC and flight leadership of any vehicle
discrepancies discovered.
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• You will conduct shift in the GOV parking lot. Return to flightline after shift change is
complete to relieve the remaining patrols.
• Ensure all flight line patrols conduct a purge of their respective areas immediately after
assuming post.
• You will verify all current EALs are accounted for and verify with off-going that all have
been taken to SSCC. You will check all patrols SSI binders to ensure current EALs are
accounted for and expired documents have been removed. Ensure all documents are
destroyed appropriately.
• One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: The KUMMSC environment may require
special considerations during a recapture scenario. Although the AFGSC AFCIA-R
process should always be considered the following immediate actions may be used in
addition to the AFCIA-R process. Immediate Actions for KUMMSC recap scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
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• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
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# (DCNI) Coyote-2 (V19-1)
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
Coyote 2
Version 19-1
Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
SAAM Response Force Fire Team
PRIMARY DUTIES:
• (DCNI) Provide immediate response capability as the ISRT for the 58th SOW restricted area
not to exceed 3 minutes when protection level resources are present in your area.
• (DCNI) Respond as a part of the Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the Kirtland Underground
Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC) and for Convoy/SAAM operations
(as required).
• (DCNI) Note: Response Times to outside your area.
• (DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC
PRIMARY DUTIES (SAAM):
• (DCNI) You are part of the Response Force (RF) for Aircraft Parking Area Operations. The
RF will be capable of responding, neutralizing and/or containing the situation until it is
resolved or until arrival of the Initial Backup Force (IBF).
• (DCNI) Your team will be responsible for controlling entry into the Aircraft Parking Area
and monitoring all avenues of approach from that location. You are verifying/granting access
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to the SAAM mission area for required personnel.
POST LIMITS:
• (DCNI) You are assigned to the 58th SOW restricted area unless properly relieved or as
directed by Area Supervisor/Flight Chief/Flight Commander or higher.
• (DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct IBF responses to Protection Level 1
resources.
POST LIMITS (SAAM):
• (DCNI) Ensure you maintain the ability to respond to the aircraft parking area and bring
immediate fire to bear on the boundary of the restricted/limited/exclusion area and exposed
weapons within 5 minutes.
• (DCNI) Swing Gate at Ordnance Street, or other designated location when applicable.
COMMUNICATION:
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
WEAPONS:
• (DCNI) Coyote-2 & 2C will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio; an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
ammunition; and, when PL1 assets are present on the flight line, an M870 with 10 rounds of
12 gauge skynet ammunition.
• (DCNI) Coyote-2A will carry an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm linked armor piercing
and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
point ammunition.
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• (DCNI) Coyote-2B will carry an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, 10 rounds of HE ammunition, 2 rounds of white star
ammunition, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
• (DCNI) The leader will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun hand
grenade and 1 CS gas grenade.
EQUIPMENT:
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
Flight Chief or higher authority.
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
real world and exercise incidents.
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
equipment.
• All alert equipment will be donned for an Inbound SAAM movement prior to A/C arrival and
prior to movement for an Outbound mission.
USE OF FORCE:
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
recover a PL1 resource.
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
neutralize an adversary.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
• Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your area, plot all aircraft with your area and
up-channel to SSCC.
• Conduct a 100% RAB check after shift change and whenever returning to the area after a
KUMMSC response.
• You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to SSCC.
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• Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a Security
Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the documents by
writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
• Printed name/rank of authenticator
• Signed name of the authenticator
• Date and time authenticated
• Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
• All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
• If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
• Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF Form
1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the
outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body, above the waistline.
• Note: Open areas 4, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flight line
restricted areas.
• Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW restricted
area,
• Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th SOW restricted
area
• (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
topside controlled area
• (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for the hot cargo pads (to include pad 5)
during PL1 logistical operations.
• Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly authenticated
EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
• Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in and
around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and surveillance of
site operations by unauthorized personnel.
• In conjunction with Coyote 1 and other coyote patrols, you will conduct a daily visual check
of all flightline physical security facilities, including boundary barrier systems, gates,
manholes, grates, and structures for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative equipment.
You will radio SSCC upon completion of this check. Reference Attachments 13 and 14 of
this instruction for guidance.
• Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by ensuring
photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography letter signed by
the 377 SFS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not possess a Kirtland AFB Form
1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open area, they must be annotated on a
properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by someone with the proper open area.
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• Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare the
photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
• (DCNI) (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
compensatory measures.
• Ensure a minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are randomly
accomplished throughout the shift within your respective area. Radio SSCC and inform them
of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the perimeter/RAB checks. Exception:
When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are present, you will not be required to
conduct RAB checks.
• In the event of a gate runner and you do not have protection level resources in your
respective area will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points.
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing by
stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 2 is all secure, and ready for inspection.”
• You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
ADDITIONAL DUTIES (SAAM):
• (DCNI) You will have a minimum of 2 members set up at a designated location with the
vehicle searching equipment and will be responsible for checking all vehicular and pedestrian
traffic requesting entry into the aircraft parking area with Kilo-2 (MWD).
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
measures.
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA (SAAM):
• (DCNI) SAAM Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security challenge because of
the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are transferred from loading platforms to the
aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams that could develop if SAAM area entry
procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended
task time that would add exposure of the weapon, the description of the SAAM exclusion
area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires
modification.
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
(restricted) area than a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the security
requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as
DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
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• (DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion
areas established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area
inspection and assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
• Upon arrival of transient aircraft you will immediately make contact with the Aircraft
commander to obtain Entry Authority List (EAL) information.
• EAL or Crew Orders are both acceptable.
• EAL will contain:
• Name, Rank (OFF/ENL/CIV), Controlled Picture ID number, Badge number,
Clearance Status, Dates of Visit, Expiration Date
• Note: A government issued photo ID with a controlled number (Driver’s License
Number, DoD Control Number, etc) is acceptable. Only enter the last 6 digits of
the DoD Control Number; all other media requires the full number.
• Crew orders will contain
• Name, rank, last six numbers of the SSAN, organization, clearance status, and
inclusive dates of travel, may be used as EALs for transit aircraft in lieu of the
procedures stated above. Compare a home base AF Form 1199, CAC, or other ID
(credential) with information contained on the crew order for positive
identification prior to allowing entry.
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
• 58th SOW Restricted Area
• This area contains three hangars (1000, 1001, and 1002) with security lighting on the
sides of them. Hangars 1000 and 1001 have lights on the south, east and west sides.
Hangar 1002 has lights on all sides. The controls to turn these lights on and off are
located on the south side of each hangar. In order to turn the lights on and off you must:
• Locate the appropriate light control box
• Open the door
• Enter 1234* on the numerical keypad
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• Press either the green “Master On” button to turn on all lights for that zone, or press
the individual green buttons for the lights you wish to turn on. There is a diagram
depicting the various zones in each light box.
• 377th ABW Transient Ramp
• The lights for this area are controlled by a light box on a pole to the east of building 333
(Base Operations). The light box contains several individual switches and a master
power switch. In order to turn these lights on and off use only the individual switches,
always leaving the master power switch turned on.
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
• (DCNI) You could be dispatched to the Aircraft Parking Area to initiate security operations
until the arrival of recalled personnel.
• (DCNI) You will assist with sweeps of the Aircraft Parking Area prior to Aircraft arrival. In
the event the aircraft should reach the Aircraft Parking Area before the entire response force
is in-place, you will be posted as a fire team until recalled personnel arrives.
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
• You will perform duties as the ESRT to the Reflex Delta unless properly relieved. Your
response time is within five (5) minutes of the Reflex Delta parking area.
• Upon aircraft arrival, divide the Reflex Delta area with a rope and stanchions. Ensure
lighting equipment is placed on the exterior of each corner of the area, facing the A/C.
• The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
• (DCNI) A No-Lone Zone (NLZ) will be established whenever Two-Person Control
(TPC) material is present on the aircraft. The NLZ will include the restricted area
perimeter around the aircraft when unoccupied. When the aircraft is occupied by an
authorized two-person concept team as identified on the EAL, the NLZ will shrink to the
interior of the aircraft. In either case, the SF entry controller will have entry control
responsibility for the aircraft and restricted area.
• (DCNI) When granting initial access to an unoccupied aircraft containing TPC material, the
Entry Controller (EC) will enforce two-person control by using the EAL to identify two
authorized individuals prior to allowing entry into the NLZ.
• (DCNI) Authorized two-person teams will be identified on the EAL by a dollar sign “$”
next to their names. The Mission Commander may authorize access to personnel not on
the EAL as long as the “$” individual is the first to enter and they have a second
individual with them that has an “X” next to their name on the EAL.
• (DCNI) Official flightline personnel, such as fuel handlers, firefighters, and Transient Alert
personnel may be granted close boundary access during launch and recovery operations when
the alert crew is onboard the aircraft or to respond to immediate emergencies without the
alert crew present.
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FLIGHTLINE VEHICLE OPERATIONS:
• Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline as long as they are
operated outside of Restricted Areas and display appropriate passes.
• Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV vehicle
pass.
• All flightline patrols are encouraged to conduct periodic checks of vehicles on the flightline
(POVs and GOVs) in order to ensure drivers are authorized, and have appropriate paperwork
available (i.e. Flightline driver licenses, GOVs licenses, POV Passes).
FPCON CHARLIE OR HIGHER PROCEDURES
• Immediately rally to KUMMSC and follow the instructions of Scorpion-1, Guardian-1/2 and
the SSCC to ensure proper coverage of the area.
• Post Highball-2, initiate traffic control procedures and close the corresponding gate.
SHIFT CHANGE:
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean, fueled, and
fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel. Ensure that you sign the AF Form
1800.
• You will verify all current EALs for transient aircraft are accounted for and have been taken
to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure all documents are
destroyed appropriately.
• You will conduct shift change at the GOV parking lot after Coyote-1 assumes post and
returns to the flightline.
• One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
AFCIA-R
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
contact.
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
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unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
defined battle-space.
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
considerations during a recapture scenario.
MISCELLANEOUS:
• Prohibited Activities
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
flight’s duty day.
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
Enforcement related books)
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
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