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export/(28 Mar 19) 377 WSSS SAAM SSI Approval Letter.md
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export/(28 Mar 19) 377 WSSS SAAM SSI Approval Letter.md
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# (28 Mar 19) 377 WSSS SAAM SSI Approval Letter
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
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377TH WEAPONS SYSTEM SECURITY SQUADRON (AFGSC)
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28 Mar 19
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
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FROM: 377 WSSS/S3
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SUBJECT: Special Security Instructions (SSI) Approval
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1. SSIs are furnished to each Integrated Defense force member and posted sentry in accordance
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with (IAW) AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, para 12.5.5. They define post limits,
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communications available, physical security deficiencies on post, compensatory measures, entry
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requirements, applicable special instructions and special equipment required.
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2. The following Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) SSIs are approved by the
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377 WSSS Operations Officer and supersede previous documents of the same name:
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Cobra 1-3 & 10, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Kilo 1-2, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Mongoose 1-4, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Mustang 1-6 & 10, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Pelican 1-5, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Raptor 1-2, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Guardian, SAAM Security Controller, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Skywatch 1-2, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Tango 1-8, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Viper 1-4, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Watchdog, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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3. TSgt Caleb Green, 377 WSSS/S5, is responsible for tracking and dissemination of SSIs. For
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further information, please contact TSgt Green at (505)853-7551, or caleb.green.2@us.af.mil.
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GIBBONS.ARTHUR Digitally signed by
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.MARVIN.IV.128391 GIBBONS.ARTHUR.MARVIN.IV.
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1283916894
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6894 Date: 2019.03.28 08:23:39 -06'00'
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ARTHUR M. GIBBONS IV, Capt, USAF
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Operations Officer
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export/(3) Supervisors Certification(1).md
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export/(3) Supervisors Certification(1).md
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# (3) Supervisors Certification(1)
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Amanda Renea Rackey SSgt/E-5
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Daniel Thomas Cronin TSgt/E-6
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NCOIC, Plans & Programs
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10 August 2020 505-846-0102
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export/(3) Supervisors Certification.md
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export/(3) Supervisors Certification.md
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# (3) Supervisors Certification
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SUPERVISOR’S CERTIFICATION (FORMALLY 1879)
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NAME/RANK OF SUBJECT
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(First) (Middle) (Last) (Rank/Grade)
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If this request is for upgrading a currently held clearance or for a Periodic Reinvestigation (PR).
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the subject’s IMMEDIATE supervisor MUST complete the certification. This certification does
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not require the supervisor to review the completed form.
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IMMEDIATE supervisor is required to fill out form:
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Please check/complete the paragraph that applies:
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1. The immediate supervisor is aware of adverse information concerning the individual named
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within this form. PLEASE INDICATE THE ADVERSE INFORMATION BELOW:
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2. The immediate supervisor is NOT aware of adverse information concerning the individual
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named within this form.
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After completing the above, please complete the following blocks:
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Supervisor’s Full Name:
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(First) (Middle) (Last) (Rank/Grade)
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Supervisor’s Title:
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Date signed by Supervisor: Supervisor’s Phone Number:
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Supervisor’s Signature:
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Any questions, please call 11 SFG / Security Manager at DSN 858-4029
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25
export/(3x5) 19 AW Card_CAO 29 Nov 21.md
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export/(3x5) 19 AW Card_CAO 29 Nov 21.md
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# (3x5) 19 AW Card_CAO 29 Nov 21
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Name and Rank:
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Unit:
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Official Duty title:
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Hometown:
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Time in service:
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Time at Little Rock:
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Goals:
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Hobbies:
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Location for photo:
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19th Airlift Wing priority portrayed and why?
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(AIRMEN | Courageous Leaders, Resilient Warriors & Strong Families)
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(MISSION | Undaunted Tactical Airlift and Agile Combat Support)
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(CULTURE | Thriving Herk Nation)
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image1.jpeg
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# (5 Aug 19) 377 WSSS Daily Posting SSI Approval Letter
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
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377TH WEAPONS SYSTEM SECURITY SQUADRON (AFGSC)
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5 Aug 19
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
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FROM: 377 WSSS/S3
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SUBJECT: Special Security Instructions (SSI) Approval
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1. SSIs are furnished to each Integrated Defense force member and posted sentry in accordance
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with (IAW) AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, para 12.5.5. They define post limits,
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communications available, physical security deficiencies on post, compensatory measures, entry
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requirements, applicable special instructions and special equipment required.
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2. The following Daily Posting SSIs are approved by the 377 WSSS Operations Officer and
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supersede previous documents of the same name:
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Guardian, SCS, SC, & AM, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
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Cerberus 1-2, & 10, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
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Romeo 1, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
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Guardian 1 & 2, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
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Scorpion 1-6, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
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Coyote 1-4, version 19-1 (Jul 19)
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3. TSgt Caleb Green, 377 WSSS/S3P, is responsible for tracking and dissemination of SSIs. For
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further information, please contact TSgt Green at (505)846-6704, or caleb.green.2@us.af.mil.
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COLE.MATTHEW Digitally signed by
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COLE.MATTHEW.G.1362411447
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.G.1362411447 Date: 2019.08.05 08:49:20 -06'00'
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MATTHEW G. COLE, Capt, USAF
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Operations Officer
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# (9 Apr 19) 377 WSSS Special-FPCON SSI Approval Letter
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
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377TH WEAPONS SYSTEM SECURITY SQUADRON (AFGSC)
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9 Apr 19
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
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FROM: 377 WSSS/S3
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SUBJECT: Special Security Instructions (SSI) Approval
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1. SSIs are furnished to each Integrated Defense force member and posted sentry in accordance
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with (IAW) AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, para 12.5.5. They define post limits,
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communications available, physical security deficiencies on post, compensatory measures, entry
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requirements, applicable special instructions and special equipment required.
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2. The following Special and Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Posting SSIs are approved
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by the 377 WSSS Operations Officer and supersede previous documents of the same name:
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DART, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Reflex 2-6, & 10, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Hawk 1-3, & 10, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Guardian, Backup SCS, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Guardian, WSTI Monitor, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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Charlie 1-4, version 19-1 (Feb 19)
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3. TSgt Caleb Green, 377 WSSS/S5, is responsible for tracking and dissemination of SSIs. For
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further information, please contact TSgt Green at (505)853-7551, or caleb.green.2@us.af.mil.
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GIBBONS.ARTHUR Digitally signed by
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.MARVIN.IV.128391 GIBBONS.ARTHUR.MARVIN.IV.
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1283916894
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6894 Date: 2019.04.09 09:48:41 -06'00'
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ARTHUR M. GIBBONS IV, Capt, USAF
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Operations Officer
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108
export/(CLASSIFIED) Area Supervisor Packet.md
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export/(CLASSIFIED) Area Supervisor Packet.md
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# (CLASSIFIED) Area Supervisor Packet
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Area Supervisor Verbal Packet
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1. Once the SGT is secured in the loading dock, what actions will the ISRT take?
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-Lower pins at V5/V6
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2. If the aircraft arrives Type-2 and departs Type-1, who will be responsible for obtaining/issuing all pertinent information from the Aircraft Commander?
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-On duty FCC/FC
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3. For arriving Type-2, what will be initiated once the aircraft/aircrew arrives at the pad?
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-Entry Control procedures
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4. Describe an FDB?
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-Tamper protected enclosure that groups IDS equipment and sensors inputs into a single or several Intrusion Detection Panels and/or Portal Control Panel located throughout KUMMSC and the surrounding areas
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5. Who will KCP notify of a downed aircraft?
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-SSCC
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6. For DART’s where will recalled personnel respond?
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-KUMMSC armory
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7. How long (at minimum) will the KUMMSC uninterrupted power supply (UPS) provide power for?
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-4 hours
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8. Who has the primary responsibility to man any Reflex Delta aircraft post?
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-The on duty flight
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9. The Reflex Delta kit will contain what?
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-Four radios
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-Six radio batteries
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-One battery charger
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-Twenty pagers
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-VA Gate remote
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10. What is the equipment for Watchdog posting?
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-A radio with a headset for discrete monitoring and binoculars
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11. Who will daily senor testing?
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-On duty FCC/FC and/or Area Supervisor
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12. How many attempts will an individual have to process through the metal detector?
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-2
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13. Where does a track or ground-based radar detector annunciate?
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-SC Console
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14. What is an SCS override? Who conducts them?
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-Procedures that bypass system door logic to open special functions or single blast doors/gates
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-SCS and a MUNS Controller
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15. Who is notified once an override has been accomplished? What will they do?
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-System Administrator
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- Change the password within the next 24 hours OR the next duty day
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16. What is a DPI?
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-Door Position Indicator-A tamper protected BMS device which indicates the position of doors, vehicle gates/barriers, and blast doors
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17. According to the SFG Tactical Assault Guide (TAG), at a minimum how many armored vehicles will be used for a KUMMSC recapture/recovery?
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-1
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18. What are the ISRT and ESRT response times?
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-ISRT is immediately but not to exceed 3 minutes
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-ESRT is immediately but not to exceed 5 minutes
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19. A Photography Authorization Letter (PAL) will be authenticated by who?
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-An E-5 or above assigned to the 377 SFG
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20. Submit all Photography Authorization Letters to who?
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-The Flight Line Constable 377 WSSS/S3
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21. Photography of transient PL2 or higher aircraft is prohibited unless prior permission is granted by who?
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-The Aircrew CC or designated representative
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22. Who will be personally involved in ALL downed aircraft scenarios?
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-377 WSSS/S3O, S3, and/or CC
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23. Where is the downed aircraft kit maintained?
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-S3 storage closet
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24. The downed aircraft bags are sealed and accounted for on what form?
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-AF Form 1473/Gun, Ammo, Equipment Inventory Log
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25. For an aircraft accident resulting in a complete base response, all media personnel will be directed to where?
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-The Incident Command Post
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26. Protestors within the base perimeter will be met and instructed to turn back prior to arriving withing ______ (how many) feet of the outh fence line of the KUMMSC topside controlled area?
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-100 ft
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27. What is AFCIAR? Describe each measure.
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-Assess- Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources
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-Final Denial-The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
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-Control-The goal is to optimize available weapon fire and maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the defined battle space
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-Immediate Sufficient Duress- Those actions, proportional to the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to prevent thrft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon. Can be achieved through weapons fire, smoke, tear gas, stun grenade, or any other means possible.
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-Assault-Actions taken by the security forces to neutralize hostile persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon(s)
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-Restore Government Control-Physically regain possession of resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area
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28. If a handheld radio is transmitted within 10 ft of a PL1 resource OR a vehicle radio within 25 ft?
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-MUNS representative & 377 ABW Safety
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29. When on 6-ring, personnel will do what prior to departing quarters?
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-Make contact with their supervisor and inform them of the destination and a phone number to be reached at
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228
export/(CUI) 377 ABW NSI SOE - Updated 24 Nov 0930.md
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228
export/(CUI) 377 ABW NSI SOE - Updated 24 Nov 0930.md
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# (CUI) 377 ABW NSI SOE - Updated 24 Nov 0930
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Remote Week
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Day 1 - Mon 29 Nov 21
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Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
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1-1 0730 WG/CC Telecon Inbrief 3rd CR TC Fish N/A
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1-2 1030 Remote Inspection Begins WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A No events before 1030L on Monday. Thanks!
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1-3 1030 PRAP: Electronic Product review (on-going) DoD Safe IGIS Hubbard 377 MTF / 377 PRAP
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1-4 1500 PRAP: End-of-Day Teams by invite IGIS Hubbard PRAP IG Team
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Day 2 - Tue 30 Nov 21
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Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
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2-1 0800 Remote Inspection Continues WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
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2-2 0800 PRAP: Electronic Product review (on-going) DoD Safe IGIS Hubbard 377 MTF / 377 PRAP
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2-3 1030 PRAP: 377 AB Installation Monitor Interview Teams by invite IGIS Adams Ms Teri Anderson
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2-4 1300 PRAP: Installation Chapel Interview DSN 781-8700 IGIS Adams 377 ABW Chaplin
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2-5 1500 PRAP: End-of-Day Teams by invite IGIS Hubbard PRAP IG Team
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Day 3 - Wed 1 Dec 21
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Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
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3-1 0800 Remote Inspection Continues WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
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3-2 0800 PRAP: Electronic Product review (on-going) DoD Safe IGIS Hubbard 377 MTF / 377 PRAP
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3-3 1030 PRAP: Installation SARC Interview DSN 781-8700 IGIS Adams 377 ABW SARC
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3-4 1500 PRAP: End-of-Day Teams by invite IGIS Hubbard PRAP IG Team
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Day 4 - Thu 2 Dec 21
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Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
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4-1 0800 Remote Inspection Continues WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
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4-2 0800 PRAP: Electronic Product review (on-going) DoD Safe IGIS Hubbard 377 MTF / 377 PRAP
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4-3 1000 Pre-departure Meeting 3rd CR/Telecon IGX Preston N/A
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4-4 1500 PRAP: End-of-Day Teams by invite IGIS Hubbard PRAP IG Team
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4-5 1530 PRAP: Remote Out Brief Teams by invite IGIS Hubbard 377 ABW MTF CC
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Day 5 - Fri 3 Dec 21
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Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
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5-1 0800 ADVON Departs WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
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Day 6 - Sat 4 Dec 21
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Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
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||||||
|
6-1 0800 Workcenter Setup WC IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
|
||||||
|
Day 7 - Sun 5 Dec 21
|
||||||
|
Event # TIME MDT EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC Unit POC OV OBSERVERS
|
||||||
|
7-1 1210 Main body arrives (Group 1) Kirtland AFB IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
|
||||||
|
7-2 1405 Main body arrives (Group 2) Kirtland AFB IGX St Romain/Preston N/A
|
||||||
|
7-3 1500 EAL Validation / Team Meeting WC 377 IG Finch N/A
|
||||||
|
7-4 1530 Oath ALL non-Global Strike IG Inspectors WC TC Fish N/A
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
http://safe.apps.mil/http://safe.apps.mil/http://safe.apps.mil/http://safe.apps.mil/
|
||||||
|
Monday
|
||||||
|
Day 8 - Mon 6 Dec 21
|
||||||
|
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC DTRA STRAT
|
||||||
|
8-1 0800 Stockpile Safety Briefing KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
8-2 0800 Wing Nuclear Surety Program review SEW IGIM Nelson
|
||||||
|
8-3 0800 Facilities Work Order Review CES IGIS Elbert
|
||||||
|
8-4 0800 SFS CC Inbrief 377 SFG IGIS Grogan Austin/Alsup Pinkham
|
||||||
|
8-5 0800 CES CC Inbrief CES IGIS Neal
|
||||||
|
8-6 0800 MUNS Plans and Scheduling MUNS IGIM Edwards
|
||||||
|
8-7 0830 PRAP: MTF In-brief 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
|
||||||
|
8-8 0830 PRAP: Installation PRAP Monitor In-brief 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
|
||||||
|
8-9 0900 SF Stan-Eval Program Review (CII) 377 SFG IGIS Bostic/Naquin Alsup Pinkham
|
||||||
|
8-10 0900 Security Support Planning & Threat 377 SFG IGIS Palalay Austin
|
||||||
|
8-11 0900 SF Blotter Review 377 SFG IGIS Grogan
|
||||||
|
8-12 0900 LRS CC Inbrief LRS Cmd Bldg IGIS Sandridge
|
||||||
|
8-13 0900 Fire Suppression Systems KUMMSC IGIS Stephens
|
||||||
|
8-14 0900 Emergency Backup Generator Test KUMMSC IGIS D. Smith
|
||||||
|
8-15 0900 EOD Management/Quality Assurance Review EOD IGIS Daley
|
||||||
|
8-16 0900 Stockpile Inspection KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
8-17 0900 Electronic Inspection Record Card Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
8-18 1000 In-field Vehicle Inspections Entire Base IGIS Sandridge
|
||||||
|
8-19 1000 PRAP: CMA/PRAP Monitor Interview (Lead/Primary PRAP clinic) 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
|
||||||
|
8-20 1030 PRAP: Unit Monitor/CO Interview 898 MUNS IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
|
||||||
|
8-21 1200 EOD Training Program Review EOD IGIS Daley
|
||||||
|
11-13 1300 2435 Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
8-22 1300 PRAP: CMA/PRAP Monitor Interview (MH clinic) 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
|
||||||
|
8-23 1300 Fire Prevention Folders Fire Station IGIS Stephens
|
||||||
|
8-24 1300 Haul Routes CES IGIS Elbert
|
||||||
|
8-25 1400 PRAP: Unit Monitor/CO Interview 377 MXS IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
8-26 1400 PRAP: MTF Deployment Health Interview (if not covered in BOMC interview) (min 1 tech and 1 provider) 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard Duran
|
||||||
|
8-27 1400 Lightning Protection System Demostration Test KUMMSC IGIS D. Smith
|
||||||
|
8-28 1600 PRAP: MTF/CC Daily 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy
|
||||||
|
8-29 1600 PRAP: Installation PRAP Daily 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson
|
||||||
|
8-30 1600 Team Chief meeting with Branch Chiefs IG Workcenter IGX Preston
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&"Arial,Bold"&12&K000000
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&10As of &T &D &"Arial,Bold"&14 377 ABW NSI SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&P of &N
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Tuesday
|
||||||
|
Day 9 - Tue 7 Dec 21
|
||||||
|
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC DTRA STRAT
|
||||||
|
9-1 0800 NARS Program Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
9-2 0800 Supply Support Spares Review KUMMSC IGIM Little
|
||||||
|
9-3 0800 Wing NCE Program review SEW IGIM Nelson
|
||||||
|
9-4 0800 Security Support Planning & Threat (On-going) 377 SFG IGIS Palalay Austin
|
||||||
|
9-5 0800 Hoists and Cranes KUM MSC IGIS Elbert
|
||||||
|
9-6 0800 SF Training Program Review (CII) 377 SFG IGIS Bostic/Naquin Alsup Pinkham
|
||||||
|
9-7 0800 PRAP: Program Review (on-going) MTF IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran/Chorniak
|
||||||
|
9-8 0800 MUNS Plans and Scheduling and Documentation MUNS IGIM Edwards
|
||||||
|
9-9 0830 PRAP: Unit Monitor/CC Interview 377 SFS IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
|
||||||
|
9-10 0900 PRAP: Patient Tracers 377 MTF (various) IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
|
||||||
|
9-11 0900 Wing EMR Program review SEW IGIM Nelson
|
||||||
|
9-12 0900 F&ES Management and Admin Fire Station IGIS Stephens
|
||||||
|
9-13 0900 In-Field Vehicle Inspections Entire Base IGIS Sandridge
|
||||||
|
9-14 0900 EOD Equipment Program EOD IGIS Daley
|
||||||
|
9-15 0900 Static Observation KUMMSC IGIS D. Smith
|
||||||
|
9-16 0900 Branch Chief & Team Chief Meeting IG Workcenter IGX Fish
|
||||||
|
9-17 0900 Technical Operation: LLCE BX1 KUMMSC IGIM Little Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
9-18 0900 Technical Operation: GM WX8 KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
9-19 0900 SF Post Visits (Days and Mids) KUMMSC IGIS Naquin Austin/Alsup Pinkham
|
||||||
|
9-20 1000 EOD Broken Arrow Practical Eval EOD IGIS Daley
|
||||||
|
9-21 1000 Armory Review (Facilities, Armories/Comm Prgm Review) 377 SFG IGIS Grogan
|
||||||
|
9-22 1000 UCMT/UPRT Program KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck
|
||||||
|
9-23 1300 PRAP: CMA/PRAP Monitor Interview (Dental) 377 MDG (Dental) IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
|
||||||
|
9-24 1300 PRAP: Unit Monitor/CC Interview 377 WSSS IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
|
||||||
|
9-25 1300 Wing RSO Program review MD GP IGIM Nelson
|
||||||
|
9-26 1300 F&ES Training KUMMSC IGIS Stephens
|
||||||
|
9-27 1300 Electronic System Security KUMMSC IGIS Naquin Austin Pinkham
|
||||||
|
9-28 1330 Generator Records Review CE IGIS D. Smith
|
||||||
|
9-29 1400 Lightning Protection Records Review CE IGIS D. Smith
|
||||||
|
9-30 1400 Daily Wing CC Update 377th WG CR TC Fish
|
||||||
|
9-31 1600 PRAP: MTF/CC Daily 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy
|
||||||
|
9-32 1600 PRAP: Installation PRAP Daily 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson
|
||||||
|
9-33 1600 Team Chief meeting with Branch Chiefs IG Workcenter IGX Preston
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&"Arial,Bold"&12&K000000
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&10As of &T &D &"Arial,Bold"&14 377 ABW NSI SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&P of &N
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Wednesday
|
||||||
|
Day 10 - Wed 8 Dec 21
|
||||||
|
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC DTRA STRAT
|
||||||
|
10-1 0800 Facilities Work Order Review CES IGIS Elbert
|
||||||
|
10-2 0800 SF Training Program Review (CII) On-Going 377 SFG IGIS Bostic/Naquin
|
||||||
|
10-3 0830 PRAP: Program Review (on-going) 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran/Chorniak Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
10-4 0900 Muns Control Program Review KUMMSC IGIM Little
|
||||||
|
10-5 0900 AAAL Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck
|
||||||
|
10-6 0900 Armory Review (Facilities, Armories/Comm Prgm Review) 377 SFG IGIS Grogan Alsup Pinkham
|
||||||
|
10-8 0900 MSG Nuclear Surety Program review EOD IGIM Nelson
|
||||||
|
10-9 0900 Emergency Communications Center Fire Station IGIS Stephens
|
||||||
|
10-10 0900 MNCL Validation/Overdue NCE Schedule Mx review/Records Review VM Bldg IGIS Sandridge
|
||||||
|
10-11 0900 EOD Op Nuc Response (Render Safe Procedures/Bay Ops - Team A) EOD IGIS Daley
|
||||||
|
10-12 0900 Technical Operation: UCMT/UPRT KUMMSC IGIM Little
|
||||||
|
10-13 0900 Technical Operation: GM/LLCE WX0 KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
10-14 0900 SF Post Visits (Days/Mids) KUMMSC IGIS Naquin Austin
|
||||||
|
10-15 1000 PRAP: Installation SARC/Chapel Follow-up (If needed) Various IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
|
||||||
|
10-16 1000 Pass and ID Program Reveiw 377 SFG IGIS Palalay
|
||||||
|
10-17 1000 MUNS Nuclear Surety Program review MUNS IGIM Nelson
|
||||||
|
10-18 1200 EOD Op Nuc Response (Render Safe Procedures/Bay Ops - Team B) EOD IGIS Daley
|
||||||
|
10-19 1300 PRAP: Patient Tracers 377 MTF (various) IGIS Hubbard/Guy Duran
|
||||||
|
10-20 1300 Haul Routes CES IGIS Elbert
|
||||||
|
10-21 1300 Physical Security 377 SFG IGIS Grogan Alsup Pinkham
|
||||||
|
10-22 1300 FES Operations (Fire Suppression Equipment) Fire Station IGIS Stephens
|
||||||
|
10-23 1300 WSSS Nuclear Surety Program review WSSS IGIM Nelson
|
||||||
|
10-24 1300 NWTP Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
10-25 1330 PRAP: Assignment Process (Career Development) 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson Chorniak
|
||||||
|
10-26 1400 SFG Nuclear Surety Program review SFS IGIM Nelson
|
||||||
|
10-27 1400 Daily Wing CC Update 377th WG CR TC Fish
|
||||||
|
10-29 1600 PRAP: MTF/CC Daily 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy
|
||||||
|
10-30 1600 PRAP: Installation PRAP Daily 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson
|
||||||
|
10-31 1600 Team Chief meeting with Branch Chiefs WC IGX Preston
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&"Arial,Bold"&12&K000000
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&10As of &T &D &"Arial,Bold"&14 377 ABW NSI SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&P of &N
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Thursday
|
||||||
|
Day 11 - Thu 9 Dec 21
|
||||||
|
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC DTRA STRAT
|
||||||
|
11-1 0800 Fire Suppression Systems (Maintenance) CEO IGIS Stephens
|
||||||
|
11-2 0830 PRAP: Program Follow-ups (If needed) Vairous GOS PRAP Team Duran/Chorniak
|
||||||
|
11-3 0900 EOD Opt'l Nuc Response (Cont RSP & Packaging Tech Op) EOD IGIS Daley Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
11-4 0900 MUNS Support Program Review KUMMSC IGIM Little
|
||||||
|
11-5 0900 11N WSA TODA Inspection KUMMSC IGIM Little
|
||||||
|
11-6 0900 TTT&HE KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
11-7 0900 NCE Inspection & Program Review KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
11-8 0900 Techncial Operation: BX3 GM/LLCE KUMMSC IGIM Little Beck Klingensmith
|
||||||
|
11-9 0900 SF Post Visits (Days/Mids) KUMMSC IGIS Naquin Alsup
|
||||||
|
11-10 1200 EOD T.O.s Program Review EOD IGIS Daley
|
||||||
|
11-11 1300 FES Special Weapons Ex CEF IGIS Stephens
|
||||||
|
11-12 1400 Daily Wing CC Update 377 WG CR TC Fish
|
||||||
|
11-13 1600 PRAP: MTF/CC Daily 377 MDG IGIS Hubbard/Guy
|
||||||
|
11-14 1600 PRAP: Installation PRAP Daily 377 FSS MPF IGIS Adams/Wilson
|
||||||
|
11-15 1600 Team Chief meeting with Branch Chiefs IG Workcenter IGX Preston
|
||||||
|
11-16 1630 Report Writing/Murder Board/Deliberation IG Workcenter IGX St Romain/Preston
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&"Arial,Bold"&12&K000000
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&10As of &T &D &"Arial,Bold"&14 377 ABW NSI SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&P of &N
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Friday-Sunday
|
||||||
|
Day 12 - Fri 10 Dec 21
|
||||||
|
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC
|
||||||
|
12-1 0800 Report Writing/Murder Board/Deliberation Cont WC IGX St Romain/Preston
|
||||||
|
12-2 1400 Daily Wing CC Update/Final DAR 377 WG CR TC Fish
|
||||||
|
12-3 1600 Sign Report IG Workcenter IGX Preston
|
||||||
|
12-4 TBD Vehicle Turn-in IG Workcenter IGX St Romain/Preston
|
||||||
|
12-5 1501 Main Body Depart Kirtland AFB KAFB IGX St Romain/Preston
|
||||||
|
Day 13 - Sat 11 Dec 21
|
||||||
|
Event # TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION LOCATION IG OPR POC
|
||||||
|
13-1 0800 Out-brief with Grades 377 WG CR TC Fish
|
||||||
|
13-2 1256 Leadership Depart Kirtland AFB KAFB IGX St Romain/Preston
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&"Arial,Bold"&12&K000000
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&10As of &T &D &"Arial,Bold"&14 377 ABW NSI SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
&P of &N
|
||||||
1333
export/(CUI) AFMAN 31-101, V2, AA&E GM1.md
Normal file
1333
export/(CUI) AFMAN 31-101, V2, AA&E GM1.md
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
13
export/(CUI_SP_PHYS) AF 116 Deviation - CCTV Purchases v3.md
Normal file
13
export/(CUI_SP_PHYS) AF 116 Deviation - CCTV Purchases v3.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (CUI_SP_PHYS) AF 116 Deviation - CCTV Purchases v3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Please wait...
|
||||||
|
If this message is not eventually replaced by the proper contents of the document, your PDF
|
||||||
|
viewer may not be able to display this type of document.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
You can upgrade to the latest version of Adobe Reader for Windows®, Mac, or Linux® by
|
||||||
|
visiting http://www.adobe.com/go/reader_download.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For more assistance with Adobe Reader visit http://www.adobe.com/go/acrreader.
|
||||||
|
Windows is either a registered trademark or a trademark of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. Mac is a trademark
|
||||||
|
of Apple Inc., registered in the United States and other countries. Linux is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other
|
||||||
|
countries.
|
||||||
263
export/(DCN) Kilo 2.md
Normal file
263
export/(DCN) Kilo 2.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCN) Kilo 2
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Kilo 2
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Explosive Detection Dog (EDD)
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide explosive detection capabilities to prevent the damage to or
|
||||||
|
possible destruction of Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Aircraft, Air
|
||||||
|
Force resources , and personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) An MWD/EDD team will be provided in support of SAAMs. In accordance
|
||||||
|
with the Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) Installation Defense Plan (IDP) 31-101,
|
||||||
|
explosive searches in support of Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF) missions will
|
||||||
|
be conducted according to standard MWD search procedures. The Aircraft
|
||||||
|
Courier, Logistics Support Area (LSA) Pad Security Supervisor (Mustang-1), and
|
||||||
|
senior MWD handler on scene must work together to ensure correct clearing of
|
||||||
|
affected areas, aircraft, and ground equipment.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure both you and your MWD/EDD alpha are prepared for duty and
|
||||||
|
have appropriate SF gear in accordance with the SFG Gear Checklist.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure one MWD/EDD team sweeps the POV and GOV parking lots at
|
||||||
|
the Squadron Operations building. Sweep GOV parking lot prior to mission brief.
|
||||||
|
Ensure parking lot guards are posted to monitor the area once the sweep is
|
||||||
|
complete.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The only authorized entry point into the Pad-5 controlled area is the
|
||||||
|
controlled area entry point located at the swing arm gate on ordinance street.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All vehicles entering Pad-5 will process through the swing gate on
|
||||||
|
Ordnance Street with the exception of on-duty SF. All vehicles will be searched
|
||||||
|
and screened by Mongoose-2. (TCP). Kilo-2 (MWD Team) will sweep all
|
||||||
|
vehicles and equipment entering the East TCP. If an unknown vehicle or person
|
||||||
|
approaches Pad 5 via any route other than the East TCP, simple challenge
|
||||||
|
procedures will be used to identify personnel or vehicles and the intent.
|
||||||
|
Ensure the EDD team is in place north of Pad-5 when the aircrew arrives after their
|
||||||
|
vehicle has been swept. Aircrew baggage will be swept by an EDD north of PAD-5
|
||||||
|
just outside the painted red line.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) After completing the pad sweep, proceed to the East side controlled area
|
||||||
|
traffic control point (TCP) swing-gate (Mongoose-2 's location) to assist with
|
||||||
|
inspecting vehicles requesting entry to Pad-5 at the East TCP swing-gate. Ensure
|
||||||
|
you park your vehicle out of the line of fire from Mongoose-2's turret mounted
|
||||||
|
machine gun.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Not to exceed 5 minutes from Pad 5, the adjacent taxiway, runway and the
|
||||||
|
primary/alternate convoy routes or as otherwise directed by Cobra-1/Mustang-1.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
|
||||||
|
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
|
||||||
|
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
|
||||||
|
radio communication capability.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open circle)
|
||||||
|
on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to channel
|
||||||
|
6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable
|
||||||
|
radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when
|
||||||
|
transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by
|
||||||
|
unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
|
||||||
|
ammunition mixed at a 4 to 1 ratio and also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of
|
||||||
|
9mm hollow point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will handle and utilize for detection a certified MWD Explosive Detection
|
||||||
|
Dog and ensure SSCC obtains your MWD’s name and tattoo number for
|
||||||
|
documentation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
|
||||||
|
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
|
||||||
|
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
|
||||||
|
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
|
||||||
|
when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
|
||||||
|
prior to movement for an outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive,
|
||||||
|
and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter
|
||||||
|
their actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
INBOUND CONVOY:
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Immediately after the briefing, proceed directly to Pad 5 and initiate
|
||||||
|
an MWD/EDD sweep of all standby MUNS vehicles, AGE equipment and
|
||||||
|
the surrounding area (parking lot, taxiway and Pad 5 aircraft parking area).
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) After completing the sweep, proceed to Mongoose-2's location to
|
||||||
|
assist with sweeping vehicles requesting entry to the Pad-5 controlled
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) At the conclusion of the mission and when directed by Cobra-
|
||||||
|
1/Mustang-1, proceed to KUMMSC GOV parking lot and await further
|
||||||
|
instruction .
|
||||||
|
OUTBOUND CONVOY:
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Immediately after the briefing, proceed directly to Pad-5 and
|
||||||
|
initiate an EDD sweep of standby MUNS vehicles, AGE equipment, and the
|
||||||
|
surrounding area (parking lot and taxiway)
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) After completing the sweep, proceed to Mongoose-2's location to
|
||||||
|
assist with sweeping vehicles requesting entry to the Pad-5 controlled
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) At the conclusion of the mission and when directed by Cobra-
|
||||||
|
1/Mustang-1, proceed to KUMMSC GOV parking lot and await further
|
||||||
|
instruction.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize
|
||||||
|
the intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander
|
||||||
|
or a senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest
|
||||||
|
priority until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their
|
||||||
|
actions to gain unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken
|
||||||
|
to deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody
|
||||||
|
of a seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or
|
||||||
|
vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) PNAF Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security
|
||||||
|
challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
|
||||||
|
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent
|
||||||
|
security seams that could develop if PNAF area entry procedures are
|
||||||
|
changed as the weapons move (or the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent
|
||||||
|
extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon, the description of
|
||||||
|
the PNAF exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Encl
|
||||||
|
9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Once the PNAF aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated
|
||||||
|
PNAF limited (restricted) area than a single limited and exclusion area is
|
||||||
|
established. Therefore, the limited and exclusion area verification and
|
||||||
|
inspection will occur at the single entry control point at all times once the
|
||||||
|
weapons enter the PNAF restricted area. For personnel not authorized
|
||||||
|
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC
|
||||||
|
must contact the SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will
|
||||||
|
ensure compliance with the security requirements outlined in DoDM S-
|
||||||
|
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as DoDM S-5210.41-
|
||||||
|
M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited
|
||||||
|
and exclusion areas established for alert parking areas where the
|
||||||
|
limited and exclusion area inspection and assignment of escorts occur
|
||||||
|
at the same entry point.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
PAD-5 ENTRY REQUIREMENTS
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All personnel entering the PAD 5 limited/exclusion area must have a valid
|
||||||
|
reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into Hot Cargo Pad 5 will be based on
|
||||||
|
the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
|
||||||
|
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for
|
||||||
|
aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential
|
||||||
|
and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other
|
||||||
|
agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
|
||||||
|
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring
|
||||||
|
entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the
|
||||||
|
PAD-5 ECP.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant
|
||||||
|
surveillance prior to entering the PAD-5 limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough
|
||||||
|
sweep is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be
|
||||||
|
conducted by SF personnel and an EDD team if available.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
975
export/(DCNI) 377 SFGI 31-113 FINAL.md
Normal file
975
export/(DCNI) 377 SFGI 31-113 FINAL.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,975 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) 377 SFGI 31-113 FINAL
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER 377TH SFG INSTRUCTION 31-113
|
||||||
|
377 TH SECURITY FORCES GROUP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 June 2016
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Security
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REMOTE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM, T-250
|
||||||
|
DIGITAL FACILITY SYSTEM
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ACCESSIBILITY: This publication is only available directly from the OPR.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RELEASABILITY: Access to this publication is restricted: this publication is unclassified
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense (DoD) Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information/For Official Use
|
||||||
|
Only (U//DCNI/FOUO). This publication may not be released to foreign nationals; requests
|
||||||
|
for accessibility must be approved by the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
OPR: 377 WSSS/S5 Certified by: 377 WSSS/CC
|
||||||
|
(Lt Col James K. Meier)
|
||||||
|
[Pages: 26]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This publication implements the 377th Security Forces Group (SFG) Remote Target Engagement
|
||||||
|
System (RTES) T-250 Digital Facility System (DFS). This group instruction is applicable to all
|
||||||
|
personnel within the 377th SFG to all It describes the responsibilities of the RTES operator, Flight
|
||||||
|
Chief (FC)/Flight Commander (FCC), Entry Controller, Combat Arms (CA), and Electronic
|
||||||
|
Security Systems (ESS) personnel. This operating instruction also covers the operation of the
|
||||||
|
RTES Operator Console, System Enable Disable Switch (SEDS) Console, Remote Duress Disable
|
||||||
|
(RDDS) Switch, and the Trainer/Simulator Console. This publication does not apply to Air Force
|
||||||
|
Reserve Command (AFRC) Units or to the Air National Guard (ANG). Refer recommended
|
||||||
|
changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using AF Form 847, Recommendation for
|
||||||
|
Change of Publication; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional
|
||||||
|
chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this
|
||||||
|
publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management
|
||||||
|
of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management
|
||||||
|
System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS). This publication may not be
|
||||||
|
supplemented or further implemented/extended. Requests for waivers must be submitted to the
|
||||||
|
OPR listed above for consideration and approval.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 1: Concept of Operations
|
||||||
|
1.1 System Overview
|
||||||
|
1.2 System Description
|
||||||
|
1.3 System Purpose
|
||||||
|
1.4 Rules of Engagement
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 2: Individual Responsibilities
|
||||||
|
2.1. RTES Operator Duties
|
||||||
|
2.2. Security Control Supervisor (SCS) Duties
|
||||||
|
2.3. Entry Controller Duties
|
||||||
|
2.4. Alarm Monitor Duties
|
||||||
|
2.5. Area Supervisor Duties
|
||||||
|
2.6. Flight Chief/Flight Commander Duties
|
||||||
|
2.7. Combat Arms Duties
|
||||||
|
2.8. Electronic Security Systems/Cyber Transport Systems (CTS) Duties
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 3: Operation of the RTES
|
||||||
|
3.1 Normal Start-up/Shut-down Operations
|
||||||
|
3.2 Emergency Shut-down
|
||||||
|
3.3 How to Conduct Joint Routine Verification (JRV).
|
||||||
|
3.4 How to Conduct Routine Verification (RV).
|
||||||
|
3.5 How to Enable RTES
|
||||||
|
3.6 When to Enable RTES
|
||||||
|
3.7 Locating the Threat
|
||||||
|
3.8 Arming and Firing the RTES
|
||||||
|
3.9 Safing and Disarming the RTES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 4: Safety and Duress of the RTES
|
||||||
|
4.1. Safety Requirements
|
||||||
|
4.2. Duress Procedures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 5: Simulator Operations and Certification
|
||||||
|
5.1. RTES Simulator
|
||||||
|
5.2. Certification
|
||||||
|
5.3. Uncertified Personnel
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 6: System and System Component Failures
|
||||||
|
6.1. Work Order Priorities
|
||||||
|
6.2. Opening Work Orders
|
||||||
|
6.3. Closing Work Orders
|
||||||
|
6.4. Work Order Tracking Procedures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENTS:
|
||||||
|
Attachment 1 - Glossary of References and Supporting Information
|
||||||
|
Attachment 2 - RTES Primary/Secondary Direction of Fire
|
||||||
|
Attachment 3 - Touch Screen Icons
|
||||||
|
Attachment 4 - Touch Screen Indicators
|
||||||
|
Attachment 5 - Equipment Malfunction/Work Order Priorities
|
||||||
|
Attachment 6 – Equipment Malfunction/Compensatory Measures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.1 System Overview.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.1.1. RTES is an enhancement of the overall security system for protecting critical
|
||||||
|
assets. Their primary functions are to provide final denial fire, area denial, and deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized personnel from avenues of approach to restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.1.2. (DCNI) RTES is employed by system operators to locate, identify, target and
|
||||||
|
engage an adversary attacking the Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance
|
||||||
|
Storage Complex (KUMMSC). Employment and operational direction of the RTES will
|
||||||
|
be the responsibility of the Security Forces (SF) on-scene commander. Close attention
|
||||||
|
will be paid to the effects of base operations when utilizing the RTES. Rules of
|
||||||
|
Engagement (ROE) in this instruction will specify when and how the RTES functions are
|
||||||
|
used.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.2. (DCNI) System Description: The RTES employs the M240B machine gun with 200
|
||||||
|
rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing/tracer ammunition. The RTES consoles, and all the
|
||||||
|
M240B machine guns associated with them are not tied into the Automated/Advanced Entry
|
||||||
|
Control System (AECS). These weapons are mounted within ballistic shielded clamshells on
|
||||||
|
three hardened towers dispersed within the controlled area and two platforms within the
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC/limited area, covering the loading dock. The RTES is remotely operated from the
|
||||||
|
operator console located in the RTES Room (#150) adjacent to the Site Security Control Center
|
||||||
|
(SSCC). Each tower on topside is equiped with two weapon systems and associated cameras.
|
||||||
|
The two towers located within the loading dock are both equipped with a weapon system and an
|
||||||
|
associated camera. All tower locations with primary and secondary fields of fire can be found in
|
||||||
|
attachment 2 of this document.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.3. System Purpose.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.3.1. The purpose of the RTES is to:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.3.1.1. Provide final denial fire before hostile unauthorized access can be gained
|
||||||
|
to controlled/restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.3.1.2. Achieve area denial fire of likely avenues of approach to
|
||||||
|
controlled/restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.3.1.3. Mitigate identified vulnerabilities that require posting of armed SF IAW
|
||||||
|
(DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN31-108V1, Nuclear Weapons Security Manual,
|
||||||
|
Enclosure 6 Para 3.d.(4).)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
1.4. Rules Of Engagement.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.1. AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force, will be strictly adhered to during all
|
||||||
|
operations of the RTES.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.2. The RTES operator will enable the system in the following situations:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.2.1. Initiation of a COVERED WAGON due to a direct threat to KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.2.2. With proper authentication from the posted SCS, Area Supervisor (AS),
|
||||||
|
FCC/FC or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.2.3. For pre-coordinated and authorized maintenance or during shift
|
||||||
|
changeover/JRV/RV.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.3. SF on scene commander is responsible for the overall employment of the RTES
|
||||||
|
and will provide direction to the RTES operator. If available, positive identification
|
||||||
|
should be made from a post or patrol that has line of sight prior to utilizing the weapon.
|
||||||
|
A confirmed visual verification by an on-scene patrol will not deter the RTES operator
|
||||||
|
from enabling and engaging hostile forces if threat to life or resources is imminent.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.4. Once the RTES operator has received direction from the AS/on-scene commander,
|
||||||
|
the SCS and RTES operator will turn on their respective SEDS keys to enable the system
|
||||||
|
to open applicable clamshells as necessary. It is recommended that only one tower with
|
||||||
|
the best tactical advantage be activated to avoid putting the other towers at risk of being
|
||||||
|
damaged. If the threat is deemed hostile by the on-scene commander and the operator
|
||||||
|
has received proper authorization, use of deadly force is authorized. The operator will
|
||||||
|
select the respective tower, arm the system and eliminate the threat.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.5. When the operator has enabled the system, the weapon will remain on safe until
|
||||||
|
the operator is ready to engage an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.6. The RTES operator will announce “weapons platform X up” to the Area
|
||||||
|
Supervisor and SCS when any platform is selected, and will potentially be fired.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.7. At no time will both the RTES and RF be redirected from final denial coverage at
|
||||||
|
the same time during hostile situations. NOTE: At no time will the RTES be enabled
|
||||||
|
during flight, squadron or wing level exercises.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 2
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1. RTES Operators will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.1. One operator will remain within the confines of the RTES Room (#150) unless
|
||||||
|
relieved by a certified operator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.1.1. Two operators will be posted for duty during each shift.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.1.2. One operator may leave to utilize facilities at any time except when there
|
||||||
|
is hostile activity.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.1.3. When the RTES is inoperative, a two-person Cerberus-4/4a will be
|
||||||
|
posted in the loading dock. Also, when there is a Department of Energy (DoE)
|
||||||
|
mission, a four-man team will be comprised of the RTES operators and Cerberus-
|
||||||
|
4/4a located in the loading dock.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.2. Comply with the requirements of this instruction, Special Security Instructions
|
||||||
|
(SSI), applicable supplements, and operator checklists.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.3. Obtain a detailed briefing and changeover with the off-going RTES operator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.3.1. Changeover will consist of a visual inspection by the operator to ensure
|
||||||
|
there are no line breaks, exposed wires, all monitors are functional, SSIs are in the
|
||||||
|
room, console and surrounding room is kept clean, and all controls are functional.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4. Conduct JRV and routine verifications to ensure all RTES equipment is operating
|
||||||
|
properly.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1. JRV Quick Reaction Checklist (QRC) # H-1 will be conducted at the
|
||||||
|
following times:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1.1. As operator(s) arrive on post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1.2. Any time the system has been enabled or the weapon has been
|
||||||
|
used.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1.3. Following start-up of the system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1.4. After maintenance has been performed on any RTES
|
||||||
|
component (arm, weapon, System Enablement/Disablement Switch, etc.).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1.5. Anytime the operator doubts the reliability of the RTES system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.2. RVs will be conducted in the following situations:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.2.1. Once an RTES operator returns to the RTES room.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.2.2. When there has been a change in the power source (i.e.
|
||||||
|
switching from commercial to generator). Steps for completing RVs are
|
||||||
|
defined in section 3.4 and in applicable QRCs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.5. Take inventory of all RTES equipment and report deficiencies or required work
|
||||||
|
orders to the SCS. The Alarm Monitor will obtain the Job Control Number from the
|
||||||
|
898 MUNS Control Center and maintain the Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form
|
||||||
|
781a, Maintenance Discrepancy and work document. Notify the SCS of the names of the
|
||||||
|
personnel making the corrective action.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.6. If any component of the system fails, do not touch the System enable/disablement
|
||||||
|
switch or touch screens due to safety reasons. Exception: If the RTES is in use due to
|
||||||
|
an attack, select another tower and continue under the direction of the SF on scene
|
||||||
|
commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.7. Do not utilize the live RTES system for any exercises.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.8. Operators will be armed IAW the Installation Defense Plan (IDP) Post Priority
|
||||||
|
Chart.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2. Security Controller Supervisor will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2.1. Act as the SEDS Panel Operator located at SCS Console.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2.2. Monitor the RTES operator when the system is enabled/disabled.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2.3. Annotate all work orders in the SF Blotter. Additionally, enter the names of the
|
||||||
|
persons making the corrective action and the corrective action(s).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2.4. The SCS will notify ESS and CTS of any work orders opened/closed. ESS/CTS
|
||||||
|
response times are outlined in Attachment 9 located in 377 WSSS SOP 31-101, Vol 4.
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC AECS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2.5. Notify the AS, FC/FCC when a work order has been opened/closed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.3. The KUMMSC Entry Controller will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.3.1. Maintain control over the RDDS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.3.2. Monitor the radio for signs of duress from inside SSCC/RTES Room. Also,
|
||||||
|
initiate the RDDS switch enable upon passive or active duress upon the RTES Controller
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
(AECS duress switch activation/failing to acknowledge radio/verbal duress) or as
|
||||||
|
directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.4. The Security Controller will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.4.1. Monitor all alarms and activations of the RTES control room or towers/loading
|
||||||
|
dock.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.4.2. Dispatch to any unannounced alarm activation involving any RTES systems or
|
||||||
|
components.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.5. Area Supervisor will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.5.1. Ensure posts/patrols are implementing temporary compensatory measures until
|
||||||
|
permanent compensatory measures are in place or the work order has been closed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.5.2. Employ RTES to gain a tactical advantage over adversaries.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.6. Flight Chief/Flight Commander will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.6.1. Become familiar with the requirements of AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense
|
||||||
|
(FOUO), AFI 31-117, 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide (TAG), AFMAN 31-108,
|
||||||
|
Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, and applicable supplements.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.6.2. Evaluate the operators on their use of the RTES system, knowledge of local
|
||||||
|
procedures, and response to hostile situations by conducting area exercises. (Ensure flight
|
||||||
|
RTES certified operators are given opportunity to use the RTES Simulator to maintain
|
||||||
|
skills.).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7. 377 SFG/Security Support Squadron/CA will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7.1. Conduct maintenance on the M240B machine guns in accordance with the
|
||||||
|
applicable technical order and commercial manuals.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7.2. Change out M240B machine guns as necessary. Change out the M240B drive
|
||||||
|
spring for each weapon at least quarterly in conjunction with a routine inspection.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7.3. (FOUO) Zero all M240B machine guns at a full distance range from 350 meters
|
||||||
|
prior to the weapon system being mounted.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7.4. Respond upon request from CTS personnel in the event a M240B machine gun
|
||||||
|
needs to be unloaded, loaded, or the weapon itself is damaged during work orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7.5. Clear expended casings and links from all RTES platforms prior to the RTES
|
||||||
|
Operator closing clamshells after firing the weapon system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
8
|
||||||
|
2.8. Electronic Security Systems/Cyber Transport Systems.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.8.1. ESS will act as System Administrators for the RTES.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.8.2. Conduct sensor testing of all alarms associated with RTES in accordance with
|
||||||
|
DoD S-5210.41-M-V2_AFMAN 31-108, Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, V2
|
||||||
|
Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.8.3. Respond upon request from CTS personnel in the event a M240B machine gun
|
||||||
|
needs to be unloaded, loaded, or the weapon itself is damaged during work orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.8.4. If a failure of the system affects the platform or the remote electronics, CTS will
|
||||||
|
notify the standby CA personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9. ESS NCO will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.1. Coordinate preventive maintenance scheduling with appropriate agencies.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2. Develop a tailored local training program for RTES system operators. Training
|
||||||
|
may be conducted on-duty, in a formal classroom environment or a combination of both.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2.1. Initial Certification:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2.1.1. Initial Certification is conducted after an individual completes
|
||||||
|
local training but before performing duties as an RTES Operator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2.2. Trainees:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2.2.1. Trainees pursuing initial RTES Operator certification can
|
||||||
|
perform duties and operate the RTES system under the direct supervision
|
||||||
|
of a Duty Position Evaluation – certified RTES Operator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2.2.2. The trainee must have initiated training documentation for the
|
||||||
|
duty position (AF Form 623A, On the Job Training Record) prior to
|
||||||
|
beginning hands on training. NOTE: At no time will the trainee be left
|
||||||
|
alone to operate the RTES.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
9
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Operation of the RTES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1. Normal Start-up/Shut-down Operations: The RTES is designed to operate continuously,
|
||||||
|
including across shift changes, and other than maintenance purposes there is no reason to shut
|
||||||
|
down the system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.1. Power-on the RTES console.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.1.1. Wait until the initial “splash screen” appears on the touch screen monitor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.1.2. View diagnostics and report errors to ESS/CTS personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.2. Powering off the Console: If the RTES program is shut down inadvertently or for
|
||||||
|
maintenance, the following steps will re-boot the Operator Console:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.2.1. RTES operator will perform a diagnostics check.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.2.2. RTES operator presses “Exit Kiosk” button.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.2.3. Then, follow normal shut down procedures for a Microsoft Windows-
|
||||||
|
based computer.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.3. Any time the system needs to be shut down, contact ESS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.4. Power-off the RTES console only if absolutely necessary and deemed credible by
|
||||||
|
either ESS or SCS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.2. (DCNI) Emergency Shut-Down: In the event of smoke or fire inside the SSCC or
|
||||||
|
evacuation of KUMMSC, the RTES operator will shut down the RTES prior to evacuation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.2.1. The operators will shut down the system and ensure the keys are maintained with
|
||||||
|
the operators.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3. How to conduct a JRV:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.1. Conduct a hardware test by touching the hardware test button on the touch screen.
|
||||||
|
The hardware test function will ensure all equipment that the operator interfaces with
|
||||||
|
works properly. If the equipment does not work then open the appropriate work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.2. The SCS and RTES operator will enable the system utilizing step 3.5.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.3. The SCS will notify the Entry Control Point (ECP) that the RTES operator will be
|
||||||
|
conducting a JRV. The ECP will receive an audible alarm once the system is enabled.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
10
|
||||||
|
3.3.4. The RTES operator for every shift will open all clamshells and verify that all
|
||||||
|
weapons automatically queue to their final denial position by comparing the touch screen
|
||||||
|
with the appropriate checklist. If the final denial lines do not match Attachment #2, open
|
||||||
|
up a work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.5. The RTES operator will select each tower in turn and will check the pan and tilt
|
||||||
|
functions of each weapon system. This will be done by moving the weapon to the
|
||||||
|
extreme left, right, up and down. Care must be taken not to sweep the weapon across
|
||||||
|
personnel and assets. At no time will the operator track non-hostile personnel/assets with
|
||||||
|
the live system. The RTES operator will check the wide angle, infrared and scope to
|
||||||
|
verify that all cameras are focused and working properly. If the weapon fails to operate
|
||||||
|
correctly the RTES operator will inform the SCS and open a work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.6. After checking each weapons pan and tilt function the operator will close that
|
||||||
|
weapons clamshell before moving on to the next weapon system. The operator will
|
||||||
|
ensure the clamshell fully closes and the weapon shows closed on the operator console.
|
||||||
|
If the weapon fails to operate correctly, contact the SCS and initiate a work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.7. Have the SCS press the O-Stop buttons to verify operability.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.8. Once all clamshells have been closed, the RTES operator will disable the system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.9. The RTES operator will verify the operator console is not showing any error
|
||||||
|
messages. If the console shows any error messages, the RTES operator will contact the
|
||||||
|
SCS and initiate a work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.10. The RTES operator will notify SCS the JRV is complete and report any
|
||||||
|
discrepancies. The SCS will record the JRV in the SF blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.4. How to Conduct RVs:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.4.1. Conduct a hardware test by touching the hardware test button on the touch screen.
|
||||||
|
The hardware test function will ensure all equipment the operator interfaces with works
|
||||||
|
properly. If the equipment does not work then open the appropriate work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.4.2. The RTES operator will verify the operator console is not showing any error
|
||||||
|
messages. If the console shows any error messages, the RTES operator will contact the
|
||||||
|
SCS and initiate a work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.4.3. The RTES operator will notify SSCC that the RV is complete and report any
|
||||||
|
discrepancies. The SCS will record the RV in the SF blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.5. How to Enable RTES:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.5.1. The RTES operator and the SCS enable RTES by turning the SEDS keys to
|
||||||
|
“SYSTEM ENABLE”. The red ENABLED light will indicate the system is activated in
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
11
|
||||||
|
conjunction with the red background of the RTES monitor. The RTES touch screen
|
||||||
|
background turns red and the camera and weapon shot selection buttons appear.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.6. When to Enable RTES:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.6.1. The SCS determines if the threat is credible and briefs the appropriate Internal
|
||||||
|
Security Response Team and AS. The AS will determine if a response from RTES is
|
||||||
|
warranted. When to enable the RTES is defined in section 1.4, ROE.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.7. Locating Threat.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.7.1. To locate the threat from the platform, press the “platform icon,” or swipe 50% or
|
||||||
|
more of the “platform monitor.” The weapon and cameras will begin to move and aim at
|
||||||
|
that platform’s Primary Direction of Fire (PDF). Each tower is assigned its own PDF by
|
||||||
|
programmed default.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.7.2. The RTES operator will notify the AS which tower is currently selected by calling
|
||||||
|
out “WEAPONS PLATFORM X UP” over the radio. This allows the AS to know the
|
||||||
|
status of the RTES at all times and deploy appropriately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.7.3. Track and acquire targets by viewing the monitor to the right of the touch screen
|
||||||
|
and utilize controls to verify target on the main screen.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8. Arming and Firing the RTES.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.1. The RTES operator presses the red ARM mechanical button beneath the touch
|
||||||
|
screen. After approximately two seconds, both the button on the RTES Arming Panel
|
||||||
|
and clamshell icon on the touch-screen will light red.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.2. It is important for the RTES Operator at this time to determine the best approach
|
||||||
|
for engaging the target successfully. If the target is moving, either the tracking method of
|
||||||
|
engagement, or the ambush method of engagement should be used. Whether the target is
|
||||||
|
stationary or moving, the operator should evaluate distance to the target and wind, speed
|
||||||
|
and direction from the tower and aim appropriately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.3. (FOUO) The topside weapons are sighted for a 350 meter zero. This means if the
|
||||||
|
target is approximately 350 meters from the tower, the crosshairs of the scope shall be
|
||||||
|
placed at the center of mass on the target.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.4. Select the number of shots by using the “Shot” button on the touch screen, there
|
||||||
|
are three selections, Single Fire, Burst Fire, and Full Auto.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.5. Grasp the hand controller with both hands, placing each index finger on its
|
||||||
|
respective firing button.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.6. Pan and tilt the weapon and operate the camera zoom to acquire the threat.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
12
|
||||||
|
3.8.7. Set the crosshairs on the target aim point.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.8. Press and hold the trigger enable button located on the top left of the hand
|
||||||
|
controller. To fire the weapon, press and hold the trigger button located on the top right
|
||||||
|
of the hand controller. This will fire the weapon for the number of rounds selected. If
|
||||||
|
Auto is selected the weapon will fire a two-second burst. If the trigger button is not
|
||||||
|
depressed for the entire two seconds, the entire burst will not be accomplished.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.9. When the RTES operator is assessing the engagement, the operator may select
|
||||||
|
different platform cameras to determine if the threat was neutralized.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.10. If the threat was not neutralized (or additional threats appear), repeat steps above.
|
||||||
|
(3.8.4.-3.8.9.)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.11. In the event additional hostilities are expected, press “Close All Clamshells” to
|
||||||
|
safeguard the weapons until needed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.12. If a weapon was fired and hostilities have ceased, DO NOT press the “Close All
|
||||||
|
Clamshells” until maintenance has been completed and CA has removed all brass from
|
||||||
|
inside.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9. Safing and Disarming the RTES.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9.1. The operator will push the “Weapon Safe” button to disarm the selected platform.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9.2. The operator may also deselect the tower in use by selecting another platform to
|
||||||
|
disengage the weapon. The newly selected tower will not be armed until the ARM
|
||||||
|
mechanical button is pushed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9.3. Press “Close All Clamshells” touch screen button.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9.4. The SCS will turn the SEDS key switch to disable.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9.5. SCS will notify CTS, ESS, and CA to inspect all towers for any damage. CA will
|
||||||
|
ensure that all guns are reloaded.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
13
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SAFETY AND DURESS OF THE RTES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1. Safety Requirements.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1.1 The primary safety feature of the RTES is the dual-system
|
||||||
|
authorization/enablement concept. The RTES will always be disabled. DO NOT enable
|
||||||
|
the system unless for a JRV, maintenance or when directed by ESS personnel, AS, or
|
||||||
|
competent authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1.2. If during maintenance operations a critical malfunction occurs that could damage
|
||||||
|
the system or harm personnel (such as clamshell closing on maintenance personnel), the
|
||||||
|
SEDS operator will immediately press the Emergency-Stop (E-stop) button. The E-stop
|
||||||
|
will disable all power to the RTES tower and remain disabled until the E-stop is returned
|
||||||
|
to its normal state.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1.3. The RTES operator will maintain in constant contact with ESS/CTS personnel via
|
||||||
|
a voice speaker system in each tower. This system is a two way intercom that allows
|
||||||
|
maintenance personnel to direct the RTES operator during maintenance operations. If
|
||||||
|
trouble is indicated by ESS/CTS personnel the SEDS operator will immediately press the
|
||||||
|
E-stop button.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1.4. With the exception of real world contingencies, the operator will only open the
|
||||||
|
clam shells during authorized and coordinated maintenance. The maintainer will lock out
|
||||||
|
the operator on that particular RTES tower to ensure the operator cannot close the clam
|
||||||
|
shell or engage the trigger. As soon as maintenance is completed, the maintainer will
|
||||||
|
allow the operator access to that tower, close the clam shell, and check the diagnostics to
|
||||||
|
ensure everything is still working properly. Disable the RTES via the SEDS console as
|
||||||
|
soon as all maintenance has been completed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1.5. During JRVs, the SCS and Entry Controller will maintain readiness to disable the
|
||||||
|
RTES if the need arises.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.2. Duress Procedures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.2.1. (DCNI) The SCS will act as the SEDS Operator. The responsibility of the SEDS
|
||||||
|
Operator is to act as part of the 2-person concept in activating RTES. In the event the
|
||||||
|
RTES operator performs an unauthorized function while the system is active, the SCS has
|
||||||
|
system disable control via the E-Stop button/O- Stop buttons. The system will remain
|
||||||
|
disabled until the E-Stop/O-Stop is returned to its normal state.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.2.2. (DCNI) Duress in the SSCC: If there is duress in the SSCC or the RTES
|
||||||
|
operator is performing an unauthorized action in coordination with the SCS, the
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC Entry Controller has system disable control via the RDDS. The RTES will be
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
14
|
||||||
|
disabled until the RDDS is returned to its normal state. NOTE: The RTES may need to
|
||||||
|
be rebooted since the RDDS removes all electrical power to the remote electronics.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
15
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 5
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SIMULATOR OPERATIONS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1 The RTES Simulator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1.1. The RTES trainer console is located in the WSSS Squadron Operations Building
|
||||||
|
#27494, Room R-1.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1.2. (DCNI) The RTES simulator allows the operator to remain proficient with the
|
||||||
|
system. It has eight scenarios the operator can perform. The simulator accurately depicts
|
||||||
|
the interior and exterior of KUMMSC to provide as much realism as possible.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1.3. The RTES simulator does not require the SCS to activate the system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1.4. The operator may exit the scenario and view the statistics of rounds fired and
|
||||||
|
enemy kills at any time.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1.5. The simulator will be used by 377 SFG/Standardization and Evaluations (SFMQ)
|
||||||
|
section personnel to certify and evaluate an individual’s ability to remain qualified on the
|
||||||
|
RTES. FC/FCC can coordinate through ESS to gain access to this room for their certified
|
||||||
|
RTES operators to train when needed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.2. Certification.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.2.1. Must be a SFmember with a response force leader certification at a minimum.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.2.2. Take and pass RTES training course conducted by ESS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.2.3. Must pass with 80% on written/verbal 377 SFG/SFMQ.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.2.4. Practical will be conducted on simulator by 377 SFG/SFMQ. Trainees must pass
|
||||||
|
four (4) scenarios out of (8) and not miss any critical steps.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.3. Uncertified personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.3.1. Uncertified individuals may not operate any portion of the system unless in Phase
|
||||||
|
II training and under the supervision of a certified RTES controller, ESS NCOIC or
|
||||||
|
SFMQ.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
16
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SYSTEM AND SYSTEM COMPONENT FAILURES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.1 Work Order Priorities: The following briefly describes the work order priorities and
|
||||||
|
maintenance response times. For a complete list of work order priorities and compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures refer to Attachment #5 and #6 of this instruction.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.1.1. (DCNI) Priority 1: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel will respond within 1
|
||||||
|
hour. Once CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel arrive on scene the RTES operator
|
||||||
|
will give them an in-depth briefing of the problem. CTS and CA will report to their
|
||||||
|
respective duty shops to get any tools and equipment needed to perform their
|
||||||
|
maintenance duties.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.1.2. (DCNI) Priority 2: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel will respond within 24
|
||||||
|
hours. Follow the same procedures listed in Para. 6.1.1.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.1.3. (DCNI) Priority 3: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel should respond by the
|
||||||
|
next duty day, but not later than 72 hours after the malfunction is reported.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.2. Opening Work Orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.2.1. All work orders will be annotated in the SF Blotter and the AFTO Form 781a,
|
||||||
|
Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document. The Remote Display Area Operator
|
||||||
|
(RDAO) and Local Display Area Operator (LDAO) will maintain a copy of the RTES
|
||||||
|
AFTO Form 781a as well.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.2.2. For safety reasons, if any component of the system fails, do not touch the SEDS or
|
||||||
|
touch screens. Exception: If the RTES is in use due to a threat or attack on
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC, select another tower and continue under the direction of the SF on scene
|
||||||
|
commander. Immediately notify SCS of the failure and the SCS will open a work order
|
||||||
|
via Munition Control. If the failure affects the platform of the remote electronics, SCS
|
||||||
|
will notify the stand-by CA personnel. SCS will notify ESS personnel of all RTES work
|
||||||
|
orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.3. Closing Work Orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.3.1. The RTES operator enters the names of the persons completing the work and the
|
||||||
|
corrective action on the AFTO Form 781a. The RTES operator will notify SCS when the
|
||||||
|
work has been completed, identify the names of the persons who completed the work and
|
||||||
|
the corrective actions taken.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.3.2. The SCS will notify the AS, FC/FCC and ESS personnel that the work order has
|
||||||
|
been closed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
17
|
||||||
|
6.3.3. The SCS will enter the names of the persons making corrective action and the
|
||||||
|
corrective action(s) taken in the SF Blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.4. Work order Tracking Procedures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.4.1. The SCS will notify ESS of any work orders opened/closed during the course of
|
||||||
|
duty day. Priority 2 and 3 work orders opened or closed during the no-duty hours will be
|
||||||
|
reported to the ESS no later than the next duty day. Priority 1 work orders opened or
|
||||||
|
closed during no-duty hours will be reported to ESS and CA standby personnel
|
||||||
|
immediately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DUSTIN G. SUTTON, Col, USAF
|
||||||
|
Commander, 377 SFG
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
18
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
References
|
||||||
|
AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (FOUO) IC #3, 3 February 2016
|
||||||
|
AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel,2 February 2016
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 1 March 2008
|
||||||
|
DoD 5210.41M , AFMAN 31-108V1/V2/V3 AFGSC SUP Nuclear Weapons Security Manual:
|
||||||
|
Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements, 7 March 2013
|
||||||
|
KAFB IDP 31-101 IC #1, Integrated Defense Plan, 9 March 2016
|
||||||
|
Air Force Technical Order 31S9-4-135-2, Change #3, 31 March 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Prescribed Forms
|
||||||
|
No forms are prescribed by this publication
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Adopted Forms
|
||||||
|
AF Form 797, Job Qualification Standard Continuation/Command JQS
|
||||||
|
AFTO Form 781A, Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document
|
||||||
|
AF Form 53, Security Force Desk Blotter
|
||||||
|
AF Form 623A, On the Job Training Record
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Abbreviations and Acronyms
|
||||||
|
AECS - Advanced Entry Control System
|
||||||
|
AFMAN - Air Force Manual
|
||||||
|
AFRIMS - Air Force Records Information Management System
|
||||||
|
AFTO - Air Force Technical Order
|
||||||
|
ANG - Air National Guard
|
||||||
|
AS - Area Supervisor
|
||||||
|
CA - Combat Arms
|
||||||
|
CTS - Cyber Transport Systems
|
||||||
|
DCNI – Department of Defense Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
DFS - Digital Facility System
|
||||||
|
DOD - Department of Defense
|
||||||
|
DOE - Department of Energy
|
||||||
|
ECP - Entry Control Point
|
||||||
|
ESS - Electronic Security Systems
|
||||||
|
E-STOP - Emergency Stop Button
|
||||||
|
FOUO - For Official Use Only
|
||||||
|
FC - Flight Chief
|
||||||
|
FCC - Flight Commander
|
||||||
|
IDP - Installation Defense Plan
|
||||||
|
JRV - Joint Routine Verification
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
19
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC - Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex
|
||||||
|
LDAO - Local Display Area Operator
|
||||||
|
OPR - Office of Primary Responsibility
|
||||||
|
PDF - Primary Direction of Fire
|
||||||
|
QRC - Quick Reaction Checklist
|
||||||
|
RDAO - Remote Display Area Operator
|
||||||
|
RDDS - Remote Duress Disable Switch
|
||||||
|
RDS - Records Disposition Schedule
|
||||||
|
REC - Remote Electronics Cabinet
|
||||||
|
ROE - Rules of Engagement
|
||||||
|
RTES - Remote Target Engagement System
|
||||||
|
RV - Routine Verification
|
||||||
|
SCS - Security Control Supervisor
|
||||||
|
SFG - Security Forces Group
|
||||||
|
SSCC - Site Security Control Center
|
||||||
|
SEDS - System Enable-Disable Switch
|
||||||
|
SF - Security Forces
|
||||||
|
SFMQ – Security Forces Standardization and Evaluations
|
||||||
|
SSI - Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
TAG - Tactical Assault Guide
|
||||||
|
UPS - Uninterruptible Power Supply
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Terms
|
||||||
|
ARMED - A weapon is armed in the RTES by pressing the WEAPON ARMED button on the
|
||||||
|
RTES Arming Panel. Prior to this action, SEDS must be enabled, and a platform must be
|
||||||
|
selected.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DISABLE - RTES is disabled when the SEDS switch is turned to the “DISABLE” position by
|
||||||
|
the SEDS Operator. Pressing the E-stop or RDDS will accomplish the same purpose.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ENABLE - RTES is enabled by the SEDS switch being turned to the “ENABLE” position by
|
||||||
|
both the RTES and the SEDS operators. This is the first step in allowing a weapon to be fired.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Remote Duress Disable Switch - This switch is in a remote location from the RTES Operator
|
||||||
|
Console, SEDS Console and the Training/Simulator Console. If pressed, the RDDS shuts down
|
||||||
|
power to all remote platforms.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RTES Consoles “States” - RTES Consoles are determined to be in one of two states. For the
|
||||||
|
Operational Console, Standby State provides a Diagnostics Mode and Operational State provides
|
||||||
|
full control of the mounted weapons. For the Trainer/Simulator Console, when the SEDS switch
|
||||||
|
is “DISABLED”, the Simulator mode is available. When the SEDS switch is “ENABLED”, the
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
20
|
||||||
|
Simulator mode goes away, and the RTES Training platform is under direct control of the
|
||||||
|
Operator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SAFED - The state of the weapon when the gun safety actuator has engaged the weapon safety
|
||||||
|
on a platform. A weapon cannot be fired in the “WEAPON SAFED” mode.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SEDS E-Stop - The SEDS E-Stop produces an emergency stop. It stops clamshell motion and
|
||||||
|
disables the trigger actuator on all platforms and disables pan and tilt motion.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
21
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 2
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RTES PRIMARY/SECONDARY DIRECTION OF FIRE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Table A2.1. RTES Primary/Secondary Direction Of Fire.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Tower Primary Secondary RTES
|
||||||
|
Direction Direction Of Fire Coverage
|
||||||
|
Of Fire
|
||||||
|
Tower 1, V1AA N/A Towers 2&3
|
||||||
|
Platform 1
|
||||||
|
Tower 1, Golf N/A Towers 2&3
|
||||||
|
Platform 5 Sector
|
||||||
|
Tower 2, V2 N/A Towers 1&3
|
||||||
|
Platform 7
|
||||||
|
Tower 2, Foxtrot N/A Towers 1&3
|
||||||
|
Platform 6 Sector
|
||||||
|
Tower 3, V8 N/A Towers 1&2
|
||||||
|
Platform 3
|
||||||
|
Tower 3, Hotel N/A Towers 1&2
|
||||||
|
Platform 2 Sector
|
||||||
|
Loading Dock V5 B1&B2 REC 8
|
||||||
|
REC 4
|
||||||
|
Loading Dock V6 B1&B2 REC 4
|
||||||
|
REC 8
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
22
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TOUCH SCREEN ICONS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Figure A3.1. Touch Screen Indicators.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
23
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TOUCH SCREEN INDICATORS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Figure A4.1. Touch Screen Indicators.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
24
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 5
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION/WORK ORDER PRIORITY LISTING
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Table 5.1. Equipment Malfunction/Work Order Priority Listing
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Equipment Malfunction Notes P1 P2 P3
|
||||||
|
1 Failed Hardware Test X
|
||||||
|
Error on system displayed on a single Operator Console w/o a
|
||||||
|
2 weapons platform degrade X
|
||||||
|
3 All Operator consoles INOP X
|
||||||
|
4 SEDS Console X
|
||||||
|
5 Single Weapons Platform INOP 1 X
|
||||||
|
6 All Weapons Platforms INOP 1 X
|
||||||
|
7 Remote Duress Disable (RDD) Switch X
|
||||||
|
8 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) X
|
||||||
|
9 Targeting cameras inoperative (Scope, Wide Angle, Thermal) 1 X
|
||||||
|
10 Platform camera inoperative X
|
||||||
|
11 Trainer Console/Server/Weapons Platform X
|
||||||
|
12 Trainer Console/Server X
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
NOTE 1: CA will respond when requested by CTS/ESS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
25
|
||||||
|
ATTACMENT 6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION/COMPENSATORY MEASURES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Table A6.1. (DCNI) Equipment Malfunction/Compensatory Measures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Equipment Malfunction Notes
|
||||||
|
1 Failed Hardware Test 1
|
||||||
|
2 Error on system displayed on a single Operator Console 1
|
||||||
|
3 All Operator consoles INOP 0
|
||||||
|
4 SEDS Console 0
|
||||||
|
5 Single Weapons Platform INOP 0
|
||||||
|
6 All Weapons Platforms INOP 0
|
||||||
|
7 RDD Switch 0
|
||||||
|
8 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) 0
|
||||||
|
9 Targeting cameras inoperative (Scope, Wide Angle, Thermal) 0
|
||||||
|
10 Platform camera inoperative 0
|
||||||
|
11 Trainer Console/Server/Weapons Platform 0
|
||||||
|
12 Trainer Console/Server 0
|
||||||
|
13 Simulator PTZ INOP 0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
NOTE 0: No Compensatory Measures required.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
NOTE 1: Utilize the other RTES Operator Console already manned by Romeo-1/2.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
26
|
||||||
1192
export/(DCNI) 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide 2018.md
Normal file
1192
export/(DCNI) 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide 2018.md
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -0,0 +1,975 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) 377 SFGI 31-113, Remote Target Engagement System, T-250 Digital Facility System
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER 377TH SFG INSTRUCTION 31-113
|
||||||
|
377 TH SECURITY FORCES GROUP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 June 2016
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Security
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REMOTE TARGET ENGAGEMENT SYSTEM, T-250
|
||||||
|
DIGITAL FACILITY SYSTEM
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ACCESSIBILITY: This publication is only available directly from the OPR.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RELEASABILITY: Access to this publication is restricted: this publication is unclassified
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense (DoD) Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information/For Official Use
|
||||||
|
Only (U//DCNI/FOUO). This publication may not be released to foreign nationals; requests
|
||||||
|
for accessibility must be approved by the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
OPR: 377 WSSS/S5 Certified by: 377 WSSS/CC
|
||||||
|
(Lt Col James K. Meier)
|
||||||
|
[Pages: 26]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This publication implements the 377th Security Forces Group (SFG) Remote Target Engagement
|
||||||
|
System (RTES) T-250 Digital Facility System (DFS). This group instruction is applicable to all
|
||||||
|
personnel within the 377th SFG to all It describes the responsibilities of the RTES operator, Flight
|
||||||
|
Chief (FC)/Flight Commander (FCC), Entry Controller, Combat Arms (CA), and Electronic
|
||||||
|
Security Systems (ESS) personnel. This operating instruction also covers the operation of the
|
||||||
|
RTES Operator Console, System Enable Disable Switch (SEDS) Console, Remote Duress Disable
|
||||||
|
(RDDS) Switch, and the Trainer/Simulator Console. This publication does not apply to Air Force
|
||||||
|
Reserve Command (AFRC) Units or to the Air National Guard (ANG). Refer recommended
|
||||||
|
changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using AF Form 847, Recommendation for
|
||||||
|
Change of Publication; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional
|
||||||
|
chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this
|
||||||
|
publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management
|
||||||
|
of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management
|
||||||
|
System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS). This publication may not be
|
||||||
|
supplemented or further implemented/extended. Requests for waivers must be submitted to the
|
||||||
|
OPR listed above for consideration and approval.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 1: Concept of Operations
|
||||||
|
1.1 System Overview
|
||||||
|
1.2 System Description
|
||||||
|
1.3 System Purpose
|
||||||
|
1.4 Rules of Engagement
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 2: Individual Responsibilities
|
||||||
|
2.1. RTES Operator Duties
|
||||||
|
2.2. Security Control Supervisor (SCS) Duties
|
||||||
|
2.3. Entry Controller Duties
|
||||||
|
2.4. Alarm Monitor Duties
|
||||||
|
2.5. Area Supervisor Duties
|
||||||
|
2.6. Flight Chief/Flight Commander Duties
|
||||||
|
2.7. Combat Arms Duties
|
||||||
|
2.8. Electronic Security Systems/Cyber Transport Systems (CTS) Duties
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 3: Operation of the RTES
|
||||||
|
3.1 Normal Start-up/Shut-down Operations
|
||||||
|
3.2 Emergency Shut-down
|
||||||
|
3.3 How to Conduct Joint Routine Verification (JRV).
|
||||||
|
3.4 How to Conduct Routine Verification (RV).
|
||||||
|
3.5 How to Enable RTES
|
||||||
|
3.6 When to Enable RTES
|
||||||
|
3.7 Locating the Threat
|
||||||
|
3.8 Arming and Firing the RTES
|
||||||
|
3.9 Safing and Disarming the RTES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 4: Safety and Duress of the RTES
|
||||||
|
4.1. Safety Requirements
|
||||||
|
4.2. Duress Procedures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 5: Simulator Operations and Certification
|
||||||
|
5.1. RTES Simulator
|
||||||
|
5.2. Certification
|
||||||
|
5.3. Uncertified Personnel
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 6: System and System Component Failures
|
||||||
|
6.1. Work Order Priorities
|
||||||
|
6.2. Opening Work Orders
|
||||||
|
6.3. Closing Work Orders
|
||||||
|
6.4. Work Order Tracking Procedures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENTS:
|
||||||
|
Attachment 1 - Glossary of References and Supporting Information
|
||||||
|
Attachment 2 - RTES Primary/Secondary Direction of Fire
|
||||||
|
Attachment 3 - Touch Screen Icons
|
||||||
|
Attachment 4 - Touch Screen Indicators
|
||||||
|
Attachment 5 - Equipment Malfunction/Work Order Priorities
|
||||||
|
Attachment 6 – Equipment Malfunction/Compensatory Measures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.1 System Overview.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.1.1. RTES is an enhancement of the overall security system for protecting critical
|
||||||
|
assets. Their primary functions are to provide final denial fire, area denial, and deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized personnel from avenues of approach to restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.1.2. (DCNI) RTES is employed by system operators to locate, identify, target and
|
||||||
|
engage an adversary attacking the Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance
|
||||||
|
Storage Complex (KUMMSC). Employment and operational direction of the RTES will
|
||||||
|
be the responsibility of the Security Forces (SF) on-scene commander. Close attention
|
||||||
|
will be paid to the effects of base operations when utilizing the RTES. Rules of
|
||||||
|
Engagement (ROE) in this instruction will specify when and how the RTES functions are
|
||||||
|
used.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.2. (DCNI) System Description: The RTES employs the M240B machine gun with 200
|
||||||
|
rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing/tracer ammunition. The RTES consoles, and all the
|
||||||
|
M240B machine guns associated with them are not tied into the Automated/Advanced Entry
|
||||||
|
Control System (AECS). These weapons are mounted within ballistic shielded clamshells on
|
||||||
|
three hardened towers dispersed within the controlled area and two platforms within the
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC/limited area, covering the loading dock. The RTES is remotely operated from the
|
||||||
|
operator console located in the RTES Room (#150) adjacent to the Site Security Control Center
|
||||||
|
(SSCC). Each tower on topside is equiped with two weapon systems and associated cameras.
|
||||||
|
The two towers located within the loading dock are both equipped with a weapon system and an
|
||||||
|
associated camera. All tower locations with primary and secondary fields of fire can be found in
|
||||||
|
attachment 2 of this document.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.3. System Purpose.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.3.1. The purpose of the RTES is to:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.3.1.1. Provide final denial fire before hostile unauthorized access can be gained
|
||||||
|
to controlled/restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.3.1.2. Achieve area denial fire of likely avenues of approach to
|
||||||
|
controlled/restricted/limited/exclusion areas.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.3.1.3. Mitigate identified vulnerabilities that require posting of armed SF IAW
|
||||||
|
(DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN31-108V1, Nuclear Weapons Security Manual,
|
||||||
|
Enclosure 6 Para 3.d.(4).)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
1.4. Rules Of Engagement.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.1. AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force, will be strictly adhered to during all
|
||||||
|
operations of the RTES.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.2. The RTES operator will enable the system in the following situations:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.2.1. Initiation of a COVERED WAGON due to a direct threat to KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.2.2. With proper authentication from the posted SCS, Area Supervisor (AS),
|
||||||
|
FCC/FC or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.2.3. For pre-coordinated and authorized maintenance or during shift
|
||||||
|
changeover/JRV/RV.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.3. SF on scene commander is responsible for the overall employment of the RTES
|
||||||
|
and will provide direction to the RTES operator. If available, positive identification
|
||||||
|
should be made from a post or patrol that has line of sight prior to utilizing the weapon.
|
||||||
|
A confirmed visual verification by an on-scene patrol will not deter the RTES operator
|
||||||
|
from enabling and engaging hostile forces if threat to life or resources is imminent.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.4. Once the RTES operator has received direction from the AS/on-scene commander,
|
||||||
|
the SCS and RTES operator will turn on their respective SEDS keys to enable the system
|
||||||
|
to open applicable clamshells as necessary. It is recommended that only one tower with
|
||||||
|
the best tactical advantage be activated to avoid putting the other towers at risk of being
|
||||||
|
damaged. If the threat is deemed hostile by the on-scene commander and the operator
|
||||||
|
has received proper authorization, use of deadly force is authorized. The operator will
|
||||||
|
select the respective tower, arm the system and eliminate the threat.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.5. When the operator has enabled the system, the weapon will remain on safe until
|
||||||
|
the operator is ready to engage an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.6. The RTES operator will announce “weapons platform X up” to the Area
|
||||||
|
Supervisor and SCS when any platform is selected, and will potentially be fired.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.7. At no time will both the RTES and RF be redirected from final denial coverage at
|
||||||
|
the same time during hostile situations. NOTE: At no time will the RTES be enabled
|
||||||
|
during flight, squadron or wing level exercises.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 2
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITIES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1. RTES Operators will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.1. One operator will remain within the confines of the RTES Room (#150) unless
|
||||||
|
relieved by a certified operator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.1.1. Two operators will be posted for duty during each shift.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.1.2. One operator may leave to utilize facilities at any time except when there
|
||||||
|
is hostile activity.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.1.3. When the RTES is inoperative, a two-person Cerberus-4/4a will be
|
||||||
|
posted in the loading dock. Also, when there is a Department of Energy (DoE)
|
||||||
|
mission, a four-man team will be comprised of the RTES operators and Cerberus-
|
||||||
|
4/4a located in the loading dock.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.2. Comply with the requirements of this instruction, Special Security Instructions
|
||||||
|
(SSI), applicable supplements, and operator checklists.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.3. Obtain a detailed briefing and changeover with the off-going RTES operator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.3.1. Changeover will consist of a visual inspection by the operator to ensure
|
||||||
|
there are no line breaks, exposed wires, all monitors are functional, SSIs are in the
|
||||||
|
room, console and surrounding room is kept clean, and all controls are functional.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4. Conduct JRV and routine verifications to ensure all RTES equipment is operating
|
||||||
|
properly.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1. JRV Quick Reaction Checklist (QRC) # H-1 will be conducted at the
|
||||||
|
following times:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1.1. As operator(s) arrive on post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1.2. Any time the system has been enabled or the weapon has been
|
||||||
|
used.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1.3. Following start-up of the system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1.4. After maintenance has been performed on any RTES
|
||||||
|
component (arm, weapon, System Enablement/Disablement Switch, etc.).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.1.5. Anytime the operator doubts the reliability of the RTES system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.2. RVs will be conducted in the following situations:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.2.1. Once an RTES operator returns to the RTES room.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.4.2.2. When there has been a change in the power source (i.e.
|
||||||
|
switching from commercial to generator). Steps for completing RVs are
|
||||||
|
defined in section 3.4 and in applicable QRCs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.5. Take inventory of all RTES equipment and report deficiencies or required work
|
||||||
|
orders to the SCS. The Alarm Monitor will obtain the Job Control Number from the
|
||||||
|
898 MUNS Control Center and maintain the Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) Form
|
||||||
|
781a, Maintenance Discrepancy and work document. Notify the SCS of the names of the
|
||||||
|
personnel making the corrective action.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.6. If any component of the system fails, do not touch the System enable/disablement
|
||||||
|
switch or touch screens due to safety reasons. Exception: If the RTES is in use due to
|
||||||
|
an attack, select another tower and continue under the direction of the SF on scene
|
||||||
|
commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.7. Do not utilize the live RTES system for any exercises.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.1.8. Operators will be armed IAW the Installation Defense Plan (IDP) Post Priority
|
||||||
|
Chart.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2. Security Controller Supervisor will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2.1. Act as the SEDS Panel Operator located at SCS Console.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2.2. Monitor the RTES operator when the system is enabled/disabled.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2.3. Annotate all work orders in the SF Blotter. Additionally, enter the names of the
|
||||||
|
persons making the corrective action and the corrective action(s).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2.4. The SCS will notify ESS and CTS of any work orders opened/closed. ESS/CTS
|
||||||
|
response times are outlined in Attachment 9 located in 377 WSSS SOP 31-101, Vol 4.
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC AECS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.2.5. Notify the AS, FC/FCC when a work order has been opened/closed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.3. The KUMMSC Entry Controller will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.3.1. Maintain control over the RDDS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.3.2. Monitor the radio for signs of duress from inside SSCC/RTES Room. Also,
|
||||||
|
initiate the RDDS switch enable upon passive or active duress upon the RTES Controller
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
(AECS duress switch activation/failing to acknowledge radio/verbal duress) or as
|
||||||
|
directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.4. The Security Controller will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.4.1. Monitor all alarms and activations of the RTES control room or towers/loading
|
||||||
|
dock.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.4.2. Dispatch to any unannounced alarm activation involving any RTES systems or
|
||||||
|
components.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.5. Area Supervisor will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.5.1. Ensure posts/patrols are implementing temporary compensatory measures until
|
||||||
|
permanent compensatory measures are in place or the work order has been closed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.5.2. Employ RTES to gain a tactical advantage over adversaries.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.6. Flight Chief/Flight Commander will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.6.1. Become familiar with the requirements of AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense
|
||||||
|
(FOUO), AFI 31-117, 377 SFG Tactical Assault Guide (TAG), AFMAN 31-108,
|
||||||
|
Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, and applicable supplements.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.6.2. Evaluate the operators on their use of the RTES system, knowledge of local
|
||||||
|
procedures, and response to hostile situations by conducting area exercises. (Ensure flight
|
||||||
|
RTES certified operators are given opportunity to use the RTES Simulator to maintain
|
||||||
|
skills.).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7. 377 SFG/Security Support Squadron/CA will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7.1. Conduct maintenance on the M240B machine guns in accordance with the
|
||||||
|
applicable technical order and commercial manuals.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7.2. Change out M240B machine guns as necessary. Change out the M240B drive
|
||||||
|
spring for each weapon at least quarterly in conjunction with a routine inspection.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7.3. (FOUO) Zero all M240B machine guns at a full distance range from 350 meters
|
||||||
|
prior to the weapon system being mounted.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7.4. Respond upon request from CTS personnel in the event a M240B machine gun
|
||||||
|
needs to be unloaded, loaded, or the weapon itself is damaged during work orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.7.5. Clear expended casings and links from all RTES platforms prior to the RTES
|
||||||
|
Operator closing clamshells after firing the weapon system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
8
|
||||||
|
2.8. Electronic Security Systems/Cyber Transport Systems.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.8.1. ESS will act as System Administrators for the RTES.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.8.2. Conduct sensor testing of all alarms associated with RTES in accordance with
|
||||||
|
DoD S-5210.41-M-V2_AFMAN 31-108, Nuclear Weapon Security Manual, V2
|
||||||
|
Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.8.3. Respond upon request from CTS personnel in the event a M240B machine gun
|
||||||
|
needs to be unloaded, loaded, or the weapon itself is damaged during work orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.8.4. If a failure of the system affects the platform or the remote electronics, CTS will
|
||||||
|
notify the standby CA personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9. ESS NCO will:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.1. Coordinate preventive maintenance scheduling with appropriate agencies.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2. Develop a tailored local training program for RTES system operators. Training
|
||||||
|
may be conducted on-duty, in a formal classroom environment or a combination of both.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2.1. Initial Certification:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2.1.1. Initial Certification is conducted after an individual completes
|
||||||
|
local training but before performing duties as an RTES Operator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2.2. Trainees:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2.2.1. Trainees pursuing initial RTES Operator certification can
|
||||||
|
perform duties and operate the RTES system under the direct supervision
|
||||||
|
of a Duty Position Evaluation – certified RTES Operator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.9.2.2.2. The trainee must have initiated training documentation for the
|
||||||
|
duty position (AF Form 623A, On the Job Training Record) prior to
|
||||||
|
beginning hands on training. NOTE: At no time will the trainee be left
|
||||||
|
alone to operate the RTES.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
9
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Operation of the RTES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1. Normal Start-up/Shut-down Operations: The RTES is designed to operate continuously,
|
||||||
|
including across shift changes, and other than maintenance purposes there is no reason to shut
|
||||||
|
down the system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.1. Power-on the RTES console.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.1.1. Wait until the initial “splash screen” appears on the touch screen monitor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.1.2. View diagnostics and report errors to ESS/CTS personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.2. Powering off the Console: If the RTES program is shut down inadvertently or for
|
||||||
|
maintenance, the following steps will re-boot the Operator Console:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.2.1. RTES operator will perform a diagnostics check.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.2.2. RTES operator presses “Exit Kiosk” button.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.2.3. Then, follow normal shut down procedures for a Microsoft Windows-
|
||||||
|
based computer.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.3. Any time the system needs to be shut down, contact ESS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.1.4. Power-off the RTES console only if absolutely necessary and deemed credible by
|
||||||
|
either ESS or SCS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.2. (DCNI) Emergency Shut-Down: In the event of smoke or fire inside the SSCC or
|
||||||
|
evacuation of KUMMSC, the RTES operator will shut down the RTES prior to evacuation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.2.1. The operators will shut down the system and ensure the keys are maintained with
|
||||||
|
the operators.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3. How to conduct a JRV:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.1. Conduct a hardware test by touching the hardware test button on the touch screen.
|
||||||
|
The hardware test function will ensure all equipment that the operator interfaces with
|
||||||
|
works properly. If the equipment does not work then open the appropriate work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.2. The SCS and RTES operator will enable the system utilizing step 3.5.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.3. The SCS will notify the Entry Control Point (ECP) that the RTES operator will be
|
||||||
|
conducting a JRV. The ECP will receive an audible alarm once the system is enabled.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
10
|
||||||
|
3.3.4. The RTES operator for every shift will open all clamshells and verify that all
|
||||||
|
weapons automatically queue to their final denial position by comparing the touch screen
|
||||||
|
with the appropriate checklist. If the final denial lines do not match Attachment #2, open
|
||||||
|
up a work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.5. The RTES operator will select each tower in turn and will check the pan and tilt
|
||||||
|
functions of each weapon system. This will be done by moving the weapon to the
|
||||||
|
extreme left, right, up and down. Care must be taken not to sweep the weapon across
|
||||||
|
personnel and assets. At no time will the operator track non-hostile personnel/assets with
|
||||||
|
the live system. The RTES operator will check the wide angle, infrared and scope to
|
||||||
|
verify that all cameras are focused and working properly. If the weapon fails to operate
|
||||||
|
correctly the RTES operator will inform the SCS and open a work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.6. After checking each weapons pan and tilt function the operator will close that
|
||||||
|
weapons clamshell before moving on to the next weapon system. The operator will
|
||||||
|
ensure the clamshell fully closes and the weapon shows closed on the operator console.
|
||||||
|
If the weapon fails to operate correctly, contact the SCS and initiate a work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.7. Have the SCS press the O-Stop buttons to verify operability.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.8. Once all clamshells have been closed, the RTES operator will disable the system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.9. The RTES operator will verify the operator console is not showing any error
|
||||||
|
messages. If the console shows any error messages, the RTES operator will contact the
|
||||||
|
SCS and initiate a work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.3.10. The RTES operator will notify SCS the JRV is complete and report any
|
||||||
|
discrepancies. The SCS will record the JRV in the SF blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.4. How to Conduct RVs:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.4.1. Conduct a hardware test by touching the hardware test button on the touch screen.
|
||||||
|
The hardware test function will ensure all equipment the operator interfaces with works
|
||||||
|
properly. If the equipment does not work then open the appropriate work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.4.2. The RTES operator will verify the operator console is not showing any error
|
||||||
|
messages. If the console shows any error messages, the RTES operator will contact the
|
||||||
|
SCS and initiate a work order.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.4.3. The RTES operator will notify SSCC that the RV is complete and report any
|
||||||
|
discrepancies. The SCS will record the RV in the SF blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.5. How to Enable RTES:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.5.1. The RTES operator and the SCS enable RTES by turning the SEDS keys to
|
||||||
|
“SYSTEM ENABLE”. The red ENABLED light will indicate the system is activated in
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
11
|
||||||
|
conjunction with the red background of the RTES monitor. The RTES touch screen
|
||||||
|
background turns red and the camera and weapon shot selection buttons appear.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.6. When to Enable RTES:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.6.1. The SCS determines if the threat is credible and briefs the appropriate Internal
|
||||||
|
Security Response Team and AS. The AS will determine if a response from RTES is
|
||||||
|
warranted. When to enable the RTES is defined in section 1.4, ROE.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.7. Locating Threat.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.7.1. To locate the threat from the platform, press the “platform icon,” or swipe 50% or
|
||||||
|
more of the “platform monitor.” The weapon and cameras will begin to move and aim at
|
||||||
|
that platform’s Primary Direction of Fire (PDF). Each tower is assigned its own PDF by
|
||||||
|
programmed default.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.7.2. The RTES operator will notify the AS which tower is currently selected by calling
|
||||||
|
out “WEAPONS PLATFORM X UP” over the radio. This allows the AS to know the
|
||||||
|
status of the RTES at all times and deploy appropriately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.7.3. Track and acquire targets by viewing the monitor to the right of the touch screen
|
||||||
|
and utilize controls to verify target on the main screen.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8. Arming and Firing the RTES.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.1. The RTES operator presses the red ARM mechanical button beneath the touch
|
||||||
|
screen. After approximately two seconds, both the button on the RTES Arming Panel
|
||||||
|
and clamshell icon on the touch-screen will light red.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.2. It is important for the RTES Operator at this time to determine the best approach
|
||||||
|
for engaging the target successfully. If the target is moving, either the tracking method of
|
||||||
|
engagement, or the ambush method of engagement should be used. Whether the target is
|
||||||
|
stationary or moving, the operator should evaluate distance to the target and wind, speed
|
||||||
|
and direction from the tower and aim appropriately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.3. (FOUO) The topside weapons are sighted for a 350 meter zero. This means if the
|
||||||
|
target is approximately 350 meters from the tower, the crosshairs of the scope shall be
|
||||||
|
placed at the center of mass on the target.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.4. Select the number of shots by using the “Shot” button on the touch screen, there
|
||||||
|
are three selections, Single Fire, Burst Fire, and Full Auto.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.5. Grasp the hand controller with both hands, placing each index finger on its
|
||||||
|
respective firing button.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.6. Pan and tilt the weapon and operate the camera zoom to acquire the threat.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
12
|
||||||
|
3.8.7. Set the crosshairs on the target aim point.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.8. Press and hold the trigger enable button located on the top left of the hand
|
||||||
|
controller. To fire the weapon, press and hold the trigger button located on the top right
|
||||||
|
of the hand controller. This will fire the weapon for the number of rounds selected. If
|
||||||
|
Auto is selected the weapon will fire a two-second burst. If the trigger button is not
|
||||||
|
depressed for the entire two seconds, the entire burst will not be accomplished.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.9. When the RTES operator is assessing the engagement, the operator may select
|
||||||
|
different platform cameras to determine if the threat was neutralized.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.10. If the threat was not neutralized (or additional threats appear), repeat steps above.
|
||||||
|
(3.8.4.-3.8.9.)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.11. In the event additional hostilities are expected, press “Close All Clamshells” to
|
||||||
|
safeguard the weapons until needed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.8.12. If a weapon was fired and hostilities have ceased, DO NOT press the “Close All
|
||||||
|
Clamshells” until maintenance has been completed and CA has removed all brass from
|
||||||
|
inside.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9. Safing and Disarming the RTES.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9.1. The operator will push the “Weapon Safe” button to disarm the selected platform.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9.2. The operator may also deselect the tower in use by selecting another platform to
|
||||||
|
disengage the weapon. The newly selected tower will not be armed until the ARM
|
||||||
|
mechanical button is pushed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9.3. Press “Close All Clamshells” touch screen button.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9.4. The SCS will turn the SEDS key switch to disable.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.9.5. SCS will notify CTS, ESS, and CA to inspect all towers for any damage. CA will
|
||||||
|
ensure that all guns are reloaded.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
13
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SAFETY AND DURESS OF THE RTES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1. Safety Requirements.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1.1 The primary safety feature of the RTES is the dual-system
|
||||||
|
authorization/enablement concept. The RTES will always be disabled. DO NOT enable
|
||||||
|
the system unless for a JRV, maintenance or when directed by ESS personnel, AS, or
|
||||||
|
competent authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1.2. If during maintenance operations a critical malfunction occurs that could damage
|
||||||
|
the system or harm personnel (such as clamshell closing on maintenance personnel), the
|
||||||
|
SEDS operator will immediately press the Emergency-Stop (E-stop) button. The E-stop
|
||||||
|
will disable all power to the RTES tower and remain disabled until the E-stop is returned
|
||||||
|
to its normal state.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1.3. The RTES operator will maintain in constant contact with ESS/CTS personnel via
|
||||||
|
a voice speaker system in each tower. This system is a two way intercom that allows
|
||||||
|
maintenance personnel to direct the RTES operator during maintenance operations. If
|
||||||
|
trouble is indicated by ESS/CTS personnel the SEDS operator will immediately press the
|
||||||
|
E-stop button.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1.4. With the exception of real world contingencies, the operator will only open the
|
||||||
|
clam shells during authorized and coordinated maintenance. The maintainer will lock out
|
||||||
|
the operator on that particular RTES tower to ensure the operator cannot close the clam
|
||||||
|
shell or engage the trigger. As soon as maintenance is completed, the maintainer will
|
||||||
|
allow the operator access to that tower, close the clam shell, and check the diagnostics to
|
||||||
|
ensure everything is still working properly. Disable the RTES via the SEDS console as
|
||||||
|
soon as all maintenance has been completed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.1.5. During JRVs, the SCS and Entry Controller will maintain readiness to disable the
|
||||||
|
RTES if the need arises.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.2. Duress Procedures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.2.1. (DCNI) The SCS will act as the SEDS Operator. The responsibility of the SEDS
|
||||||
|
Operator is to act as part of the 2-person concept in activating RTES. In the event the
|
||||||
|
RTES operator performs an unauthorized function while the system is active, the SCS has
|
||||||
|
system disable control via the E-Stop button/O- Stop buttons. The system will remain
|
||||||
|
disabled until the E-Stop/O-Stop is returned to its normal state.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4.2.2. (DCNI) Duress in the SSCC: If there is duress in the SSCC or the RTES
|
||||||
|
operator is performing an unauthorized action in coordination with the SCS, the
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC Entry Controller has system disable control via the RDDS. The RTES will be
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
14
|
||||||
|
disabled until the RDDS is returned to its normal state. NOTE: The RTES may need to
|
||||||
|
be rebooted since the RDDS removes all electrical power to the remote electronics.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
15
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 5
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SIMULATOR OPERATIONS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1 The RTES Simulator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1.1. The RTES trainer console is located in the WSSS Squadron Operations Building
|
||||||
|
#27494, Room R-1.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1.2. (DCNI) The RTES simulator allows the operator to remain proficient with the
|
||||||
|
system. It has eight scenarios the operator can perform. The simulator accurately depicts
|
||||||
|
the interior and exterior of KUMMSC to provide as much realism as possible.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1.3. The RTES simulator does not require the SCS to activate the system.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1.4. The operator may exit the scenario and view the statistics of rounds fired and
|
||||||
|
enemy kills at any time.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.1.5. The simulator will be used by 377 SFG/Standardization and Evaluations (SFMQ)
|
||||||
|
section personnel to certify and evaluate an individual’s ability to remain qualified on the
|
||||||
|
RTES. FC/FCC can coordinate through ESS to gain access to this room for their certified
|
||||||
|
RTES operators to train when needed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.2. Certification.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.2.1. Must be a SFmember with a response force leader certification at a minimum.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.2.2. Take and pass RTES training course conducted by ESS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.2.3. Must pass with 80% on written/verbal 377 SFG/SFMQ.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.2.4. Practical will be conducted on simulator by 377 SFG/SFMQ. Trainees must pass
|
||||||
|
four (4) scenarios out of (8) and not miss any critical steps.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.3. Uncertified personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.3.1. Uncertified individuals may not operate any portion of the system unless in Phase
|
||||||
|
II training and under the supervision of a certified RTES controller, ESS NCOIC or
|
||||||
|
SFMQ.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
16
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SYSTEM AND SYSTEM COMPONENT FAILURES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.1 Work Order Priorities: The following briefly describes the work order priorities and
|
||||||
|
maintenance response times. For a complete list of work order priorities and compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures refer to Attachment #5 and #6 of this instruction.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.1.1. (DCNI) Priority 1: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel will respond within 1
|
||||||
|
hour. Once CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel arrive on scene the RTES operator
|
||||||
|
will give them an in-depth briefing of the problem. CTS and CA will report to their
|
||||||
|
respective duty shops to get any tools and equipment needed to perform their
|
||||||
|
maintenance duties.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.1.2. (DCNI) Priority 2: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel will respond within 24
|
||||||
|
hours. Follow the same procedures listed in Para. 6.1.1.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.1.3. (DCNI) Priority 3: CTS maintenance and/or CA personnel should respond by the
|
||||||
|
next duty day, but not later than 72 hours after the malfunction is reported.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.2. Opening Work Orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.2.1. All work orders will be annotated in the SF Blotter and the AFTO Form 781a,
|
||||||
|
Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document. The Remote Display Area Operator
|
||||||
|
(RDAO) and Local Display Area Operator (LDAO) will maintain a copy of the RTES
|
||||||
|
AFTO Form 781a as well.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.2.2. For safety reasons, if any component of the system fails, do not touch the SEDS or
|
||||||
|
touch screens. Exception: If the RTES is in use due to a threat or attack on
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC, select another tower and continue under the direction of the SF on scene
|
||||||
|
commander. Immediately notify SCS of the failure and the SCS will open a work order
|
||||||
|
via Munition Control. If the failure affects the platform of the remote electronics, SCS
|
||||||
|
will notify the stand-by CA personnel. SCS will notify ESS personnel of all RTES work
|
||||||
|
orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.3. Closing Work Orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.3.1. The RTES operator enters the names of the persons completing the work and the
|
||||||
|
corrective action on the AFTO Form 781a. The RTES operator will notify SCS when the
|
||||||
|
work has been completed, identify the names of the persons who completed the work and
|
||||||
|
the corrective actions taken.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.3.2. The SCS will notify the AS, FC/FCC and ESS personnel that the work order has
|
||||||
|
been closed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
17
|
||||||
|
6.3.3. The SCS will enter the names of the persons making corrective action and the
|
||||||
|
corrective action(s) taken in the SF Blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.4. Work order Tracking Procedures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6.4.1. The SCS will notify ESS of any work orders opened/closed during the course of
|
||||||
|
duty day. Priority 2 and 3 work orders opened or closed during the no-duty hours will be
|
||||||
|
reported to the ESS no later than the next duty day. Priority 1 work orders opened or
|
||||||
|
closed during no-duty hours will be reported to ESS and CA standby personnel
|
||||||
|
immediately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DUSTIN G. SUTTON, Col, USAF
|
||||||
|
Commander, 377 SFG
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
18
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
References
|
||||||
|
AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (FOUO) IC #3, 3 February 2016
|
||||||
|
AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel,2 February 2016
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 1 March 2008
|
||||||
|
DoD 5210.41M , AFMAN 31-108V1/V2/V3 AFGSC SUP Nuclear Weapons Security Manual:
|
||||||
|
Nuclear Weapon Specific Requirements, 7 March 2013
|
||||||
|
KAFB IDP 31-101 IC #1, Integrated Defense Plan, 9 March 2016
|
||||||
|
Air Force Technical Order 31S9-4-135-2, Change #3, 31 March 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Prescribed Forms
|
||||||
|
No forms are prescribed by this publication
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Adopted Forms
|
||||||
|
AF Form 797, Job Qualification Standard Continuation/Command JQS
|
||||||
|
AFTO Form 781A, Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document
|
||||||
|
AF Form 53, Security Force Desk Blotter
|
||||||
|
AF Form 623A, On the Job Training Record
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Abbreviations and Acronyms
|
||||||
|
AECS - Advanced Entry Control System
|
||||||
|
AFMAN - Air Force Manual
|
||||||
|
AFRIMS - Air Force Records Information Management System
|
||||||
|
AFTO - Air Force Technical Order
|
||||||
|
ANG - Air National Guard
|
||||||
|
AS - Area Supervisor
|
||||||
|
CA - Combat Arms
|
||||||
|
CTS - Cyber Transport Systems
|
||||||
|
DCNI – Department of Defense Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
DFS - Digital Facility System
|
||||||
|
DOD - Department of Defense
|
||||||
|
DOE - Department of Energy
|
||||||
|
ECP - Entry Control Point
|
||||||
|
ESS - Electronic Security Systems
|
||||||
|
E-STOP - Emergency Stop Button
|
||||||
|
FOUO - For Official Use Only
|
||||||
|
FC - Flight Chief
|
||||||
|
FCC - Flight Commander
|
||||||
|
IDP - Installation Defense Plan
|
||||||
|
JRV - Joint Routine Verification
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
19
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC - Kirtland Underground Munitions and Maintenance Storage Complex
|
||||||
|
LDAO - Local Display Area Operator
|
||||||
|
OPR - Office of Primary Responsibility
|
||||||
|
PDF - Primary Direction of Fire
|
||||||
|
QRC - Quick Reaction Checklist
|
||||||
|
RDAO - Remote Display Area Operator
|
||||||
|
RDDS - Remote Duress Disable Switch
|
||||||
|
RDS - Records Disposition Schedule
|
||||||
|
REC - Remote Electronics Cabinet
|
||||||
|
ROE - Rules of Engagement
|
||||||
|
RTES - Remote Target Engagement System
|
||||||
|
RV - Routine Verification
|
||||||
|
SCS - Security Control Supervisor
|
||||||
|
SFG - Security Forces Group
|
||||||
|
SSCC - Site Security Control Center
|
||||||
|
SEDS - System Enable-Disable Switch
|
||||||
|
SF - Security Forces
|
||||||
|
SFMQ – Security Forces Standardization and Evaluations
|
||||||
|
SSI - Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
TAG - Tactical Assault Guide
|
||||||
|
UPS - Uninterruptible Power Supply
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Terms
|
||||||
|
ARMED - A weapon is armed in the RTES by pressing the WEAPON ARMED button on the
|
||||||
|
RTES Arming Panel. Prior to this action, SEDS must be enabled, and a platform must be
|
||||||
|
selected.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DISABLE - RTES is disabled when the SEDS switch is turned to the “DISABLE” position by
|
||||||
|
the SEDS Operator. Pressing the E-stop or RDDS will accomplish the same purpose.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ENABLE - RTES is enabled by the SEDS switch being turned to the “ENABLE” position by
|
||||||
|
both the RTES and the SEDS operators. This is the first step in allowing a weapon to be fired.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Remote Duress Disable Switch - This switch is in a remote location from the RTES Operator
|
||||||
|
Console, SEDS Console and the Training/Simulator Console. If pressed, the RDDS shuts down
|
||||||
|
power to all remote platforms.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RTES Consoles “States” - RTES Consoles are determined to be in one of two states. For the
|
||||||
|
Operational Console, Standby State provides a Diagnostics Mode and Operational State provides
|
||||||
|
full control of the mounted weapons. For the Trainer/Simulator Console, when the SEDS switch
|
||||||
|
is “DISABLED”, the Simulator mode is available. When the SEDS switch is “ENABLED”, the
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
20
|
||||||
|
Simulator mode goes away, and the RTES Training platform is under direct control of the
|
||||||
|
Operator.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SAFED - The state of the weapon when the gun safety actuator has engaged the weapon safety
|
||||||
|
on a platform. A weapon cannot be fired in the “WEAPON SAFED” mode.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SEDS E-Stop - The SEDS E-Stop produces an emergency stop. It stops clamshell motion and
|
||||||
|
disables the trigger actuator on all platforms and disables pan and tilt motion.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
21
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 2
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RTES PRIMARY/SECONDARY DIRECTION OF FIRE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Table A2.1. RTES Primary/Secondary Direction Of Fire.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Tower Primary Secondary RTES
|
||||||
|
Direction Direction Of Fire Coverage
|
||||||
|
Of Fire
|
||||||
|
Tower 1, V1AA N/A Towers 2&3
|
||||||
|
Platform 1
|
||||||
|
Tower 1, Golf N/A Towers 2&3
|
||||||
|
Platform 5 Sector
|
||||||
|
Tower 2, V2 N/A Towers 1&3
|
||||||
|
Platform 7
|
||||||
|
Tower 2, Foxtrot N/A Towers 1&3
|
||||||
|
Platform 6 Sector
|
||||||
|
Tower 3, V8 N/A Towers 1&2
|
||||||
|
Platform 3
|
||||||
|
Tower 3, Hotel N/A Towers 1&2
|
||||||
|
Platform 2 Sector
|
||||||
|
Loading Dock V5 B1&B2 REC 8
|
||||||
|
REC 4
|
||||||
|
Loading Dock V6 B1&B2 REC 4
|
||||||
|
REC 8
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
22
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TOUCH SCREEN ICONS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Figure A3.1. Touch Screen Indicators.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
23
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TOUCH SCREEN INDICATORS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Figure A4.1. Touch Screen Indicators.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
24
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 5
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION/WORK ORDER PRIORITY LISTING
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Table 5.1. Equipment Malfunction/Work Order Priority Listing
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Equipment Malfunction Notes P1 P2 P3
|
||||||
|
1 Failed Hardware Test X
|
||||||
|
Error on system displayed on a single Operator Console w/o a
|
||||||
|
2 weapons platform degrade X
|
||||||
|
3 All Operator consoles INOP X
|
||||||
|
4 SEDS Console X
|
||||||
|
5 Single Weapons Platform INOP 1 X
|
||||||
|
6 All Weapons Platforms INOP 1 X
|
||||||
|
7 Remote Duress Disable (RDD) Switch X
|
||||||
|
8 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) X
|
||||||
|
9 Targeting cameras inoperative (Scope, Wide Angle, Thermal) 1 X
|
||||||
|
10 Platform camera inoperative X
|
||||||
|
11 Trainer Console/Server/Weapons Platform X
|
||||||
|
12 Trainer Console/Server X
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
NOTE 1: CA will respond when requested by CTS/ESS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
25
|
||||||
|
ATTACMENT 6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION/COMPENSATORY MEASURES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Table A6.1. (DCNI) Equipment Malfunction/Compensatory Measures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Equipment Malfunction Notes
|
||||||
|
1 Failed Hardware Test 1
|
||||||
|
2 Error on system displayed on a single Operator Console 1
|
||||||
|
3 All Operator consoles INOP 0
|
||||||
|
4 SEDS Console 0
|
||||||
|
5 Single Weapons Platform INOP 0
|
||||||
|
6 All Weapons Platforms INOP 0
|
||||||
|
7 RDD Switch 0
|
||||||
|
8 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) 0
|
||||||
|
9 Targeting cameras inoperative (Scope, Wide Angle, Thermal) 0
|
||||||
|
10 Platform camera inoperative 0
|
||||||
|
11 Trainer Console/Server/Weapons Platform 0
|
||||||
|
12 Trainer Console/Server 0
|
||||||
|
13 Simulator PTZ INOP 0
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
NOTE 0: No Compensatory Measures required.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
NOTE 1: Utilize the other RTES Operator Console already manned by Romeo-1/2.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
26
|
||||||
68
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS Duty Descriptions.md
Normal file
68
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS Duty Descriptions.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) 377 WSSS Duty Descriptions
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377 WSSS Duty Descriptions
|
||||||
|
(For Official Use Only)
|
||||||
|
RFL:
|
||||||
|
- Protects $5.9 billion in resources at Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex (KUMMSC)
|
||||||
|
- Responsible for the security of $2.9 billion worth of Air Base Wing Protection Level aircraft vital to national security
|
||||||
|
- Performs security checks of responsible locks/doors/alarm systems to identify evidence of tampering or forced entry
|
||||||
|
- Searches vehicles, challenges/identifies/detains unauthorized individuals w/in responsible controlled/restricted areas
|
||||||
|
SCAM:
|
||||||
|
- Secures Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex limited/exclusion areas; $5.9B PL1 assets
|
||||||
|
- Operates $6.5M Advanced Entry Control System (AECS); implements strict access controls for all two-person areas
|
||||||
|
- Monitors/operates facility cameras; documents all sensor alarm data; initiates and tracks alarm & facility work orders
|
||||||
|
- Implements applicable facility/alarm compensatory measures; completes appropriate checklists/notification matrices
|
||||||
|
FC and Assistant FC:
|
||||||
|
- Supervises 54 Airmen; responsible for securing $5.9B PL-1 assets/$134.8M PL-3 aircraft/$11M SDTD PL-3 facilities
|
||||||
|
- On-Scene Commander for Security Incidents/contingencies/DoE PL-1 Security Transports & TACAMO acft missions
|
||||||
|
- Executed SECAF-CSAF- directed NSI oversight insps f/nuclear-capable units & all MAJCOM IG Inspection Teams
|
||||||
|
- Provided oversight of SAF/IG exercises, policies & guidance; ensures security compliance f/$485B AF-wide assets
|
||||||
|
SCS:
|
||||||
|
- Provides C2 for 57 Airman securing $5.9B in PL1/PL2 assets/$134.8M in PL3 aircraft f/7 controlled/5 restricted areas
|
||||||
|
- Oversees all access controls for Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex two person areas
|
||||||
|
- On-duty liaison with 898 MUNS/58 SOW/150 FW/377 ABW for all security matters; ensuring checklist compliance
|
||||||
|
- Authors daily security blotter; oversees PRP suspensions/re-instatements; makes timely notifications to senior lders
|
||||||
|
KEC:
|
||||||
|
- Secures Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex limited/exclusion areas; $5.9B PL1 assets
|
||||||
|
- Conducts changeover; accounts for keys, visitor badges, verification badges and EALs; function tests X-ray machines
|
||||||
|
- Performs strict access controls to PL1 areas; validates credentials; searches hand-carried items, vehicles & personnel
|
||||||
|
- Executes daily PRP suspensions, re-instatements; initiates Security Incidents and completes all applicable checklists
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Area Supervisor:
|
||||||
|
- Secures Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex & two-person area; $5.9B PL1 resources
|
||||||
|
- Supervises sec response force; oversees changeover actions; inspects equipment, weapons, vehicles/conducts checks
|
||||||
|
- Conducts daily proficiency exercises for SSCC & patrols; oversees limited & two-person access controls procedures
|
||||||
|
- Oversees DoE PL1N Secure Transport msns; leads Security Incident responses; executes emergency entry operations
|
||||||
|
RFM:
|
||||||
|
- Protects $5.9 billion in resources at Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex (KUMMSC)
|
||||||
|
- Provides circulation control for flight line restricted areas, base housing & $2.7B PL3 SPECOPS helos/fixed wing acft
|
||||||
|
- Responds to Security Incidents in two-person/restricted/controlled areas; conducts checks/RAMs for 11 PL 1-4 areas
|
||||||
|
- Conducts daily physical security inspections of topside controlled area; supports DoE Secure Transport PL 1 mission
|
||||||
|
NCOIC, ESS:
|
||||||
|
- Provides Electronic Security Systems management f/$6.5M Advanced Entry Control System deployed at KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
- Manages KUMMSC Intrusion Detection System false/nuisance alarms & ensures 100% DoD regulation compliance
|
||||||
|
- Ensures all software, hardware, policies, training and testing requirements associated w/AECS is conducted/complete
|
||||||
|
- Coordinates/Completes annual & quarterly IDS testing requirements for all deployed sensors/associated field devices
|
||||||
|
Flightline Constable:
|
||||||
|
- Ensures proper physical security standards are maintained and posting is in place for aircraft valued at > $2B dollars
|
||||||
|
- Coordinator for all flight line Restricted Area Entry Authority Lists and Restricted Area Photo Authorization Listings
|
||||||
|
- Protects $2.1B in PL1 resources at Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex (KUMMSC)
|
||||||
|
- Responsible for security of over $134.8 million worth of Protection Level 3 aircraft that are vital to national security
|
||||||
|
Operations Superintendent:
|
||||||
|
- Leads 315 SF performing PL1 and flight line msns on 52K acre base w/3 Wings, 150 msn partners & 21K personnel
|
||||||
|
- Oversees 7 distinct duty sections including AD & civilian staff fulfilling admin, operations & security support tasks
|
||||||
|
- Responsible f/$9M in vehicles & equipment across 36 posts/patrols to secure $5.9B in PL1 & $2.7B in PL2-3 assets
|
||||||
|
- Lead Wing security planner for all PL1/2/3 matters to include logistical movements, upgrade projects and exercises
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Remote Target Engagement System:
|
||||||
|
- Operates $15M Remote Target Engagement System (RTES); implements strict access to likely avenues of approach
|
||||||
|
- Protects $5.9 billion in resources at Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance & Storage Complex (KUMMSC)
|
||||||
|
- Responsible for providing final denial fire during contingency ops, deter unauthorized hostiles access to RA/LA/EA
|
||||||
|
- Performs visual inspection of RTES, ensuring no line breaks, exposed wires and all monitors/controls are functional
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Acronyms:
|
||||||
|
SI-Security Incident, EC-Entry Controller, RA-Restricted Area, CA-Controller Area, LA-Limited Area,
|
||||||
|
SGT-Safe Guard Transport
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(For Official Use Only)
|
||||||
658
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS SOP Volume 1, WSSS Operations.md
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export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS SOP Volume 1, WSSS Operations.md
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@ -0,0 +1,658 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) 377 WSSS SOP Volume 1, WSSS Operations
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Table 1
|
||||||
|
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR
|
||||||
|
INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER WSSS SOP 31-101, Volume 1 377TH WEAPONS SYSTEM SECURITY SQUADRON (WSSS) 22 February 2018
|
||||||
|
KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE (AFGSC)
|
||||||
|
Security Forces
|
||||||
|
WSSS OPERATIONS
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
ACCESSIBILITY: This publication is only available directly from the OPR.
|
||||||
|
RELEASABILITY: Access to this publication is restricted: this publication is classified Department of Defense (DoD) Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information/For Official Use Only (DCNI/FOUO). This publication may not be released to foreign nationals; requests for accessibility must be approved by the OPR.
|
||||||
|
OPR: 377 WSSS/S3O Certified by: 377 WSSS/S3 (Capt Roberto J. Cornier)
|
||||||
|
Supersedes: 377 WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol 1, 19 December 2016 [Pages: 43]
|
||||||
|
This 377 WSSS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) implements AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense, AFMAN 31-108, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Security Manual and establishes guidance governing the authority, procedures, responsibilities, duties, guidance, standards, tasks and requirements for all WSSS operations. This SOP establishes procedures and requirements regarding flight duty positions, use of communications, duress/authentication responsibilities and training. This publication does not apply to Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) Units or to the Air National Guard (ANG). Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional’s chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm. See Attachment 1 for a Glossary of References and Supporting Information. The use of the name or mark of any specific manufacturer, commercial product, commodity, or service in this publication does not imply
|
||||||
|
endorsement by the Air Force.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Table of Contents
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 1: FLIGHT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
|
||||||
|
1.1. Overview ....................................................................................................................4
|
||||||
|
1.2. Flight Commander (FCC) and Flight Chief (FC) Administrative Functions..............4
|
||||||
|
1.3. FCC and FC SOPs .....................................................................................................4
|
||||||
|
1.4. Guardmount and Shift Change ...................................................................................5
|
||||||
|
1.5. FCC and FC Contingency Operating Procedures .......................................................9
|
||||||
|
1.6. Site Security Control Center (SSCC) .........................................................................9
|
||||||
|
1.7. Security Control Supervisor (SCS) Duties ...............................................................10
|
||||||
|
1.8. Activation and Relief Procedures for Alternate SSCC..............................................12
|
||||||
|
1.9. Security Controller (SC) Duties ...............................................................................12
|
||||||
|
1.10. Alarm Monitor (AM) Duties ..................................................................................13
|
||||||
|
1.11. KUMMSC Entry Control Point (ECP) Operations ................................................13
|
||||||
|
1.12. KUMMSC ECP Duties ..........................................................................................13
|
||||||
|
1.13. Area Supervisor (AS) .............................................................................................15
|
||||||
|
1.14. Response Force Leader (RFL)................................................................................16
|
||||||
|
1.15. Response Force Member (RFM) ............................................................................16
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 2: SECURITY FORCES (SF) COMMUNICATIONS
|
||||||
|
2.1. Overview ..................................................................................................................17
|
||||||
|
2.2. Procedures ................................................................................................................17
|
||||||
|
2.3. Radio Channels.........................................................................................................18
|
||||||
|
2.4. Duress and Authentication Procedures .....................................................................18
|
||||||
|
2.5. Duress Words ...........................................................................................................18
|
||||||
|
2.6. Authentication Codes ...............................................................................................19
|
||||||
|
2.7. Emergency Response Codes.....................................................................................19
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 3: KUMMSC CONTROLLED AREA (CA) OPERATIONS
|
||||||
|
3.1. Overview ..................................................................................................................21
|
||||||
|
3.2. KUMMSC Controlled Areas (CAs) ........................................................................ 21
|
||||||
|
3.3. Entry Requirements/Circulation Control ..................................................................22
|
||||||
|
3.4. Securing KUMMSC CAs .........................................................................................22
|
||||||
|
3.5. Compensatory Measures ..........................................................................................23
|
||||||
|
3.6. Unauthorized Individuals/Responding to Alarms in the CAs ..................................23
|
||||||
|
3.7. Key Control ..............................................................................................................23
|
||||||
|
3.8. Bomb Threat/Robbery and Evacuation Procedures ..................................................24
|
||||||
|
3.9. Emergency Response Entry/Egress ..........................................................................24
|
||||||
|
3.10. Emergency Response to Airfield and Runway.......................................................25
|
||||||
|
3.11. CA Training............................................................................................................25
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 4: SF TRAINING PROGRAM
|
||||||
|
4.1. Overview ..................................................................................................................26
|
||||||
|
4.2. Security Forces Education and Training Program (SFETP).....................................26
|
||||||
|
4.3. Security Forces Scheduling Program .......................................................................28
|
||||||
|
4.4. Security Forces Duty Officer Program (SFDO) .......................................................28
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 5: RECALL PROCEDURES
|
||||||
|
5.1. Overview ..................................................................................................................29
|
||||||
|
5.2. Definitions ...............................................................................................................29
|
||||||
|
5.3. Responsibilities.........................................................................................................29
|
||||||
|
5.4. Recall procedures .....................................................................................................29
|
||||||
|
5.5. Personnel Strength Procedures .................................................................................31
|
||||||
|
5.6. Communication Outage, Recall Procedures.............................................................31
|
||||||
|
6 ATTACHMENTS:
|
||||||
|
Attachment 1. Glossary of Reference and Supporting Information..................................32
|
||||||
|
Attachment 2. Security Force Response and Brevity Codes.............................................38
|
||||||
|
Attachment 3. WSSS Staff Call Signs ..............................................................................39
|
||||||
|
Attachment 4. CA Escort/Safety Briefing ........................................................................40
|
||||||
|
Attachment 5. Required Equipment .................................................................................41
|
||||||
|
Attachment 6. Standard Operating Procedure ..................................................................43
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 1
|
||||||
|
FLIGHT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
|
||||||
|
1.1. (DCNI) Overview. This chapter establishes the duties and responsibilities for Flight Commanders (FCC), Flight Chiefs (FC), Area Supervisors (AS), Security Control Supervisors (SCS), Security Controllers/Alarm Monitors (SCAM), Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance And Storage Complex (KUMMSC) Entry Controllers (KEC), Response Force Leaders (RFL) and Response Force Members (RFM) during normal security, contingencies and increased Force Protection Condition (FPCON) measures. It also outlines the procedures for conducting guardmount. FCCs and FCs are responsible for implementing the procedures contained herein.
|
||||||
|
1.2. Flight Commander (FCC) and Flight Chief (FC)
|
||||||
|
1.2.1. (DCNI) Flight Commander (FCC). When available, an officer will oversee the supervision and management of each shift. FCCs are responsible for the training, equipping, conduct and welfare of the flight both on and off duty. They are responsible for knowing each person assigned to the flight, especially their strengths and weaknesses. They work closely with the FC in handling time consuming and difficult problems of command interest. On-duty FCCs are the direct representatives of the 377 WSSS/CC. The intent is to have a commissioned officer on duty at all times in support of nuclear missions. When there is not a commissioned officer available for posting or assigned to the flight, a certified FC will take the position as the FCC and a subordinate NCO, certified in the Flight Chief position will assume the role as the FC. S3/S3O will maintain an on call roster of available commissioned officers.
|
||||||
|
1.2.2. (DCNI) Flight Chief (FC). FCs are also direct representatives of the 377 WSSS/CC. FCs are directly responsible to the FCC. FCs will ensure all assigned personnel are trained and equipped to accomplish security operations. FCs are also responsible for the conduct and welfare of all assigned flight personnel both on and off duty. They must know each person assigned to the flight, especially their strengths and weaknesses. They must be on the alert for adverse morale trends and take steps to correct all incorrect actions. A Duty Position Evaluation (DPE) certified FC will be on duty (armed and equipped) at all times. When there is not a certified FCC assigned or available, two certified FCs do not need to be posted. The certified FC will assume the role as FCC and a subordinate NCO, certified in the Flight Chief position will assume the FC in support of the FCC. While not required, it is desired that the subordinate NCO is FC certified.
|
||||||
|
1.3. FCC and FC Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
|
||||||
|
1.3.1. Ensure all critically certified posts are manned by certified personnel.
|
||||||
|
1.3.2. Ensure all personnel assigned as vehicle drivers are licensed and certified to operate their assigned Government Owned Vehicle (GOV). Additionally, ensure those personnel driving on the flightline have a current AF IMT 483, Certificate of
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Competency and a valid state issued driver’s license.
|
||||||
|
1.3.3. When vehicles and equipment shortages exist, FCCs and FCs are responsible for ensuring adequate distribution to achieve maximum effectiveness until the shortage can be corrected. All RF vehicles must be armored. RF and Initial Backup Force (IBF) vehicles should have off-road capability, working land mobile radio and, when possible, a working Public Address (PA) system or bullhorn.
|
||||||
|
1.3.4. Ensure operational deficiencies identified during your shift are reported to the appropriate office/agency and in the AF Form 53, Security Forces Blotter.
|
||||||
|
1.3.5. While in training for a critical certification position, uncertified individuals will be posted with a certified individual and under direct supervision at all times.
|
||||||
|
1.3.6. (FOUO) Duty rosters for all flights, convoys and PNAF posting will be produced utilizing the standardized excel spreadsheet. Each roster will maintain the required information via columns for Name, Call Sign or Post, Certifications held, required weapons for the corresponding post, required equipment necessary from the armory for corresponding post and radio number. Posting and weapons configurations will be listed on all duty rosters IAW the post priority chart contained within the IDP. Utilizing the excel spreadsheet allows for automatic generation of duty rosters once all pertinent information is loaded into the data table. Ensure the information in the spreadsheet remains current per the MQL, S3T and SFMQ certification rosters. Holiday duty rosters will use the same template to ensure certified/non-certified personnel are posted correctly. Contact S3O for questions or concerns regarding the duty roster excel spreadsheet.
|
||||||
|
1.4. Guardmount and Shift Change.
|
||||||
|
1.4.1. Prior to completing changeover, the on-coming and off-going FCC and/or FC will meet face-to-face and discuss any pass-ons, discrepancies within their area of responsibility (AOR), anticipated activities/operations and any other information deemed necessary.
|
||||||
|
1.4.1.1. Only SrA and above who have been properly trained and are authorized to bear firearms will conduct clearing barrel attendant duties. Clearing barrel
|
||||||
|
attendants’ training will be documented on the AF Form 797, Job Qualification Standard (JQS) and they must be knowledgeable of clearing procedures for all firearms loaded and unloaded at the clearing area. The clearing barrel attendant must not engage in any other duties or functions during the period of weapons handling. This requirement does not apply to personnel engaged in combat, weapons qualification training, or training exercises simulating combat.
|
||||||
|
1.4.2. (DCNI) All posts are subject to inspection of their equipment, bags etc. prior to
|
||||||
|
Guardmount IAW the 377 SFG Checklist to ensure unauthorized items cannot be introduced
|
||||||
|
into the limited area. Ten percent (10%) of posted members will be selected for equipment
|
||||||
|
inspections per shift, and ALL posted members will be inspected as a whole, at least once
|
||||||
|
per 2-week cycle. Additionally, all KUMMSC security and support forces will process all
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
hand-carried items to include their equipment, bags, etc. through the X-ray machine at the ECP, and proceed through the metal detector.
|
||||||
|
1.4.2.1. Upon discovery of missing or damaged equipment, items must be replaced as soon as reasonably possible. Immediately coordinate with SSPTS/S4 personnel to facilitate replacement and accomplish an AF Form 1168, Statement of Suspect/Witness/Complaint to cover explanations for the loss or damage.
|
||||||
|
1.4.3. (DCNI) The FCC and/or FC will conduct guardmount for each shift. All personnel will be present at the KUMMSC armory with sufficient time to facilitate weapons issue prior to guardmount.
|
||||||
|
1.4.4. During guardmount determine the readiness of personnel, to include their appearance and mental and physical condition. Ensure personnel are properly equipped and trained. Conduct roll call, announcements, security status briefing, weapons inspection and post assignments. Open ranks inspection should occur at least once per work cycle and be annotated in the security blotter.
|
||||||
|
1.4.4.1. FCC and FC will comply with and ensure uniformity of all personnel. Refer to 377 WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol 1, WSSS Operations, Attachment 5 for required, standardized and authorized wear of equipment/gear.
|
||||||
|
1.4.4.2. Aircrew patches will be displayed on the front Velcro panel of the IOTV or plate carrier. Aircrew patches will have the Security Forces badge, Name, Rank and USAF embroidered on it only.
|
||||||
|
1.4.4.3. Flight patches must be approved by 377 WSSS/S3 or 377 WSSS/S3O in writing and will be worn on the IOTV or plate carrier on the Velcro molle attachment on the back just under the drag handle. Do not wear unapproved patches on either the ABU, OCP uniform, IOTV or plate carrier.
|
||||||
|
1.4.4.4. Airman Battle Shirt (ABS) offers flame-resistant protection and exceptional comfort under armor. Wear of the ABS must be with either an ABU blouse, IOTV or plate carrier on over the ABS at all times. At no time will an ABS be worn without one of the aforementioned outerwear over it (i.e. at the BX, Shoppette, Dining Facility, etc.). Additionally, a Velcro nametape and rank patch will be worn on the right sleeve.
|
||||||
|
1.4.4.5. Morale T-shirts are authorized and encouraged, but must be worn IAW AFI 36-2903, Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
1.4.5. If available, use the S3OS “Controlled Guardmount Slides” to ensure required items are briefed at guardmount. If guardmount slides are unavailable ensure all requirements are briefed IAW AFI 31-118, Security Forces Standards and Procedures.
|
||||||
|
1.4.6. Check all personnel for signs of alcohol use or other indicators identifying an individual may be unfit for duty.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.7. Conduct Pre-AUoF Duty Briefing as designated by the SFG/AUoF Office.
|
||||||
|
1.4.8. Prior to going on break, brief all personnel on break safety consisting of; travel outside the local area, driving while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, etc.
|
||||||
|
1.4.9. Immediately upon assuming post, ensure all posts and patrols conduct a security status and communication check with SSCC.
|
||||||
|
1.4.10. Ensure a joint post inspection is conducted involving both on-coming and off- going personnel. This inspection will include a check of their assigned vehicle (if applicable), status of post supplies and cleanliness of their post. If applicable to a specific post, the post changeover/accountability checklist will be included in the SSIs and will be used. If possible, all identified discrepancies will be corrected prior to relief. Those not corrected will be annotated in the blotter. 377 WSSS/S4V will be immediately notified of any vehicle discrepancies. Ensure all AF Form 1168s are completed by all personnel involved when discrepancies not previously detected are discovered. Statements will be forwarded to S3OS and S4V.
|
||||||
|
1.4.10.1. If a vehicle is determined to be damaged by accident or vandalism, the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) will be contacted for processing and an SF Vehicle Accident report will be initiated.
|
||||||
|
1.4.11. (FOUO) FCCs and FCs will conduct post checks on each post and patrol once per shift, unless daily operations prevent it. Post checks will evaluate duty performance, general and specific job knowledge, attitude, behavior and morale. At a minimum the following will be checked:
|
||||||
|
1.4.11.1. Vehicles for condition and cleanliness and documentation via AF Form 1800, Operator’s Inspection Guide and Trouble Report.
|
||||||
|
1.4.11.2. Work areas for cleanliness, serviceability and equipment.
|
||||||
|
1.4.11.3. Ensure security force members have appropriate equipment and standardization of gear (i.e. rank/name tapes on combat shirts/plate carriers).
|
||||||
|
1.4.11.4. Ensure security force members are knowledgeable of the job required, post briefings, response procedures, etc. Check post SSIs for accuracy and serviceability and inform S5 of any discrepancies.
|
||||||
|
1.4.12. (FOUO) Each flight will conduct at least one (1) flight-level exercise per shift, at least one (1) RF and final denial exercise per cycle, and one (1) IBF exercise per cycle. Be knowledgeable of RF employment, weaponry, armament and special equipment.
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.1. (DCNI) Security exercises will be tailored to the local Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment (NSTCA) and conducted in a safe manner. Document each exercise in the blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.2. The following security exercises should be conducted on a random basis at least once per shift:
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.2.1. (FOUO) Flight Level Exercise. Flight Commanders or Flight Chiefs/SF Supervisors will conduct daily (minimum of one) flight level exercises.
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.2.2. (FOUO) Proficiency Exercises. SF supervisors (i.e. Area Supervisors) will conduct daily (minimum of one per station) proficiency exercises for ESS operators at local, redundant, and remote security system locations.
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.3. (FOUO) A minimum of one of the following security exercises will be conducted on a random basis throughout a work cycle:
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.3.1. (FOUO) RF Configuration Exercise 1.4.12.3.2. (FOUO) Emergency Response Exercise 1.4.12.3.3. (FOUO) Recapture and Recovery Exercise
|
||||||
|
NOTE: Work Cycle is defined as the days a flight works between breaks. (i.e. Work: Monday/Tuesday, Break: Wednesday/Thursday; the flight’s cycle would be the corresponding Monday/Tuesday or days worked)
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.4. (FOUO) The following security exercises will be conducted on a random basis at least once a month:
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.4.1. (FOUO) IBF Configuration Exercise 1.4.12.4.2. (FOUO) Final Denial Exercise 1.4.12.4.3. (FOUO) Flight line Detection Exercise
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.5. The following security exercises are types of exercises that can be implemented for daily, cycle, or monthly exercises:
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.5.1. (FOUO) Unauthorized Individual Entering the Restricted Area.
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.5.2. (FOUO) Unauthorized Entry into Two-Person Area.
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.5.3. (FOUO) Unplanned Power Outage.
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.5.4. (FOUO) Helicopter Denial. 1.4.12.5.5. (FOUO) Emergency Response (ER). 1.4.12.5.6. (FOUO) Definite threat at the ECP.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.5.7. (FOUO) IBF Response.
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.5.8. (FOUO) ECP Entry Denial.
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.5.9. (FOUO) Overt Attack with IBF Response.
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.5.10. (FOUO) Controlled Area Alarms
|
||||||
|
1.4.12.5.11. (FOUO) Partial and Total Radio Outage (Communication Loss)
|
||||||
|
1.5. FCC and FC Contingency Operating Procedures.
|
||||||
|
1.5.1. (FOUO) FCC, FC and/or appropriate AS will respond to all Security Incidents or Covered Wagon situations to assume on-scene command and oversee resolution of the incident. The flightline External Security Response Team (ESRT) will respond immediately to all incidents on the flightline not to exceed five (5) minutes and assume initial on-scene command until the arrival of FCC or FC.
|
||||||
|
1.5.2. (FOUO) Termination authority for a Security Incident is the on-duty FCC and/or FC. The termination authority for a Covered Wagon is the 377th Air Base Wing Commander (ABW/CC) through Kirtland Command Post (KCP).
|
||||||
|
1.5.3. (DCNI) The FCC and/or FC will meet all arriving REFLEX DELTA (RD) aircraft, obtain and authenticate crew orders as an Entry Authority List (EAL) and oversee implementation of all appropriate security measures.
|
||||||
|
1.5.4. (DCNI) Flight leadership will meet with the TCC (Tactical Convoy Commander) at the golf course for DoE SGT (Safeguard Transport) missions to act as a liaison for the command element until the mission is complete. In addition, if an incident occurs within KUMMSC, the on duty FC/FCC will be on-scene commander and if an incident occurs topside, DoE will be the on-scene commander.
|
||||||
|
1.6. Site Security Control Center (SSCC).
|
||||||
|
1.6.1. (DCNI) SSCC and Munitions Control (MC) are the command and control centers for all operations involving KUMMSC. During normal operations, all three (3) certified security controllers will remain within the confines of the SSCC. However, the SCS may enter MC during contingencies, e.g., to get the command codes, when necessary to meet mission requirements and perform emergency function such as opening the Cubical Unlocking Device (CUD) box, and checking KUMMSC Power Box in MC.
|
||||||
|
1.6.2. The security positions (SCS, SC/AM) are considered critical and require formal certification by the 377 SFG Standardization and Evaluation (SFG/SFMQ) section and completion of local AECS training conducted by WSSS/S3S prior to performing duties.
|
||||||
|
1.6.3. (DCNI) Unescorted Entry: All on-duty flight, SF staff personnel and senior squadron leadership are authorized unescorted entry into SSCC. On duty SF will not
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
assume escort duties. SF staff personnel and senior squadron leadership may also escort personnel into SSCC. All other personnel requesting entry into SSCC must possess a valid AF 1199, Computer Generated Restricted Area Badge, and have a valid reason for entry. The valid reason will be determined by senior squadron leadership, FCC/FC or SCS prior to entering.
|
||||||
|
1.6.4. (FOUO) Escorted Entry: The SCS will verify the need for entry. There will be no more than six (6) personnel (including SF personnel) within SSCC at one time unless approved by the SCS.
|
||||||
|
1.7. SCS Duties. The SCS will:
|
||||||
|
1.7.1. Be responsible for overall supervision of personnel posted in SSCC. They will keep senior flight leadership and squadron leadership advised of all security matters.
|
||||||
|
1.7.2. Act as a liaison between MC and SSCC and ensure all problems are resolved by the respective squadrons.
|
||||||
|
1.7.3. (FOUO) Direct SF during normal and emergency operations. Operate communication consoles and equipment and ensure security communications checks of
|
||||||
|
all on-duty security forces (including SSPTS/KUMMSC armorer) are conducted randomly not to exceed every 30 minutes.
|
||||||
|
1.7.4. (FOUO) Utilize the security reporting and alerting system to up-channel the appropriate reports (Security Incident/Covered Wagon, etc.) to the KCP.
|
||||||
|
1.7.5. Ensure locations of all security forces and resources, (i.e. aircraft) are plotted on the plotting board within SSCC and BDOC. SSCC will contact BDOC with all aircraft plots at shift change and notify them of any changes during shift.
|
||||||
|
1.7.6. Implement QRCs (Quick Reaction Checklist) and ensure all required notifications are made in accordance with the notification matrix located within the SSCC. Note: The SCS or SC/AM will make all required notifications.
|
||||||
|
1.7.7. Ensure two-person areas and blast door opening/closing procedures are strictly adhered to.
|
||||||
|
1.7.8. Be knowledgeable of procedures for the Safeguard Transport/Remote Control Unit (SGT/RCU), as written in the Installation Defense Plan (IDP) Appendix 3 to Annex Z.
|
||||||
|
1.7.9. (FOUO) Conduct duress checks with BDOC, ECP, MC, WSSS Armory and SF Armory. Ensure that the BDOC re-enables MC, SCS, and SC/AM upon completion of the testing with a minimum of a 5 second delay between enabling. Maintain constant communication with all control centers during the entire test. Annotate checks in the SF blotter. Duress checks will be accomplished as soon as possible after conducting changeover; however, duress checks will be a secondary priority during actual
|
||||||
|
contingencies or other day-to-day operations (weapons issue/turn-in) that prevent these checks from being accomplished. The reason for delay in conducting duress checks does
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
not have to be annotated in the SF blotter provided they are conducted immediately after termination of the delay.
|
||||||
|
1.7.10. (FOUO) Annotate AUoF/PRP changes made during the shift in the blotter. Follow the appropriate QRC pertaining to AUoF/PRP actions. This includes suspension, permanent decertification, and Discrete Control Area (DCA) changes and reinstatements. The Local form 164, Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Notification and Removal Log, will be verified against AECS while completing all AUoF/PRP changes. Ensure the Local form 164 is updated accordingly. Note: Use notification matrix for AUoF/PRP suspension/reinstatements. Personnel in training for SCS may take AUoF/PRP notifications with a certified SCS assisting and verifying.
|
||||||
|
1.7.11. Conduct area purge verification at the end of the shift. This will be done by checking all MUNS pre-notes and work areas, having the KUMMSC Entry Controller (KEC) verify the AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log, and account for all visitor badges. Once verification of all nonessential personnel has been completed, annotate in the blotter.
|
||||||
|
1.7.12. Ensure that before personnel enter the exclusion area, SF members conduct a purge of the interlock behind B-7 or B-14 with the SVA (acting as the Entry Controller) to ensure the area is ready to accept assets. Personnel with unescorted access and their hand- carried items will be subject to inspection upon entering or exiting the exclusion area by the SVA. All escorted personnel and their hand-carried items will be inspected upon entering and exiting the exclusion area. Escorted personnel and selected unescorted personnel will be placed into a hold area just outside the exclusion area. SF personnel will conduct an inspection of personnel via transfrisker or hand search and an inspection of
|
||||||
|
individuals’ hand-carried items. After personnel have been inspected, the SVA will validate the individuals on the EAL and they will proceed to the cleared area.
|
||||||
|
1.7.13. Ensure an Exclusion Verification List (EVL) check is conducted at the beginning of each shift and/or after the MUNS end of duty day check. Ensure this check is annotated in the blotter.
|
||||||
|
1.7.14. Day Flight SCS will ensure the Topside Area Supervisor (AS) conducts a physical security inspection of the topside controlled area. Ensure all discrepancies are annotated in the SF blotter and notifications are made to S3.
|
||||||
|
1.7.15. Mid Flight SCS will ensure a topside patrol conducts a lighting check of the topside controlled area. They will also ensure the ECP conducts a lighting check of the loading dock. The Topside AS will conduct a physical security inspection of the topside controlled area. All flightline patrols will conduct a lighting check of their area of responsibility. The Flightline Area Supervisor will check Pad-5. Ensure all discrepancies are annotated in the blotter and notifications are made to the Flightline Constable or Physical Security Monitor.
|
||||||
|
1.7.16. (DCNI) Ensure an ISRT physically conducts four (4) hour checks of blast doors B-7/B-14 and the MUNS Armory. A blotter entry is required. Note: Closed Circuit Television/Immediate Visual Assessment (CCTV/ IVA) is not sufficient.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.7.17. (DCNI) Notify S3O utilizing the notification matrix when you receive any mission information (SGT/PNAF/RD) from MUNS or KCP.
|
||||||
|
1.7.18. Ensure expired EALs are removed and forwarded to S5 or shredded NLT the next duty day.
|
||||||
|
1.7.19. Know all permanent deviations, technical deviations and temporary deviations affecting restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
1.8. Activation and Relief Procedures for Alternate SSCC.
|
||||||
|
1.8.1. (DCNI) Upon activation of the Alternate SSCC (located in the BDOC) during an emergency or increased FPCON to Charlie or higher, one (1) certified SC/AM or SCS will be posted at BDOC. Upon posting, or if the situation lasts long enough that relief is required, the on-coming controller assuming duties will ensure changeover is completed upon assuming post.
|
||||||
|
1.9. SC Duties.
|
||||||
|
1.9.1. Direct SF during normal and emergency security operations.
|
||||||
|
1.9.2. Review all paperwork (AF Form 340, Sensor Alarm Data and AFTO Form 781A, Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document) for accuracy and ensure an adequate quantity is available for the upcoming shift.
|
||||||
|
1.9.3. If required, ensure an AF Form 340 is accomplished to record all sensor alarm data received in SSCC.
|
||||||
|
1.9.4. Operate communications consoles and equipment.
|
||||||
|
1.9.5. Control the radio net and dispatch all forces as required in all QRCs. Plot post/patrol locations for all responses.
|
||||||
|
1.9.6. (FOUO) Conduct a security status/communications check with all post and patrols not to exceed 30 minutes including the 377 SSPTS/KUMMSC armorer.
|
||||||
|
1.9.7. Update the aircraft plotting boards with on-coming flightline patrols, to reflect the location of all priority aircraft, tail number and type of aircraft in each area. Include the aircraft located in the all hangars. Updates will be made as required thereafter.
|
||||||
|
1.9.8. Obtain the current vehicle status and mileage of all SF vehicles being operated at KUMMSC and the flightline area at the beginning of each shift. Ensure this information is annotated on the blotter back page and notify S4V of any discrepancies.
|
||||||
|
1.9.9. (DCNI) Ensure adequate compensatory measures are implemented in case of failures, malfunctions or emergencies. Know all permanent deviations, technical deviations and temporary deviations in effect at KUMMSC. Ensure only the fact that compensatory measures are initiated is annotated in the blotter and not the actual
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
compensatory measure itself.
|
||||||
|
1.9.10. Use the appropriate QRCs for every security situation.
|
||||||
|
1.10. AM Duties.
|
||||||
|
1.10.1. If required, ensure an AF Form 340 is accomplished to record all sensor alarm data received in SSCC.
|
||||||
|
1.10.2. Each shift’s AM will ensure the EVL is accomplished reflecting the status of the cubicles and maintenance bays.
|
||||||
|
1.10.3. Ensure adequate compensatory measures are implemented in case of failures, malfunctions or emergencies and annotated in the blotter.
|
||||||
|
1.10.4. Know all permanent deviations, technical deviations and temporary deviations affecting restricted, limited and exclusion areas.
|
||||||
|
1.10.5. Monitor the CCTV system and blast door openings/closings.
|
||||||
|
1.10.6. (DCNI) Control entry into the two-person areas. Note: When personnel depart the bay areas at any time, ensure all sensor fields are secure. Do not allow the two- person team to depart the area until a valid alarm reset is achieved. Verify with the SVA that a stay behind threat check was completed and ensure the SRT conducts a joint accountability for personnel in the interlock to counter the stay behind threat.
|
||||||
|
1.10.7. (DCNI) Verify, initiate and track all work orders affecting KUMMSC with MC via the AFTO Form 781A prior to relief. All new AFTO Form 781As must be coordinated with S3S.
|
||||||
|
1.11. KUMMSC Entry Control Point (ECP) Operations.
|
||||||
|
1.11.1. (DCNI) The EC controls entry/exit to and from KUMMSC. The minimum required manning for the ECP is two (2) certified KUMMSC Entry Controllers (KECs). The FCC and/or FC will designate the individual with supervisory command/control for ECP operations via duty roster. Normally, one (1) EC within the ECP monitors the CCTV, AECS, x-ray monitor and communication equipment. The second EC processes personnel and vehicles.
|
||||||
|
1.11.2. The EC is considered a critical duty position and completion of local AECS training/Duty Position Evaluation (DPE) prior to performing duties is required.
|
||||||
|
1.12. KUMMSC ECP Duties.
|
||||||
|
1.12.1. Deny unauthorized access of personnel and/or items into the limited/exclusion area. NOTE: Refer to Enclosure 3 To Tab A To Appendix 1 To Annex Z To KAFB IDP 31-101. Protection Level 1 Restricted Area Entry and Circulation Control.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.12.2. (FOUO) Up-channel alarm activation/Security Incidents/Covered Wagon situation(s) to appropriate office (SSCC/BDOC/KCP) and initiate ECP lockdown as needed.
|
||||||
|
1.12.3. If required, ensure an AF Form 340 is accomplished to record all sensor alarm data received in the ECP.
|
||||||
|
1.12.4. When scanning inbound/outbound hand-carried items, ensure all items are identified. Verify inspectable items via x-ray. If items cannot be identified, reverse the x-ray machine and have the owner and EC hand search the item.
|
||||||
|
1.12.5. (DCNI) Items such as electronic circuit boards or unusual looking tools will be closely scrutinized and treated as a possible threat until further investigation. Contact MC for authorization and clarification of questionable items entering/departing KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
1.12.6. Limited Area Screening Procedures. All escorted personnel and their hand-
|
||||||
|
carried items will be inspected upon entering and exiting KUMMSC limited area. This
|
||||||
|
will be done utilizing the walk through magnetometers and x-ray machines. If the
|
||||||
|
magnetometers and/or x-ray machines are inoperative or not available, utilize handheld
|
||||||
|
transfriskers on all personnel and hand search all hand-carried items. Upon the first metal
|
||||||
|
detector alarm activation, direct individual to remove and identify all items causing the
|
||||||
|
alarm. After EC identifies all items, instruct the individual to reprocess through the metal
|
||||||
|
detector. If an individual fails the second attempt through the metal detector, the EC will
|
||||||
|
use the transfrisker.
|
||||||
|
1.12.7. (DCNI) All individuals granted unescorted entry authority and their hand carried
|
||||||
|
items will be subjected to search upon entering the limited area by processing their hand
|
||||||
|
carried items through the x-ray machine and walk through the magnetometers. A security
|
||||||
|
measure will be in place to subject those individuals granted unescorted entry authority and
|
||||||
|
their hand carried items to inspection for readily detectable prohibited materials and
|
||||||
|
contraband items upon exiting the KUMMSC limited area by conducting one 30 minute
|
||||||
|
outbound inspection of selected personnel and their hand carried items, per 8 hour shift.
|
||||||
|
During 12 hour shifts, conduct two 30 minute outbound inspections of selected personnel
|
||||||
|
and their hand carried items.
|
||||||
|
1.12.8. Conduct thorough searches of vehicles entering KUMMSC. Note: Ensure the driver completes all personnel entry procedures (i.e. metal detector, RAB/Pin/Bio) before returning to vehicle before entry into loading dock.
|
||||||
|
1.12.9. Ensure an up to date Local form 164 is maintained in the ECP.
|
||||||
|
1.12.10. If Entry Controllers discover an AF 1199, Restricted Area Badge (RAB) during screening procedures that cannot be distinguished (i.e. faded photograph or information scratched off), that is damaged which affects the badge’s functionality, or otherwise unserviceable, the bearer will not be granted unescorted entry into the Limited Area.
|
||||||
|
1.12.11. Ensure entry requirements are met for the escort official/escortee(s).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.12.12. Ensure escort briefing is given in the presence of a certified EC prior to allowing entry into the limited area.
|
||||||
|
1.12.13. Ensure, prior to raising a barrier, an on scene patrol advises appropriate control center the barrier is clear from any vehicle traffic/obstruction.
|
||||||
|
1.12.13.1. (FOUO) During RF or IBF responses, ensure the responding patrol verifies their status with SSCC prior to having barriers dropped for responding patrols.
|
||||||
|
1.12.14.(DCNI) Escortees will not be allowed to drive vehicles into the KUMMSC restricted area.
|
||||||
|
1.12.15. Record entry and exit times of escortee(s) on AF FM 1109 and retrieve Visitor Badge from escortee(s) upon exit.
|
||||||
|
1.12.16.(FOUO) Unannounced Emergency Vehicles. Should an unannounced emergency vehicle arrive at V1AA, the ECP will immediately contact SSCC to verify the emergency. SSCC will dispatch a patrol to V1AA to stand-by. On-duty security forces must verify an emergency condition exists prior to allowing entry. Note: Entry will not be allowed based upon emergency lights and sirens alone. Once the emergency is confirmed, emergency entry procedures apply.
|
||||||
|
1.12.17. Notify SSCC of situations requiring work orders.
|
||||||
|
1.12.18. In the event of an AECS failure, the KECP will process all personnel using the MRABL.
|
||||||
|
1.12.19.1. EC will:
|
||||||
|
1.12.19.1.1. Collect personnel’s RAB and CAC.
|
||||||
|
1.12.19.1.2. Verify the individuals RAB and CAC with the MRABL and Local form 164. Once all methods of identification are verified the individual will be granted entry.
|
||||||
|
1.13. Area Supervisor (AS).
|
||||||
|
1.13.1. Area Supervisors consist of the Topside Area Supervisor, Underground Area Supervisor and Flightline Area Supervisor. The AS will provide command/control during emergency operations and initiate special functions when applicable.
|
||||||
|
1.13.1.1. Ensure Daily Visual Inspections (DVI)/Physical Security Inspections (PSI) are conducted in accordance with the S5/PSI checklist found in all AS SSIs. These checks are to be conducted every shift and annotated in the blotter.
|
||||||
|
1.13.1.2. Area Supervisors are responsible for conducting post checks, equipment checks and exercises as required.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1.13.2. (DCNI) When Department of Energy (DoE) personnel arrive at V1AA, the Topside AS will make contact with the DoE Convoy Commander, verify his/her credentials against the provided DoE Courier Listing (DCL) authenticated by a SF E-5 or above, located in the Topside AS SSIs. Ensure the DoE Convoy Commander vouches for security of all personnel and vehicles prior to granting entry. If the DoE Convoy Commander is not listed within the DCL, have SSCC verify identity through MC and/or DoE control centers.
|
||||||
|
1.14. Response Force Leader (RFL).
|
||||||
|
1.14.1 (DCNI) Respond to any controlled/limited area alarms/incidents within the Squadron Operations building, Utility Building (UB), KUMMSC, and/or the flightline. Squadron Operations alarm points are the SF Armory, C2B, F1 and the Enrollment Center. ISRT/ESRT response times are as follows:
|
||||||
|
1.14.1.1. (DCNI) ISRT: Immediate response not to exceed 3 minutes.
|
||||||
|
1.14.1.2. (DCNI) ESRT: Immediate response not to exceed 5 minutes.
|
||||||
|
1.14.2. (DCNI) Respond to all exclusion area alarms/incidents. Response time is met once IVA is obtained via CCTV and underground ISRT is in place at the low side of the appropriate blast door (B-7/B-14/B-15).
|
||||||
|
1.15. Response Force Member (RFM).
|
||||||
|
1.15.1. (DCNI) Respond to any controlled/restricted/limited area alarms/incidents within the Squadron Operations building, Utility Building (UB), KUMMSC, and/or the flightline as a fire team member. Squadron Operations alarm points are the SF Armory, C2B, F1 and the Enrollment Center. The member must respond within the established response time and follow the command of the response force leader.
|
||||||
|
1.15.2. (DCNI) Respond to all exclusion area alarms/incidents. Response time is met once IVA is obtained via CCTV and underground ISRT is in place at the low side of the
|
||||||
|
appropriate blast door (B-7/B-14/B-15).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 2
|
||||||
|
SECURITY FORCES (SF) COMMUNICATIONS
|
||||||
|
2.1. (FOUO) Overview. The SF communications system consists of base stations within SSCC, ECP, BDOC and Alternate BDOC (Bldg #20452, SSPTS) as well as portable radios, vehicle radios, underground intercom system, landlines and manual signal techniques. The SSCC is the command and control center for all security activities. All personnel assigned SF duties are required to become knowledgeable and comply with the contents of this chapter.
|
||||||
|
2.2. (FOUO) Procedures. The primary means of communication are two-way radios. Landlines and intercom are secondary means of communication. Manual signal techniques will be used as alternate means of communication when necessary or possible. The following procedures will be used when operating a SF radio:
|
||||||
|
2.2.1. Obscene or unprofessional language will not be tolerated. Use concise and professional speech.
|
||||||
|
2.2.2. Use proper SF response and brevity codes IAW Attachment 2 or Job Knowledge book.
|
||||||
|
2.2.3. Prior to transmitting to another post and/or unit, request “Direct” communications from SSCC unless otherwise directed by SSCC during actual/exercise contingencies.
|
||||||
|
2.2.4. (DCNI) 377 SFS personnel dispatched to assist the KUMMSC security forces will switch to channel “8” and advise SSCC of their status and intention to fall under SSCC operational control.
|
||||||
|
2.2.5. Before departing one net to begin transmitting on another, users are required to obtain permission from the respective control center (either SSCC or BDOC).
|
||||||
|
2.2.6. (FOUO) The appropriate control center will initiate a passive duress on a post or patrol failing to answer the radio after three (3) attempts. The duress will be announced using the term “Code 15”, followed by the call sign of the post or patrol under duress. This is only a passive duress, but should be treated with the same degree of importance as an active duress.
|
||||||
|
2.2.7. (FOUO) No one will transmit using a two-way radio or any electronic transmitting device such as a cell phone, within 10 feet of a Protection Level 1 (PL1) resource. No one will transmit using a vehicle mounted radio within 25 feet of a PL1 resource. If a transmission within unauthorized distances occurs, report the occurrence to 377 ABW Safety (SEW) as soon as possible.
|
||||||
|
2.2.8. (FOUO) Unless approved by S3 office, mobile phones are not authorized on post and will not be used for the transmission of sensitive information during security forces responses.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2.3. (FOUO) Radio Channels. There are 10 different radio channels associated with the SF communications system (see Table 2.1. below).
|
||||||
|
Table 2.1. (FOUO) Radio Channels
|
||||||
|
Channel #1 LE-1 Primary Police Services
|
||||||
|
Channel #2 LE-2 Secondary for Police Services
|
||||||
|
Channel #3 SP-1 N/A
|
||||||
|
Channel #4 SP-2 N/A
|
||||||
|
Channel #5 MUNS MUNS Operations
|
||||||
|
Channel #6 R/D-1 Repeater Down, Line of Sight only, no encryption
|
||||||
|
Channel #7 R/D-2 Repeater Down, Line of Sight only, no encryption
|
||||||
|
Channel #8 SF-1 Primary for Security
|
||||||
|
Channel #9 SF-2 Secondary for Security/Alternate SAAM Ops
|
||||||
|
Channel #10 PAD OPS PNAF/SAAM Operations
|
||||||
|
Channel #11 SFG Group Talk
|
||||||
|
2.3.1. (FOUO) Land Mobile Radio (LMR) Encryption Capability. The LMR system is capable of encrypted transmission. Each two-way portable radio is equipped with encryption/decryption modules. The LMR system is not authorized for transmission of classified material/information.
|
||||||
|
2.3.2. (FOUO) During commercial power loss, all base stations lose encryption capability. In an event of such a power outage, all base stations must be re-keyed by an authorized representative from SSPTS/S4A. The order of precedence for re-keying is base stations,
|
||||||
|
on-duty patrols/posts radios in order of post priority, standby radios in the armory and leadership/staff radios.
|
||||||
|
2.3.3. Telephones. Telephones/landlines are considered secondary means of communications if they are available.
|
||||||
|
2.3.4. (DCNI) Intercoms. Located throughout KUMMSC and the topside gate area, these intercoms are used to contact the responsible control center from a particular door, gate or area. From the workstation, the operator can call any intercom within the facility. The distributed intercoms operate by pressing a button on the intercom box. The individual intercom is programmed to ring at the workstation.
|
||||||
|
2.3.5. Do not discuss classified information over or near an intercom station.
|
||||||
|
2.4. (FOUO) Duress and Authentication Procedures. FCC and/or FCs will ensure their personnel are knowledgeable and trained on the purpose and use of current duress words, emergency entry codes and authentication procedures.
|
||||||
|
2.5. (FOUO) Duress Words. A duress word is used during normal conversation to indicate duress. SFS/Plans and Programs (SFS/S5) is responsible for developing and distributing the primary, alternate and exercise duress words. All SF personnel must be knowledgeable of the current duress words.
|
||||||
|
2.5.1. (FOUO) The duress words are valid for six (6) months from date of activation. Actual or suspected compromise of the primary duress word will activate the alternate duress word as the new primary. SFS/S5 will establish new duress words (primary and alternate) the next duty day and notify all required agencies and personnel of the new words. Duress words are maintained as “For Official Use Only” (FOUO).
|
||||||
|
2.5.2. (FOUO) 377 SFS/S5 should also develop an exercise duress word for training situations. The exercise duress word will be changed when the primary and alternate duress words are changed. Note: PNAF specific duress words will be developed by Convoy Commander prior to each mission; see WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol 3, Prime Nuclear Airlift Force/Convoy Security.
|
||||||
|
2.6. (FOUO) Authentication Codes. SF personnel will utilize the Security Forces authentication code to initiate and terminate all actual or exercise incidents or otherwise determine if a post is under duress.
|
||||||
|
2.6.1. (FOUO) Personnel will be given two (2) attempts to properly authenticate.
|
||||||
|
2.6.2. (FOUO) After the second misauthentication, the SSCC or BDOC as appropriate will follow all QRCs and initiate duress procedures on the post/patrol. SSCC or BDOC will dispatch additional response forces to the post/patrol’s location to determine the cause for misauthentication and verify the security status of personnel involved.
|
||||||
|
2.6.3. (FOUO) If the location of the post/patrol is not known, SSCC or BDOC as appropriate will direct all posts/patrols to initiate sweeps of their areas to find and ascertain the status of the missing post/patrol.
|
||||||
|
2.7. (FOUO) Emergency Response Codes. 377 SFS/S5 will develop and distribute the emergency response code to all affected agencies/personnel. SF and emergency response agencies (fire department, explosive ordnance disposal and medical) will use an emergency response code (similar to the sign/countersign system) to expedite emergency entry into restricted areas. An SF member will pass one (1) portion of the sign/countersign to each emergency response vehicle; in turn the emergency responding vehicles will pass the remainder of the code for authorized emergency entry. For example: five (5) is the ERC for the day; the SF member controlling entry would pass the ERC by extending three (3) fingers on one (1) hand and the agency requesting emergency entry would respond by extending two (2) fingers on one (1) hand (completing a total of five (5)). Note: Do not use half of the emergency response code if the number is an even number. This prevents someone mirroring your actions to gain entry.
|
||||||
|
2.7.1. (FOUO) Utilizing the Emergency Response Code. Individuals utilizing the emergency response code will be given only one (1) chance to authenticate. If an incorrect response to the emergency response code is given, the emergency response vehicle(s) and personnel will be challenged. The driver who passed the wrong response code will be separated from the vehicle to ascertain their identity and to determine if a duress situation exists. If no duress is indicated, their identity will be verified by contacting the appropriate agency or responsible control center. If all is in order, the
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
vehicle and personnel will be allowed to proceed. If a duress situation is indicated, notify SSCC and take appropriate actions.
|
||||||
|
2.7.2. (FOUO) A separate Alert Response Code (ARC) will be used for all REFLEX DELTA missions. It is used in the same manner as the ERC described in para 2.7. above. Refer to REFLEX DELTA Plan, July 2013 for more information.
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 3
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC CONTROLLED AREA (CA) OPERATIONS
|
||||||
|
3.1. (DCNI) Overview. There are seven (7) Controlled Areas (CA) associated with KUMMSC. Each of these areas has been identified as a CA IAW AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense. This chapter establishes responsibilities and procedures for the orderly processing and admission of personnel into the CAs associated with KUMMSC. The following paragraphs identify the location, entry requirements and associated security measures.
|
||||||
|
3.2. KUMMSC Controlled Areas.
|
||||||
|
3.2.1. (DCNI) Enrollment Center. The Enrollment Center is located at the southeast end of the Squadron Operations (Squad Ops) building (Bldg #27494). This room contains the Enrollment Master Station (EMS) and is protected by Balance Magnetic Switch (BMS) and Passive Infrared (PIR) sensors and a duress switch.
|
||||||
|
3.2.2. (DCNI) WSSS Armory. The WSSS armory is located at the southwest end of Squad Ops. This room is used to store weapons and ammunition and is normally manned. The Armory is protected by PIR and BMS sensors and duress switches. Note: Further CA requirements for the WSSS Armory can be found in SFI 31-229, Armory Operations.
|
||||||
|
3.2.3. (DCNI) F-1 Communications Room. F-1 is located at the southwest end of Squad Ops. This room contains Field Distribution Boxes (FDB) 11 and 11A and is protected by BMS and PIR sensors.
|
||||||
|
3.2.4. (DCNI) C2B Land Mobile Radio (LMR) Communications Room. C2B is located at the northeast end of Squad Ops. This room contains LMR equipment and is protected by BMS sensors.
|
||||||
|
3.2.5. (DCNI) Utility Building (UB). UB (Bldg #27497) is located at the southwest end of the Squad Ops Government Vehicle (GOV) parking lot. This facility contains the KUMMSC emergency generator and FDB 10/10A. This facility is protected by BMS sensors.
|
||||||
|
3.2.6. (DCNI) KUMMSC Topside CA. The KUMMSC Topside CA extends from the CA boundary to the entry/exit tunnels of KUMMSC. Personnel will enter the area through V1B (pedestrian walkway) or V1AA/V1AB (vehicle entry/exit). This area is protected by 1.2 miles of barbed wire fence and a vehicle denial cable; it has camera coverage and is continuously patrolled.
|
||||||
|
3.3. Entry Requirements/Circulation Control for KUMMSC Controlled Area.
|
||||||
|
3.3.1. (DCNI) Only personnel with an open area #8 on their AF Form 1199, Computer Generated Restricted Area Badge (RAB), or listed on an authorization letter will be granted unescorted entry into a KUMMSC CA. Note: For unescorted entry to the WSSS Armory, personnel are required to be on an authorization letter maintained by the armory and SSCC. All other personnel will be escorted in and logged in/out on an AF Form
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1109.
|
||||||
|
3.3.1.1. (DCNI) RABs shall be worn in a readily identifiable location on the outer garment at all times.
|
||||||
|
3.3.1.2. (DCNI) Authorization letters for CA access are maintained within SSCC or 898 MUNS Control.
|
||||||
|
3.3.2. (DCNI) Prior to granting access to the CA within Squadron Operations Building or Utility Building, SSCC will authenticate with the individual (utilizing SF authentication procedures described in Chapter 2 of this SOP) and verify their status.
|
||||||
|
3.3.3. Escorted personnel will be signed in on the AF Form 1109 prior to entry and receive the Escort/Safety Briefing (Attachment 4). Escorted personnel may be subject to a random search for any unauthorized items.
|
||||||
|
3.3.4. Additional Entry Requirements/Circulation Control.
|
||||||
|
3.3.4.1. (DCNI) 898 MUNS Armory. Entry into the 898 MUNS Armory is controlled by 898 MUNS Control (MC). Note: Reference 898 MUNS OI 31-1 for additional requirements.
|
||||||
|
3.3.4.2. (DCNI) Enrollment Center EMS Database. Access to the Enrollment Center EMS database requires an authorized 377 WSSS Enrollment Official and an authorized 898 MUNS Enrollment Official (identified on the Enrollment Center Official authorization letter). SSCC will authenticate with both individuals to verify their status prior granting them access the EMS database.
|
||||||
|
3.3.4.2.1. (DCNI) Lone individuals are not authorized to access the EMS database. If the EMS database is accessed and a “Comm Restore LE to
|
||||||
|
Enroll” alarm is received, dispatch patrols immediately to challenge the individual.
|
||||||
|
3.3.4.3. (FOUO) Commercial Vehicle Entry. Commercial vehicle entry procedures do not apply to Controlled Area 8. Refer to the IDP for further guidance.
|
||||||
|
3.4. Securing KUMMSC CAs.
|
||||||
|
3.4.1. (DCNI) Once everyone has departed the CA, the SF official will contact SSCC to secure the room/alarms. SSCC will authenticate with the SF official and the alarms will be returned to secure mode.
|
||||||
|
3.4.1.1. (DCNI) Prior to departing the Enrollment Center, the EMS database must be logged-off and the communication switch that controls connection availability to the EMS computer will be turned to setting B, C or D. Once this is complete, the Enrollment Center official will contact SSCC to ensure a
|
||||||
|
“communications loss” alarm was received.
|
||||||
|
3.4.2. (DCNI) All alarms will be in secure mode anytime the CA is not manned.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.5. Compensatory Measures.
|
||||||
|
3.5.1. (DCNI) When alarms are not operational, a patrol will conduct physical checks of the KUMMSC CAs, not to exceed every four (4) hours, and notify SSCC of the status of the areas.
|
||||||
|
3.5.2. (FOUO) During FPCON BRAVO or higher, checks of all KUMMSC CAs will be accomplished a minimum of once per shift when the alarms are operational. Note: For the SF Armory, these checks will not exceed every two (2) hours, when the armory is unmanned.
|
||||||
|
3.5.3. (DCNI) All checks will be recorded in the WSSS blotter. Note: Ensure the times are varied, so as to not set a pattern.
|
||||||
|
3.6. Unauthorized Individuals/Responding to Alarms in the CAs.
|
||||||
|
3.6.1. (DCNI) For all unauthorized/suspicious individuals and alarms within a CA, an armed response is required. Patrols will respond and establish 360-degree security, conduct sweeps and assess the alarm. Patrols will challenge and remove all individuals from the CA, identify them and ascertain reason for entry. Note: Patrols responding to the CA will make contact with SSCC for entry and authenticate prior to entry.
|
||||||
|
3.6.2. (DCNI) Individuals approaching the KUMMSC Topside CA from an unauthorized avenue of approach will be challenged, removed from the area and SSCC will be notified.
|
||||||
|
3.7. Key Control.
|
||||||
|
3.7.1. (DCNI) The Key and Lock Custodian will maintain keys to the CAs in a secured lock box within 377 WSSS/S3.
|
||||||
|
Note: The munitions keys are secured by the 898 MUNS Security Manager.
|
||||||
|
3.7.1.1. (FOUO) Keys maintained in the key box will be signed out/in on an AF Form 2432, Key Issue Log, to include the date and time of issue, serial number of the key and signature of individual issuing the key. Notify WSSS/S3 if a key is lost, misplaced or stolen and the affected lock will be replaced immediately.
|
||||||
|
3.7.1.2. (FOUO) Additional keys will be maintained with on-duty security patrols for access during alarm activations. These keys will be accounted for at the beginning of each shift by the on-coming patrols and annotated by SSCC in the blotter.
|
||||||
|
3.7.2. An appointment letter will be generated and signed by the WSSS/CC to identify the primary and alternate Key and Lock Custodians.
|
||||||
|
3.8. Bomb Threat/Robbery and Evacuation Procedures.
|
||||||
|
3.8.1. (FOUO) An AF Form 440, Bomb Threat Aid, will be posted by all government
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
phones IAW AFI 31-101. An AF Form 439, Robbery Checklist, will be posted in all CA six-part folders. This aid will be strictly followed for all verbal and telephonic threats.
|
||||||
|
3.8.2. (FOUO) Suspicious Package. If a suspicious package is discovered in or around a CA, do not transmit a radio within 25 feet and immediately notify SSCC. SSCC will initiate the appropriate Quick Reaction Checklist (QRC).
|
||||||
|
3.8.3. Robbery Procedures. Immediate actions to take during a robbery:
|
||||||
|
3.8.3.1. (FOUO) If an individual is attempting to gain/has gained unauthorized entry to a CA, immediately notify SSCC, challenge the individual and remove them from the area.
|
||||||
|
3.8.3.2. (FOUO) Conduct a 100% inventory of all resources in the CA and report all discrepancies to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
3.8.3.3. (FOUO) Provide SSCC with information displayed on the AF Form 439.
|
||||||
|
3.8.4. (FOUO) Evacuation Procedures. Evacuation of a CA will be initiated for all fire alarms and suspected explosive devices. Note: Squad Ops has three (3) major exits (east, south, and west doors). Follow all instructions of the on-scene incident commander.
|
||||||
|
3.8.4.1. Attempt to secure the CA if possible.
|
||||||
|
3.8.4.2. Log off enrollment terminals.
|
||||||
|
3.8.4.3. Ensure all visitors are accounted for and evacuated.
|
||||||
|
3.9. (FOUO) Emergency Response Entry/Egress. For emergency situations involving outside agencies (Fire Department, Medical, EOD, etc.) that require emergency entry:
|
||||||
|
3.9.1. (FOUO) Patrols will set-up a cordon around affected area and evacuate all personnel.
|
||||||
|
3.9.2. (FOUO) All personnel will enter/exit through the Entry Control Point (ECP) of the cordon.
|
||||||
|
3.9.3. (FOUO) Patrols will maintain observation/accountability of all emergency responders, as safely as possible. Once the emergency situation is clear, patrols will conduct a search of the affected area and emergency responders and equipment. All emergency responders/vehicles will be logged on an AF Form 1109.
|
||||||
|
3.10. (FOUO) Emergency Response to the Airfield and Runway. Incursion prevention is completed by obtaining a Flightline Driver’s License. All responding personnel will adhere to the flightline driving instructions and emergency lights on the flightline. Note: For further guidance on emergency response to the airfield and runway, refer to 377 WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol 2, Flightline Security.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3.11. (FOUO) Controlled Area Training. All personnel authorized unescorted entry into any CAs must receive initial/annual training from the applicable Controlled Area Monitor. Controlled Area Monitors receive annual training from 377 SFS/S5C Resource Protection office. Controlled Area Monitor training is documented and maintained by S3C personnel in
|
||||||
|
their Controlled Area book.
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 4
|
||||||
|
SECURITY FORCES TRAINING PROGRAM
|
||||||
|
4.1. Overview. The SF training program ensures that all individuals are trained in specific tasks throughout their career. The training program consists of flight training, AF IMT 623A, On-The-Job Training Record Continuation Sheet, initial evaluations, trainee responsibilities, CDCs, upgrade, TDYs and unit scheduling program.
|
||||||
|
4.2. Security Forces Education and Training Program (SFETP).
|
||||||
|
4.2.1. FCC and/or FC will ensure an effective training program is implemented to encompass both the training of newly assigned personnel and completion of recurring training. All assigned personnel will be evaluated on basic tactics, searches, challenges and handcuffing procedures, and tactical deployment techniques prior to Duty Position Evaluation (DPE) testing.
|
||||||
|
4.2.2. FCC and/or FC will manage all upgrade training (UGT), CDC completion and remedial training programs IAW AFI 36-2646, Security Forces Training and Standardization Evaluation Programs.
|
||||||
|
4.2.3. When manning permits, while in training for non-critical duty positions, uncertified individuals will be posted with a certified individual.
|
||||||
|
4.2.4. The electronic equivalent AF IMT 623, On-The-Job Training Record, located in AFTR, Air Force Training Record, will be used for formal documentation of all pertinent tasks and as a record of training accomplished for all personnel.
|
||||||
|
4.2.4.1. These records are required to be completed and turned in to SSPTS/S3T by the individual’s supervisor prior to the individual’s DPE.
|
||||||
|
4.2.5. Flight Training. The flight training program will be conducted as leader led training (LLT) as designated in the master training plan (MTP). This consists of individual and collective training efforts conducted on-post by flight members on daily and contingency tasks.
|
||||||
|
4.2.6. Initial Evaluation. The initial evaluation is a comprehensive review of the
|
||||||
|
trainee’s current and past training experiences, as well as an interview to get a feel of the trainee’s background. The trainee’s supervisor will conduct the initial evaluation within
|
||||||
|
the first 60 calendar days of the trainee’s arrival. Make an entry on the AF IMT 623A and ensure the trainee and supervisor sign and date. The initial orientation and evaluation can be conducted and documented on the same form and at the same time.
|
||||||
|
4.2.7. Immediate Supervisor Responsibilities. The immediate supervisor is responsible for the trainee's progress through UGT. They will issue and administer the CDC volumes and Unit Review Exercises (URE). The supervisor must also maintain contact with the UTM to ensure administrative UGT requirements are being met. Immediately notify the UTM in the case of any serious delay of the trainee's training progress and ensure the AF
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
IMT 623 is properly annotated.
|
||||||
|
4.2.8. Trainee Responsibilities. Individuals enrolled in UGT will complete training requirements on time. Trainees must:
|
||||||
|
4.2.8.1. Actively participate in all opportunities for upgrade and qualification training.
|
||||||
|
4.2.8.2. Obtain and maintain knowledge, qualifications, certifications, and attain the next skill level.
|
||||||
|
4.2.8.3. Budget on- and off-duty time to complete assigned training tasks, particularly CDC and self-study training requirements, within established time limits.
|
||||||
|
4.2.8.4. Request assistance from supervisor, trainer, and UTM when having difficulty with any part of training.
|
||||||
|
4.2.8.5. Acknowledge and document task qualification upon completion of training.
|
||||||
|
4.2.8.6. Understand their deployment/UTC, and home station requirements.
|
||||||
|
4.2.9. Mandatory Career Development Course (CDC) Program. Administer the mandatory CDC program IAW AFI 36-2201 Air Force Training Program.
|
||||||
|
4.2.10. Course Exam (CE). The supervisor will order the CE through the UTM upon completion of VREs/UREs. The supervisor and trainee will conduct a comprehensive review of all volumes prior to the CE and annotate on the 623A in AFTR. Upon completion of all requirements the trainee will complete a CE pretest. Individuals must have three passing scores of at least 90% to take the CE. Once three passing scores are obtained, the UTM will contact Base Training to schedule the CE. If trainee receives a score of 90% or better on the CE, the Commander may grant a one-day pass that may be used at the discretion of the flight leadership.
|
||||||
|
4.2.11. First and Second Time CDC Exam Failures. AFI 36-2201, Air Force Training Program provides specific guidance on exam failures. Upon a failure, representatives from the flight’s chain of command will report to 377 WSSS/CC, as directed, with all CDCs, training records and detailed training plan. Additionally, the CC, with help from the UTM or Base Training Manger will interview the supervisor and trainee to determine the reason for failure and evaluate all items as directed by AFI 36-2201 Table 6.1., CDC Administration.
|
||||||
|
4.2.12. Upgrade Actions. When a trainee completes all UGT requirements, CDC completion, minimum months in training, and attainment of the appropriate grade, their supervisor will recommend upgrade by making a 623A entry in AFTR and forwarding an upgrade request to the UTM. To determine eligibility for five (5) and seven (7) level upgrades, contact the UTM.
|
||||||
|
4.2.13. Temporary Duty (TDY). If the trainee is TDY during the time a course
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
examination is due, the supervisor will contact the UTM to request a course extension. FCs will request all course extensions in writing. The supervisor will then request a new CE when the trainee returns. In the event that a trainer is TDY for more than seven (7) days (this includes all leaves), the trainee’s supervisor or section NCOIC will appoint a temporary trainer until the permanent trainer returns.
|
||||||
|
4.3. Security Forces Scheduling Program.
|
||||||
|
4.3.1. The SSPTS/Scheduler is the central point of contact for all base agencies levying any requirements on security forces personnel. Training appointments, weapon firing, dental exams, etc., are examples of requirements that must be routed through the scheduler. Each flight/section is responsible for an appointment monitor who will be the point of contact for scheduling. Squadron-made appointments have priority over self-made appointments.
|
||||||
|
4.4. Security Forces Duty Officer Program (SFDO)
|
||||||
|
4.4.1. A SNCO or Officer will be assigned SFDO duties for a month at a time. The Security Forces Manager (SFM) will draft the schedule and ensure personnel are properly notified. SFDOs will conduct the following actions during their duties:
|
||||||
|
4.4.1.1. Attend each flight’s Guardmount.
|
||||||
|
4.4.1.2. Conduct post checks with each Airmen posted.
|
||||||
|
4.4.1.3. Observe any flight, Surety, squadron or group exercises being conducted during post checks.
|
||||||
|
4.4.2. Prior to their assigned month, SFDOs will meet with the Squadron Commander (CC) and SFM to gather special interest or focus items to be looked at during their duties. Ensure to review the previous month’s SFDO report prior to SFDO duty.
|
||||||
|
4.4.3. SFDO will complete a report at the conclusion of their duties and submit the report to the CC and SFM by the 15th of the month following their duties.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHAPTER 5 RECALL PROCEDURES
|
||||||
|
5.1. Overview. This chapter establishes policies and procedures regarding the 377 WSSS pyramid recall and alerting system. Recalls provide the 377 WSSS/CC with the additional manpower strength to neutralize hostile threats and a means for sending reports up and down the chain of command. This chapter implements standardized recall procedures within the 377 WSSS, consistent with the 377 SFG and ABW Recall Plans. All personnel assigned to the 377 WSSS must be knowledgeable of these procedures.
|
||||||
|
5.2. Definitions.
|
||||||
|
5.2.1. (FOUO) Six-Ring Standby. Personnel must prepare themselves by assembling appropriate uniforms and equipment, and be capable of immediate response. Notified personnel will maintain the ability to answer the telephone within six (6) rings. Prior to departing quarters personnel will make contact with immediate supervisors and inform them of the destination and a phone number to be contacted. Consumption of alcohol, while on six-ring alert is strictly prohibited.
|
||||||
|
5.2.2. (DCNI) Alert Gear. For the purpose of the recall, alert gear is as follows: IOTV or plate carrier with plates and rifleman’s kit attached, Helmet w/cover and NVG mount attached, gas mask (M-50) w/protective lens and carrier, DD Form 1574 (gas mask inspection card), gas mask fit test, gas mask inserts (if required), Operational flashlight, handcuffs w/key OR flex cuffs, eye protection (goggles or ballistic eyewear), IFAK (tourniquet and Israeli bandage on person only).
|
||||||
|
5.3. Responsibilities.
|
||||||
|
5.3.1. (FOUO) FCC, FC and section superintendents are responsible for preparing and maintaining the current Pyramid Recall Roster for their flight/section. Note: The recall table and recall phases will be listed on all Pyramid Recall Rosters. Each flight/section’s recall roster will be updated no later than the last duty day of each month or as changes occur. A flight copy will be provided to each person assigned to the respective section or flight.
|
||||||
|
5.3.2. SSCC is responsible for providing Strength Reports (SRs) to the S1 when required.
|
||||||
|
5.4. Recall Procedures.
|
||||||
|
5.4.1. (FOUO) Squadron recalls will be implemented in accordance with QRCs, increased FPCONs or as directed by the 377 WSSS/CC or higher authority. The on-duty FCC and/or FC may direct the initiation of the IBF/SBF recall, as necessary.
|
||||||
|
5.4.2. Upon receipt of notification to initiate a recall, the control center receiving the notification will inform the remaining control centers (SSCC, BDOC, and Alternate BDOC if posted).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5.4.3. (FOUO) SSCC will be the primary control center for initiating squadron recalls. In the event SSCC is unable to initiate the recall, responsibility for initiating the recall will transfer to the BDOC. In the event BDOC is unable to initiate the recall, responsibility for initiating the recall will transfer to another office or agency as determined by FCC and/or FC or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
5.4.4. SSCC, or appropriate control center, will implement recall procedures using the Pyramid Recall Rosters. BDOC will make notifications utilizing ATHOC if necessary.
|
||||||
|
5.4.5. Each FCC/FC or section superintendent will make notifications back up with contact status not to exceed 30 minutes.
|
||||||
|
5.4.6. When contact is made, personnel will be told an unclassified reason for the recall, the type of recall and where to report.
|
||||||
|
5.4.7. The BDOC will activate the klaxon to recall dormitory residents:
|
||||||
|
5.4.7.1. (DCNI) Primary Klaxon. The primary klaxon is a steady tone. When the primary klaxon sounds, you must report with all appropriate alert gear to the SFS Armory, Bldg #20222.
|
||||||
|
5.4.7.2. (DCNI) Alternate Klaxon. The alternate klaxon has the same tone as the primary, however, it sounds on/off every five (5) seconds. When the alternate klaxon sounds, you must report with all appropriate alert gear to the Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (CATM) as soon as possible.
|
||||||
|
5.4.8. (DCNI) Recalls during normal business days/hours: For members responding from outside the KUMMSC area, the primary location for recalls will be the SFS Armory and the alternate location is the CATM facility. For personnel inside the KUMMSC area (KUMMSC, Squad Ops, Parking Area), respond to the KUMMSC armory with your alert gear for arming and posting. Battle Staff will be formed in the arming area by CC, SFM, S3O, S1 and S4. S3O will establish telephonic contact with the posting NCO at the primary or alternate arming points for coordination of responding fire teams.
|
||||||
|
5.4.9. (DCNI) Recalls during off duty days/hours: For members responding from outside the KUMMSC area, the primary location for recalls will be the SFS Armory and the alternate location is the CATM facility. Battle Staff will be formed at Alternate BDOC, Bldg #20452 by CC, SFM, S3O, S1 and S4. S3O will establish telephonic contact with the posting NCO at the primary or alternate arming points for coordination of responding fire teams.
|
||||||
|
5.4.10. All personnel responding to recalls will respond to the appropriate arming point or staging area wearing helmet, flak vest with level IV plates and protective mask attached to body, when possible. Although it is preferred to respond in uniform, responding personnel may wear civilian clothes to facilitate faster SF response to the situation.
|
||||||
|
Note: Ensure proper footwear is worn (i.e. no flip flops, slippers, etc).
|
||||||
|
5.4.11. Mission critical personnel responding from off-base will enter the installation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
through the KAFB contractor gate off Gibson Road during FPCON Delta, unless otherwise directed by the Incident Commander. Entry is granted using a DBIDs authorized credential (i.e. Common Access Card (CAC)). Additionally, mission critical personnel are identified in DBIDS.
|
||||||
|
5.5. Personnel Strength Reporting Procedures.
|
||||||
|
5.5.1. (FOUO) SSCC will begin strength reporting as soon as possible and continue until all personnel are accounted for. This information will be up-channeled from S1 to SSCC. SSCC will report this information to the EOC, CAT, and BDOC as necessary.
|
||||||
|
5.5.2. S1 will obtain the total number of military assigned, TDY, on leave and in hospital/on quarters. Report this information along with an updated number of personnel who have been contacted/notified of the recall to the applicable control center or Battle Staff.
|
||||||
|
5.5.3. Recalling Personnel from TDY/Leave Status. TDY/leave personnel will be recalled only by order of the 377 WSSS/CC or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
5.6. Communication Outage (COMM OUT), Recall Procedures.
|
||||||
|
5.6.1. In the event that a squadron recall is initiated during a communications outage (no access to electronic recall rosters and no hard line phone access), recall notifications will be made face-to-face utilizing pyramid recall rosters.
|
||||||
|
5.6.2. If individual does not answer the door at the time of recall, leave a note on the door with reporting instructions and proceed to the next individual on the recall roster.
|
||||||
|
5.6.3. Report back up the chain of command if contact has not been made.
|
||||||
|
JOSEPH J. PARSONS, Lt Col, USAF
|
||||||
|
Commander
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 1
|
||||||
|
GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
References
|
||||||
|
AFI 33-332, The Air Force Privacy and Civil Liberties Program, 12 January 2015 AFI 36-2618, The Enlisted Force Structure, 27 February 2009
|
||||||
|
AFI 36-2646, Security Forces Training & Standardization Evaluation Programs, 12 January 2017
|
||||||
|
AFI 36-2201, Air Force Training Program, 15 September 2010
|
||||||
|
AFI 36-2903, Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel, 18 July 2011 AFI 36-2905, Fitness Program, 21 October 2013
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 1 March 2008
|
||||||
|
AFI 31-118, Security Forces Standards and Procedures, 5 March 2014
|
||||||
|
DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, V1/V2/V3 Nuclear Weapons Security Manual, 15 June 2017, AFGSCSUP 21 February 2014
|
||||||
|
DoDM 5210.42_AFMAN 13-501, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP),
|
||||||
|
09 March 2017
|
||||||
|
KAFB Integrated Defense Plan 31-101, 20 February 2018
|
||||||
|
Prescribed Forms
|
||||||
|
No forms are prescribed by this publication
|
||||||
|
Adopted Forms
|
||||||
|
AF Form 164, Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Notification and Removal Log
|
||||||
|
AF Form 340, Sensor Alarm Data
|
||||||
|
AF IMT 483, Flightline Competency Certification
|
||||||
|
AF Form 797, Job Qualification Standard (JQS) Continuation/Command JQS
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1168, Statement of Suspect/Witness/Complaint
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AF 1199CG, Computer Generated Restricted Area Badge
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1800, Operator’s Inspection Guide and Trouble Report
|
||||||
|
AF IMT 623, On-The-Job Training Record
|
||||||
|
AF IMT 623A, On-The-Job Training Record Continuation Sheets AFTO Form 781A, Maintenance Discrepancy and Work Document AFTR, Air Force Training Record
|
||||||
|
Abbreviations and Acronyms
|
||||||
|
ABDOC – Alternate Base Defense Operations Center
|
||||||
|
ABW – Air Base Wing
|
||||||
|
AECS – Advanced Entry Control System AFGSC – Air Force Global Strike Command AFMAN – Air Force Manual
|
||||||
|
AFRC – Air Force Reserve Command
|
||||||
|
AFRIMS – Air Force Records Information Management System
|
||||||
|
AFSC – Air Force Specialty Code
|
||||||
|
AM – Alarm Monitor
|
||||||
|
ANG – Air National Guard AOR – Area of Responsibility AS – Area Supervisor
|
||||||
|
BDOC – Base Defense Operations Center
|
||||||
|
CATM – Combat Arms Training and Maintenance
|
||||||
|
CC – Commander
|
||||||
|
CE – Course Exam
|
||||||
|
CDC – Career Development Course
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMM OUT – Communication Outage
|
||||||
|
CUD – Cubical Unlocking Device
|
||||||
|
DCL – Department of Energy Courier Letter
|
||||||
|
DCNI – Department of Defense Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
DoD – Department of Defense
|
||||||
|
DoE – Department of Energy
|
||||||
|
DPE – Duty Position Evaluation
|
||||||
|
DV – Distinguished Visitor DVI – Daily Visual Inspection EAL – Entry Authority List EC – Entry Controller
|
||||||
|
ECP – Entry Control Point
|
||||||
|
EVL – Exclusion Verification List
|
||||||
|
ER – Emergency Response
|
||||||
|
ERC – Emergency Response Code
|
||||||
|
ESRT – External Security Response Team
|
||||||
|
FC – Flight Chief
|
||||||
|
FCC – Flight Commander
|
||||||
|
FOUO – For Official Use Only FPCON – Force Protection Condition FTM – Flight Training Monitor GOV – Government Owned Vehicle
|
||||||
|
HMMWV – High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
|
||||||
|
HHQ – Higher Headquarters
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
IAW – In Accordance With
|
||||||
|
ISRT – Internal Security Response Team IVA – Immediate Visual Assessment KEC – Kirtland Entry Control
|
||||||
|
KCP – Kirtland Command Post
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC – Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex
|
||||||
|
LMR – Land Mobile Radio
|
||||||
|
MC – Munitions Control
|
||||||
|
MFR – Memorandum for Record
|
||||||
|
MPH – Miles Per Hour
|
||||||
|
MTP – Master Training Plan
|
||||||
|
NSTCA – Nuclear Security Threat Capability Assessment
|
||||||
|
NVG – Night Vision Device
|
||||||
|
NWSS – Nuclear Weapons Surety Standards
|
||||||
|
OPR – Office of Primary Responsibility
|
||||||
|
OI – Operating Instruction
|
||||||
|
PA – Public Address
|
||||||
|
PL – Protection Level
|
||||||
|
PNAF – Primed Nuclear Airlift Force PRP – Personal Reliability Program PSI – Physical Security Inspection QRC – Quick Reference Checklist RCU – Remote Controlled Unit
|
||||||
|
RD – Reflex Delta
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RDS – Records Disposition Schedule
|
||||||
|
RF – Response Force
|
||||||
|
RFL – Response Force Leader RFM – Response Force Member S1 – Unit Personnel Office
|
||||||
|
S3 – Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
S5 – Plans and Programs Section
|
||||||
|
S3O – Operations Superintendent
|
||||||
|
SAAM – Special Assignment Airlift Mission
|
||||||
|
SBF – Subsequent Backup Force
|
||||||
|
SC – Security Controller
|
||||||
|
SCS – Security Control Supervisor
|
||||||
|
SEC – Senior Entry Controller
|
||||||
|
SF – Security Forces
|
||||||
|
SFETP – Security Forces Education and Training Plan
|
||||||
|
SFG – Security Forces Group
|
||||||
|
SFMQ – Security Forces Standardization Evaluation Section
|
||||||
|
SGT – Safeguard Transport
|
||||||
|
SOP – Standard Operating Procedure SSCC – Site Security Control Center SSPTS – Security Support Squadron SSI – Special Security Instruction SVA – Sole Vouching Authority
|
||||||
|
TDY – Temporary Duty
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TM – Training Monitor
|
||||||
|
TPC - Two-Person Control
|
||||||
|
TTC - Tactical Convoy Commander
|
||||||
|
TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
|
||||||
|
UB – Utility Building
|
||||||
|
UGT – Upgrade Training
|
||||||
|
URE – Unit Review Exercise
|
||||||
|
VCNCO – Vehicle Control Noncommissioned Officer
|
||||||
|
VRE – Volume Review Exercise
|
||||||
|
WSSS – Weapons System Security Squadron
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 2
|
||||||
|
SECURITY FORCES RESPONSE AND BREVITY CODES
|
||||||
|
A2. Response Codes.
|
||||||
|
A2.1. (FOUO) The codes in the following table will be used by SSCC and responding patrols during situations where brevity and discreet information is sent/received to and from responding patrols and dispatchers:
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Table A2.1.
|
||||||
|
SECURITY FORCE RESPONSE AND BREVITY CODES
|
||||||
|
Code 1 Routine Response
|
||||||
|
Code 2 Urgent Response
|
||||||
|
Code 3 Emergency Response
|
||||||
|
Code 4 Wants and Warrants
|
||||||
|
Code 5 Traffic Stop
|
||||||
|
Code 6 Latrine Break
|
||||||
|
Code 7 Meal Break
|
||||||
|
Code 8 Suspect in Custody
|
||||||
|
Code 8A Suspect of Opposite Sex in Custody
|
||||||
|
Code 9 Change Frequency
|
||||||
|
Code 10 All in Order (not to be used in normal security status check)
|
||||||
|
Code 11 Domestic Disturbance
|
||||||
|
Code 12 Traffic Accident
|
||||||
|
Code 13 Officer Needs Immediate Assistance; Emergency
|
||||||
|
Code 14 Unannounced Alarm Activation
|
||||||
|
Code 15 Duress Indication (applicable post or location)
|
||||||
|
Code 16 Explosive Device
|
||||||
|
ATTATCHMENT 3
|
||||||
|
WSSS STAFF CALL SIGNS
|
||||||
|
A3. Staff Call Signs.
|
||||||
|
A3.1. (FOUO) The call signs listed in the following table will be used by SSCC for short and concise radio transmissions with 377 WSSS Staff Offices.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Table A3.1. 377 WSSS Staff Call Signs
|
||||||
|
Call Sign Duty Position Call Sign Duty Position
|
||||||
|
Guardian-6 Commander Predator-1 NCOIC, Operations
|
||||||
|
Guardian-3 Operations Officer Predator-2 NCOIC, Plans and Programs
|
||||||
|
Guardian-3A Operations Superintendent Predator-3 NCOIC, Sensors
|
||||||
|
Guardian-9 Security Forces Manager Predator-4 Flightline Constable
|
||||||
|
Diamond-1 First Sergeant Predator-5 NCOIC, Nuclear Surety
|
||||||
|
Guardian-4 Superintendent S4/S5 Predator-6 Physical Security
|
||||||
|
Predator-7 System Administrator
|
||||||
|
Predator-8 Vehicle Control NCO
|
||||||
|
Predator-9 Resource Advisor/Supply
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLED AREA ESCORT/SAFETY BRIEFING
|
||||||
|
A4. Controlled Area Escort/Safety Briefing
|
||||||
|
A4.1. (FOUO) The briefing listed below will be used when providing a safety/escort briefing for individuals being escorted into KUMMSC Controlled Areas.
|
||||||
|
- This area is designated as a Controlled Area and you must be escorted at all times.
|
||||||
|
-Cell phones, cameras or any other recording devices are prohibited and must remain outside the area.
|
||||||
|
-Ensure you have properly filled out all required information on the AF Form 1109, Visitor Register Log.
|
||||||
|
-Do not lose sight of your designated escort or depart the area without first notifying your escort.
|
||||||
|
-Any hand-carried items you bring into this area may be subject to search by your designated escort.
|
||||||
|
-Any hazmat in the area must be briefed.
|
||||||
|
-DO NOT handle anything without authorization from your escort official.
|
||||||
|
-If we need to evacuate the area, exit the building through the nearest available exit.
|
||||||
|
-If evacuation is necessary all personnel must depart the area.
|
||||||
|
-If you are the last person exiting the area SECURE THE DOOR BEHIND YOU.
|
||||||
|
-All visitors must stay with their escort if possible and meet at the evacuation point unless otherwise directed by your escort official.
|
||||||
|
-All evacuated visitors must stand by at the directed evacuation point until accounted for and released by your escort official or the Fire Chief.
|
||||||
|
-Are there any questions or concerns at this time?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 5 REQUIRED EQUIPMENT
|
||||||
|
A5.1. (DCNI) REQUIRED ITEMS (asterisk items are subject to inspection): All gear will be clean and serviceable at all times.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.1. *Tactical ballistic vest w/plates and Rifleman’s Kit attached.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.2. *Helmet w/NVG mount attached.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.3. *Gas mask w/protective lens and carrier.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.3.1. *Eye glass inserts, as required (via fit test print out).
|
||||||
|
A5.1.3.2. *Fit test results.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.3.3. *DD Form 1574, Inspection/serviceability card (properly filled out with up- to-date-inspection).
|
||||||
|
A5.1.4. *Operational flashlight.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.5. *Handcuffs w/key and Flex cuffs.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.6. *M9 Holster.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.7. *Canteen w/ proper gas mask cap.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.8. *Hearing protection.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.9. *Eye protection (goggles or ballistic eyewear).
|
||||||
|
A5.1.10. *Inclement weather gear (as needed). A5.1.11. *Job knowledge handbook (if available). A5.1.12. *Common access card (CAC).
|
||||||
|
A5.1.13. *Whistle.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.14. *Current civilian and GOV driver’s license.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.15. *Gloves.
|
||||||
|
A5.1.16. *Restricted Area Badge (RAB) (serviceable w/ holder or lanyard).
|
||||||
|
A5.1.17. *Current flightline competency card.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A5.1.18. *Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) (Tourniquet & Israeli bandage on person and will be located on the right side of your gear).
|
||||||
|
A5.1.19. Multi mission pack, issued A bag or Ruck Sack.
|
||||||
|
ATTACHMENT 6
|
||||||
|
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR PLATE CARRIER
|
||||||
|
A6. STANDARD SET-UP A6.1. REQUIRED POUCHES
|
||||||
|
A6.1.1. (FOUO) Each Security Forces member is required to attach the following pouches to his/her plate carrier:
|
||||||
|
A6.1.1.1. Enough M-4 Pouches to carry 6 magazines
|
||||||
|
A6.1.1.2. Radio Pouch A6.1.1.3. Handcuff Pouch A6.1.1.4. Utility Pouch
|
||||||
|
A6.1.1.5. Tourniquets will be located on the right side of your gear.
|
||||||
|
A6.1.1.6. M-9 pouch (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
A6.1.1.7. Pouches will be affixed in any fashion that is comfortable to the wearer as long as they are accessible and functional.
|
||||||
|
A6.2. ACCOUTREMENTS
|
||||||
|
A6.2.1. RANK AND NAMETAPE/AIRCREW PATCH
|
||||||
|
A6.2.1.1. Name and Rank will be displayed on the front Velcro panel of the vest. Issued Aircrew patches will be displayed on the front Velcro panel of the IOTV or plate carrier. Aircrew patches will have the Security Forces badge, Name, Rank and USAF embroidered on it only. If Aircrew patch has not yet been issued, a Velcro rank centered above a
|
||||||
|
nametape is authorized.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm
|
||||||
|
image1.png
|
||||||
1659
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS SOP Volume 2, Flightline Security.md
Normal file
1659
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS SOP Volume 2, Flightline Security.md
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
1568
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS SOP Volume 3, PNAF_Convoy Security.md
Normal file
1568
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS SOP Volume 3, PNAF_Convoy Security.md
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
3123
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS SOP Volume 4, AECS.md
Normal file
3123
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS SOP Volume 4, AECS.md
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
128
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS STEP CODES (02 May 2018).md
Normal file
128
export/(DCNI) 377 WSSS STEP CODES (02 May 2018).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) 377 WSSS STEP CODES (02 May 2018)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
377 WSSS STEP CODE LISTING FOR OUTBOUND OPERATIONS
|
||||||
|
Current as of 02 May 2018
|
||||||
|
COMPLETION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
BROWN (Alt)
|
||||||
|
YELLOW
|
||||||
|
GREEN
|
||||||
|
TIME
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RED
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) ACTION(S) ACCOMPLISHED
|
||||||
|
5 1 16 24 Facility lockdown complete
|
||||||
|
24 10 23 29 (Initiate/Terminate) MM‐7/14 *
|
||||||
|
23 24 36 1 (Initiate/Terminate) MC‐2 *
|
||||||
|
19 16 14 20 Initiate pad sweeps
|
||||||
|
4 38 1 28 Terminate pad sweeps
|
||||||
|
31 18 21 14 Units in place
|
||||||
|
15 29 33 8 Aircraft seal is broken
|
||||||
|
18 13 25 32 Initiate aircraft sanitation
|
||||||
|
36 35 4 9 Terminate aircraft sanitation
|
||||||
|
2 34 2 12 Type I security established
|
||||||
|
22 8 12 11 Exclusion area pre‐screening complete
|
||||||
|
26 31 9 16 Initiate route sweeps
|
||||||
|
10 12 18 35 Initiate courier briefing
|
||||||
|
14 22 39 13 Courier accepts Type‐I security
|
||||||
|
13 26 34 23 Terminate courier briefing
|
||||||
|
8 30 3 2 Initiate shipper's briefing *
|
||||||
|
7 6 32 38 Terminate shipper's briefing *
|
||||||
|
21 39 35 3 Terminate route sweeps
|
||||||
|
39 25 28 31 Convoy route is secure
|
||||||
|
28 23 17 6 SAAM Coordinator declares, "Ready to receive"
|
||||||
|
9 36 5 4 Convoy CC requests permission to initiate movement
|
||||||
|
20 7 38 33 Permission to initiate movement granted by ABW/CC
|
||||||
|
30 9 30 21 Authenticate to have V1‐AA/AB opened and EC‐1/2 initiated
|
||||||
|
37 27 13 27 Initiate movement/convoy composition (Authenticate this step)
|
||||||
|
35 32 8 36 Checkpoint reached (Authenticate this step)
|
||||||
|
1 20 6 30 Authenticate number of vehicles & personnel entering Pad‐5 with Mustang‐10
|
||||||
|
6 11 10 37 Terminate movement (Authenticate this step)
|
||||||
|
38 2 37 25 Upload initiated *
|
||||||
|
17 19 31 15 Units in place for 360° coverage of aircraft upon taxi/take off
|
||||||
|
29 15 15 26 Approximately 30 minute from upload complete *
|
||||||
|
16 14 7 10 Upload complete *
|
||||||
|
32 33 20 18 Lower taxiway cables
|
||||||
|
3 3 27 34 Aircraft preparing to depart (lower ropes/stanchions)
|
||||||
|
12 37 29 19 Aircraft take off complete
|
||||||
|
25 5 24 22 Aircraft aborted takeoff/returning (all forces respond & position f/inbound ops)
|
||||||
|
33 17 22 5 TCPs block traffic
|
||||||
|
11 21 11 7 Use alternate route
|
||||||
|
27 28 26 39 Visual of aircraft on approach to the airfield
|
||||||
|
34 4 19 17 Aircraft landed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(*) MUNS calls in this step
|
||||||
|
Note: Step codes are created and maintained by the 377 WSSS/S5. This is a controlled item for official use only. Copies and distribution must be
|
||||||
|
for official use only and approved by the 377 WSSS/S3. Do NOT duplicate or modify in anyway.
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
377 WSSS STEP CODE LISTING FOR INBOUND OPERATIONS
|
||||||
|
Current as of 02 May 2018
|
||||||
|
COMPLETION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ORANGE (Alt)
|
||||||
|
SILVER
|
||||||
|
BLACK
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
BLUE
|
||||||
|
TIME
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) ACTION(S) ACCOMPLISHED
|
||||||
|
3 18 6 10 Initiate pad sweeps
|
||||||
|
17 7 2 4 Terminate pad sweeps
|
||||||
|
33 20 1 7 Units in place
|
||||||
|
15 8 27 32 Type‐I security established
|
||||||
|
9 16 9 39 Units in Place for 360° coverage of aircraft upon landing/taxing
|
||||||
|
32 24 25 24 Lower taxiway cables
|
||||||
|
12 14 36 35 Exclusion area pre‐screening complete
|
||||||
|
34 3 15 20 Visual of aircraft on approach to the airfield
|
||||||
|
27 6 39 12 Aircraft landed
|
||||||
|
20 34 21 38 Initiate courier briefing
|
||||||
|
25 2 37 29 Courier accepts Type‐I security
|
||||||
|
7 30 16 22 Terminate courier briefing
|
||||||
|
5 36 33 11 Initiate shipper's briefing *
|
||||||
|
19 32 28 16 Terminate shipper's briefing *
|
||||||
|
1 10 4 8 Download initiated *
|
||||||
|
6 23 32 5 Approximately 30 minute from download completion *
|
||||||
|
31 35 18 34 Initiate route sweeps
|
||||||
|
22 12 19 33 Prepare facility for lockdown *
|
||||||
|
29 38 30 3 Facility lockdown complete
|
||||||
|
28 37 38 13 Loading Dock SVA declares "Ready to receive" *
|
||||||
|
8 4 17 9 Terminate route sweeps
|
||||||
|
18 25 10 37 Convoy route is secured
|
||||||
|
35 11 34 31 Download complete *
|
||||||
|
24 21 12 27 Convoy CC requests permission to initiate movement
|
||||||
|
21 9 23 2 Permission to initiate movement granted by Wing/CC
|
||||||
|
38 26 13 28 Initiate movement/convoy composition (Authenticate this step)
|
||||||
|
10 19 11 15 Checkpoint reached (Authenticate this step)
|
||||||
|
39 5 5 6 Authenticate to have V1‐AA/AB opened and EC‐1/2 initiated
|
||||||
|
23 39 20 18 Authenticate number of vehicles & personnel entering KUMMSC with SSCC
|
||||||
|
13 29 26 36 Terminate movement (Authenticate this step)
|
||||||
|
30 28 3 25 (Initiate/terminate) MC‐2 *
|
||||||
|
2 13 14 19 (Initiate/terminate) MM‐7/14 *
|
||||||
|
16 27 8 17 TCPs block traffic
|
||||||
|
37 31 22 26 Use alternate Route
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(*) MUNS calls in this step
|
||||||
|
Note: Step codes are created and maintained by the 377 WSSS/S5. This is a controlled item for official use only. Copies and distribution must be
|
||||||
|
for official use only and approved by the 377 WSSS/S3. Do NOT duplicate or modify in anyway.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
73
export/(DCNI) A-1 Unannounced Alarm.md
Normal file
73
export/(DCNI) A-1 Unannounced Alarm.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-1 Unannounced Alarm
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-1 October 2015
|
||||||
|
UNANNOUNCED ALARM ACTIVATION
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation/Type of Alarm:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Acknowledge Alarm
|
||||||
|
3 Immediate Visual assessment of alarm through CCTV (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
IVA Via:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Notify all posts/patrols of situation and dispatch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Initiate Security Incident QRC A#6 (If applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 360 established (If applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8
|
||||||
|
Patrols on scene: S-1_______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4______, S-5______, Other _______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Sweeps initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Suspect(s) handcuffed (If applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Suspect removed from area (If applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Obtain description and all pertinent information (If applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Have BDOC dispatch a Police Unit (If applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Search of suspect(s) initiated (If applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Search completed (If applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Suspect turned over to LE patrols (If applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Sweeps terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 Secondary sweeps initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19 Secondary sweeps terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-1 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-1 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
20 Exterior sweeps initiated (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
21 Exterior sweeps terminated (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
22 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
23 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
24 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-1 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
39
export/(DCNI) A-10 ASCOT AC Arrival-Departure.md
Normal file
39
export/(DCNI) A-10 ASCOT AC Arrival-Departure.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-10 ASCOT AC Arrival-Departure
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-10 October 2015
|
||||||
|
ASCOT A/C Arrival/Departure
|
||||||
|
“Reference: 377 ABW KAFB ASCOT Support Plan”
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Sweep Pad 5 two hours prior to arrival.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Record Arrival/Departure times in the blotter, and document the
|
||||||
|
Security briefing from the Flight Chief/Commander in the blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Ensure Coyote units block the intersection of Randolph road and the
|
||||||
|
Taxiway via the swing gates and drop the anti-vehicle cable on the
|
||||||
|
Taxiway Northwest of PAD 5 for arrivals and departures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Ensure the Flight Chief or Flight Commander meets the A/C upon
|
||||||
|
arrival, conducts a security brief IAW local standardized checklist with
|
||||||
|
the A/C Commander, and issues a radio to the RAF security team via
|
||||||
|
1297.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Ensure Coyote 1 maintains a 5 minute response capability to the A/C.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Coordinate with SFS for courtesy storage of RAF weapons in the SFS
|
||||||
|
armory if needed. (Note: courtesy storage of weapons will NOT be in
|
||||||
|
the WSSS armory)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Ensure Coyote units conduct a minimum of 4 hour checks on the A/C
|
||||||
|
and RAF security personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Ensure radio communications status checks are conducted IAW
|
||||||
|
established procedures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-10 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
139
export/(DCNI) A-11 UAS.md
Normal file
139
export/(DCNI) A-11 UAS.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-11 UAS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-11 January 2017
|
||||||
|
UNAUTHORIZED UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (KUMMSC/FLIGHTLINE)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION POST
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify posts/patrols of situation and have same use SALUTE report
|
||||||
|
to relay all pertinent information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Dispatch patrols to search for drone operator
|
||||||
|
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC to initiate their search for
|
||||||
|
operator. Notify S3O, S3, CC and KCP IAW notification matrix.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Notify FAA Air Traffic Control Tower of situation and last known
|
||||||
|
location of drone.
|
||||||
|
6 If drone operator is located, patrols will detain individual(s).
|
||||||
|
7 Confiscate SD card/video and/or photos. Confiscate drone and
|
||||||
|
obtain FAA Small UAS Certificate of Registration from operator.
|
||||||
|
Ensure this information is annotated in blotter.
|
||||||
|
UAS IN THE VICINITY OF KUMMSC:
|
||||||
|
8 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
|
||||||
|
9
|
||||||
|
Topside patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4_____, S-5_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Direct ECP to initiate lockdown
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 IBF standing by for dispatch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Notify Sandia Security (845-3114) of UAS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
IN THE EVENT THE UAS BECOMES HOSTILE:
|
||||||
|
13 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Advise all posts/patrols NOT to open fire unless fired upon
|
||||||
|
15 Notify all posts/patrols of Covered Wagon, FPCON Delta actions
|
||||||
|
and initiate a Squadron Level Recall
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Declare Covered Wagon and notify KCP as follows:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
“This is (Rank Name) with the 377 WSSS, initiate Covered Wagon
|
||||||
|
#____ and Force Protection Condition Delta at (time) Zulu.”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KCP Controller:_________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-11 Page 1 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-11 January 2017
|
||||||
|
NOTIFY HQ AFGSC AT DSN 94-781-9788 OR SECTERA 781-
|
||||||
|
7015 IF UNABLE TO COME IN CONTACT KCP and initiate QRC
|
||||||
|
#B-6
|
||||||
|
17 Initiate SCS-1 and activate terrorist push button
|
||||||
|
18 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19
|
||||||
|
Initiate IBF to Rally Point ______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
20 Initiate Follow-On-BF
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
21 Maintain contact with post/patrols engaging UAS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
IN THE EVENT THE UAS DEPARTS:
|
||||||
|
22 If UAS departs continue notifications and stand by for further
|
||||||
|
direction from Incident Commander
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
IN THE EVENT THE UAS HAS LANDED:
|
||||||
|
23 If UAS has landed, check for UAS Certificate of Registration
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
24 Upon removal of UAS initiate purge of all post/patrols areas of
|
||||||
|
responsibility
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
25 Request termination from incident commander
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
26 Notify all post/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
27
|
||||||
|
Terminate purge
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
UAS ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
28
|
||||||
|
Flightline patrols on scene: C-1_____, C-2_____, C-3_____,
|
||||||
|
C-4_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
29 Notify Sunport Aviation Police (505-328-5070) of UAS
|
||||||
|
30 BDOC will send UAS Report to:
|
||||||
|
David Jones in Albuquerque: david.a.jones@faa.gov
|
||||||
|
SA Kenny Maldonado in Dallas: Kenny.Maldonado@faa.gov
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-11 Page 2 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-11 January 2017
|
||||||
|
Refer to KAFB IDP as needed:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Tab B to Appendix 6 to Annex C (Page 140) (PL 1, 2, 3 Areas)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Tab C to Appendix 6 to Annex C (Page 143) (Main Base Non-Restricted Areas)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Tab A to Appendix 10 to Annex Z (Page 468) (PL 1 Movements/SAAM Aircraft)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Refer to FAA LEO Guidance Chart below as needed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If notified of UAS by FAA or FAA/ABQ Sunport then also contact:
|
||||||
|
Dave Jones, Principal Operations Inspector
|
||||||
|
ABQ FSDO
|
||||||
|
505-764-1211
|
||||||
|
David.A.Jones@faa.gov <mailto:David.A.Jones@faa.gov>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-11 Page 3 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-11 January 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-11 Page 4 of 4
|
||||||
104
export/(DCNI) A-12 Active Shooter Hostage.md
Normal file
104
export/(DCNI) A-12 Active Shooter Hostage.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-12 Active Shooter Hostage
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-12 January 2016
|
||||||
|
Active Shooter/Hostage Situation
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
Notified By:_________________ Time:___________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location/Direction of travel of shooter:_____________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Description/number of subject(s)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Sex:_____ Race:_____ Height:_____ Weight:_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Clothing:______________ Identifying features:________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Vehicle information:_____________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Weapon(s):______________ DIM count:_____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*If explosives are involved initiate Bomb threat QRC A-3*
|
||||||
|
2 Notify/Dispatch all post and patrols
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Establish topside 360
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cordon affected area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ECP:__________ TCPs:_____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*Instruct to make immediate entry do NOT wait for 360*
|
||||||
|
3 Initiate Covered Wagon (QRC A-7)/FPCON DELTA/Group level
|
||||||
|
Exercise
|
||||||
|
4 Accomplish initial notifications to KCP, BDOC, S3O, S3, CC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Additional agency to contact if NOT done so by BDOC:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
___AFOSI
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
___S2I Hostage Negotiator
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
___Local Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
___Fire Department
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
___Staff Judge Advocate
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
___Public Affairs
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
___Medical
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-3 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-12 January 2016
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Lockdown Facility/Squadron operations building
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If shots fired at KUMMSC/Squad Ops
|
||||||
|
Instruct personnel to close/barricade themselves behind office doors
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If shots fired and shooter is in close proximity of
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC/Squad Ops (Example Golf Course)
|
||||||
|
Lock all doors, do not allow personnel to leave the Bldg. Initiate one
|
||||||
|
point of entry, with personnel checking ID’s(armed if possible)
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
Patrols on scene: S-1_______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4______, S-5______, C-1_______, C-2_______, C-3_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-4______, Other _______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Upon termination establish crime scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*separate witnesses/Identify evidence if possible*
|
||||||
|
9 Once crime scene is secure, coordinate medical response to scene
|
||||||
|
and establish medical evacuation point.
|
||||||
|
10 Medical Transport Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Time:____ Name of crew:_______________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name(s) of victims transported:____________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location transported:___________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
If Hostages are present
|
||||||
|
12 Special Demands/Request from shooter:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Contact S2I Hostage Negotiator
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name:__________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Establish an Inner/Outer perimeter
|
||||||
|
15 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-3 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
69
export/(DCNI) A-13 Gate runner.md
Normal file
69
export/(DCNI) A-13 Gate runner.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-13 Gate runner
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-13 January 2016
|
||||||
|
Gate Runner/Unauthorized Entry Checklist
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notified By:_________________ Time:___________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Description:___________________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Color:_______ Make:_________ Model:________ LP#:_______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Last known direction of travel:_____________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Personnel description:___________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#Occupants:_____ Ethnicity:_________ Sex:____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 **Initial Notifications (S3O, S3, WSSS/CC) within 5 min of initiation
|
||||||
|
of incident.**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notify all posts/patrols of situation:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notify all posts/patrols of vehicle description:________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notify all posts/patrols of the personnel/subject(s)
|
||||||
|
description:______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
After description is obtained:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Dispatch topside patrols to establish topside 360 as well as TCP’s
|
||||||
|
at Highball 2 and Highball 4:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S1:______ S2:______ S3:______ S4:______ S5:______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Dispatch Coyote 1 and 2 to chokepoints 1 and 2 if BDOC has not
|
||||||
|
already done so.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Chokepoint 1: ________ Chokepoint 2: ________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Have each responding patrol confirm situation/dispatch by restating
|
||||||
|
type of incident and location.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 AFTER ACTION NOTIFICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Refer to Notification Matrix:_____________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-3 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-13 January 2016
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 BLOTTER:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ensure incident is annotated in the blotter (use applicable canned
|
||||||
|
entry).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-3 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-1a Unannounced Alarm-Misauthentication in Two-Person Area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-1a October 2015
|
||||||
|
UNANNOUNCED ALARM ACTIVATION/MISAUTHENTICATION IN TWO-PERSON
|
||||||
|
AREA
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Acknowledge Alarm
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Immediate visual assessment (IVA) of alarm through CCTV
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notify all posts/patrols of situation and dispatch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Initiate Security Incident QRC #A-6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Accomplish initial notifications to MUNS Control, BDOC, S3O, S3,
|
||||||
|
KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Patrols on scene: S-1_______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4______, S-5______, Cr-2/3______, Cr-4______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Other#______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PERSONNEL ARE IN THE AFFECTED AREA (EXTRACTION):
|
||||||
|
Contact SVA and instruct all personnel to go into the interlock
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Close all appropriate doors and open B7/14 for ISRT entry
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Request blast door override (Obtain override codes from 2-Person
|
||||||
|
box)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Override blast doors
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Extract all personnel from interlock and verify status
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Sweeps initiated with subsequent two-person team
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-1a Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-1a October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PERSONNEL ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE AFFECTED AREA (And alarm received is
|
||||||
|
a tamper or creates a penetration pattern):
|
||||||
|
Instruct MUNS Control to generate Two-Person team
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Request blast door override (Obtain override codes from 2-Person
|
||||||
|
box)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Override blast doors
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Sweep to alarm point initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Initiate appropriate up channel report if unauthorized individuals are
|
||||||
|
discovered
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Area search initiated by ISRT and MUNS Two-Person team
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MUNS Two-Person team secures all classified material (if
|
||||||
|
applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISAUTHENTICATION IN TWO-PERSON AREA:
|
||||||
|
Contact SVA and instruct all personnel to get into the position of
|
||||||
|
disadvantage (prone/face down)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Instruct MUNS Control to generate Two-Person team (if personnel
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-1a Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-1a October 2015
|
||||||
|
are in cell area)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Request blast door override (Obtain override codes from 2-Person
|
||||||
|
box)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Override blast doors
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Extract all personnel from interlock into Brandt Hall and verify status
|
||||||
|
with individual who mis-authenticated (SVAs will be armed – do not
|
||||||
|
seize weapons for verification of status)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Sweeps initiated with subsequent two-person team
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If status verification is confirmed all secure, brief personnel on proper
|
||||||
|
procedures and release
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If status verification is in question, extract all personnel to topside
|
||||||
|
patrols
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MUNS Two-Person team secures all classified material (if
|
||||||
|
applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-1a Page 3 of 2
|
||||||
38
export/(DCNI) A-2 CCTV Failure.md
Normal file
38
export/(DCNI) A-2 CCTV Failure.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-2 CCTV Failure
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-2 October 2015
|
||||||
|
CCTV FAILURE
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify all posts/patrols of situation/dispatch RF patrols
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 All RF patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4_____, S-5______, Cr-2/3______, Cr-4______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Initiate appropriate JCN, (QRC #D-15)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Priority-1 (Within Two-person area/4 or more cameras)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Priority-2 (Outside the Two-Person area/3 or more cameras)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Accomplish initial notifications to S3O, S3, KCP and BDOC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 MUNS escort team on scene (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 CTS personnel on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Cameras(s) fixed/verified as operational
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 JCN closed out, (QRC #D-15)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-2 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
237
export/(DCNI) A-3 Bomb Threat Suspicious Package.md
Normal file
237
export/(DCNI) A-3 Bomb Threat Suspicious Package.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-3 Bomb Threat Suspicious Package
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
BOMB THREAT/SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Notifications received from:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Complete AF Form 440, BOMB THREAT AID, (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Notify all posts/patrols of situation and instruct them to conduct
|
||||||
|
sweeps of their areas
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6, if threat affects PL 1-3
|
||||||
|
resources
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Establish a cordon around the affected area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
500 feet for briefcase size
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1000 feet for barrel/vehicle size
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1000 feet for unknown size
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ESTABLISH ADDITIONAL CORDONS AS NECESSARY IF ARMS,
|
||||||
|
AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVE (AAE) FACILITIES ARE
|
||||||
|
AFFECTED
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Evacuate all personnel within affected area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Instruct BDOC to dispatch a MWD.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Instruct owner/user agencies to search their respective areas
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9
|
||||||
|
MWD unit on scene:___________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Search initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-3 Page 1 of 5
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
ACTUAL DEVICE FOUND
|
||||||
|
11 Description/locations of device
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Notify all posts/patrols to not transmit within 25ft of device
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Declare Covered Wagon, (QRC #A-7), if device is affecting PL 1-3
|
||||||
|
resources
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Notify EOD at (6-2229) of the situation. During non-duty hours,
|
||||||
|
KCP will contact EOD
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Notify Fire Department (6-8220)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16
|
||||||
|
Obtain wind speed and directions(6-9722)/(6-8220)
|
||||||
|
_________/__________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Plot ECP/TCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 EOD on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19 Fire Department on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
20 Device safe/removed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
21 Request termination through KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
22 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
IF DEVICE IS LOCATED AT ECP
|
||||||
|
1 Description/location of device:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify all posts/patrols not to transmit within 25ft of device
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Close B-1 through B-4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 ECP ALL Lockdown
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-3 Page 2 of 5
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Direct the ECP to accomplish the following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Challenge all suspects and remove to Sally Port
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Assist with the evacuation of all non-essential personnel
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Remove keys, combinations and log off of AECS terminal
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Fall back to defensive fighting position in the loading dock
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
Obtain wind speed and directions(6-9722)/(6-8220)
|
||||||
|
_____________/____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Plot ECP/TCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Notify EOD at (6-2229) of the situation. During non-duty hours,
|
||||||
|
KCP will contact EOD
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Notify Fire Department
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Suspect(s) have been removed from the area (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Search of suspect initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Suspect turned over to SFS patrols
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 EOD on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Fire Department on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Device safe/removed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Initiate purge of the affected area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-3 Page 3 of 5
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 Notify all posts/patrols to conduct sweeps of AoR
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19 Request termination of Covered Wagon through KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
20 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
21 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
IF DEVICE IS LOCATED ON THE FLIGHTLINE
|
||||||
|
1 Description/Location of device:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Instruct all posts/patrols not to transmit within 25ft of the device
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7, if device is affecting PL 1-3
|
||||||
|
resources
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Notify EOD at (6-2229) of the situation. During non-duty hours,
|
||||||
|
KCP will contact EOD
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Notify Fire Department
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Instruct 58 SOW and 377 Base Ops to perform the following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Relocate aircraft adjacent to the cordon (if practical)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Initiate evacuation of affected buildings
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Conduct search of all aircraft to locate additional devices
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
Obtain wind speed and direction(6-9722)/(6-8220)
|
||||||
|
__________/____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Plot ECP/TCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 EOD on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-3 Page 4 of 5
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Fire Department on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Device safe/removed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Initiate purge of affected area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Request termination of Covered Wagon through KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-3 Page 5 of 5
|
||||||
70
export/(DCNI) A-4 Unplanned Power Outage.md
Normal file
70
export/(DCNI) A-4 Unplanned Power Outage.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-4 Unplanned Power Outage
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-4 October 2015
|
||||||
|
UNPLANNED POWER OUTAGE (KUMMSC)
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Dispatch patrols to Utility Building, Vehicle Barn, Sub-Power Station,
|
||||||
|
and Rooms 158 and 160
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Declare Security Incident, (QRC #A-6)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC, KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 All patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3______, S-4_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-5_____, Cr-2/3______, Cr-4______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ensure 360 is established Topside/Utility Building
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Sweeps of Vehicle Barn and Sub-Power station, Rooms 158 and 160
|
||||||
|
initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Sweeps initiated Utility Building
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Status of generator:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: If generator is not operational, contact CE (6-8222) and
|
||||||
|
initiate an Emergency Work Order. Prep for the MEP-9
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 If investigation reveals probable or actual hostile, initiate Covered
|
||||||
|
Wagon, (QRC #A-7)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 CE on scene: (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reason for outage:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-4 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-4 October 2015
|
||||||
|
11 Commercial power restored
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-4 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
83
export/(DCNI) A-5 Comm Outage.md
Normal file
83
export/(DCNI) A-5 Comm Outage.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-5 Comm Outage
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-5 October 2015
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION OUTAGE (PARTIAL/TOTAL)
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Send a runner to notify topside patrols and to activate Alt/SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Dispatch patrol to check antenna outside of C2B and establish 360 of
|
||||||
|
Squad Ops
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Dispatch Cerberus-2/3 to check antenna cable from B-5 to B-3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Dispatch Cerberus-4 to check antenna cable from V-3 to B-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Declare Security Incident, (QRC #A-6), if total communication outage
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: Topside 360 is required by QRC #A-6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Activate Alt SSCC by posting certified SCS/System Admin at BDOC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 BDOC initiates initial notifications to WSSS S3O, S3, CC, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 All patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3______, S-4_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cr-2/3_____, Cr-4______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Check of Antenna complete
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Sweeps of C2B initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Check of antenna cable from B-5 to B-3 complete
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Check of antenna cable from V-3 to B-1 complete
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-5 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-5 October 2015
|
||||||
|
14 Initiate Emergency Work Order through Kirtland C4 (6-1091)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
W/O #_______________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7, if investigation reveals
|
||||||
|
probable/actual hostile actions
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Comm Maintenance personnel on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Communications restored
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 Cause of Comm outage:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
20 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
21 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-5 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
106
export/(DCNI) A-6 Security Incident.md
Normal file
106
export/(DCNI) A-6 Security Incident.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-6 Security Incident
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-6 October 2015
|
||||||
|
SECURITY INCIDENT
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify all posts/patrols and dispatch as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Declare Security Incident and notify KCP as follows:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
“This is (Rank Name) with the 377 WSSS, initiate Security Incident
|
||||||
|
#____ at (time) Zulu.”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KCP Controller:_________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
NOTIFY HQ AFGSC AT DSN 94-781-9788 OR SECTERA 781-7015
|
||||||
|
IF UNABLE TO COME IN CONTACT KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 All patrols on scene: C-1_____, C-2_____, C-3_____, C-4_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____, S-5_____, SFS_____,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cr-2/3_____, Cr-4_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Sweeps initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Suspect(s) discovered
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7, if probable or actual hostile
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Suspect(s) detained
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Suspect(s) removed from the area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Search of suspect(s) initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-6 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-6 October 2015
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Suspect(s) turned over to SFS patrol
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Obtain all pertinent information:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Rank/Name:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Squadron/Off Sym:
|
||||||
|
(Civ base affiliation)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Duty Phone:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name of supervisor/phone number:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Secondary sweeps initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Exterior sweeps initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Situation determined non-hostile
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19 Notify KCP of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KCP Controller:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
20 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
21 Complete Security Incident and verify number with BDOC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
22 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-6 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
199
export/(DCNI) A-7 Covered Wagon.md
Normal file
199
export/(DCNI) A-7 Covered Wagon.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-7 Covered Wagon
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-7 October 2015
|
||||||
|
COVERED WAGON
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify all posts/patrols and dispatch as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Dispatch IBF to Rally Point______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 If SGT is in the dock, activate SGT/RCU procedures(if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Initiate all downstairs actions:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______ECP ALL Lockdown
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Don all alert gear
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Cr-2/3/4 in final denial positions
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Close vault door
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Initiate MUNS mass arming
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______SCS-1 and activate Terrorist Push Button
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Declare Covered Wagon and notify KCP as follows:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
“This is (Rank Name) with the 377 WSSS, initiate Covered Wagon
|
||||||
|
#____ and Force Protection Condition Delta at (time) Zulu.”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KCP Controller:_________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
NOTIFY HQ AFGSC AT DSN 94-781-9788 OR SECTERA 781-7015
|
||||||
|
IF UNABLE TO COME IN CONTACT KCP and initiate QRC #B-6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reference FPCON Delta from FPCON QRC and Checklist Binder as
|
||||||
|
necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: BDOC, initiate SFG recall and dormitory klaxon
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-7 Page 1 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-7 October 2015
|
||||||
|
9 Contact BDOC and notify them of the following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Situation requiring a BF
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Name and call sign of the RF leader
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Radio channel and routes of travel to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Post Alt SSCC with first available certified controller/System
|
||||||
|
Admin
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name of Controller______________ Time on Scene_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Request medical personnel as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: If contact cannot be made with BDOC, switch to LE
|
||||||
|
frequency and direct all SFS post/patrols to Code 9 to the
|
||||||
|
appropriate frequency
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Status of Follow-On-BF
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 All patrols on scene: C-1_____, C-2_____, C-3_____, C-4_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____, S-5_____, SFS_____,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cr-2/3_____, Cr-4_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Instruct MUNS control to obtain their half of the override codes and
|
||||||
|
standby for Blast Door Override procedures (if situation is within the
|
||||||
|
Two-Person Area. Initiate QRC #A-10)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Notify MUNS Control of the following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Situation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Shut down the air handlers if gas is suspected
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Ensure senior MUNS representative has a radio and is in
|
||||||
|
contact with SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MUNS Rep_______________________ # of Personnel_______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 IBF on scene Rally Point
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______IBF en-route
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-7 Page 2 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-7 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ensure IBF responds via separate routes, (if possible)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Routes:____________/_____________/_______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Situation Update:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: Provide additional updates to leaders as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Assault initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 If suspect(s) surrender, immediately detain and remove from affected
|
||||||
|
area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 Area sweep initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated, with:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Friendlies KIA___________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Enemies KIA____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EPW____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19 Follow-On-BF formed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
20 Follow-On-BF en route, (as necessary)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
21 Follow-On-BF on scene:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________/________, ________/________, ________/_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________/________, ________/________, ________/_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-7 Page 3 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-7 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
22 Secondary sweeps initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
23 Exterior sweeps initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
24 Request termination of Covered Wagon through KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
25 Termination received
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
26 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
27 Reset Terrorist Push Button
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
28 Deactivate SCS-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
29 Direct flightline patrols to accomplish 100% RAB purge of their AORs
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
30 Complete Covered Wagon Log and verify number with BDOC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
31 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-7 Page 4 of 4
|
||||||
100
export/(DCNI) A-8 Empty Quiver.md
Normal file
100
export/(DCNI) A-8 Empty Quiver.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-8 Empty Quiver
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-8 October 2015
|
||||||
|
EMPTY QUIVER
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Dispatch forces to conduct immediate recapture operations.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: Establish Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Declare Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Contact/instruct BDOC to close all gates and to notify local LE
|
||||||
|
agencies to assist with road blocks.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Accomplish initial notifications to S3O, S3 and CC and contact FBI
|
||||||
|
via KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: FBI becomes lead investigative agency once Empty
|
||||||
|
Quiver has been confirmed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Notify KCP of a potential Empty Quiver/Covered Wagon utilizing the
|
||||||
|
following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
“This is (Rank Name) with the 377 WSSS, initiate Covered Wagon
|
||||||
|
#____, Force Protection Condition Delta and we are requesting an
|
||||||
|
Empty Quiver at (Time) Zulu.”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Relay the following to KCP regarding Empty Quiver:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Location of incident
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Type of Weapon/Component
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Casualties
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Property damage
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Type of operation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Description of Event
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Measures being conducted to recover materials
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Suspected route of escape
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-8 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-8 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KCP Controllers Name:________________________________
|
||||||
|
7 Notify appropriate emergency response agencies:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Fire Department
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______EOD
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Medical Service
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 In the event that weapons are airlifted contact the FAA tower and
|
||||||
|
instruct them to track A/C and obtain the following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Type of aircraft
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Markings
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Direction of travel
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Once government control of resource is regained and hostilities are
|
||||||
|
confirmed terminated, establish an exclusion area (if applicable) with
|
||||||
|
available units.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
When available, ensure a certified Entry Controller (KEC) is posted
|
||||||
|
for ECP. Entry/Exit to and from the exclusion area is prohibited
|
||||||
|
until a certified EC is on scene.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Integrity of the resource been verified (as applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Request termination of Covered Wagon, FPCON Delta and Empty
|
||||||
|
Quiver through KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-8 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
70
export/(DCNI) A-9 Unauthorized Aircraft.md
Normal file
70
export/(DCNI) A-9 Unauthorized Aircraft.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) A-9 Unauthorized Aircraft
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-9 October 2015
|
||||||
|
UNAUTHORIZED AIRCRAFT LANDING/HELICOPTER DENIAL (KUMMSC)
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Dispatch all appropriate patrols
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Dispatch flightline patrols to Rally Point_______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Direct ECP to initiate ECP All Lockdown
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Close B-1 through B-4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC, KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4_____, S-5_____, Cr-2/3_____, Cr-4_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Advise all posts/patrols NOT to open fire unless fired upon by A/C or
|
||||||
|
occupants
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 IBF on scene Rally Point and standing by for dispatch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Direct topside patrol to signal A/C pilot to shut down engines (if
|
||||||
|
possible)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Notify Sandia Security (845-3114) of the unauthorized A/C
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Challenge all personnel in A/C
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Suspect(s) detained and removed from the restricted/controlled area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reason for Landing:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Suspect(s) turned over to SFS patrols
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 A/C sweeps initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-9 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A-9 October 2015
|
||||||
|
17 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19 Coordinate removal of A/C with KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
20 Accomplish notifications (refer to notification matrix)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
A-9 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
199
export/(DCNI) AM (V19-1).md
Normal file
199
export/(DCNI) AM (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) AM (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Guardian
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Alarm Monitor
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are the Alarm Monitor (AM), responsible for acknowledging, assessing,
|
||||||
|
provide initial visual assessment (IVA), and ensure dispatch of RF to Topside/KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
alarm annunciations. You are also responsible for controlling entry into the Two-Person
|
||||||
|
Area in accordance with all appropriate checklists. You are NOT part of the response force or
|
||||||
|
back-up force but will support those forces as needed to facilitate their response.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure a minimum of 2 blast doors are secured between the Loading Dock and the
|
||||||
|
storage cells, and at least one blast door between the Loading Dock and the Site Security
|
||||||
|
Control Center (SSCC).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If these blast door configuration rules cannot be met, ensure all Response Force
|
||||||
|
personnel are aware of the configuration violation and are posted in final denial positions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Acknowledge, assess, and ensure dispatch of Response Forces to alarm
|
||||||
|
annunciations and mis-authentications. Declare security situations as required.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Use applicable Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC) and make notifications for all
|
||||||
|
Security Incidents and other contingency operations.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Alarm Monitor, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Within the confines of SSCC unless relieved by another certified SCAM or by a
|
||||||
|
certified Security Control Supervisor (SCS). The AM may enter MUNS Control (MC) to
|
||||||
|
obtain the system override codes when the use of these procedures is required or during
|
||||||
|
changeover to check with MC on planned activities that may occur during your shift.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Your primary means of communication are your communication consoles and
|
||||||
|
equipment. Secondary means will be hand-held portable radios.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
|
||||||
|
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
|
||||||
|
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
|
||||||
|
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2 of 5
|
||||||
|
Alarm Monitor, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SSCC EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) In the event SSCC needs to be evacuated, the following needs to be completed:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All classified materials, portable radios and assigned weapons need to be taken
|
||||||
|
out of the office.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Note: If classified material cannot be removed, ensure 100%
|
||||||
|
accountability is conducted upon return to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Log off of all AECS consoles
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) SSCC will communicate with BDOC via Alternate SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a 100% purge of SSCC and report findings to Guardian-1/2.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Shift change will be conducted within the confines of SSCC and MC.
|
||||||
|
• Inspect your workstation and ensure it is free from trash and clutter, clean and fully
|
||||||
|
operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
• Conduct a radio check to ensure that the desk remote associated with your console is
|
||||||
|
operational.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct AECS changeover using Joint Routine Verification.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Account for all publications IAW the changeover binder.
|
||||||
|
• Account for the pass-on book.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all paperwork for off-going shift is complete and accounted for.
|
||||||
|
• Check with MC for planned activities that may affect your shift.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3 of 5
|
||||||
|
Alarm Monitor, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Initiating and tracking all work orders and JCNs.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the joint end-of-day check with MUNS personnel is conducted and the
|
||||||
|
Storage Cell Check is conducted when TPC area duties are complete.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Operate communications consoles and equipment.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Implement security reporting and alerting systems when required.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Document all openings and closings of cubicles and maintenance bays on the
|
||||||
|
required forms.
|
||||||
|
• Conduct JRV/changeover in accordance with all applicable checklists located within SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
|
||||||
|
and any O-6 and above. You will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing by
|
||||||
|
stating “Sir/Ma’am, Guardian is all secure and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be knowledgeable of and comply with alarm activation procedures, compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures and personnel entry and internal controls.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4 of 5
|
||||||
|
Alarm Monitor, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5 of 5
|
||||||
200
export/(DCNI) AM.md
Normal file
200
export/(DCNI) AM.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) AM
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Guardian
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Alarm Monitor
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are the Alarm Monitor (AM), responsible for acknowledging,
|
||||||
|
assessing, provide initial visual assessment (IVA), and ensure dispatch of RF to
|
||||||
|
Topside/KUMMSC alarm annunciations. You are also responsible controlling
|
||||||
|
entry into the Two-Person Area in accordance with all appropriate checklists. You
|
||||||
|
are NOT part of the response force or back-up force but will support those forces
|
||||||
|
as needed to facilitate their response.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure a minimum of 2 blast doors are secured between the Loading
|
||||||
|
Dock and the storage cells, and at least one blast door between the Loading
|
||||||
|
Dock and the Site Security Control Center (SSCC).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If these blast door configuration rules cannot be met, ensure all
|
||||||
|
Response Force personnel are aware of the configuration violation and are
|
||||||
|
posted in final denial positions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Acknowledge, assess, and ensure dispatch of Response Forces to alarm
|
||||||
|
annunciations and mis-authentications. Declare security situations as required.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Use applicable Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC) and make notifications
|
||||||
|
for all Security Incidents and other contingency operations.
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Within the confines of SSCC unless relieved by another certified SCAM
|
||||||
|
or by a certified Security Control Supervisor (SCS). The AM may enter MUNS
|
||||||
|
Control (MC) to obtain the system override codes when the use of these
|
||||||
|
procedures is required or during changeover to check with MC on planned
|
||||||
|
activities that may occur during your shift.
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Your primary means of communication are your communication consoles
|
||||||
|
and equipment. Secondary means will be hand-held portable radios.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition and
|
||||||
|
an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in
|
||||||
|
accordance with AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117,
|
||||||
|
Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate,
|
||||||
|
decisive, and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination
|
||||||
|
deter their actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
|
||||||
|
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
|
||||||
|
The ONLY exception is when present in the Site Security Control Center. This
|
||||||
|
gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm or
|
||||||
|
situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
|
||||||
|
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
|
||||||
|
situations or when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
SSCC EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) In the event SSCC needs to be evacuated, the following needs to be
|
||||||
|
completed:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All classified materials, portable radios and assigned weapons need
|
||||||
|
to be taken out of the office.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: If classified material cannot be removed, ensure 100%
|
||||||
|
accountability is conducted upon return to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Log off of all AECS console
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) SSCC will communicate with BDOC via Alternate SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a 100% purge of SSCC and report findings to Guardian-1/2.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Shift change will be conducted within the confines of SSCC and MC.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your workstation and ensure it is free from trash and clutter, clean and fully
|
||||||
|
operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Conduct a radio check to ensure that the desk remote associated with your console
|
||||||
|
is operational.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct AECS changeover using Joint Routine Verification.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Account for SSIs, Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC), 377 WSSS Notification
|
||||||
|
Brevity Matrix, Authorizations book, KUMMSC Upgrade Concept of Operations
|
||||||
|
Guidance and mission calendar.
|
||||||
|
Account for the pass-on book.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all paperwork for off-going shift is complete and accounted for.
|
||||||
|
Check with MC for planned activities that may affect your shift.
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Initiating and tracking all work orders and JCNs.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Operate communications consoles and equipment.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Implement security reporting and alerting systems when required.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Document all openings and closings of cubicles and maintenance bays on
|
||||||
|
the required forms.
|
||||||
|
Conduct JRV/changeover in accordance with all applicable checklists located within
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 and above. You will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Guardian is all secure and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be knowledgeable of and comply with alarm activation procedures,
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures and personnel entry and internal controls.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment
|
||||||
|
may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
51
export/(DCNI) B-1 (Security Patrol Duress).md
Normal file
51
export/(DCNI) B-1 (Security Patrol Duress).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-1 (Security Patrol Duress)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-1 October 2015
|
||||||
|
SECURITY PATROL DURESS (ACTIVE/PASSIVE)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify all post/patrols to “Code 9/___”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Notify all post/patrols of the situation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Dispatch applicable patrols and instruct patrols to conduct sweeps of
|
||||||
|
respective area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ACTIVE DURESS:
|
||||||
|
5 Initiate security incident (QRC #A-6)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Initiate challenge
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Reason for duress
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If actual hostile initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and Hostage
|
||||||
|
Situation, (QRC #B-9)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Accomplish initial notification to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PASSIVE DURESS:
|
||||||
|
11 Initiate challenge
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Reason for duress
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If actual hostile initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and Hostage
|
||||||
|
Situation, (QRC #B-9)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-1 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
47
export/(DCNI) B-10 (AMOS).md
Normal file
47
export/(DCNI) B-10 (AMOS).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-10 (AMOS)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-10 October 2015
|
||||||
|
ALARM MONITOR OPERATOR STATUS (AMOS)
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Initiate applicable “Bravo Series” QRC for duress
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Notify all posts/patrols to “Code 9/____”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Notify all posts/patrols of situation and dispatch to original alarm
|
||||||
|
point as well as office that failed to acknowledge alarm
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Initiate Security Incident (QRC #A-6)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Patrols on scene responsible monitoring office:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4_______, S-5_______ Cr-2/3________, Cr-4_______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Patrols on scene for alarm point:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4_______, S-5_______ Cr-2/3________, Cr-4_______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Attempt telephonic contact with appropriate office and authenticate
|
||||||
|
status (DO NOT HANG UP)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 If actual duress situation exists, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7)
|
||||||
|
and hostage situation (QRC #B-9) if applicable
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-10 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
53
export/(DCNI) B-11 (KUMMSC Armory Duress).md
Normal file
53
export/(DCNI) B-11 (KUMMSC Armory Duress).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-11 (KUMMSC Armory Duress)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-11 October 2015
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC ARMORY DURESS
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify all posts/patrols to “Code 9_____”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Notify all posts/patrols of duress and dispatch as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Initiate Security Incident (QRC #A-6)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 All patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____,
|
||||||
|
SFS_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Attempt telephonic contact with KUMMSC Armory. (DO NOT
|
||||||
|
HANG UP)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If negative contact is made, direct patrols to make immediate entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 If contact is made, instruct a member of the Armory to step out with
|
||||||
|
CAC card and have patrol ascertain status
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Instruct patrol to conduct interior sweeps of the KUMMSC Armory.
|
||||||
|
Authenticate with SSCC via armory open line.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If probable or actual hostile, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7)
|
||||||
|
and Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9), if applicable
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Notify all post/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-11 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
77
export/(DCNI) B-2 (ECP Portal Duress).md
Normal file
77
export/(DCNI) B-2 (ECP Portal Duress).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-2 (ECP Portal Duress)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-2 October 2015
|
||||||
|
ECP PORTAL DURESS
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Duress received from ECP portal #______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Conduct Immediate Visual Assessment (IVA), dispatch all
|
||||||
|
posts/patrols and notify them of Duress.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location_______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6, and initiate ECP ALL lockdown
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If hostilities are present, initiate Covered Wagon, QRC #A-7
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Notify all posts/patrols to Code 9/____ (If applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Initiate challenge of all personnel between D-1 through T-4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
Patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-5_____, Cr-2/3_____, Cr-4_____, SFS_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Obtain identity of personnel within the booth. Remove individual to
|
||||||
|
the Sally Port and conduct officer safety pat down
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Authenticate for Mini EC-1. Instruct ECP to initiate Special Function
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Prior to Activating Mini EC-1, verify with a Topside SRT that all
|
||||||
|
vehicles are clear of Vehicle Ram Barriers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Topside patrols removed all individuals from the controlled area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Instruct ECP to reset Mini EC-1 after all personnel have been
|
||||||
|
removed from the restricted area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Prior to Deactivating Mini EC-1, verify with a Topside SRT that
|
||||||
|
all vehicles are clear of Vehicle Ram Barriers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Sweeps of affected area initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-2 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-2 October 2015
|
||||||
|
13 Search of suspected individuals initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Request termination if deemed non-hostile. Ensure AF IMT 1168 is
|
||||||
|
accomplished
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 If situation determined to be hostile, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC
|
||||||
|
#A-7) and Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-2 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
77
export/(DCNI) B-3 (ECP Duress).md
Normal file
77
export/(DCNI) B-3 (ECP Duress).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-3 (ECP Duress)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
ECP DURESS (ACTIVE/PASSIVE)
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ACTIVE DURESS:
|
||||||
|
2 Initiate ECP ALL lockdown procedures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Disable ECP console and cameras
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Notify all post/patrols of appropriate “Code 9/___”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Notify and dispatch posts/patrols as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Initiate Security Incident (QRC #A-6)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Patrols on scene: S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4_______, S-5_______ Cr-2/3________, Cr-4_______ and
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SFS____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Attempt telephonic contact with ECP (DO NOT HANG UP)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Authenticate and initiate Mini EC-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Prior to Activating Mini EC-1, verify with a Topside SRT that all
|
||||||
|
vehicles are clear of Vehicle Ram Barriers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Authenticate status of ECP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Advise one member from ECP to step into Sally Port and make
|
||||||
|
contact with sweep team
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 If ECP is not secure or negative contact is made, make immediate
|
||||||
|
entry
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If hostile actions occur, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and
|
||||||
|
Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9) if applicable
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Conduct sweeps of interior and exterior of ECP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-3 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Authenticate with member of the sweep team to verify status via
|
||||||
|
open telephone
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Enable ECP Console and Cameras
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-3 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
102
export/(DCNI) B-4 (SSCC MC Duress).md
Normal file
102
export/(DCNI) B-4 (SSCC MC Duress).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-4 (SSCC MC Duress)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-4 October 2015
|
||||||
|
SSCC/MC DURESS
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SSCC DURESS (BDOC ACTIONS):
|
||||||
|
Disable SSCC (Duress switch must be active)
|
||||||
|
IN ALL OTHER CASES CONTACT SYSTEM ADMIN (3-2143/
|
||||||
|
6-5038) OR REFER TO NOTIFICATION MATRIX
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notify all post/patrols of appropriate “Code 9/___”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Dispatch patrols as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Declare a Security Incident, QRC #A-6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Accomplish initial notifications to S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Patrols on scene: S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4_______, S-5_______ Cr-2/3________, Cr-4_______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Attempt telephonic contact with SSCC (DO NOT HANG UP)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If SSCC is not secure or negative contact is made, make immediate
|
||||||
|
entry
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If secure, BDOC will relay status and pertinent information of
|
||||||
|
individual stepping out
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-2/3 will make contact and verify status of individual
|
||||||
|
Conduct sweeps of interior and exterior of SSCC, MC and RTES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If probable or actual hostile, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and
|
||||||
|
Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9)
|
||||||
|
Authenticate status of SSCC with Cerberus-2/3 via open telephone
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Enable SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
BDOC will instruct all post/patrols “Code 9/__” and ensure SSCC
|
||||||
|
reassumes control of net
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-4 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-4 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MC DURESS (SSCC ACTIONS):
|
||||||
|
Disable MC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Dispatch patrols as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Declare a Security Incident, QRC #A-6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Patrols on scene: S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4_______, S-5_______ Cr-2/3________, Cr-4_______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Attempt telephonic contact with MC (DO NOT HANG UP)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If MC is not secure or negative contact is made, make immediate
|
||||||
|
entry
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If secure, SSCC will relay status and pertinent information of
|
||||||
|
individual stepping out
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-2/3 will make contact and verify status of individual
|
||||||
|
Conduct sweeps of interior and exterior of MC, SSCC, and RTES
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If probable or actual hostile, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and
|
||||||
|
Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9)
|
||||||
|
Authenticate status of MC with Cerberus-2/3 via open telephone
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Enable MC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-4 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
47
export/(DCNI) B-5 (MUNS Armory Duress).md
Normal file
47
export/(DCNI) B-5 (MUNS Armory Duress).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-5 (MUNS Armory Duress)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-5 October 2015
|
||||||
|
MUNS ARMORY DURESS
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify and dispatch all posts/patrols as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Secure B-1 through B-4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Patrols on scene: Cr-2_____, Cr-3______, Cr-4_____,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____, S-5_____,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SFS_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Topside 360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Attempt telephonic contact with MUNS Armory. (DO NOT HANG
|
||||||
|
UP)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 If non-hostile terminate duress once ISRT has made face to face
|
||||||
|
contact with MUNS armorer and conducted a sweep of affected area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 If determined hostile, declare Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and
|
||||||
|
Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9) if applicable
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-5 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
30
export/(DCNI) B-6 (Wing Command Post Duress).md
Normal file
30
export/(DCNI) B-6 (Wing Command Post Duress).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-6 (Wing Command Post Duress)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-6 October 2015
|
||||||
|
WING COMMAND POST DURESS
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notify all posts/patrols of the situation and to increase security
|
||||||
|
vigilance
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Accomplish initial notifications to S3O, S3, and CC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Assist BDOC as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Once BDOC has notified SSCC that KCP is secure, notify all
|
||||||
|
posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If declared hostile, initiate Covered Wagon procedures (QRC #A-7)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-6 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
41
export/(DCNI) B-7 (BDOC Duress).md
Normal file
41
export/(DCNI) B-7 (BDOC Duress).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-7 (BDOC Duress)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-7 October 2015
|
||||||
|
BDOC DURESS
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Switch to LE primary frequency and instruct SFS patrols to “Code
|
||||||
|
9/____”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Notify all SFS patrols of duress
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Direct SFS Flight Chief to dispatch patrols and assist as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Accomplish initial notifications to S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Patrols on scene: SFS_______/________, SFS______/______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SFS______/______, SFS______/______, SFS______/______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Attempt telephonic contact with BDOC. (DO NOT HANG UP)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Notify SFS Flight Chief of status and standby for sweeps to be
|
||||||
|
initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 If situation is determined non-hostile, request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 If hostile actions have occurred, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7)
|
||||||
|
and Hostage Situation (QRC #B-9) if applicable
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-7 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
53
export/(DCNI) B-8 (Enrollment Center Duress).md
Normal file
53
export/(DCNI) B-8 (Enrollment Center Duress).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-8 (Enrollment Center Duress)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-8 October 2015
|
||||||
|
ENROLLMENT CENTER DURESS
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify all posts/patrols of duress and dispatch
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Initiate Security Incident (QRC #A-6)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2______, S-3_____,
|
||||||
|
S-4_____, S-5_____, SFS______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Attempt telephonic contact with Enrollment Center (6-4762) and
|
||||||
|
authenticate status (DO NOT HANG UP)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If negative contact is made, direct patrols to make immediate entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 If hostile, initiate Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7) and Hostage
|
||||||
|
Situation (QRC #B-9) if applicable
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Patrols make face to face contact with Enrollment Center officials
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Sweeps initiated on Enrollment Center
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Responding patrol will authenticate with SSCC via open line in
|
||||||
|
Enrollment Center
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Reason for Duress:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-8 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
104
export/(DCNI) B-9 (Hostage Situation).md
Normal file
104
export/(DCNI) B-9 (Hostage Situation).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) B-9 (Hostage Situation)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-9 October 2015
|
||||||
|
HOSTAGE SITUATION
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*If hostage situation is affecting PL1N, the presence of hostages
|
||||||
|
will not deter from the immediate recapture/recovery
|
||||||
|
operations.*
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If known, relay the following information to BDOC:
|
||||||
|
Demands:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# of Hostages/Names:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# of Suspects/Names:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Weapons/Armament/Explosives:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Declare Covered Wagon, (QRC #A-7) if applicable
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Notify all posts/patrols and dispatch as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Establish 360
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Direct evacuation of non-essential personnel
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Building/Areas to be evacuated:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location:____________ Location:____________
|
||||||
|
Location:____________ Location:____________
|
||||||
|
Location:____________ Location:____________
|
||||||
|
Location:____________ Location:____________
|
||||||
|
Location:____________ Location:____________
|
||||||
|
Location:____________ Location:____________
|
||||||
|
Location:____________ Location:____________
|
||||||
|
Location:____________ Location:____________
|
||||||
|
Location:____________ Location:____________
|
||||||
|
Location:____________ Location:____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Evacuation complete
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-9 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
B-9 October 2015
|
||||||
|
8 ECP Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Patrols/TCPs Cordon sentries posted:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TCP Location:_________________
|
||||||
|
TCP Location:_________________
|
||||||
|
TCP Location:_________________
|
||||||
|
TCP Location:_________________
|
||||||
|
TCP Location:_________________
|
||||||
|
TCP Location:_________________
|
||||||
|
TCP Location:_________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Hostage negotiation team formed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Situation update:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Assault initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DIM Count____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Detained____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Area Sweep initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
B-9 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
201
export/(DCNI) Backup SCS (V19-1).md
Normal file
201
export/(DCNI) Backup SCS (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Backup SCS (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Guardian
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Backup SCS
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are responsible for acting as Alternate SSCC, acknowledging, assessing, and
|
||||||
|
ensuring dispatch of Response Forces (RF) to topside alarm annunciations when SSCC is not
|
||||||
|
able to. You are NOT part of the response force or back-up force but will support those
|
||||||
|
forces as needed to facilitate their response.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Use the topside alarm sector map (Attachment 3) to coordinate responses by
|
||||||
|
Scorpion patrols to suspicious Perimeter Surveillance Radar System (PSRS) alarm
|
||||||
|
annunciations.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Dispatch RF as needed to resolve any alarm situation, as directed.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Use applicable Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC) and make notifications for all
|
||||||
|
Security Incidents and other contingency operations.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Guardian, Backup SCS, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all topside patrols are actively patrolling their respective patrol zones
|
||||||
|
(Attachment 1) and monitoring avenues of approach. Ensure all topside patrols are
|
||||||
|
displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to potential aggressors. Ensure a
|
||||||
|
minimum of one Scorpion patrol remains within the topside controlled area at all times.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If leaving the control center after being properly relieved by a certified SC/AM or
|
||||||
|
SCS, all required gear must be worn.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Within the confines of BDOC unless relieved by another certified SC/AM or SCS.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
|
||||||
|
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
|
||||||
|
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
|
||||||
|
Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Guardian, Backup SCS, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armory with both
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SSCC EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) In the event SSCC needs to be evacuated, the following needs to be completed:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All classified materials, portable radios and assigned weapons need to be taken
|
||||||
|
out of the office.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Note: If classified material cannot be removed, ensure 100% accountability
|
||||||
|
is conducted upon return to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Log off of all AECS consoles
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) SSCC will communicate with BDOC via Alternate SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a 100% purge of SSCC and report findings to Guardian-1/2.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
• Shift change will be conducted within the confines of BDOC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a radio check to ensure the remote console at the Law Enforcement Desk
|
||||||
|
associated with your console is operational.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct AECS changeover using Joint Routine Verification (JRV, QRC)
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Account for SSIs, Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC), 377 WSSS Notification
|
||||||
|
Brevity Matrix and KUMMSC Upgrade Concept of Operations Guidance.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Account for the pass-on book.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Guardian, Backup SCS, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Check with MC for planned activities that may affect your shift.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around limited areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and surveillance
|
||||||
|
of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure each Scorpion patrol conducts a walking patrol within one of the sectors
|
||||||
|
defined within Attachment 2. These walking patrols will be accomplished by each Scorpion
|
||||||
|
patrol within a different sector at different times. Additional walking patrols per Scorpion
|
||||||
|
unit per shift are encouraged. Radio SSCC and inform them of the applicable sector,
|
||||||
|
initiation, and termination of the walking patrols.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all walking patrols are randomly executed throughout the shift and are
|
||||||
|
adequately spread throughout different sectors to maximize coverage.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF
|
||||||
|
Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and offer a post
|
||||||
|
briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Guardian is all secure and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be knowledgeable of and comply with alarm activation procedures, compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures and personnel entry and internal controls.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Guardian, Backup SCS, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
206
export/(DCNI) C-1 Emergency Response (KUMMSC).md
Normal file
206
export/(DCNI) C-1 Emergency Response (KUMMSC).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-1 Emergency Response (KUMMSC)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-1 October 2015
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE (KUMMSC)
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: If fire is behind B-5, secure the vault door to SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Dispatch all posts/patrols as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Initiate IBF response to Rally Point_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 All posts/patrols on scene: V1AA____________, V-2______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
V-8______, HB-2_____, HB-4_____, ECP______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 IBF on scene Rally Point_______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FIRE:
|
||||||
|
9 IF FIRE IS BEHIND B-3/4 (BRANDT HALL)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-2/3 on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Actions:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-4 in final denial
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
IF FIRE IS IN LOADING DOCK
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-4 on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Actions:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-2/3 in final denial
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: Verify that Type 1 resources are not located within the area
|
||||||
|
10 If HAZMAT is required, initiate QRC #C-8.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-1 Page 1 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-1 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Obtain the following from the Fire Department:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Cordon size
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Wind speed and direction
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Number of vehicles and personnel responding (if possible)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Obtain number of personnel within the facility via evacuation report/AF
|
||||||
|
IMT 1109
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MUNS________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SF____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Other_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Contact MUNS Control if the facility will be evacuated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Shelter in place
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Evacuate. Number of personnel evacuating___________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: Ensure evacuees proceed to cafeteria. Ensure cafeteria has
|
||||||
|
been purged before handing off.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Authenticate for an EC-ALL/MC-2 as determined by the OSC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________EC-ALL initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Prior to Activating EC-ALL, verify all vehicles are clear of Vehicle
|
||||||
|
Ram Barriers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________MC-2 initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Notify MUNS Control of the situation and to prepare for Blast Door
|
||||||
|
Override
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Obtain Blast Containment Alarm information from MUNS control.
|
||||||
|
Authority to enter a potentially contaminated zone must be
|
||||||
|
approved by the 377 ABW/CC prior to opening the affected blast
|
||||||
|
doors
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(Tritium release does not require 377 ABW/CC authority prior to
|
||||||
|
entry)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-1 Page 2 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-1 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Fire Department on Scene V1AA
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of vehicles within the area________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of personnel in the area___________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FD trail vehicle__________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Maintain an accurate count
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Maintain positive control of all evacuees until they can be
|
||||||
|
questioned and properly processed out of the Restricted/Limited
|
||||||
|
Area and an AF IMT 1109 is completed. (if SFS patrolman responds
|
||||||
|
ensure he/she follows these actions)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Sign/Counter-Sign conducted
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 Fire Department on scene loading dock
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19 Area declared safe by Fire Department
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cause of fire:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
20 EOD on scene Loading Dock (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
21 EOD declares area safe (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
22 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
23 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
24 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
25 Area purge initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: Notify the Area Supervisor/on scene SFS patrolman to purge
|
||||||
|
the evacuee holding area and initiate statements (AF 1168s) if
|
||||||
|
required.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-1 Page 3 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-1 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
26 Dispatch additional topside patrols to V1AA to assist with vehicle
|
||||||
|
searches
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
27 Search all emergency responders and all individuals logged out on the
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1109 prior to departure
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If Emergency responders must depart the area due to an
|
||||||
|
emergency, ensure that an SFS patrolman follows the emergency
|
||||||
|
response vehicle in order to conduct a search and annotate the AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1109
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SECURITY FORCES EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
28 Notify BDOC to dispatch the remaining IBF patrols as the FBF as
|
||||||
|
directed by the OSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
29 Instruct BDOC/Posting NCO to recall a system administrator and
|
||||||
|
activate Alternate/SSCC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
30 Inform BDOC to make all notifications
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
31 If possible, take all classified material when evacuating. If classified
|
||||||
|
cannot be removed, ensure 100% accountability is conducted upon
|
||||||
|
return to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
32 Recall a system administrator to take control of blast doors from BDOC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
33 Log off of all AECS consoles
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
34 Take all portable radios
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
35 SSCC assumes command and control from alternate location.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
36 Upon termination return to KUMMSC, Cr-1/2/3/4, ECP and SSCC will
|
||||||
|
initiate a purge of the facility
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
37 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-1 Page 4 of 4
|
||||||
99
export/(DCNI) C-10 Natural Disaster-Inclement weather.md
Normal file
99
export/(DCNI) C-10 Natural Disaster-Inclement weather.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-10 Natural Disaster-Inclement weather
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-10 October 2015
|
||||||
|
NATURAL DISASTER/INCLEMENT WEATHER
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
NATURAL DISASTER:
|
||||||
|
2 Contact base weather (6-9707) for information on weather related
|
||||||
|
disasters
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Notify all posts/patrols. Advise them to check all physical security
|
||||||
|
safeguard for damage
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Coordinate with Guardian 1/2 to establish compensatory measures
|
||||||
|
(if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Compensatory measures implemented. Contact outside agencies as
|
||||||
|
necessary (Kirtland C-4, CE, Fire Department, etc.):
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
INCLEMENT WEATHER/SNOW REMOVAL:
|
||||||
|
6 Advise all mobile patrols of extreme weather conditions and state the
|
||||||
|
following.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Utilize caution while driving
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Do not leave the paved surface
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Dispatch response forces to provide a topside 360 all flight line forces
|
||||||
|
should be positioned to provide optimal security observation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Patrols may only leave static posts for security responses or if
|
||||||
|
directed by Flight Chief/Commander or higher authority
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 All mobile patrols on scene:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-1_____________, S-2______________, S-3______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-4_____________, S-5______________, C-1______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-2_____________, C-3______________, C-4______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-10 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-10 October 2015
|
||||||
|
10 Instruct a topside patrol to conduct hourly checks of the entry/exit
|
||||||
|
tunnel
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 If entry/exit tunnels become impassable, contact KCP and request
|
||||||
|
CHENEGA be en-route to initiate snow removal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If required, Dispatch Scorpion-2 to V1AA and stand by for CHENEGA
|
||||||
|
(ensure Scorpion-2 positively identifies the driver and conducts a
|
||||||
|
search of the vehicle)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_____CHENEGA on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Dispatch Cerberus-1 to the loading dock to observe CHENEGA
|
||||||
|
personnel do not depart course or vehicle as they travel through the
|
||||||
|
dock
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Search of CHENEGA vehicle and personnel conducted
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Ensure patrols are on scene, refer to QRC# 3 EC-ALL
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 CHENEGA actions complete
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Ensure CHENEGA departs the area appropriately
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 If Low Water Bridge is flooded or impassable due to snow, contact
|
||||||
|
KCP and advise them the primary route is impassable.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KCP Controller Name:_________________________________
|
||||||
|
(Make a blotter entry)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-10 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
54
export/(DCNI) C-11 National Defense Area.md
Normal file
54
export/(DCNI) C-11 National Defense Area.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-11 National Defense Area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-11 October 2015
|
||||||
|
NATIONAL DEFENSE AREA
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Contact additional response agencies (if applicable):
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Fire Department
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Local law enforcement
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Hazmat
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______EOD
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______OSI
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______FBI
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 At the direction of the 377 WSSS/CC, contact KCP and notify of the
|
||||||
|
situation and request authorization form the 377 ABW/CC to establish
|
||||||
|
an NDA
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 377 ABW/CC authorizes the establishment of NDA
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SAAM coordinator can authorize the establishment of NDA if a Type-I
|
||||||
|
movement is in progress
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Notify the land owner (if possible) and brief them on the situation and
|
||||||
|
reason for establishing a NDA
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
*377 ABW/PA will distribute appropriate briefing to state during
|
||||||
|
the establishment of the cordon
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Brief A/C CC to establish temporary boundary and place NDA signs
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 NDA established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location: ___________ NDA terminated: _____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-11 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
99
export/(DCNI) C-1a Emergency Response (Flghtline).md
Normal file
99
export/(DCNI) C-1a Emergency Response (Flghtline).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-1a Emergency Response (Flghtline)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-1a October 2015
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE (FLIGHTLINE)
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Received From:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Dispatch patrols as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 All posts/patrols on scene: C-1_______, C-2______, C-3______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-4_______ , G-1/2________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 360 established around affected area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Cordon established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location of ECP:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cordon Size:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Obtain the following from the Fire Department (if adjusted by IC):
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Cordon size
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Wind speed and direction
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Number of vehicles responding (if possible)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Fire Department on Scene ECP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of vehicles within the affected area________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of personnel in the affected area___________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Maintain an accurate count
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PL1/2 RESOURCES IN AREA:
|
||||||
|
10 Sign/Counter-Sign conducted
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-1a Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-1a October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 If nuclear resources/explosive devices are involved, notify EOD via
|
||||||
|
KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Fire Department declared area safe
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Fire Department makes recommendation to declare area safe,
|
||||||
|
but official determination is up to on-scene commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 If HAZMAT in area, refer to QRC #C-8
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If medical response is necessary, initiate QRC #C-2/2a.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Albuquerque Ambulance Service on scene________: (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Search of all emergency responders complete and all individuals
|
||||||
|
logged out on the AF Form 1109 prior to departure
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If emergency responders must depart the area due to an
|
||||||
|
emergency, ensure that an SFS patrol follows the emergency
|
||||||
|
response vehicle in order to conduct a search and annotate the
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1109
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Direct all patrols to conduct a purge of the affected area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel and vehicles have departed and that no
|
||||||
|
unauthorized material has been left or removed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Sweeps complete
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-1a Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
118
export/(DCNI) C-1b Emergency Response (Pad-5).md
Normal file
118
export/(DCNI) C-1b Emergency Response (Pad-5).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-1b Emergency Response (Pad-5)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-1b October 2015
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE (TYPE-1/PAD-5)
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Received From:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Dispatch patrols as necessary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Declare Security Incident, QRC #A-6
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Declare potential Broken Arrow, QRC #C-3 (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 All posts/patrols on scene: Mustang-2______, Mustang-3_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Mustang-4______, Mongoose-1______, Mongoose-2_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Mongoose-3______, Mongoose-4______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Contact Fire Department/online source to obtain the following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_________Cordon Size
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_________Wind speed and direction__________/____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 ECP/TCP’s established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location of ECP____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cordon Size_______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location of TCP____________ Location of TCP____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-1b Page 1 of 3
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-1b October 2015
|
||||||
|
8 Fire Department on Scene ECP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of vehicles within the area_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of personnel in the area___________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Maintain an accurate count
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Sign/Counter-Sign conducted
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Results:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 HAZMAT, QRC #C-8, EOD, QRC #A-3, and Albuquerque
|
||||||
|
Ambulance Services, QRC #C-2 on scene (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______EOD declares area safe
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______HAZMAT declares area safe
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Fire department evacuated all injured personnel
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EOD/HAZMAT makes recommendation to declare area safe, but
|
||||||
|
official determination is up to on-scene commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Search of all emergency responders complete and all individuals
|
||||||
|
logged out on the AF Form 1109 prior to departure
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If emergency responders must depart the area due to an
|
||||||
|
emergency, ensure that an SFS patrol follows the emergency
|
||||||
|
response vehicle in order to conduct a search and annotate the
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1109
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Conduct purge of the affected area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
______Terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Ensure a cursory check and a count of all personnel and injured is
|
||||||
|
conducted on AAS Vehicle’s at the CCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 All injured personnel removed from the affected area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-1b Page 2 of 3
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-1b October 2015
|
||||||
|
16 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-1b Page 3 of 3
|
||||||
84
export/(DCNI) C-2 Medical Emergency Response.md
Normal file
84
export/(DCNI) C-2 Medical Emergency Response.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-2 Medical Emergency Response
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-2 October 2015
|
||||||
|
MEDICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE (AAS) KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Received From:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Verify there is an actual emergency at KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Dispatch all posts/patrols
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: Dispatch Guardian-1/2 to the ECP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Patrols on scene:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
S-1______, S-2_______, S-3_______, S-4______, S-5_______,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cr-2/3______, Cr-4_______, Guardian-1/2______, Coy-1______
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 360 established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 SSCC will contact Guardian-1/2 and notify them of number of vehicles
|
||||||
|
and occupants responding.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of vehicles_______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of occupants_____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Ensure AAS is stopped at the cordon ECP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Ensure Guardian-1/2 makes face to face contact with driver to verify
|
||||||
|
their status
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Ensure prior to allowing entry into cordon, EC logs necessary
|
||||||
|
information on AF Form 1109.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 IF EMERGENCY IS AT KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
Conduct a check and a count of all personnel and injured prior to
|
||||||
|
personnel departing V-2 or V-8 and delivering to AAS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ENSURE AAS DOES NOT ENTER RESTRICTED AREA
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AAS can respond to V-2 or V-8 (whichever is the extraction point)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-2 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-2 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If a check cannot be conducted prior to personnel departing V-2
|
||||||
|
or V-8, an SFS patrol will follow the emergency response vehicle
|
||||||
|
to the hospital to accomplish search and log personnel on AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1109
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 IF EMERGENCY IS NOT AT KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
Ensure patrol on scene awaiting emergency personnel conducts a
|
||||||
|
check and count of all personnel including injured.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Fire Department/Flight Medicine extracts personnel from restricted
|
||||||
|
area to AAS at V-2 or V-8.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 All injured personnel removed by AAS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Termination received
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-2 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
198
export/(DCNI) C-3 Broken Arrow.md
Normal file
198
export/(DCNI) C-3 Broken Arrow.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-3 Broken Arrow
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
BROKEN ARROW
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SGT van number (if applicable):__________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Convoy: _____________________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Type of A/C and Tail Number (if applicable):________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Fuel remaining: ___________Line #: ______________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# of resources:____________ # of personnel affected_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location/Grid coordinates:_______________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Dispatch/notify all posts/patrols
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ON BASE:
|
||||||
|
3 Evacuate all non-essential personnel (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Declare appropriate up channel report (If applicable): Security
|
||||||
|
Incident (QRC #A-6), Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 2500 foot cordon established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location of ECP:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cordon Size:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Evacuation complete
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 All TCP posted:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-3 Page 1 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:_________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Crisis Action Team formed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Dead, Injured, Missing (DIM) Count
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Dead: _____________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Injured: ___________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Missing: ____________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Fire Department (QRC #C-1/1a/1b) actions initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Fire Department declares area safe: ______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EOD (QRC #A-3) on scene (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EOD declares area safe: ________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
HAZMAT (QRC #C-8) on scene (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
HAZMAT declares area safe (if applicable): ___________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EOD makes recommendation to declare area safe, but official
|
||||||
|
determination is up to on-scene commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Initiate withdrawal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Recovery operations initiated (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Area declared safe: __________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
OFF BASE:
|
||||||
|
14 INITIATE NATIONAL DEFENSE AREA, QRC #C-13
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377 ABW/CC is the only person authorized to establish a NDA. 377
|
||||||
|
ABW/CV may establish an NDA if contact cannot be made
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-3 Page 2 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
with 377 ABW/CC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Initiate recall
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
16 Form response teams. Gain permission from 377 ABW/CC prior to
|
||||||
|
departing installation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
17 Declare appropriate up channel report (If applicable): Security
|
||||||
|
Incident (QRC #A-6), Covered Wagon (QRC #A-7)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
18 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
19 If an aircraft is involved initiate downed aircraft procedures, QRC #C-4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
20 2500 foot cordon established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location of ECP:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cordon Size:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
21 Evacuation complete
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
22 All TCP posted:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name/Call Sign:_________________ Location:______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
23 National Defense Area formed, QRC #C-12
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-3 Page 3 of 4
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-3 October 2015
|
||||||
|
24 Crisis Action Team formed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
25 Dead, Injured, Missing (DIM) Count
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Dead: _____________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Injured: ___________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Missing: ____________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
26 Fire Department (QRC #C-1/1a/1b) actions initiated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Fire Department declares area Safe: ______________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EOD (QRC #A-3) on scene (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EOD declares area safe: ________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
HAZMAT (QRC #C-8) on scene (if applicable)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
HAZMAT declares area safe (if applicable): ___________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EOD makes recommendation to declare area safe, but official
|
||||||
|
determination is up to on-scene commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
27 Initiate withdrawal
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
28 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
29 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-3 Page 4 of 4
|
||||||
132
export/(DCNI) C-4 Downed Aircraft.md
Normal file
132
export/(DCNI) C-4 Downed Aircraft.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-4 Downed Aircraft
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-4 October 2015
|
||||||
|
DOWNED AIRCRAFT/PRECAUTIONARY LANDING
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Receive notification of a downed aircraft or precautionary landing,
|
||||||
|
do not make any verbal commitments to provide security manning
|
||||||
|
support until Squadron leadership has been fully briefed on the
|
||||||
|
situation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Gather the following information:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________Grid coordinate in Lat/Long or MGRS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________Estimated distance and direction from KAFB:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________Is the site accessible by road:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________Time of incident:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________Reason for landing:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________Precautionary Landing or Hard Landing
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
________Injuries
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Ensure 58 MOC notified 377 ABW KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If not, immediately direct the 58 MOC to contact the KCP to initiate
|
||||||
|
ABW notifications and official request for assistance from the Air
|
||||||
|
Base Wing
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, S4, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Ensure flight leadership selects an NCO team leader and up to 2
|
||||||
|
additional Airmen to secure the aircraft. Team members will all have
|
||||||
|
M4s. Ensure the personal cell phone numbers for all team members
|
||||||
|
are annotated.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
NCO:______________________ Contact #_________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Amn:______________________ Contact #_________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-4 Page 1 of 3
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-4 October 2015
|
||||||
|
Amn:______________________ Contact #_________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Dispatch a topside patrol to the Armory to retrieve the keys to the
|
||||||
|
Operations storage room and obtain a downed aircraft kit. Stage the
|
||||||
|
kit near the Armory or Flight Chief’s office. Ensure the NCO checks
|
||||||
|
out the satellite phone from the armory via AF FM 1297
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Go to the O-drive, O:\++SECURITY++\58 SOW Precautionary
|
||||||
|
Landing Site Directions and conduct the following:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_______Pull up the PowerPoint presentation describing driving
|
||||||
|
directions to the applicable site
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_______Familiarize yourself with the driving directions and aerial
|
||||||
|
photographs
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_______Ensure your flight leadership is informed on the site
|
||||||
|
locations and directions
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Ensure team leaves with a fully fueled 4 X 4 with a mobile two-way
|
||||||
|
radio/sat phone
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Confirm with Operations staff personnel and the Commander
|
||||||
|
whether the team will drive to the site or be flown out by 58 SOW
|
||||||
|
aircraft. (Note: Unless completely inaccessible by vehicle, teams
|
||||||
|
will drive to the site to ensure vehicle availability for emergency
|
||||||
|
purposes.)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 If flying out, coordinate with the 58 WOC on the time and location
|
||||||
|
for departure and facilitate the team’s availability for on-time
|
||||||
|
departure
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Prior to allowing the team to depart base, has permission been
|
||||||
|
granted from the 377 WSSS/CC and 377 ABW/CC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Ensure the team/team leader has done the following prior to
|
||||||
|
departing base:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_______ Phone numbers to local Law Enforcement Agency
|
||||||
|
responsible for the area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_______ Rules of Engagement/Safety brief
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_______ Accurate instructions to the site, do they understand the
|
||||||
|
directions?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-4 Page 2 of 3
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-4 October 2015
|
||||||
|
_______ SSIs
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_______ One additional radio battery per team member
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_______ Secure the downed aircraft response kit and conduct an
|
||||||
|
inventory of its contents
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_______ All team members will take their personal cell phones as
|
||||||
|
an alternate means of communication
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_______ Conduct 30 minute status checks
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
14 Notify leadership of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
15 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-4 Page 3 of 3
|
||||||
53
export/(DCNI) C-5 SF Vehicle Accident-Deadlined vehicle.md
Normal file
53
export/(DCNI) C-5 SF Vehicle Accident-Deadlined vehicle.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-5 SF Vehicle Accident-Deadlined vehicle
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-5 October 2015
|
||||||
|
SF VEHICLE ACCIDENT/DEADLINED VEHICLE
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Instruct patrol(s) not to move the vehicle(s) until an investigation has
|
||||||
|
been conducted
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(If safety for personnel and equipment is a factor, the Flight Chief or
|
||||||
|
higher may authorize movement of the vehicle)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Contact Fire Department, QRC #C-1/1a/1b, if there are any injuries
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, S4, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Instruct Flight Chief to obtain AF Form 1168 from all personnel
|
||||||
|
involved and witnesses
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Instruct vehicle operator to accomplish the SF Form 91
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Forward all information to SSCC for blotter entry
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DEADLINED VEHICLE:
|
||||||
|
9 Deadlined vehicle Reg: Ending mileage:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
New vehicle reg: New vehicle mileage:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 ADDITIONAL REQUIRED INFORMATION:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Transfer all equipment from deadlined vehicle to new vehicle.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ensure operator annotates AF Form 1800 (Deadlined and New
|
||||||
|
Vehicle) with all pertinent data.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If the vehicle needs to be towed, notify VCO to initiate the
|
||||||
|
appropriate action.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Accomplish blotter entry
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-5 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
54
export/(DCNI) C-6 In-Flight Emergency.md
Normal file
54
export/(DCNI) C-6 In-Flight Emergency.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-6 In-Flight Emergency
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-6 October 2015
|
||||||
|
IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCY
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Notified by:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Type of A/C:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Tail #:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Call Sign:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Nature of emergency:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of personnel on board:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Fuel Remaining:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Line #s (if applicable):
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If coming from overseas, notify customs via KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Landing on Runway:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ETA:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify all posts/patrols of in-flight emergency
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Dispatch Coyote-1 to the east side of Bldg #333 and standby
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Obtain wind speed and direction
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Fire Department, QRC #C-1a, on scene.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Fire Chief’s Name:_____________________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Further instructions from Fire Chief:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 In-Flight emergency terminated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-6 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
54
export/(DCNI) C-7 Ground Emergency.md
Normal file
54
export/(DCNI) C-7 Ground Emergency.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-7 Ground Emergency
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-7 October 2015
|
||||||
|
GROUND EMERGENCY
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify and dispatch all posts/patrols
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Obtain wind speed and direction:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____,
|
||||||
|
S-5_____, C-1_____, C-2_____, C-3_____, C-4_____,G-1/2_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Fire Department, QRC #C-1/1a/1b, on scene.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Evacuation point:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Further instructions from Fire Chief:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Cordon established:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location: ________________ Location: ____________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location: ________________ Location: ____________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location: ________________ Location: ____________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location: ________________ Location: ____________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 All non-essential personnel removed to evacuation point
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of personnel removed: ____________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Evacuation Point: _______________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Verify termination from fire chief
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-7 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
74
export/(DCNI) C-8 HAZMAT.md
Normal file
74
export/(DCNI) C-8 HAZMAT.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-8 HAZMAT
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-8 October 2015
|
||||||
|
HAZMAT
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Situation:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Notify and dispatch all posts/patrols of HAZMAT situation. Instruct
|
||||||
|
all affected patrols to don all pertinent alert gear
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Obtain wind speed and direction
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Cordon established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location: _____________________Location: ________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location: _____________________Location: ________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location: _____________________Location: ________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Patrols on scene: S-1_____, S-2_____, S-3_____, S-4_____, S-
|
||||||
|
5_____, C-1_____, C-2_____, C-3_____, C-4_____,G-1/2_____
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7 Fire Department on scene
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location: _____________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 HAZMAT on scene.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Location: ______________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Name of HAZMAT Team Lead: _____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Evacuation point: ________________________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Further instructions from HAZMAT team lead:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Instruct BDOC to initiate evacuation procedures
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ensure non-essential personnel are evacuated.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-8 Page 1 of 2
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-8 October 2015
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Number of personnel evacuated:____________
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Hazmat declares area safe
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
11 Request termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
12 Notify all posts/patrols of termination
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
13 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-8 Page 2 of 2
|
||||||
52
export/(DCNI) C-9 SSCC Evacuation.md
Normal file
52
export/(DCNI) C-9 SSCC Evacuation.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) C-9 SSCC Evacuation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
C-9 October 2015
|
||||||
|
SSCC/BDOC EVACUATION
|
||||||
|
STATUS TIME ACTION
|
||||||
|
1 Receive permission for evacuation from 377 ABW/CC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Notify BDOC to dispatch the remaining IBF patrols and the FBF as
|
||||||
|
directed by the OSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
2 Instruct BDOC to recall a certified SC/AM and activate
|
||||||
|
Alternate/SSCC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3 Accomplish initial notifications to BDOC, S3O, S3, CC and KCP
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: Recall a System Administrator to take control of AECS
|
||||||
|
from BDOC (Do not evacuate until sys adm is on scene BDOC)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
4 Take all of the following items:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
__________Classified material
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
__________All portable radios
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
__________Assigned weapons
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Note: If classified cannot be removed, ensure 100%
|
||||||
|
accountability is conducted upon return to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5 Log off of all AECS consoles
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
6 Upon termination return to KUMMSC, Cerberus-2/3/4, ECP and SSCC
|
||||||
|
will initiate a purge of the facility
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
BDOC EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
7 Disable X-Ray Video capability
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
8 Instruct BDOC to log off of AECS consoles
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
9 Switch to LE frequency and instruct LE patrols to “Code 9/__” and
|
||||||
|
direct senior patrolmen to take charge of forces until Alt/BDOC is
|
||||||
|
established
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
10 Accomplish notifications IAW notification matrix
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department of Defense Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
|
||||||
|
C-9 Page 1 of 1
|
||||||
338
export/(DCNI) CHARLIE 1.md
Normal file
338
export/(DCNI) CHARLIE 1.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) CHARLIE 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHARLIE-1/A/B/C
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC BACKUP FORCE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are the Charlie Back-up Force Leader and are responsible for all
|
||||||
|
Charlie Backup forces to include Charlie 2, 3, and 4. You will respond to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
and follow the direction of Guardian1/2, or Scorpion 1. If Guardian 1/2 or Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
is incapacitated you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
|
||||||
|
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
|
||||||
|
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
|
||||||
|
radio communication capability.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
|
||||||
|
ammunition and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
The Alpha member will be armed with an M4/203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
|
||||||
|
ammunition and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition and
|
||||||
|
10 rounds of High Explosive ammunition and 2 rounds of White Star ammunition.
|
||||||
|
The Bravo member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm and with
|
||||||
|
an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive,
|
||||||
|
and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter
|
||||||
|
their actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
|
||||||
|
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
|
||||||
|
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
|
||||||
|
or situation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while respond to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
|
||||||
|
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
|
||||||
|
situations or when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will also carry 4 Smoke, 4 non-lethal stun hand grenades and 6 CS Gas
|
||||||
|
Grenades on your post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
|
||||||
|
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
|
||||||
|
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
|
||||||
|
senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
|
||||||
|
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE SAFE GUARD TRANSPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
DoE Secure Transport arrivals, you will coordinate your efforts with Scorpion 1.
|
||||||
|
Assist Scorpion 1 with the following:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Cerberus 10 will relay the tractor, trailer, convoy CC, vehicle
|
||||||
|
registrations, and Convoy CC credential information via radio or intercom.
|
||||||
|
When DoE arrives at V1AA:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify all the credentials of all convoy personnel entering the topside
|
||||||
|
controlled area against the DoE Courier Listing.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If any information does not match, have Site Security Control Center
|
||||||
|
(SSCC) verify DoE affiliation through MUNS control and the DoE Control
|
||||||
|
Center.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all vehicle information matches previously supplied
|
||||||
|
information relayed from Cerberus 10.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify the Convoy Commander’s security status and ensure he
|
||||||
|
vouches for the security of all personnel/vehicles and ensure he vouches that
|
||||||
|
all arriving convoy vehicles have been sanitized and remained under constant
|
||||||
|
positive control.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
DOD CONVOY OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) For inbound or outbound convoy mission, be prepared to assist Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
with manual barrier procedures at V1AA.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Maintain situational awareness of the convoy movement and ensure you are
|
||||||
|
aware which version of the step code will be used along with specific step codes
|
||||||
|
applicable to your post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
|
||||||
|
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the
|
||||||
|
surrounding area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
|
||||||
|
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion
|
||||||
|
1.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA
|
||||||
|
you/Scorpion 1 will:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
|
||||||
|
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully
|
||||||
|
pass the correct counter-sign.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and
|
||||||
|
ascertain reason for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of
|
||||||
|
foul play or duress.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist
|
||||||
|
Scorpion 1 with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well
|
||||||
|
as those personnel staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to
|
||||||
|
physically document the number of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You
|
||||||
|
should not rely on memory to record this information.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged
|
||||||
|
out of the topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur
|
||||||
|
regardless of the fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1109. The annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual
|
||||||
|
vehicles and vehicle occupants to depart through V1AB.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency
|
||||||
|
response vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband
|
||||||
|
materials. Upon discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS
|
||||||
|
personnel for official determination of “contraband.”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location,
|
||||||
|
emergency responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this
|
||||||
|
case, responders will not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE
|
||||||
|
Patrol should be pre-positioned outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the
|
||||||
|
subsequent emergency location. The patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and
|
||||||
|
annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the subsequent emergency location. Make
|
||||||
|
contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is knowledgeable with respect to
|
||||||
|
this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not already in their
|
||||||
|
possession).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FACILITY EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over
|
||||||
|
evacuees as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the
|
||||||
|
exception of hand-held radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not
|
||||||
|
allowed. If hand-held classified material is present, search the content to verify it is
|
||||||
|
classified material. Log all evacuees on an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive
|
||||||
|
control over evacuees until the situation is resolved or they are otherwise released
|
||||||
|
by the Incident Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV)
|
||||||
|
parking lot west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased
|
||||||
|
to avoid congregation of all patrols.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash,
|
||||||
|
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377
|
||||||
|
WSSS blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
|
||||||
|
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building
|
||||||
|
(UB), C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted
|
||||||
|
through the use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside
|
||||||
|
patrol in the event the card readers are not operational.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will
|
||||||
|
make telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name
|
||||||
|
and badge number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If
|
||||||
|
AECS is not operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted
|
||||||
|
Area Badge Listing (MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside
|
||||||
|
patrol to meet the individual at the applicable location and verify the identity of the
|
||||||
|
personnel requesting access. If there appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a
|
||||||
|
challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out, notify SSCC and allow entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring
|
||||||
|
avenues of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to
|
||||||
|
potential aggressors.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible
|
||||||
|
concealment in and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such
|
||||||
|
areas for observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections
|
||||||
|
and checks of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour
|
||||||
|
checks are conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e.
|
||||||
|
Armory, Utility Building, C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not
|
||||||
|
congregate for longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
|
||||||
|
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
|
||||||
|
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle
|
||||||
|
denial barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post
|
||||||
|
and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie-1 is all secure and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective
|
||||||
|
Foot Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate
|
||||||
|
your walking patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate
|
||||||
|
coverage of the surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and
|
||||||
|
termination of all walking patrols.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System
|
||||||
|
(PSRS) alarm annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map.
|
||||||
|
Upon arriving at the applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and
|
||||||
|
report your findings back to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
334
export/(DCNI) CHARLIE 2.md
Normal file
334
export/(DCNI) CHARLIE 2.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) CHARLIE 2
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHARLIE-2/A/B/C
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC BACKUP FORCE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding
|
||||||
|
to contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 3, and 4. If the situation
|
||||||
|
demands you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
|
||||||
|
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
|
||||||
|
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
|
||||||
|
radio communication capability.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Leader and Charlie member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds
|
||||||
|
of 5.56mm ammunition and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition. The Alpha member will be armed with an M4/203 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow point ammunition
|
||||||
|
and 10 rounds of High Explosive ammunition and White Star ammunition. The
|
||||||
|
Bravo member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm and with an
|
||||||
|
M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive,
|
||||||
|
and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter
|
||||||
|
their actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
|
||||||
|
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
|
||||||
|
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
|
||||||
|
or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
|
||||||
|
to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
|
||||||
|
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
|
||||||
|
situations or when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
|
||||||
|
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
|
||||||
|
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
|
||||||
|
senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
|
||||||
|
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE SAFE GUARD TRANSPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
DoE Secure Transport arrivals, you will coordinate your efforts with Scorpion 1.
|
||||||
|
Assist Scorpion 1 with the following:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Cerberus 10 will relay the tractor, trailer, convoy CC, vehicle
|
||||||
|
registrations, and Convoy CC credential information via radio or intercom.
|
||||||
|
When DoE arrives at V1AA:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify all the credentials of all convoy personnel entering the topside
|
||||||
|
controlled area against the DoE Courier Listing.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If any information does not match, have Site Security Control Center
|
||||||
|
(SSCC) verify DoE affiliation through MUNS control and the DoE Control
|
||||||
|
Center.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all vehicle information matches previously supplied
|
||||||
|
information relayed from Cerberus 10.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify the Convoy Commander’s security status and ensure he
|
||||||
|
vouches for the security of all personnel/vehicles and ensure he vouches that
|
||||||
|
all arriving convoy vehicles have been sanitized and remained under constant
|
||||||
|
positive control.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD CONVOY OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) For inbound or outbound convoy mission, be prepared to assist Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
with manual barrier procedures at V1AA.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Maintain situational awareness of the convoy movement and ensure you are
|
||||||
|
aware which version of the step code will be used along with specific step codes
|
||||||
|
applicable to your post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
|
||||||
|
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the
|
||||||
|
surrounding area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
|
||||||
|
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion
|
||||||
|
1.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA
|
||||||
|
you/Scorpion 1 will:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
|
||||||
|
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully
|
||||||
|
pass the correct counter-sign.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and
|
||||||
|
ascertain reason for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of
|
||||||
|
foul play or duress.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist
|
||||||
|
Scorpion 1 with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well
|
||||||
|
as those personnel staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to
|
||||||
|
physically document the number of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You
|
||||||
|
should not rely on memory to record this information.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged
|
||||||
|
out of the topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur
|
||||||
|
regardless of the fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1109. The annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual
|
||||||
|
vehicles and vehicle occupants to depart through V1AB.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency
|
||||||
|
response vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband
|
||||||
|
materials. Upon discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS
|
||||||
|
personnel for official determination of “contraband.”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location,
|
||||||
|
emergency responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this
|
||||||
|
case, responders will not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE
|
||||||
|
Patrol should be pre-positioned outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the
|
||||||
|
subsequent emergency location. The patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and
|
||||||
|
annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the subsequent emergency location. Make
|
||||||
|
contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is knowledgeable with respect to
|
||||||
|
this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not already in their
|
||||||
|
possession).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FACILITY EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over
|
||||||
|
evacuees as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the
|
||||||
|
exception of hand-held radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not
|
||||||
|
allowed. If hand-held classified material is present, search the content to verify it is
|
||||||
|
classified material. Log all evacuees on an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive
|
||||||
|
control over evacuees until the situation is resolved or they are otherwise released
|
||||||
|
by the Incident Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV)
|
||||||
|
parking lot west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased
|
||||||
|
to avoid congregation of all patrols.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash,
|
||||||
|
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377
|
||||||
|
WSSS blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
|
||||||
|
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building
|
||||||
|
(UB), C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted
|
||||||
|
through the use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside
|
||||||
|
patrol in the event the card readers are not operational.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will
|
||||||
|
make telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name
|
||||||
|
and badge number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If
|
||||||
|
AECS is not operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted
|
||||||
|
Area Badge Listing (MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside
|
||||||
|
patrol to meet the individual at the applicable location and verify the identity of the
|
||||||
|
personnel requesting access. If there appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a
|
||||||
|
challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out, notify SSCC and allow entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring
|
||||||
|
avenues of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to
|
||||||
|
potential aggressors.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible
|
||||||
|
concealment in and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such
|
||||||
|
areas for observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections
|
||||||
|
and checks of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour
|
||||||
|
checks are conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e.
|
||||||
|
Armory, Utility Building, C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not
|
||||||
|
congregate for longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
|
||||||
|
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
|
||||||
|
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle
|
||||||
|
denial barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post
|
||||||
|
and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 2 is all secure and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective
|
||||||
|
Foot Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate
|
||||||
|
your walking patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate
|
||||||
|
coverage of the surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and
|
||||||
|
termination of all walking patrols.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System
|
||||||
|
(PSRS) alarm annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map.
|
||||||
|
Upon arriving at the applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and
|
||||||
|
report your findings back to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
333
export/(DCNI) CHARLIE 3.md
Normal file
333
export/(DCNI) CHARLIE 3.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) CHARLIE 3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHARLIE-3/A/B/C
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC BACKUP FORCE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding
|
||||||
|
to contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 2, and 4. If the situation
|
||||||
|
demands you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
|
||||||
|
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
|
||||||
|
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
|
||||||
|
radio communication capability.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Leader and Charlie member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds
|
||||||
|
of 5.56mm ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19 hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
The Alpha member will be armed with an M4/203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
|
||||||
|
ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition and 10
|
||||||
|
rounds of High Explosive ammunition and White Star ammunition. The Bravo
|
||||||
|
member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm and an M9 with 30
|
||||||
|
rounds of hollow point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive,
|
||||||
|
and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter
|
||||||
|
their actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
|
||||||
|
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
|
||||||
|
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
|
||||||
|
or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
|
||||||
|
to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
|
||||||
|
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
|
||||||
|
situations or when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
|
||||||
|
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
|
||||||
|
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
|
||||||
|
senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
|
||||||
|
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE SAFE GUARD TRANSPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
DoE Secure Transport arrivals, you will coordinate your efforts with Scorpion 1.
|
||||||
|
Assist Scorpion 1 with the following:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Cerberus 10 will relay the tractor, trailer, convoy CC, vehicle
|
||||||
|
registrations, and Convoy CC credential information via radio or intercom.
|
||||||
|
When DoE arrives at V1AA:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify all the credentials of all convoy personnel entering the topside
|
||||||
|
controlled area against the DoE Courier Listing.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If any information does not match, have Site Security Control Center
|
||||||
|
(SSCC) verify DoE affiliation through MUNS control and the DoE Control
|
||||||
|
Center.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all vehicle information matches previously supplied
|
||||||
|
information relayed from Cerberus 10.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify the Convoy Commander’s security status and ensure he
|
||||||
|
vouches for the security of all personnel/vehicles and ensure he vouches that
|
||||||
|
all arriving convoy vehicles have been sanitized and remained under constant
|
||||||
|
positive control.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD CONVOY OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) For inbound or outbound convoy mission, be prepared to assist Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
with manual barrier procedures at V1AA.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Maintain situational awareness of the convoy movement and ensure you are
|
||||||
|
aware which version of the step code will be used along with specific step codes
|
||||||
|
applicable to your post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
|
||||||
|
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the
|
||||||
|
surrounding area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
|
||||||
|
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion
|
||||||
|
1.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA
|
||||||
|
you/Scorpion 1 will:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
|
||||||
|
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully
|
||||||
|
pass the correct counter-sign.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and
|
||||||
|
ascertain reason for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of
|
||||||
|
foul play or duress.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist
|
||||||
|
Scorpion 1 with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well
|
||||||
|
as those personnel staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to
|
||||||
|
physically document the number of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You
|
||||||
|
should not rely on memory to record this information.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged
|
||||||
|
out of the topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur
|
||||||
|
regardless of the fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1109. The annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual
|
||||||
|
vehicles and vehicle occupants to depart through V1AB.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency
|
||||||
|
response vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband
|
||||||
|
materials. Upon discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS
|
||||||
|
personnel for official determination of “contraband.”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location,
|
||||||
|
emergency responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this
|
||||||
|
case, responders will not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE
|
||||||
|
Patrol should be pre-positioned outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the
|
||||||
|
subsequent emergency location. The patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and
|
||||||
|
annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the subsequent emergency location. Make
|
||||||
|
contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is knowledgeable with respect to
|
||||||
|
this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not already in their
|
||||||
|
possession).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FACILITY EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over
|
||||||
|
evacuees as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the
|
||||||
|
exception of hand-held radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not
|
||||||
|
allowed. If hand-held classified material is present, search the content to verify it is
|
||||||
|
classified material. Log all evacuees on an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive
|
||||||
|
control over evacuees until the situation is resolved or they are otherwise released
|
||||||
|
by the Incident Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV)
|
||||||
|
parking lot west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased
|
||||||
|
to avoid congregation of all patrols.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash,
|
||||||
|
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377
|
||||||
|
WSSS blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
|
||||||
|
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building
|
||||||
|
(UB), C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted
|
||||||
|
through the use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside
|
||||||
|
patrol in the event the card readers are not operational.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will
|
||||||
|
make telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name
|
||||||
|
and badge number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If
|
||||||
|
AECS is not operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted
|
||||||
|
Area Badge Listing (MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside
|
||||||
|
patrol to meet the individual at the applicable location and verify the identity of the
|
||||||
|
personnel requesting access. If there appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a
|
||||||
|
challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out, notify SSCC and allow entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring
|
||||||
|
avenues of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to
|
||||||
|
potential aggressors.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible
|
||||||
|
concealment in and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such
|
||||||
|
areas for observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections
|
||||||
|
and checks of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour
|
||||||
|
checks are conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e.
|
||||||
|
Armory, Utility Building, C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not
|
||||||
|
congregate for longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
|
||||||
|
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
|
||||||
|
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle
|
||||||
|
denial barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post
|
||||||
|
and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 3 is all secure and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective
|
||||||
|
Foot Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate
|
||||||
|
your walking patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate
|
||||||
|
coverage of the surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and
|
||||||
|
termination of all walking patrols.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System
|
||||||
|
(PSRS) alarm annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map.
|
||||||
|
Upon arriving at the applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and
|
||||||
|
report your findings back to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
340
export/(DCNI) CHARLIE 4.md
Normal file
340
export/(DCNI) CHARLIE 4.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) CHARLIE 4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHARLIE-4/A/B/C
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC BACKUP FORCE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding
|
||||||
|
to contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 2, and 3. If the situation
|
||||||
|
demands you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
|
||||||
|
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
|
||||||
|
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
|
||||||
|
radio communication capability.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Leader and Charlie member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds
|
||||||
|
of 5.56mm ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of hollow-point ammunition. The
|
||||||
|
Alpha member will be armed with an M4/203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
|
||||||
|
ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of hollow-point ammunition and 10 rounds of
|
||||||
|
High Explosive ammunition and 2 rounds of White Star ammunition. The Bravo
|
||||||
|
member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm and an M9 with 30
|
||||||
|
rounds of hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive,
|
||||||
|
and effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter
|
||||||
|
their actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
|
||||||
|
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
|
||||||
|
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
|
||||||
|
or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
|
||||||
|
to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
|
||||||
|
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
|
||||||
|
situations or when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
|
||||||
|
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
|
||||||
|
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
|
||||||
|
senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
|
||||||
|
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE SAFE GUARD TRANSPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
DoE Secure Transport arrivals, you will coordinate your efforts with Scorpion 1.
|
||||||
|
Assist Scorpion 1 with the following:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Cerberus 10 will relay the tractor, trailer, convoy CC, vehicle
|
||||||
|
registrations, and Convoy CC credential information via radio or intercom.
|
||||||
|
When DoE arrives at V1AA:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify all the credentials of all convoy personnel entering the topside
|
||||||
|
controlled area against the DoE Courier Listing.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If any information does not match, have Site Security Control Center
|
||||||
|
(SSCC) verify DoE affiliation through MUNS control and the DoE Control
|
||||||
|
Center.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all vehicle information matches previously supplied
|
||||||
|
information relayed from Cerberus 10.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify the Convoy Commander’s security status and ensure he
|
||||||
|
vouches for the security of all personnel/vehicles and ensure he vouches that
|
||||||
|
all arriving convoy vehicles have been sanitized and remained under constant
|
||||||
|
positive control.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD CONVOY OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) For inbound or outbound convoy mission, be prepared to assist Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
with manual barrier procedures at V1AA.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Maintain situational awareness of the convoy movement and ensure you are
|
||||||
|
aware which version of the step code will be used along with specific step codes
|
||||||
|
applicable to your post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
|
||||||
|
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the
|
||||||
|
surrounding area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
|
||||||
|
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion
|
||||||
|
1.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA
|
||||||
|
you/Scorpion 1 will:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
|
||||||
|
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully
|
||||||
|
pass the correct counter-sign.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and
|
||||||
|
ascertain reason for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of
|
||||||
|
foul play or duress.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist
|
||||||
|
Scorpion 1 with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well
|
||||||
|
as those personnel staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to
|
||||||
|
physically document the number of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You
|
||||||
|
should not rely on memory to record this information.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged
|
||||||
|
out of the topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur
|
||||||
|
regardless of the fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1109. The annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual
|
||||||
|
vehicles and vehicle occupants to depart through V1AB.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency
|
||||||
|
response vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband
|
||||||
|
materials. Upon discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS
|
||||||
|
personnel for official determination of “contraband.”
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location,
|
||||||
|
emergency responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this
|
||||||
|
case, responders will not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE
|
||||||
|
Patrol should be pre-positioned outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the
|
||||||
|
subsequent emergency location. The patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and
|
||||||
|
annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the subsequent emergency location. Make
|
||||||
|
contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is knowledgeable with respect to
|
||||||
|
this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not already in their
|
||||||
|
possession).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FACILITY EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over
|
||||||
|
evacuees as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the
|
||||||
|
exception of hand-held radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not
|
||||||
|
allowed. If hand-held classified material is present, search the content to verify it is
|
||||||
|
classified material. Log all evacuees on an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive
|
||||||
|
control over evacuees until the situation is resolved or they are otherwise released
|
||||||
|
by the Incident Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV)
|
||||||
|
parking lot west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased
|
||||||
|
to avoid congregation of all patrols.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash,
|
||||||
|
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377
|
||||||
|
WSSS blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
|
||||||
|
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building
|
||||||
|
(UB), C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted
|
||||||
|
through the use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside
|
||||||
|
patrol in the event the card readers are not operational.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will
|
||||||
|
make telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name
|
||||||
|
and badge number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If
|
||||||
|
AECS is not operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted
|
||||||
|
Area Badge Listing (MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside
|
||||||
|
patrol to meet the individual at the applicable location and verify the identity of the
|
||||||
|
personnel requesting access. If there appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a
|
||||||
|
challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out, notify SSCC and allow entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring
|
||||||
|
avenues of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to
|
||||||
|
potential aggressors.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible
|
||||||
|
concealment in and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such
|
||||||
|
areas for observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections
|
||||||
|
and checks of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour
|
||||||
|
checks are conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e.
|
||||||
|
Armory, Utility Building, C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not
|
||||||
|
congregate for longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
|
||||||
|
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
|
||||||
|
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle
|
||||||
|
denial barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post
|
||||||
|
and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 4 is all secure and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective
|
||||||
|
Foot Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate
|
||||||
|
your walking patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate
|
||||||
|
coverage of the surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and
|
||||||
|
termination of all walking patrols.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System
|
||||||
|
(PSRS) alarm annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map.
|
||||||
|
Upon arriving at the applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and
|
||||||
|
report your findings back to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
310
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 12.md
Normal file
310
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 12.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) COYOTE 12
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 12
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reflex Delta Billet Entry Controller
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
You are the Entry Controller (EC) for all Reflex Delta missions and will stay within 25
|
||||||
|
feet of the established entry control point of the PL1 restricted area unless properly
|
||||||
|
relieved.
|
||||||
|
Additionally, in conjunction with Coyote 13 (Reflex Delta Close Bound Sentry), you
|
||||||
|
comprise a 2-man Internal Security Response Team. Coordinate with Coyote 13 to
|
||||||
|
ensure adequate coverage of the restricted area’s interior. To the greatest extent
|
||||||
|
possible, remain 180° apart with respect to the restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial Backup Force IBF and will not
|
||||||
|
respond to KUMMSC contingency operations.
|
||||||
|
The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
|
||||||
|
immediate response capability to the area inside the perimeter in order to defeat an
|
||||||
|
adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
|
||||||
|
You will control entry and access to Reflex Delta aircraft using authenticated Entry
|
||||||
|
Authority Lists (EAL). For personnel desiring entry, compare the provided
|
||||||
|
identification credentials against the information listed on the authenticated EAL. All
|
||||||
|
information must match or entry is not authorized.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
|
||||||
|
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the orange radio
|
||||||
|
communication box.
|
||||||
|
A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
|
||||||
|
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
|
||||||
|
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
|
||||||
|
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
|
||||||
|
to Coyote 4’s area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
You will stay within 25 feet of the established entry control point of the PL1 restricted
|
||||||
|
area unless properly relieved.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmission using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who will
|
||||||
|
contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition
|
||||||
|
and M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Ensure those entering the roped restricted area must be on an authenticated EAL or
|
||||||
|
authenticated Aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body
|
||||||
|
above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
|
||||||
|
restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot
|
||||||
|
cargo pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
|
||||||
|
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline
|
||||||
|
photography letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If
|
||||||
|
photographers do not possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area
|
||||||
|
badge) with the proper open area, they must be annotated on a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL or be escorted by someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare
|
||||||
|
the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
|
||||||
|
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 12 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
|
||||||
|
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. You will
|
||||||
|
assume entry control duties and Coyote 13 will assume Close Boundary Sentry
|
||||||
|
duties.
|
||||||
|
In conjunction with Coyote 14, make contact with the Aircraft commander as soon as
|
||||||
|
possible to obtain EAL information.
|
||||||
|
Acceptable EAL information will come in Aircrew Orders or an Interim EAL
|
||||||
|
template.
|
||||||
|
Aircrew Orders are provided by the pilot or mission commander and if used,
|
||||||
|
must contain the following information:
|
||||||
|
Name
|
||||||
|
Rank
|
||||||
|
Organization
|
||||||
|
Last 6 of Social Security Number or Controlled Picture Identification
|
||||||
|
Number
|
||||||
|
Badge number
|
||||||
|
Dates of Visit
|
||||||
|
Clearance Status
|
||||||
|
Expiration Date
|
||||||
|
If the Crew Orders do not contain all information listed above, you may hand-
|
||||||
|
write in the missing information, if practical. If hand-writing the information in on
|
||||||
|
the Aircrew Orders would make them unreadable, use the Interim EAL template.
|
||||||
|
If Aircrew Orders are not available, use the Interim EAL template. Fill in all the
|
||||||
|
blocks on the template to include all members of the aircrew.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
|
||||||
|
Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
|
||||||
|
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, Coyote-1 will take the both
|
||||||
|
documents and make copies for distribution as follows.
|
||||||
|
One copy for Coyote 1(Flightline Area Supervisor)
|
||||||
|
One copy for Coyote 14 (Reflex Delta Area Supervisor)
|
||||||
|
One copy (original) for Coyote 12 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller)
|
||||||
|
One copy for the Mission Commander
|
||||||
|
One copy for SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
You will use the authenticated EAL to control entry at the designated Entry Control
|
||||||
|
Point to the roped restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If personnel are being escorted into the restricted area, prior to allowing entry to
|
||||||
|
and exit from the restricted area, you must verify with escort officials that they
|
||||||
|
have completed an inspection of all vehicles and hand-carried items of those
|
||||||
|
they are escorting. NOTE: This entails two separate inspections; an inspection
|
||||||
|
prior to entry and an inspection prior to exit.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The on-duty Flight Chief or Flight Commander will meet the mission commander and
|
||||||
|
deliver a local area security briefing as outlined in Attachment 15. If the Flight Chief
|
||||||
|
or Flight Commander are not available, Coyote 14 will brief the mission commander
|
||||||
|
on the contents of Attachment 15.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
|
||||||
|
The presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
|
||||||
|
concept within the roped restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
You will ensure enforcement of the two-person concept before granting access to
|
||||||
|
the aircraft. Enforce the two-person control by using an EAL to identify two
|
||||||
|
authorized individuals prior to allowing entry. Certified 2-person control team
|
||||||
|
members are identified with an “X” next to their name on the Entry Authority List
|
||||||
|
provided by the aircrew.
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
|
||||||
|
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
|
||||||
|
vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted at the entry control point of the Reflex Delta restricted
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
If you have a vehicle, Inspect it using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from
|
||||||
|
trash, clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
Account for SSIs, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
249
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 13.md
Normal file
249
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 13.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) COYOTE 13
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 13
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reflex Delta Close Bound Sentry
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
You are the flight line Close Boundary Sentry (CBS) for all Reflex Delta missions.
|
||||||
|
The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
|
||||||
|
immediate response capability to the area inside the perimeter in order to defeat an
|
||||||
|
adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
|
||||||
|
Additionally, in conjunction with Coyote 12 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller), you
|
||||||
|
comprise a 2-man Internal Security Response Team. Coordinate with Coyote 12 to
|
||||||
|
ensure adequate coverage of the restricted area’s interior. To the greatest extent
|
||||||
|
possible, remain 180° apart with respect to the restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial Backup Force IBF and will not
|
||||||
|
respond to KUMMSC contingency operations.
|
||||||
|
Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
|
||||||
|
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the orange radio
|
||||||
|
communication box.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
(Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes, cones,
|
||||||
|
stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you have
|
||||||
|
enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20 stanchions, 4
|
||||||
|
RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered to Coyote 4’s
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
You must wear all required gear when responding to any situation or alarm. This
|
||||||
|
includes Flak Vest with Level IV ballistic plates, helmet, and gas mask with
|
||||||
|
appropriately filled out DD Form 1574/fit test.
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
|
||||||
|
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
|
||||||
|
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
|
||||||
|
or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
If leaving your vehicle, all required gear must be worn.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
You will remain within the restricted area perimeter and to the greatest extent
|
||||||
|
possible, remain 180° from Coyote 12 with respect to the restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource are prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC
|
||||||
|
who will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition
|
||||||
|
and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
|
||||||
|
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. You will
|
||||||
|
assume Close Boundary Sentry duties and Coyote 12 will assume entry control
|
||||||
|
duties
|
||||||
|
The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
|
||||||
|
The presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
|
||||||
|
concept within the roped restricted area boundary. When in effect, you will monitor
|
||||||
|
enforcement of the two-person concept
|
||||||
|
SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
|
||||||
|
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Ensure those entering the roped restricted area must be on an authenticated EAL or
|
||||||
|
authenticated Aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body
|
||||||
|
above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
|
||||||
|
restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to hot cargo pads
|
||||||
|
(to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
|
||||||
|
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare
|
||||||
|
the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
|
||||||
|
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 13 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
|
||||||
|
vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted at the entry control point of the Reflex Delta restricted
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
If you have a vehicle, inspect it using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash,
|
||||||
|
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
303
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 14.md
Normal file
303
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 14.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) COYOTE 14
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 14
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reflex Delta Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(U) PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are the dedicated ISRT for all Reflex Delta missions which will be
|
||||||
|
located on the 377th ABW parking ramp. You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial
|
||||||
|
Backup Force IBF and will not respond to KUMMSC contingency operations.
|
||||||
|
The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
|
||||||
|
immediate response capability to this perimeter in order to defeat an adversary
|
||||||
|
before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
|
||||||
|
The ranking member of this team is the Reflex Delta Area Supervisor and
|
||||||
|
responsible to ensure all security requirements are maintained.
|
||||||
|
Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
|
||||||
|
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the reflex delta kit.
|
||||||
|
A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
|
||||||
|
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
|
||||||
|
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
|
||||||
|
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
|
||||||
|
to ` 4’s area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(U) You will stay within the 377 Air Base Wing restricted area unless properly
|
||||||
|
relieved.
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
|
||||||
|
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition
|
||||||
|
and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Ensure those entering the roped restricted area are on an authenticated EAL or
|
||||||
|
authenticated Aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their
|
||||||
|
body above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
|
||||||
|
restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access the hot cargo
|
||||||
|
pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
|
||||||
|
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
|
||||||
|
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
|
||||||
|
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
|
||||||
|
discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 14 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
|
||||||
|
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. Coyote
|
||||||
|
12 will assume entry control duties and Coyote 13 will assume Close Boundary
|
||||||
|
Sentry duties.
|
||||||
|
In conjunction with Coyote 12, make contact with the Aircraft commander as soon as
|
||||||
|
possible to obtain Entry Authority List (EAL) information.
|
||||||
|
Aircrew Orders are provided by the pilot or mission commander and if used,
|
||||||
|
must contain the following information:
|
||||||
|
Name
|
||||||
|
Rank
|
||||||
|
Organization
|
||||||
|
Last 6 of Social Security Number or Controlled Picture Identification
|
||||||
|
Number
|
||||||
|
Badge number
|
||||||
|
Dates of Visit
|
||||||
|
Clearance Status
|
||||||
|
Expiration Date
|
||||||
|
If the Crew Orders do not contain all information listed above, you may hand-
|
||||||
|
write in the missing information, if practical. If hand-writing the information in
|
||||||
|
on the Aircrew Orders would make them unreadable, use the Interim EAL
|
||||||
|
template.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
|
||||||
|
Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
|
||||||
|
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, Coyote-1 will take the both
|
||||||
|
documents and make copies for distribution as follows.
|
||||||
|
One copy for Coyote 1(Flightline Area Supervisor)
|
||||||
|
One copy for Coyote 14 (Reflex Delta Area Supervisor)
|
||||||
|
One copy (original) for Coyote 12 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller)
|
||||||
|
One copy for the Mission Commander
|
||||||
|
One copy for SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 10 will use the authenticated EAL to control entry at the designated Entry
|
||||||
|
Control Point to the roped restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The on-duty Flight Chief or Flight Commander will meet the mission commander and
|
||||||
|
deliver a local area security briefing as outlined in Attachment 15. If the Flight Chief
|
||||||
|
or Flight Commander are not available, you will brief the mission commander on the
|
||||||
|
contents of Attachment 15.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material. The
|
||||||
|
presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
|
||||||
|
concept within the roped restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
(Certified 2-person control team members are identified with an “X” next to their
|
||||||
|
name on the Entry Authority List provided by the aircrew.
|
||||||
|
SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
|
||||||
|
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
|
||||||
|
If TPC material is onboard an unoccupied aircraft and cannot be removed, the
|
||||||
|
crew will secure the material in an approved onboard container. SF subsequently
|
||||||
|
ensure enforcement of the TPC rule upon granting access to the aircraft. Enforce
|
||||||
|
two-person control by using an EAL to identify two authorized individuals prior to
|
||||||
|
allowing entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
|
||||||
|
vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
|
||||||
|
377th ABW Transient Ramp Restricted Area lights are controlled by a light box on a
|
||||||
|
pole to the east of building 333 (Base Operations). The light box contains several
|
||||||
|
individual switches and a master power switch. In order to turn these lights on and
|
||||||
|
off use only the individual switches, always leaving the master power switch turned
|
||||||
|
on.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted immediately adjacent to the roped restricted area
|
||||||
|
of the Reflex Delta on 377th ABW parking ramp.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
Account for SSIs, Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC), DOE courier listing, and AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
|
||||||
|
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
|
||||||
|
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
|
||||||
|
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
|
||||||
|
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
|
||||||
|
nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
246
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 7.md
Normal file
246
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 7.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) COYOTE 7
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 7-7A
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Randolph Gate EC/Search
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are responsible for controlling entry/exit of all pedestrian/vehicle traffic
|
||||||
|
entering through the Randolph Gate. You will control entry utilizing KAFB Restricted
|
||||||
|
Area badge or home station AF FM 1199 against a properly authenticated EAL. You
|
||||||
|
will conduct a search of all vehicles entering the Randolph Gate.
|
||||||
|
You will perform your duties in a highly vigilant manner consistent with the Nuclear
|
||||||
|
Weapons Security Standards.
|
||||||
|
You will employ a Deter, Detect, Delay, Deny, and Defeat approach to your duties.
|
||||||
|
This approach is critical to the “Defense in Depth” strategy; you must detect and
|
||||||
|
defeat an adversary as far away from KUMMSC as possible.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Your post limits are within close proximately to effectively control entry
|
||||||
|
through the Randolph Gate.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The leader and alpha member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition as well as an M9 with 30 rounds of ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
|
||||||
|
to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your immediate area and report any
|
||||||
|
discrepancies to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel entering your ECP display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted
|
||||||
|
area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the outermost
|
||||||
|
garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body, above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
|
||||||
|
flight line restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area,
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
|
||||||
|
NMANG restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot
|
||||||
|
cargo pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a
|
||||||
|
properly authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare
|
||||||
|
the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
|
||||||
|
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
In the event of an installation gate runner you will immediately close your gate and
|
||||||
|
will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at the discretion of SSCC or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 7-7A is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will immediately shut your gate and respond
|
||||||
|
in conjunction with Coyote 1. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
|
||||||
|
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing PL1 resources
|
||||||
|
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
|
||||||
|
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and challenge, initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid
|
||||||
|
flight line POV vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted at the Randolph Gate.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Ensure that you sign the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
You will verify all current SSIs and EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have
|
||||||
|
been taken to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure
|
||||||
|
all documents are destroyed appropriately.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
246
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 8.md
Normal file
246
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 8.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) COYOTE 8
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 8-8A
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Presidential Gate EC/Search
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are responsible for controlling entry/exit of all pedestrian/vehicle traffic
|
||||||
|
entering through the Presidential Gate. You will control entry utilizing KAFB
|
||||||
|
Restricted Area badge or home station AF FM 1199 against a properly authenticated
|
||||||
|
EAL. You will conduct a search of all vehicles entering the Presidential Gate.
|
||||||
|
You will perform your duties in a highly vigilant manner consistent with the Nuclear
|
||||||
|
Weapons Security Standards.
|
||||||
|
You will employ a Deter, Detect, Delay, Deny, and Defeat approach to your duties.
|
||||||
|
This approach is critical to the “Defense in Depth” strategy; you must detect and
|
||||||
|
defeat an adversary as far away from KUMMSC as possible.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Your post limits are within close proximately to effectively control entry
|
||||||
|
through the Presidential Gate.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition as well as an M9 with 30 rounds of ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all member maintain ammunition and required equipment while respond to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your immediate area and report any
|
||||||
|
discrepancies to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel entering your ECP display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted
|
||||||
|
area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the outermost
|
||||||
|
garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body, above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
|
||||||
|
flight line restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area,
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
|
||||||
|
NMANG restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot
|
||||||
|
cargo pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a
|
||||||
|
properly authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare
|
||||||
|
the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
|
||||||
|
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
In the event of an installation gate runner you will immediately close your gate and
|
||||||
|
will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at the discretion of SSCC or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 8-8A is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will immediately shut your gate and respond
|
||||||
|
in conjunction with Coyote 1. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
|
||||||
|
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing PL1 resources
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
|
||||||
|
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and challenge, initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid
|
||||||
|
flight line POV vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted at the Presidential Gate.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Ensure that you sign the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
You will verify all current SSIs and EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have
|
||||||
|
been taken to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure
|
||||||
|
all documents are destroyed appropriately.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
297
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 9.md
Normal file
297
export/(DCNI) COYOTE 9.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) COYOTE 9
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 9
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Act as an additional Internal Security Response Team for KAFB flightline,
|
||||||
|
also when directed respond as an additional part of the 15 personnel Initial Backup
|
||||||
|
Force (IBF) for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex
|
||||||
|
(KUMMSC).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide immediate response capability as the ISRT for the KAFB flightline
|
||||||
|
restricted areas not to exceed 5 minutes or if assigned to a specific restricted area
|
||||||
|
when protection level resources are present in your area you must maintain a 3
|
||||||
|
minute response capability.
|
||||||
|
Note: (DCNI) Response Times to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Within the KAFB flighline not to exceed 5 minutes from flightline restricted
|
||||||
|
areas. If assigned a specific restricted area your post limits are within that particular
|
||||||
|
restricted area you are assigned until properly relieved.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct BAF responses to Protection
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
Level 1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
|
||||||
|
point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
|
||||||
|
to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your area, plot all aircraft with your
|
||||||
|
area and up-channel to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flight line restricted areas display an
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their
|
||||||
|
body, above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
|
||||||
|
flight line restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area,
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
|
||||||
|
NMANG restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot cargo
|
||||||
|
pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a
|
||||||
|
properly authenticated EAL for access to flight line restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and
|
||||||
|
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
In conjunction with Coyote 1 and other coyote patrols, you will conduct a daily visual
|
||||||
|
check of all flight line physical security facilities, including boundary barrier systems,
|
||||||
|
gates, manholes, grates, and structures for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative
|
||||||
|
equipment. You will radio SSCC upon completion of this check. Reference
|
||||||
|
Attachments 13 and 14 of this instruction for guidance.
|
||||||
|
Flight line Photography - Validate that all flight line photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flight line photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flight line Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
|
||||||
|
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
|
||||||
|
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
|
||||||
|
discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
Ensure a minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are randomly
|
||||||
|
accomplished throughout the shift within your respective area. Radio SSCC and
|
||||||
|
inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the perimeter/RAB
|
||||||
|
checks. Exception: When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are present,
|
||||||
|
you will not be required to conduct RAB checks.
|
||||||
|
In the event of a gate runner and you do not have protection level resources in your
|
||||||
|
respective area will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 9 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
|
||||||
|
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
|
||||||
|
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
|
||||||
|
150th FW NMANG Restricted Area
|
||||||
|
There are fifteen light poles in the 150th FW NMANG restricted area. These light
|
||||||
|
poles each contain four to six lights; however, only two lights will be illuminated
|
||||||
|
on each pole at night. The purpose of this configuration is to have the other
|
||||||
|
lights act as emergency back-ups. The emergency back-up lights are operated
|
||||||
|
manually by way of a switches located an unlocked box at the base of each
|
||||||
|
individual light pole.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You could be dispatched to Pad 5 to initiate security operations until the
|
||||||
|
arrival of recalled personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will assist with sweeps for Pad 5 prior to Aircraft arrival. In the event
|
||||||
|
the aircraft should reach Pad 5 before the entire response force is in-place, you will
|
||||||
|
be posted as a fire team until recalled personnel arrives.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
|
||||||
|
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
|
||||||
|
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
|
||||||
|
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
|
||||||
|
to Coyote 4’s area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
(Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
|
||||||
|
vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted within the 150th NMANG restricted area.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that you sign the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
You will verify all current EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have been taken
|
||||||
|
to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure all
|
||||||
|
documents are destroyed appropriately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
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|
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# (DCNI) Cerberus 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CERBERUS 1
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
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|
||||||
|
KUMMSC Underground Area Supervisor
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Supervise all Security Forces operations as the Downstairs Area Supervisor
|
||||||
|
for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex
|
||||||
|
(KUMMSC).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond to security incidents and emergencies as dispatched by command
|
||||||
|
and control elements.
|
||||||
|
Conduct post check/visits with Cerberus 2/3/10, Romeo 1, and SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During hostile situations, you will provide initial command and control for all
|
||||||
|
security incidents located within KUMMSC until arrival of back-up forces or
|
||||||
|
termination of all hostile elements.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide armed response to security incidents within the KUMMSC entry
|
||||||
|
tunnel, exit tunnel, loading dock, and on the high side of B-1/2.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Up-channel information to Guardian-1/2 as needed and notify SSCC of all
|
||||||
|
pertinent information.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Remain within the KUMMSC underground facility unless proper relieved.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within 10ft of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
|
||||||
|
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) At a minimum, the leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210
|
||||||
|
rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm
|
||||||
|
hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure ECP & SSCC conduct a thorough review of the AF FM 164’s vs
|
||||||
|
ACES during their changeover.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a check of Enclosure 12 once per hour during contingency
|
||||||
|
operations (tamper switch failure, etc.) or when instructed by SSCC.
|
||||||
|
Assist Cerberus 10 with processing large escort groups. If the situation allows,
|
||||||
|
attempt to have the AF Form 1109 filled out prior to the escort group arrival. Ensure
|
||||||
|
all areas are clean, organized, free of clutter, and presentable.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the restricted/limited area
|
||||||
|
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
|
||||||
|
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
|
||||||
|
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure compliance with the two-person concept within exclusion areas. An
|
||||||
|
exclusion area will exist in Brandt Hall when Protection Level 1 resources are in
|
||||||
|
transit between A/B sides, or in route to the Loading Dock.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually pump the blast doors.
|
||||||
|
Detailed instructions on how to pump the blast doors are located within the brown
|
||||||
|
tool box adjacent to B-3/4.
|
||||||
|
Be familiar with process and procedures outlining manual operation for all the
|
||||||
|
vehicle doors and barriers.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 1 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
|
||||||
|
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
|
||||||
|
senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest
|
||||||
|
priority until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their
|
||||||
|
actions to gain unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
(U) ENTRY CONTROL PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon entry and exit of the facility, all personnel granted unescorted entry,
|
||||||
|
along with their hand-carried items, are subject to inspection by security personnel
|
||||||
|
for readily detectable prohibited materials and contraband items.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) EXEMPTIONS: Because of early expiration of service life, possible damage
|
||||||
|
to equipment, possible injury to personnel, accountability, exposure to hazardous
|
||||||
|
materials, need-to-know basis, or equipment needing continuous humidity
|
||||||
|
protection, the following items are exempt from inspection:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Hermetically sealed munitions supplies and equipment (e.g., limited life
|
||||||
|
components, explosive ejector cartridges).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Munitions supplies and equipment in heat sealed barrier bags (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
humidity indicators, missile components, etc).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Munitions containers with intact shipping or storage seals (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
deployment kits and classified munitions).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Limited Life Components in non-commercial closed wooden or
|
||||||
|
cardboard containers with affixed shipping documents.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All personnel will place hand-carried items in a plastic bins for screening via
|
||||||
|
X-Ray.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure Cerberus 10 verifies the items via X-Ray monitor and ensure all
|
||||||
|
hand-carried items are identified. If items cannot be identified, the X-Ray will be
|
||||||
|
reversed and the owner and EC will accomplish a hand-on verification of the item
|
||||||
|
unless it is considered a possible threat.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Items such as electronic circuit boards or unusual looking tools will be
|
||||||
|
closely scrutinized and treated as a possible threat until further investigation proves
|
||||||
|
otherwise. Contact munitions control for authorization and clarification of
|
||||||
|
questionable items entering/departing the area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Personnel will be directed through the metal detector. If the detector
|
||||||
|
annunciates, the individual will be directed to identify any items that may be causing
|
||||||
|
the alarm. Any identified items removed from their person will be processed through
|
||||||
|
the X-ray for screening.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Instruct the individual to re-process through the metal detector, subsequent
|
||||||
|
metal detector alarms will be investigated with a hand-held trans frisker until positive
|
||||||
|
identification of all items can be made.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) For inbound vehicle processing, only the vehicle driver will be allowed within
|
||||||
|
a vehicle during vehicle entry of KUMMSC. Exception: DoE SGT/SST vehicles and
|
||||||
|
vehicles associated with emergency responses. Passengers will dismount at V-2
|
||||||
|
and process the facility as pedestrians.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) A single member of the Loading Dock ISRT (Cerberus 4 if posted) may be
|
||||||
|
dispatched to the Sally Port to assist with vehicle inspections. Vehicle inspections
|
||||||
|
will not occur until the driver has been processed through the booths and has re-
|
||||||
|
entered the Sally Port from D-7
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure systematic and thorough inspections of all vehicles entering or
|
||||||
|
exiting the facility are conducted. Vehicles will be inspected for unauthorized
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
personnel, readily detectable prohibited contraband items, explosive devices,
|
||||||
|
contraband, etc. Each vehicle will be given at least a visual inspection of readily
|
||||||
|
accessible areas such as driver and passenger compartments, cargo carrying area,
|
||||||
|
engine compartment, and undercarriage.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure the use of flashlights and undercarriage mirrors as needed to
|
||||||
|
accomplish undercarriage inspections.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Outbound vehicles may contain passengers. Ensure the slot number (and
|
||||||
|
visitor’s badges, if applicable) of persons exiting the facility via vehicle at V-6 is
|
||||||
|
obtained from Cerberus-4 (if posted). Make sure the orange cards are removed
|
||||||
|
from the badge binder.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) For escorted personnel, ensure the escort briefing is given in the presence
|
||||||
|
of a certified EC prior to allowing entry into the restricted area. Escorts will process
|
||||||
|
first and stand by on the low side of the booths for escortee processing. Those
|
||||||
|
requiring escort will be screened and verified via EAL, signed in via AF Form 1109
|
||||||
|
Visitor Register Log, and issued an 1199CG Visitor’s Badge.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All escorts and escortee(s) will process through the booths. Booths will be
|
||||||
|
manually unlocked for escortee(s), escorts will process booths normally. The Sally
|
||||||
|
Port will not be used as a staging area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Record entry and exit times of escorted personnel and retrieve 1199 CG
|
||||||
|
Visitor’s Badge from escorted personnel upon departure from KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure Cerberus 4 obtains the visitor’s badge(s) for escorted personnel
|
||||||
|
departing the facility via vehicle at V-6 if applicable.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE SST/SGT, DEPARTURE, AND RON PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Prior to proceeding down the entry tunnel, topside patrols will verify DoE
|
||||||
|
credentials against the DoE Agent Listing and verify that DoE vehicles have been
|
||||||
|
sanitized and remained under constant observation.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not inspect inbound or outbound DoE Vehicles transporting Type I or
|
||||||
|
Type II cargo, to include decoy and support vehicles.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) DoE vehicles entering or exiting KUMMSC cold or entering/exiting for
|
||||||
|
MUNS training operations (no Type I or Type II cargo) will be searched.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If DoE vehicles are processing the facility for something other than a
|
||||||
|
Type I or Type II mission (training event), they must be inspected. Follow
|
||||||
|
standard vehicle inspection procedures in these cases.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During loading dock upload and download operations, when B1-4 are open,
|
||||||
|
ensure all final denial positions are posted in Brandt Hall and Cerberus 4 (if posted)
|
||||||
|
is posted on V-5 and V-6. Also ensure D-12 and D-13 are chained.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure the retaining pins on V5 and V6 have been lowered when hot
|
||||||
|
SGTs/SSTs are present. Performing this action will prevent external control of the
|
||||||
|
bi-fold doors by the ECP as well as inadvertent/unauthorized openings.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If SGT/SST is remaining overnight (RON), ensure checks are conducted on
|
||||||
|
SGTs/SSTs every 4 hours, or every 2 hours when the CCTV is inoperative. Check
|
||||||
|
the seal number on the rear door, the locks, and the security lights on the rear of the
|
||||||
|
trailer.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) SGTs are equipped with three warning lights on the rear and front of the
|
||||||
|
trailer. The lights on the front are located in the upper right corner and the lights
|
||||||
|
on the rear are located on the upper left side or centered across the top. The
|
||||||
|
lights, from left to right, dictate:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Alarm Monitor (AM) Light (amber). The left light, as you are looking
|
||||||
|
at the trailer, indicates the status of the SGT internal security system. This
|
||||||
|
will illuminate when the internal security system of the SGT has been
|
||||||
|
activated. The light will remain flashing for 100 seconds after activation.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Temperature Alarm (TA) Light (amber). The center light, as you are
|
||||||
|
looking at the trailer, indicates the internal temperature status of the SGT.
|
||||||
|
This will illuminate when the temperature is too hot or too cold.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Fire Alarm (FA) Light (amber). The right light, as you are looking at
|
||||||
|
the trailer, will illuminate to signify a fire condition in the SGT or when
|
||||||
|
temperature conditions inside indicate conditions are prevalent for an internal
|
||||||
|
fire.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) NOTE: Notify SSCC immediately if any light is illuminated or
|
||||||
|
flashing.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
LOADING DOCK OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure D12 and D13 are chained. Maintain accountability of personnel and
|
||||||
|
vehicles within the loading dock at all times.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
INTER AREA/COVOY MOVEMENT PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During inter area movements; ensure all final denial positions are posted in
|
||||||
|
Brandt Hall until the movement is terminated.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During an emergency response, maintain visual and accountability of Fire
|
||||||
|
Department (FD) personnel upon their arrival into your area. Ensure all personnel
|
||||||
|
and vehicles have been inspected prior to exiting the limited area. After FD departs,
|
||||||
|
coordinate a purge of all areas entered by FD personnel, to include all administration
|
||||||
|
areas. Relay status of all areas to SSCC upon completion of purges. NOTE: If a
|
||||||
|
fire exists in the administration areas, notify SSCC and attempt to extinguish
|
||||||
|
the fire using available fire extinguishers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
When emergency evacuation is warranted:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure non-essential personnel are clear of administration areas.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Special Function MC2 will be initiated. All personnel must depart in an
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
orderly fashion.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Direct all evacuating personnel through B1-4. In conjunction with
|
||||||
|
Cerberus 4 (if posted), route evacuating personnel to V-6.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure personnel are not departing with ANY hand carried items.
|
||||||
|
NOTE: The only authorized items are classified material and/or radio. All
|
||||||
|
other items will be confiscated immediately and abandoned in place.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Unless obstructions don’t allow exit through V6, all evacuating personnel
|
||||||
|
will exit loading dock through V6. If the situation allows, have all evacuating
|
||||||
|
personnel swipe out at V6. Topside patrols will accomplish AF Form 1109
|
||||||
|
annotations for all evacuating personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MANUAL PROCEDURES FOR BI-FOLD DOORS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be familiar with procedures to manually open V5 and V6. The bi-fold doors
|
||||||
|
will require manual procedures when contingency operations exist or if directed by
|
||||||
|
SSCC or flight leadership. To manually open the doors:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure the locking pins are raised.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Locate the manual override valve located on the piping adjacent to the
|
||||||
|
doors. Turn the valve handle so that it points directly up or directly down. The
|
||||||
|
valve handle should parallel to (in line with) the pipe it’s attached to.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Push or pull the doors open or closed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Inspect your post and ensure it is free from trash, clean, organized and fully
|
||||||
|
operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Visit all underground posts immediately after shift change to ensure proper
|
||||||
|
changeovers have taken place. Make sure applicable changeover checklists have
|
||||||
|
been used and all items have been accounted for.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all ballistic barrier are in operational condition, check barrier for:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Maneuverability (ensure they roll).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Cleanliness (armored glass is clean).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Operability (raise and lower).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Serviceability (no cracks, no graffiti).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: Report discrepancies to SSCC or flight leadership immediately.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure a lighting check in conducted and relay any discrepancies
|
||||||
|
immediately to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure Cerberus 2/3 have accounted for the vault door combination and
|
||||||
|
available flexi cuffs/flexi cuffs cutter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
|
||||||
|
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
|
||||||
|
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
|
||||||
|
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
|
||||||
|
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
|
||||||
|
nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
8
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
484
export/(DCNI) Cerberus 10.md
Normal file
484
export/(DCNI) Cerberus 10.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,484 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cerberus 10
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus 10 / 10a
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC Entry Control Point
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Positively control entry/exit to Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance
|
||||||
|
Storage Complex (KUMMSC) by processing personnel and vehicles IAW applicable
|
||||||
|
instructions and up channel suspicious activity to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Deny unauthorized access to KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide immediate armed response to any threats affecting Entry Control
|
||||||
|
Point (ECP) operations.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Perform Advanced Entry Control System (AECS) duties IAW applicable
|
||||||
|
instructions (WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol. 4).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all inbound/outbound hand carried items are processed through the
|
||||||
|
X-Ray machine at the ECP. If the X-Ray machine is in-operable, all hand carried
|
||||||
|
items will be hand searched.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Perform all Remote Duress Disable Switch (RDDS) duties as required IAW
|
||||||
|
377 SFGI 31-113.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Within the ECP area starting at the high side of T-3/T-5/V-4 and extending
|
||||||
|
into the loading dock not to exceed V-7
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
|
||||||
|
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
|
||||||
|
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
|
||||||
|
radio communication capability.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within 10ft of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
|
||||||
|
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
|
||||||
|
point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
|
||||||
|
The ONLY exception is when present in the KUMMSC Entry Control Center. This
|
||||||
|
gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm or
|
||||||
|
situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
|
||||||
|
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
|
||||||
|
when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PERSONNEL PROCESSING:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Entry into KUMMSC Limited Area shall require positive action from a single
|
||||||
|
and authorized individual inside the ECP or SSCC. The AECS shall not, by itself,
|
||||||
|
allow entry into the Limited Area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Prior to allowing entry to T-3, obtain name and status of personnel
|
||||||
|
requesting entry via stentofon, landline, or face-to-face.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
o UNESCORTED ENTRY:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Allow access thru T-3 for personnel requesting unescorted
|
||||||
|
entry after obtaining name and status.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure personnel place all hand carried items on X-Ray
|
||||||
|
machine and process thru metal detector. Personnel processing have
|
||||||
|
two attempts to pass metal detector. After failing second attempt,
|
||||||
|
personnel will be trans-frisked IAW Metal Detector Alarm.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Personnel will proceed to M-1 through M-4 for further
|
||||||
|
processing.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If personnel are authorized and secure, they will be cleared to
|
||||||
|
proceed.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If an M-1 through M-4 alarm is received, reference applicable
|
||||||
|
“E Series” QRCs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
o ESCORTED ENTRY:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) An escort official will not escort more than six (6)
|
||||||
|
individuals into limited/exclusion areas.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Prior to allowing entry to T-3, you will obtain the following
|
||||||
|
from the escort official:
|
||||||
|
Name and status of escort official.
|
||||||
|
Name(s)/EAL number/purpose and duration of visit/status of
|
||||||
|
escortee(s).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Have escort official read the escort briefing to
|
||||||
|
escortee(s) in the presence of a certified EC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Have escort official gather one form of photo identification (i.e.
|
||||||
|
CAC, driver’s license, RAB, or passport) from each escortee(s) and
|
||||||
|
pass them to the EC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Have escort official process IAW unescorted entry procedures.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Once escort official has processed thru the booths, EC
|
||||||
|
will unlock one of the booths to allow escort official to prepare to
|
||||||
|
receive escortee(s).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify all escortee(s) photo identification against the
|
||||||
|
appropriate EAL and log them onto the AF Form 1109 (Visitor’s
|
||||||
|
Register Log).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Process each escortee individually by allowing access thru T-3
|
||||||
|
and positively identify the individual via their credential.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Have escortee(s) process hand carried items via the X-Ray
|
||||||
|
machine and process thru the metal detector.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) After escortee(s) have successfully processed the metal
|
||||||
|
detector, issue them a visitor’s badge and direct them to the escort
|
||||||
|
official.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) After all escortee(s) have been processed, have escort official
|
||||||
|
sign the AF Form 1109 and have them process thru the designated
|
||||||
|
booth.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The escort official will process thru T-4 prior to any escortee(s)
|
||||||
|
being granted access to T-4.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The EC will then initiate the process via AECS to unlock T-4 to
|
||||||
|
allow entry for escortee(s).
|
||||||
|
INSPECTOR GENERAL/DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA)
|
||||||
|
INSPECTORS ENTRY:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Once inspector personnel arrive at T-3, a certified EC will make face-
|
||||||
|
to-face contact and verify the following information:
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) The EC will validate their credentials against the appropriate EAL
|
||||||
|
before granting access thru T-3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All inspectors/individuals are granted escorted/unescorted
|
||||||
|
entry to all limited areas based on the EAL and a valid AF Restricted
|
||||||
|
Areas Badge, DD Form 2/2 AF/Common Access Card or a government
|
||||||
|
issued photo ID.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) DTRA Identification Badge (badge is white containing the
|
||||||
|
following information on front of badge: the acronym “DTRA” and
|
||||||
|
“Defense Threat Reduction Agency” spelled out at the top; a number;
|
||||||
|
the bearer’s photograph to the right of the number; and the bearer’s
|
||||||
|
name at the bottom. The badge number is on the back of the badge in
|
||||||
|
the lower right hand corner.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Once verification process has occurred, all inspectors will be logged in on
|
||||||
|
the AF Form 1109 for accountability purposes only (i.e. emergency evacuation).
|
||||||
|
NOTE: ENSURE ENTRY/EXIT TIMES ARE RECORDED ON THE 1109.
|
||||||
|
NOTE: The escort official column will not be filled out for inspector personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) At this point, inspectors may be allowed access thru T-3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All inspectors must process hand carried items via the X-Ray machine and
|
||||||
|
process thru the metal detector.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) After inspector(s) have successfully processed thru the metal
|
||||||
|
detector, they will then proceed to the designated booth.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) The EC will then initiate the process via AECS to unlock T-4 to allow
|
||||||
|
entry for inspectors.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
VEHICLE INPROCESSING:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) For inbound vehicle processing, only the vehicle driver will be allowed within
|
||||||
|
a vehicle during vehicle entry of KUMMSC. NOTE: The vehicle driver cannot be
|
||||||
|
an escortee.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure a Topside patrol is on scene at V1-AA/V1-AB to verify that all
|
||||||
|
vehicles are clear of vehicle ram barriers. Cerberus-10 will verify with the Topside
|
||||||
|
patrol via radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of the barriers. After
|
||||||
|
verification that barriers are clear, utilize CCTV to ensure all vehicles are clear of
|
||||||
|
barriers. NOTE: Ensure that distinct radio transmissions are used to verify
|
||||||
|
that barriers have been cleared (i.e. Scorpion-1 this is Cerberus-10, is V1-AB
|
||||||
|
clear? Cerberus-10 this is Scorpion-1, V1-AB is clear.)
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Passengers/escortee(s) will dismount at V-2 and process the facility as
|
||||||
|
pedestrians with exception of DoE SGT/SST vehicles, PL1 convoy vehicles and
|
||||||
|
vehicles associated with emergency response situations.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) A single member of the ECP or Loading Dock ISRT (Cerberus 4 if posted)
|
||||||
|
will be dispatched to the Sally Port to conduct the vehicle inspection. Vehicle
|
||||||
|
inspection will not occur until the driver has been processed through the booths and
|
||||||
|
has re-entered the Sally Port from D-7.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct systematic and thorough inspections of all vehicles entering or
|
||||||
|
exiting the facility with the exception of authorized vehicles exempt from search.
|
||||||
|
Look for unauthorized personnel, readily detectable prohibited contraband items,
|
||||||
|
explosive devices, contraband, etc. Each vehicle will be given at least a visual
|
||||||
|
inspection of readily accessible areas such as driver and passenger compartments,
|
||||||
|
cargo carrying area, engine compartment, and undercarriage.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Use your flashlight and undercarriage mirror as needed to accomplish
|
||||||
|
undercarriage inspections.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
VEHICLE OUTPROCESSING:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Outbound vehicles may contain passengers. Cerberus-4 (if posted) or an
|
||||||
|
EC, in conjunction with the ECP, will verify each passenger has properly processed
|
||||||
|
out of the facility via V-6 AECS card reader. If passengers were escorted, ensure
|
||||||
|
EC or Cerberus-4 receives all visitors’ badges. EC will then ensure all personnel are
|
||||||
|
logged out via AF Form 1109.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure a Topside SRT is on scene at V1-AA/V1-AB to verify that all vehicles
|
||||||
|
are clear of vehicle ram barriers after departure from the controlled area. After
|
||||||
|
verification that barriers are clear, utilize CCTV to ensure all vehicles are clear of
|
||||||
|
barriers. The Topside SRT will verify with Cerberus-10 via radio transmission that all
|
||||||
|
vehicles are clear of the barriers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE CONVOY ENTRY/EXIT PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Confirm with a designated Topside patrol that OST personnel identity was
|
||||||
|
verified via DOE issued picture identification and the Certification List of
|
||||||
|
DOE/NNSA/OST Personnel (FA 9026) and DoE vehicles have been
|
||||||
|
sanitized/remained under constant observation via Convoy Commander.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The DoE team’s access to limited/exclusion areas are under escort of DoD
|
||||||
|
personnel. NOTE: On-duty SF personnel will not act as escort officials for DoE
|
||||||
|
personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) DoE vehicles entering or exiting for MUNS training operations will not be
|
||||||
|
searched unless deemed necessary as directed by Wing Commander or designated
|
||||||
|
representative. These searches will be conducted in the Sally Port.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority. When securing special functions, ensure that the patrols located at
|
||||||
|
V-2/V-8 verify via radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of barriers.
|
||||||
|
After notification that all vehicles are clear, verify through CCTV before
|
||||||
|
securing barriers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) TYPE I CONVOY PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not inspect inbound or outbound DoE Vehicles associated
|
||||||
|
with Type I cargo, to include decoy and support vehicles.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Loaded SGTs may be searched while within limited/exclusion
|
||||||
|
areas, but only when the cargo is in the custody of DoD
|
||||||
|
representatives.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) TYPE II CONVOY PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) DoE vehicles associated with Type II cargo, requesting entry
|
||||||
|
into KUMMSC, will be searched if a search is deemed necessary
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If search is deemed necessary, Type II cargo may be
|
||||||
|
searched only within limited/exclusion areas and when cargo is in
|
||||||
|
custody of DoD representative.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ON BASE MILITARY CONVOY PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) For on base military convoys, only the tow vehicle and driver/passengers
|
||||||
|
will be authorized unimpeded entry/exit to and from Loading Dock after receiving
|
||||||
|
pre-authentication from Convoy Commander.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) EC will retrieve badge information from tow vehicle driver/passengers to
|
||||||
|
change Discrete Controlled Area (DCA) to appropriate location.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority. When securing special functions, ensure that the patrols located at
|
||||||
|
V-2/V-8 verify via radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of barriers.
|
||||||
|
After notification that all vehicles are clear, verify through CCTV before
|
||||||
|
securing barriers.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Maintain visual accountability of Fire Department (FD) personnel within the
|
||||||
|
Sally Port/ECP area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) After FD departs, purge the ECP and Sally Port if FD had access to those
|
||||||
|
areas and relay status of the purge to SSCC upon completion. NOTE: If a fire
|
||||||
|
exists in the ECP or Sally Port area, immediately notify SSCC and attempt to
|
||||||
|
extinguish the fire using available fire extinguishers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
When emergency evacuation is warranted:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure personnel are not departing with ANY hand carried items.
|
||||||
|
NOTE: The only authorized items are classified material and/or radio. All
|
||||||
|
other items will be confiscated immediately and abandoned in place. AF FM
|
||||||
|
52 WILL NOT be accomplished due to the nature of the emergency.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Unless obstructions don’t allow exit through V-6, all evacuating
|
||||||
|
personnel to exit loading dock through V-6. If the situation allows, have all
|
||||||
|
evacuating personnel swipe out at V-6. Topside patrols will accomplish AF Form
|
||||||
|
1109 annotations for all evacuating personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ECP EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
When emergency evacuation is warranted:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If time/safety permits, EC personnel will log off the AECS console.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If time/safety does not permit, upon return to ECP, purge ECP, conduct a
|
||||||
|
complete changeover using changeover checklist, and conduct a routine
|
||||||
|
verification of the system using JRV.
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, one member of the
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ECP will provide Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD) at V-5. Coordinate with
|
||||||
|
Topside Area Supervisor/SSCC for termination of ISD to minimize fratricide.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Remaining ECP personnel should man the weapons ports.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
X-RAY/METAL DETECTOR PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All personnel will place hand-carried items in a plastic bins for screening via
|
||||||
|
X-Ray.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify the items via X-Ray monitor and ensure all hand-carried items are
|
||||||
|
identified. If items cannot be identified, reverse the X-Ray machine, have the owner
|
||||||
|
and EC accomplish a hand-on verification of the item unless it is considered a
|
||||||
|
possible threat.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Items such as electronic circuit boards or unusual looking tools will be
|
||||||
|
closely scrutinized and treated as a possible threat until further investigation proves
|
||||||
|
otherwise. Contact munitions control for authorization and clarification of
|
||||||
|
questionable items entering/departing the area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All personnel should remove all metallic items prior to passing through the
|
||||||
|
metal detector. Any items removed from their person will be processed through the
|
||||||
|
X-ray for screening.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) NOTE: Unless the X-ray is broken, the EC will not conduct a simple
|
||||||
|
hand-on search of these items, they will always be processed through the X-
|
||||||
|
ray.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Direct personnel through the metal detector. If the detector annunciates,
|
||||||
|
direct the individual to identify any items that may be causing the alarm. Any
|
||||||
|
identified items removed from their person will be processed through the X-ray for
|
||||||
|
screening.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Instruct the individual to re-process through the metal detector, subsequent
|
||||||
|
metal detector alarms will be investigated with a hand-held transfrisker until positive
|
||||||
|
identification of all items can be made.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ITEMS EXEMPT FROM SEARCH:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Because of early expiration of service life, possible damage to equipment,
|
||||||
|
possible injury to personnel, accountability, exposure to hazardous materials, need-
|
||||||
|
to-know basis, or equipment needing continuous humidity protection, the following
|
||||||
|
items are exempt from inspection:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Hermetically sealed munitions supplies and equipment (e.g., limited life
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
8
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
components, explosive ejector cartridges).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Munitions supplies and equipment in heat sealed barrier bags (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
humidity indicators, missile components, etc).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Munitions containers with intact shipping or storage seals (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
deployment kits and classified munitions).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Limited Life Components in non-commercial closed wooden or
|
||||||
|
cardboard containers with affixed shipping documents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Conduct a joint changeover using the changeover checklist with the off-going EC.
|
||||||
|
You will conduct daily inspections and checks of your area.
|
||||||
|
Receive a briefing from the off-going SEC concerning past, current, and planned
|
||||||
|
events and review the pass-on book and work orders. Contact the Alarm Monitor to
|
||||||
|
verify open work orders for accuracy. Refer to Joint Routine Verification.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure the inbound X-Ray machine, outbound X-Ray machine, and metal
|
||||||
|
detector is tested at each shift change using the applicable testing device.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a check of all communications lines and a radio status check with
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Account for all checklist books and verify that each individual checklist is
|
||||||
|
present and accounted for. Ensure checklists are clean and ready for use i.e., all
|
||||||
|
dry erase markers are cleaned from the plastic sheet.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Verify the graphics display monitor to ensure all portals and special
|
||||||
|
functions are in the appropriate state. Refer to WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol. 4.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a joint routine verification of AECS with the off-going EC by
|
||||||
|
obtaining the system status. Verify the system is operating on primary comm. Refer
|
||||||
|
to WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol. 4.
|
||||||
|
If there are discrepancies with any of the above items, both the on-coming and off-
|
||||||
|
going FCC/FC will be contacted. If the discrepancy cannot be corrected prior to off-
|
||||||
|
going departing, an informational blotter entry will be made. Once off-going
|
||||||
|
personnel have been relieved, the on-coming personnel are responsible for all items
|
||||||
|
associated with this position.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Monitor and maintain situational awareness of all CCTV, AECS, X-ray
|
||||||
|
computer, and communication equipment.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above, you will report the status of your post
|
||||||
|
and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 10 is all secure, and ready
|
||||||
|
for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
9
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
|
||||||
|
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
|
||||||
|
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
|
||||||
|
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
|
||||||
|
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
|
||||||
|
nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
10
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
258
export/(DCNI) Cerberus 2,3.md
Normal file
258
export/(DCNI) Cerberus 2,3.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cerberus 2,3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus 2 & Cerberus 3
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC Internal Security Response Teams
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond to Security Incidents and emergencies as the Internal Security
|
||||||
|
Response Teams for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage
|
||||||
|
Complex (KUMMSC). You comprise a portion of the 13/5 Response Force (RF) or
|
||||||
|
15/5 Response Force if Scorpion 6 is posted.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During hostile situations, provide final denial security at blast doors B-3 and
|
||||||
|
B-4 until arrival of back-up forces or termination of all hostile elements.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond as dispatched to any alarm annunciations or Security Incidents on
|
||||||
|
the high side of B-3/4 within 3 minutes.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Behind blast doors B3/4 except during emergency response (fire/medical),
|
||||||
|
loading dock operations and logistics movements. Maintain a 3 minute response
|
||||||
|
capability to all alarm activations or Security Incidents occurring on the high side of
|
||||||
|
B3/4.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
|
||||||
|
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Three members will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball
|
||||||
|
and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition. One member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm
|
||||||
|
linked armor piercing/tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm
|
||||||
|
hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
|
||||||
|
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
|
||||||
|
The ONLY exception is when present in the Site Security Control Center or the
|
||||||
|
Art Room. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond
|
||||||
|
to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
|
||||||
|
when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
You must wear all required gear when responding to any situation or alarm. This
|
||||||
|
includes Flak Vest with Level IV ballistic plates, helmet, and gas mask with
|
||||||
|
appropriately filled out DD Form 1574/fit test.
|
||||||
|
If leaving any of these areas mentioned above, all required gear must be worn.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
|
||||||
|
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
|
||||||
|
senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest
|
||||||
|
priority until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their
|
||||||
|
actions to gain unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE SAFE GUARD TRANSPORT ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During loading dock upload and download operations, when B1-4 are open,
|
||||||
|
post in Brandt Hall final denial positions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
INTER AREA MOVEMENT:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During inter area movement you will be posted in Brandt Hall final denial
|
||||||
|
positions until movement is terminated.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During an emergency response, maintain visual and accountability of Fire
|
||||||
|
Department (FD) personnel upon their arrival into Brandt Hall. After FD departs,
|
||||||
|
purge entire area to include all administration areas. Relay status of all areas to
|
||||||
|
SSCC upon completion of purge. NOTE: If a fire exists in the administration
|
||||||
|
areas, notify SSCC and attempt to extinguish the fire using available fire
|
||||||
|
extinguishers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
When emergency evacuation is warranted:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure non-essential personnel are clear of administration areas.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) MC2 will be initiated. All personnel must depart in an orderly file
|
||||||
|
formation.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) With the exception of classified material and radios, evacuating
|
||||||
|
personnel are not authorized to transport any hand-carried items out of the
|
||||||
|
facility. All other items will be immediately confiscated and abandoned in
|
||||||
|
place.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Direct all evacuating personnel through B1-4. In conjunction with
|
||||||
|
Cerberus 4, route evacuating personnel to V6. If the situation allows, have all
|
||||||
|
evacuating personnel swipe out at V6.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Pass evacuees off to topside patrols for additional processing.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Shift change will be conducted in the ART room.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your post and ensure it is free from trash, clean, organized and fully
|
||||||
|
operational (ballistic barriers) prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure the ballistic barriers are in operational condition, check barriers
|
||||||
|
for:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Maneuverability (ensure they roll)
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Cleanliness (armored glass is clean)
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Operability (raise and lower)
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Serviceability (no cracks, no graffiti)
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) NOTE: Report discrepancies to SSCC or flight leadership
|
||||||
|
immediately.
|
||||||
|
Account for SSIs, vault door combination and available flexi cuffs/flexi cuffs cutter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the restricted/limited area
|
||||||
|
display an AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG
|
||||||
|
will be displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of
|
||||||
|
their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure compliance with the two-person concept within exclusion areas. An
|
||||||
|
exclusion area will exist in Brandt Hall when Protection Level 1 resources are in
|
||||||
|
transit between A/B sides, or in route to the Loading Dock.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually pump the blast doors.
|
||||||
|
Detailed instructions on how to pump the blast doors are located within the brown
|
||||||
|
tool box adjacent to B-3/4.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 2/3 is all secure and ready for
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
inspection, do you request a post briefing?”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
|
||||||
|
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
|
||||||
|
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
|
||||||
|
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
|
||||||
|
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
|
||||||
|
nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
334
export/(DCNI) Cerberus 4.md
Normal file
334
export/(DCNI) Cerberus 4.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cerberus 4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus 4/4a
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Loading Dock Internal Security Response Team
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide an immediate response capability to KUMMSC as part of the 13/5
|
||||||
|
Response Force or 15/5 Response Force if Scorpion 6 is posted and neutralize any
|
||||||
|
threats attempting to gain unauthorized access to PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond as dispatched to any alarm annunciations or Security Incidents on
|
||||||
|
the low side of B-1 and B-2 within 3 minutes.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Cerberus-4/4a will remain within the confines of the loading dock and Sally
|
||||||
|
Port/ECP area, bound on either end by V5 and V6 unless otherwise directed and/or
|
||||||
|
properly relieved.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who will
|
||||||
|
contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
|
||||||
|
tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition. Your
|
||||||
|
member will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm linked armor
|
||||||
|
piercing/tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117 Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
|
||||||
|
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
|
||||||
|
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
|
||||||
|
or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
|
||||||
|
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
|
||||||
|
when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
|
||||||
|
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
|
||||||
|
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
|
||||||
|
senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
|
||||||
|
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE SGT/SST ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During loading dock upload and down load operations, ensure D12 and D13
|
||||||
|
have been chained shut. Unless otherwise directed, post on V5 and V6 until
|
||||||
|
completion of the operation.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Lower the door retaining pins on V5 and V6 when hot SGTs/SSTs are
|
||||||
|
present. Performing this action will prevent external control of the bi-fold doors by
|
||||||
|
the ECP as well as inadvertent/unauthorized openings.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If SGT/SST is remaining overnight (RON), check SGTs/SSTs every 4 hours,
|
||||||
|
or every 2 hours when the CCTV is inoperative. Check the seal number on the rear
|
||||||
|
door, the locks, and the security lights on the rear of the trailer.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) SGTs are equipped with three warning lights on the rear and front of the
|
||||||
|
trailer. The lights on the front are located in the upper right corner and the lights on
|
||||||
|
the rear are located on the upper left side or centered across the top. The lights,
|
||||||
|
from left to right, dictate:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Alarm Monitor (AM) Light (amber). The left light, as you are looking at the
|
||||||
|
trailer, indicates the status of the SGT internal security system. This will illuminate
|
||||||
|
when the internal security system of the SGT has been activated. The light will
|
||||||
|
remain flashing for 100 seconds after activation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Temperature Alarm (TA) Light (amber). The center light, as you are looking
|
||||||
|
at the trailer, indicates the internal temperature status of the SGT. This will
|
||||||
|
illuminate when the temperature is too hot or too cold.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Fire Alarm (FA) Light (amber). The right light, as you are looking at the
|
||||||
|
trailer, will illuminate to signify a fire condition in the SGT or when temperature
|
||||||
|
conditions inside indicate conditions are prevalent for an internal fire.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) NOTE: Notify SSCC immediately if any light is illuminated or flashing.
|
||||||
|
DOD CONVOY OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Post on V5 and V6 and ensure D12 and D13 are chained. Maintain
|
||||||
|
accountability of personnel and vehicles within the loading dock at all times.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Maintain visual and accountability of Fire Department (FD) personnel upon
|
||||||
|
their arrival into the loading dock area. Ensure your count is consistent with the
|
||||||
|
numbers passed along by topside patrols prior to FD entry through V2.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all personnel and vehicles have been inspected prior to exiting the
|
||||||
|
limited area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) After FD departs, purge entire loading dock area to include the restroom,
|
||||||
|
paint shed, sally port, etc. Relay status of the loading dock purge to SSCC upon
|
||||||
|
completion. NOTE: If a fire exists in the loading dock, notify SSCC and immediately
|
||||||
|
and attempt to extinguish using available fire extinguishers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FACILITY EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure loading dock is clear of all non-essential personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) An MC2 special function will be initiated. All personnel must depart in an
|
||||||
|
orderly/file formation.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) With the exception of classified material and radios, evacuating personnel
|
||||||
|
are not authorized to transport any hand-carried items out of the facility. All other
|
||||||
|
items will be immediately confiscated and abandoned in place.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Direct all personnel to exit loading dock through V6. If the situation allows,
|
||||||
|
have all evacuating personnel swipe out at V6.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Pass evacuees off to topside patrols for additional processing.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Shift change will be conducted in the loading dock, at B2.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Inspect your post and ensure it is free from trash, clean, organized and fully
|
||||||
|
operational (ballistic barriers) prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure the ballistic barrier are in operational condition, check barrier for:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Maneuverability (ensure they roll).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Cleanliness (armored glass is clean).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Operability (raise and lower).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Serviceability (no cracks, no graffiti).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Report discrepancies to SSCC or flight leadership immediately.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a lighting check and relay any discrepancies immediately to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Check the SGT Remote Control Unit (RCU) antenna located approximately
|
||||||
|
8-10 feet in front of B1, hanging off the air handler duct-work. This antenna relays
|
||||||
|
the status of the SGT/SST trailer to SSCC. Check to ensure the antenna is not bent,
|
||||||
|
broken, or tampered with. Note: If the antenna appears to be unserviceable, DO
|
||||||
|
NOT TOUCH IT; notify SSCC immediately.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure manual pins for V-5/6 are not in-place (in the “up” configuration).
|
||||||
|
This is important because when the pins are in-place (“down”), the ECP has no
|
||||||
|
control of opening V5/V6. Note: If an SGT/SST is in the loading dock, the pins must
|
||||||
|
be placed in the “down” configuration. The “down” configuration manually secures
|
||||||
|
the loading dock (See Attachment 9.2 for facility schematics).
|
||||||
|
Account for SSIs and ensure you ask off-going personnel for any applicable pass-
|
||||||
|
ons. Brief your oncoming relief on significant event occurring during your shift.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Check Enclosure 12 once per hour during contingency operations (tamper
|
||||||
|
switch failure, etc.) or when instructed by SSCC.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assist entry controllers with vehicle processing/searching as directed.
|
||||||
|
When vehicles are departing the loading dock, ensure the vehicle and all associated
|
||||||
|
hand-carried items are search prior to vehicle departure past V6.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Collect the visitor’s badges for all escorted personnel departing the
|
||||||
|
facility via vehicle at V6. Ensure the visitor’s badges are brought back to the
|
||||||
|
ECP at the earliest opportunity.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the restricted/limited area
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
display an AF Form 1199CG, Air Force Entry Control Card (Restricted Area Badge)
|
||||||
|
on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the outermost garment
|
||||||
|
somewhere on the upper portion of their body. Open area 8 is required for KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
access.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure compliance with the 2-person concept when an exclusion zone
|
||||||
|
exists within the Loading Dock Area. An exclusion zone will exist when Protection
|
||||||
|
Level 1 resources are present within the loading dock area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) A Protection Level 1 resource(s) secured within a DoE Safe Guard
|
||||||
|
Transport Trailer does not constitute an exclusion zone. In this situation, only the
|
||||||
|
interior of the trailer becomes an exclusion zone requiring the 2-person concept.
|
||||||
|
The loading dock is considered a restricted/limited area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct daily inspections and checks of your area. Be vigilant for things
|
||||||
|
out of the ordinary, out of place, and for signs of foul play.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be familiar with procedures on how to manually pump open the blast doors
|
||||||
|
1-4. Detailed instructions/checklists on how to pump the blast doors are located
|
||||||
|
behind the clear plastic document frames adjacent to the blast doors. The tools
|
||||||
|
needed to pump B1-2 are located within the brown tool box adjacent to D13. An
|
||||||
|
additional tool box is located within the interlock for doors 3-4.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel,
|
||||||
|
Inspectors, SF Commanders and any other O-6 or above, you will report the
|
||||||
|
status of your post and offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 4 is
|
||||||
|
all secure, and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MANUAL AND PROCEDURES FOR BI-FOLD DOORS
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The bi-fold doors will require manual procedures when contingency
|
||||||
|
operations exist or if directed by SSCC or Flight Leadership. To manually open
|
||||||
|
the doors:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure the locking pins are raised.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Locate the manual override valve located on the piping adjacent to the
|
||||||
|
doors. Turn the valve handle so that it points directly up or directly down. The
|
||||||
|
valve handle should parallel to (in line with) the pipe it’s attached to.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Push or pull the doors open or closed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
|
||||||
|
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
|
||||||
|
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
|
||||||
|
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
|
||||||
|
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
|
||||||
|
nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
385
export/(DCNI) Cerberus-1 (V19-1).md
Normal file
385
export/(DCNI) Cerberus-1 (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cerberus-1 (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-1
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC Underground Area Supervisor/
|
||||||
|
Internal Security Team
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Supervise all Security Forces operations as the Downstairs Area Supervisor for the
|
||||||
|
Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance and Storage Complex (KUMMSC). You
|
||||||
|
comprise a portion of the Response Force (RF).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Respond to security incidents and emergencies as dispatched by command and
|
||||||
|
control elements.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) During hostile situations, you will provide initial command and control for all security
|
||||||
|
incidents located within KUMMSC until arrival of back-up forces or termination of all hostile
|
||||||
|
elements. Additionally, provide final denial security at blast doors B-3 and B-4 until arrival of
|
||||||
|
back-up forces or termination of all hostile elements.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Up-channel information to Guardian-1/2 as needed and notify SSCC of all pertinent
|
||||||
|
information.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Remain within the KUMMSC underground facility unless proper relieved. Remain
|
||||||
|
on the high side of B-3/4 if acting as required member of 4-person fire team. If additional
|
||||||
|
manning is provided, the leader may traverse the entire facility, as long as a 4-person fire team
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
is constantly present on the high side of B-3/4.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball
|
||||||
|
and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
|
||||||
|
point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2 of 9
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
|
||||||
|
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
|
||||||
|
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
|
||||||
|
recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
|
||||||
|
neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure ECP & SSCC conduct a thorough review of the AF FM 164s vs AECS
|
||||||
|
during their changeover (if applicable).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the joint end-of-day check with MUNS personnel is conducted and the
|
||||||
|
Storage Cell Check is conducted when TPC area duties are complete.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assist the KUMMSC ECP with operations, when at least four (4) ISRT personnel
|
||||||
|
are posted behind B-3/4 (not including yourself).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct the local and remote daily exercises for the AM/SCS in conjunction with
|
||||||
|
the Topside Area Supervisor.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a check of Enclosure 12 once per hour during contingency operations
|
||||||
|
(tamper switch failure, etc.) or when instructed by SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• Assist Cerberus 10 with processing large escort groups. If the situation allows, attempt to
|
||||||
|
have the AF Form 1109 filled out prior to the escort group arrival. Ensure all areas are clean,
|
||||||
|
organized, free of clutter, and presentable.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the restricted/limited area display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the
|
||||||
|
outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
|
||||||
|
required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure compliance with the two-person concept within exclusion areas. An
|
||||||
|
exclusion area will exist in Brandt Hall when Protection Level 1 resources are in transit
|
||||||
|
between A/B sides, or in route to the Loading Dock.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually pump the blast doors. Detailed
|
||||||
|
instructions on how to pump the blast doors are located within the brown tool box adjacent to
|
||||||
|
B-3/4.
|
||||||
|
• Be familiar with process and procedures outlining manual operation for all the vehicle doors
|
||||||
|
and barriers.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
|
||||||
|
and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing by
|
||||||
|
stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 1 is all secure, and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3 of 9
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
|
||||||
|
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
|
||||||
|
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
|
||||||
|
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
|
||||||
|
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ENTRY CONTROL PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon entry and exit of the facility, all personnel granted unescorted entry, along
|
||||||
|
with their hand-carried items, are subject to inspection by security personnel for readily
|
||||||
|
detectable prohibited materials and contraband items.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) EXEMPTIONS: Because of early expiration of service life, possible damage to
|
||||||
|
equipment, possible injury to personnel, accountability, exposure to hazardous materials,
|
||||||
|
need-to-know basis, or equipment needing continuous humidity protection, the following
|
||||||
|
items are exempt from inspection:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Hermetically sealed munitions supplies and equipment (e.g., limited life
|
||||||
|
components, explosive ejector cartridges).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Munitions supplies and equipment in heat sealed barrier bags (e.g., humidity
|
||||||
|
indicators, missile components, etc).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Munitions containers with intact shipping or storage seals (e.g., deployment kits
|
||||||
|
and classified munitions).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Limited Life Components in non-commercial closed wooden or cardboard
|
||||||
|
containers with affixed shipping documents.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All personnel will place hand-carried items in a plastic bins for screening via X-
|
||||||
|
Ray.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure Cerberus 10 verifies the items via X-Ray monitor and ensure all hand-
|
||||||
|
carried items are identified. If items cannot be identified, the X-Ray will be reversed and the
|
||||||
|
owner and EC will accomplish a hand-on verification of the item unless it is considered a
|
||||||
|
possible threat.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Items such as electronic circuit boards or unusual looking tools will be closely
|
||||||
|
scrutinized and treated as a possible threat until further investigation proves otherwise.
|
||||||
|
Contact munitions control for authorization and clarification of questionable items
|
||||||
|
entering/departing the area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4 of 9
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Personnel will be directed through the metal detector. If the detector annunciates,
|
||||||
|
the individual will be directed to identify any items that may be causing the alarm. Any
|
||||||
|
identified items removed from their person will be processed through the X-ray for
|
||||||
|
screening.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Instruct the individual to re-process through the metal detector, subsequent metal
|
||||||
|
detector alarms will be investigated with a hand-held trans frisker until positive identification
|
||||||
|
of all items can be made.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) For inbound vehicle processing, only the vehicle driver will be allowed within a
|
||||||
|
vehicle during vehicle entry of KUMMSC. Exception: DoE SGT vehicles and vehicles
|
||||||
|
associated with emergency responses. Passengers will dismount at V-2 and process the
|
||||||
|
facility as pedestrians.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure systematic and thorough inspections of all vehicles entering or exiting the
|
||||||
|
facility are conducted. Vehicles will be inspected for unauthorized personnel, readily
|
||||||
|
detectable prohibited contraband items, explosive devices, contraband, etc. Each vehicle will
|
||||||
|
be given at least a visual inspection of readily accessible areas such as driver and passenger
|
||||||
|
compartments, cargo carrying area, engine compartment, and undercarriage.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the use of flashlights and undercarriage mirrors as needed to accomplish
|
||||||
|
undercarriage inspections.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Outbound vehicles may contain passengers. Ensure the slot number (and visitor’s
|
||||||
|
badges, if applicable) of persons exiting the facility via vehicle at V-6 is obtained from
|
||||||
|
Loading Dock ISRT (if posted). Make sure the orange cards are removed from the badge
|
||||||
|
binder.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) For escorted personnel, ensure the escort briefing is given in the presence of a
|
||||||
|
certified EC prior to allowing entry into the restricted area. Escorts will process first and
|
||||||
|
stand by on the low side of the booths for escortee processing. Those requiring escort will be
|
||||||
|
screened and verified via EAL, signed in via AF Form 1109 Visitor Register Log, and issued
|
||||||
|
an 1199CG Visitor’s Badge.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All escorts and escortee(s) will process through the booths. Booths will be
|
||||||
|
manually unlocked for escortee(s), escorts will process booths normally. The Sally Port will
|
||||||
|
not be used as a staging area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Record entry and exit times of escorted personnel and retrieve 1199 CG Visitor’s
|
||||||
|
Badge from escorted personnel upon departure from KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure an EC or the Loading Dock ISRT obtains the visitor’s badge(s) for escorted
|
||||||
|
personnel departing the facility via vehicle at V-6 if applicable.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE SGT, ARRIVAL, DEPARTURE, AND RON PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prior to proceeding down the entry tunnel, topside patrols will verify DoE
|
||||||
|
credentials against the DoE Agent Listing and verify that DoE vehicles have been sanitized
|
||||||
|
and remained under constant observation.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) DoE vehicles carrying Type I cargo will not be inspected if the Convoy
|
||||||
|
Commander verifies that the vehicle has been sanitized and kept under constant
|
||||||
|
surveillance.
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5 of 9
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) DoE vehicles entering or exiting KUMMSC cold or entering/exiting for MUNS
|
||||||
|
training operations (no Type I or Type II cargo) will be searched.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If DoE vehicles are processing the facility for something other than a Type I or
|
||||||
|
Type II mission (training event), they must be inspected. Follow standard vehicle
|
||||||
|
inspection procedures in these cases.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) During loading dock upload and download operations, when B1-4 are open, ensure
|
||||||
|
all final denial positions are posted in Brandt Hall and Loading Dock ISRT (if posted) is
|
||||||
|
posted on V-5 and V-6. Also ensure D-12 and D-13 are chained.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the retaining pins on V5 and V6 have been lowered when hot SGTs are
|
||||||
|
present. Performing this action will prevent external control of the bi-fold doors by the ECP
|
||||||
|
as well as inadvertent/unauthorized openings.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If SGT is remaining overnight (RON), ensure checks are conducted on SGTs every
|
||||||
|
4 hours, or every 2 hours when the CCTV is inoperative. Check the seal number on the rear
|
||||||
|
door, the locks, and the security lights on the rear of the trailer.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) SGTs are equipped with three warning lights on the rear and front of the trailer.
|
||||||
|
The lights on the front are located in the upper right corner and the lights on the rear are
|
||||||
|
located on the upper left side or centered across the top. The lights, from left to right,
|
||||||
|
dictate:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Alarm Monitor (AM) Light (amber). The left light, as you are looking at the
|
||||||
|
trailer, indicates the status of the SGT internal security system. This will illuminate
|
||||||
|
when the internal security system of the SGT has been activated. The light will
|
||||||
|
remain flashing for 100 seconds after activation.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Temperature Alarm (TA) Light (amber). The center light, as you are
|
||||||
|
looking at the trailer, indicates the internal temperature status of the SGT. This will
|
||||||
|
illuminate when the temperature is too hot or too cold.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Fire Alarm (FA) Light (amber). The right light, as you are looking at the
|
||||||
|
trailer, will illuminate to signify a fire condition in the SGT or when temperature
|
||||||
|
conditions inside indicate conditions are prevalent for an internal fire.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) NOTE: Notify SSCC immediately if any light is illuminated or flashing.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
LOADING DOCK OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure D12 and D13 are chained. Maintain accountability of personnel and
|
||||||
|
vehicles within the loading dock at all times.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
INTER AREA/COVOY MOVEMENT PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) During inter area movements; ensure all final denial positions are posted in Brandt
|
||||||
|
Hall until the movement is terminated.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) During an emergency response, maintain visual and accountability of Fire
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6 of 9
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Department (FD) personnel upon their arrival into your area. Ensure all personnel and
|
||||||
|
vehicles have been inspected prior to exiting the limited area. After FD departs, coordinate a
|
||||||
|
purge of all areas entered by FD personnel, to include all administration areas. Relay status
|
||||||
|
of all areas to SSCC upon completion of purges. NOTE: If a fire exists in the
|
||||||
|
administration areas, notify SSCC and attempt to extinguish the fire using available
|
||||||
|
fire extinguishers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• When emergency evacuation is warranted:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure non-essential personnel are clear of administration areas.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Special Function MC2 will be initiated. All personnel must depart in an orderly
|
||||||
|
fashion.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Direct all evacuating personnel through B1-4. In conjunction with the Loading
|
||||||
|
Dock ISRT (if posted), route evacuating personnel to V-6.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure personnel are not departing with ANY hand carried items. NOTE: The
|
||||||
|
only authorized items are classified material and/or radio. All other items will be
|
||||||
|
confiscated immediately and abandoned in place.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Unless obstructions don’t allow exit through V6, all evacuating personnel will
|
||||||
|
exit loading dock through V6. If the situation allows, have all evacuating personnel
|
||||||
|
swipe out at V6. Topside patrols will accomplish AF Form 1109 annotations for all
|
||||||
|
evacuating personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MANUAL PROCEDURES FOR BI-FOLD DOORS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be familiar with procedures to manually open V5 and V6. The bi-fold doors will
|
||||||
|
require manual procedures when contingency operations exist or if directed by SSCC or
|
||||||
|
flight leadership. To manually open the doors:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the locking pins are raised.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Locate the manual override valve located on the piping adjacent to the doors.
|
||||||
|
Turn the valve handle so that it points directly up or directly down. The valve handle
|
||||||
|
should parallel to (in line with) the pipe it’s attached to.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Push or pull the doors open or closed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
• Inspect your post and ensure it is free from trash, clean, organized and fully operational prior
|
||||||
|
to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
• Visit all underground posts immediately after shift change to ensure proper changeovers have
|
||||||
|
taken place. Make sure applicable changeover checklists have been used and all items have
|
||||||
|
been accounted for.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all ballistic barrier are in operational condition, check barrier for:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7 of 9
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Maneuverability (ensure they roll).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Cleanliness (armored glass is clean).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Operability (raise and lower).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Serviceability (no cracks, no graffiti).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Note: Report discrepancies to SSCC or flight leadership immediately.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure a lighting check in conducted and relay any discrepancies immediately to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the vault door combination and available flexi cuffs/flexi cuffs cutters are
|
||||||
|
accounted for.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
8 of 9
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
9 of 9
|
||||||
439
export/(DCNI) Cerberus-10 (V19-1).md
Normal file
439
export/(DCNI) Cerberus-10 (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,439 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cerberus-10 (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus 10
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC Entry Control Point
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Positively control entry/exit to Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance
|
||||||
|
Storage Complex (KUMMSC) by processing personnel and vehicles IAW applicable
|
||||||
|
instructions and up channel suspicious activity to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Deny unauthorized access to KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Provide immediate armed response to any threats affecting Entry Control Point
|
||||||
|
(ECP) operations.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Perform Advanced Entry Control System (AECS) duties IAW applicable
|
||||||
|
instructions (WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol. 4).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all inbound/outbound hand carried items are processed through the X-Ray
|
||||||
|
machine at the ECP. If the X-Ray machine is in-operable, all hand carried items will be
|
||||||
|
hand searched.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Perform all Remote Duress Disable Switch (RDDS) duties as required IAW 377
|
||||||
|
SFGI 31-113.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-10, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Within the ECP area starting at the high side of T-3/T-5 and extending into the
|
||||||
|
loading dock not to exceed V-7. If one member is inside the loading dock conducting
|
||||||
|
checks, all processing must be paused until both members are attentive to their entry control
|
||||||
|
duties.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball
|
||||||
|
and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
|
||||||
|
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
|
||||||
|
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
|
||||||
|
recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
|
||||||
|
neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2 of 10
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-10, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PERSONNEL PROCESSING:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Entry into KUMMSC Limited Area shall require positive action from a single
|
||||||
|
authorized individual inside the ECP or SSCC. AECS shall not, by itself, allow entry into
|
||||||
|
the Limited Area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prior to allowing entry to T-3, obtain name and status of personnel requesting entry
|
||||||
|
via stentofon, landline telephone, or face-to-face communication.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• UNESCORTED ENTRY:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Allow access thru T-3 for personnel requesting unescorted entry after
|
||||||
|
obtaining name and status.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure personnel place all hand carried items on X-Ray machine and
|
||||||
|
process thru metal detector. Personnel processing have two attempts to pass
|
||||||
|
metal detector. After failing second attempt, personnel will be trans-frisked IAW
|
||||||
|
Metal Detector Alarm.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Personnel will proceed to M-1 through M-4 for further processing.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If personnel are authorized and secure, they will be cleared to proceed.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If an M-1 through M-4 alarm is received, reference applicable “E Series”
|
||||||
|
QRCs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• ESCORTED ENTRY:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) An escort official will not escort more than six (6) individuals into
|
||||||
|
limited/exclusion areas.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prior to allowing entry to T-3, you will obtain the following from the
|
||||||
|
escort official:
|
||||||
|
Name and status of escort official.
|
||||||
|
Name(s)/EAL number/purpose and duration of visit/status of escortee(s).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3 of 10
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-10, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Have escort official read the escort briefing to escortee(s) in the
|
||||||
|
presence of a certified EC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Have escort official gather one form of photo identification (i.e. CAC,
|
||||||
|
driver’s license, RAB, or passport) from each escortee and pass them to the EC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Have escort official process IAW unescorted entry procedures.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Once escort official has processed thru the booths, EC will
|
||||||
|
unlock one of the booths to allow escort official to prepare to receive
|
||||||
|
escortee(s).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Verify all escortee(s) photo identification against the appropriate EAL
|
||||||
|
and log them onto the AF Form 1109 (Visitor’s Register Log).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Process each escortee individually by allowing access thru T-3 and
|
||||||
|
positively identify the individual via their credential.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Have escortee(s) process hand carried items via the X-Ray machine and
|
||||||
|
process thru the metal detector.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) After escortee(s) have successfully processed the metal detector, issue
|
||||||
|
them a visitor’s badge and direct them to the escort official.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) After all escortee(s) have been processed, have escort official sign the
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1109 and have them process thru the designated booth.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The escort official will process thru T-4 prior to any escortee(s) being
|
||||||
|
granted access to T-4.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The EC will then initiate the process via AECS to unlock T-4 to allow
|
||||||
|
entry for escortee(s).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
INSPECTOR GENERAL/DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA)
|
||||||
|
INSPECTORS ENTRY:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Once inspector personnel arrive at T-3, a certified EC will make face-to-face
|
||||||
|
contact and verify the following information:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The EC will validate their credentials against the appropriate EAL before
|
||||||
|
granting access thru T-3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All inspectors/individuals are granted escorted/unescorted entry to all
|
||||||
|
limited areas based on the EAL and a valid AF Restricted Areas Badge, DD
|
||||||
|
Form 2/2 AF/Common Access Card or a government issued photo ID.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) DTRA Identification Badge (badge is white containing the following
|
||||||
|
information on front of badge: the acronym “DTRA” and “Defense Threat
|
||||||
|
Reduction Agency” spelled out at the top; a number; the bearer’s photograph
|
||||||
|
to the right of the number; and the bearer’s name at the bottom. The badge
|
||||||
|
number is on the back of the badge in the lower right hand corner.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Once verification process has occurred, all inspectors will be logged in on the AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1109 for accountability purposes only (i.e. emergency evacuation).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4 of 10
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-10, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• NOTE: ENSURE ENTRY/EXIT TIMES ARE RECORDED ON THE 1109.
|
||||||
|
• NOTE: The escort official column will not be filled out for inspector personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) At this point, inspectors may be allowed access thru T-3.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All inspectors must process hand carried items via the X-Ray machine and process
|
||||||
|
thru the metal detector.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) After inspector(s) have successfully processed thru the metal detector, they
|
||||||
|
will then proceed to the designated booth.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The EC will then initiate the process via AECS to unlock T-4 to allow
|
||||||
|
entry for inspectors.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
VEHICLE INPROCESSING:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) For inbound vehicle processing, only the vehicle driver will be allowed within a
|
||||||
|
vehicle during vehicle entry of KUMMSC. NOTE: The vehicle driver cannot be an
|
||||||
|
escortee unless it is a specialized vehicle requiring an escortee to operate.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure a Topside patrol is on scene at V1-AA/V1-AB to verify that all vehicles are
|
||||||
|
clear of vehicle ram barriers. Cerberus-10 will verify with the Topside patrol via radio
|
||||||
|
transmission that all vehicles are clear of the barriers. After verification that barriers are
|
||||||
|
clear, utilize CCTV to ensure all vehicles are clear of barriers. NOTE: Ensure that distinct
|
||||||
|
radio transmissions are used to verify that barriers have been cleared (i.e. Scorpion-1
|
||||||
|
this is Cerberus-10, is V1-AB clear? Cerberus-10 this is Scorpion-1, V1-AB is clear.)
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Passengers/escortee(s) will dismount at V-2 and process the facility as pedestrians
|
||||||
|
with exception of DoE SGT vehicles, PL1 convoy vehicles and vehicles associated with
|
||||||
|
emergency response situations.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) A single member of the ECP or Loading Dock ISRT (if posted) will be dispatched
|
||||||
|
to the Sally Port to conduct the vehicle inspection. Vehicle inspection will not occur until the
|
||||||
|
driver has been processed through the booths and has re-entered the Sally Port from D-7.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct systematic and thorough inspections of all vehicles entering or exiting the
|
||||||
|
facility with the exception of authorized vehicles exempt from search. Look for unauthorized
|
||||||
|
personnel, readily detectable prohibited contraband items, explosive devices, contraband, etc.
|
||||||
|
Each vehicle will be given at least a visual inspection of readily accessible areas such as
|
||||||
|
driver and passenger compartments, cargo carrying area, engine compartment, and
|
||||||
|
undercarriage.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Use your flashlight and undercarriage mirror as needed to accomplish undercarriage
|
||||||
|
inspections.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
VEHICLE OUTPROCESSING:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Outbound vehicles may contain passengers. Loading Dock ISRT (if posted) or an
|
||||||
|
EC, in conjunction with the ECP, will verify each passenger has properly processed out of
|
||||||
|
the facility via V-6 AECS card reader. If passengers were escorted, ensure EC or Loading
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5 of 10
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-10, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Dock ISRT receives all visitors’ badges. EC will then ensure all personnel are logged out via
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1109.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure a Topside SRT is on scene at V1-AA/V1-AB to verify that all vehicles are
|
||||||
|
clear of vehicle ram barriers after departure from the controlled area. After verification that
|
||||||
|
barriers are clear, utilize CCTV to ensure all vehicles are clear of barriers. The Topside SRT
|
||||||
|
will verify with Cerberus-10 via radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of the barriers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE CONVOY ENTRY/EXIT PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Confirm with a designated Topside patrol that OST personnel identity was verified
|
||||||
|
via DOE issued picture identification and the Certification List of DOE/NNSA/OST
|
||||||
|
Personnel (FA 9026) and DoE vehicles have been sanitized/remained under constant
|
||||||
|
observation via Convoy Commander.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The DoE team’s access to limited/exclusion areas are under escort of DoD
|
||||||
|
personnel. NOTE: On-duty SF personnel will not act as escort officials for DoE
|
||||||
|
personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) DoE vehicles entering or exiting for MUNS training operations will not be searched
|
||||||
|
unless deemed necessary as directed by Wing Commander or designated representative.
|
||||||
|
These searches will be conducted in the Sally Port.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
When securing special functions, ensure that the patrols located at V-2/V-8 verify via
|
||||||
|
radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of barriers. After notification that all
|
||||||
|
vehicles are clear, verify through CCTV before securing barriers.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) TYPE I CONVOY PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) DoE vehicles will not be inspected if the Convoy Commander verifies
|
||||||
|
that the vehicle has been sanitized and kept under constant surveillance.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Loaded SGTs may be searched while within limited/exclusion areas, but
|
||||||
|
only when the cargo is in the custody of DoD representatives.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) TYPE II CONVOY PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) DoE vehicles associated with Type II cargo, requesting entry into
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC, will be searched if a search is deemed necessary
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If search is deemed necessary, Type II cargo may be searched only
|
||||||
|
within limited/exclusion areas and when cargo is in custody of DoD
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ON BASE MILITARY CONVOY PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) For on base military convoys, only the tow vehicle and driver/passengers will be
|
||||||
|
authorized unimpeded entry/exit to and from Loading Dock after receiving pre-authentication
|
||||||
|
from Convoy Commander.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) EC will retrieve badge information from tow vehicle driver/passengers to change
|
||||||
|
Discrete Controlled Area (DCA) to appropriate location.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6 of 10
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-10, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the proper special functions are initiated when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
When securing special functions, ensure that the patrols located at V-2/V-8 verify via
|
||||||
|
radio transmission that all vehicles are clear of barriers. After notification that all
|
||||||
|
vehicles are clear, verify through CCTV before securing barriers.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Maintain visual accountability of Fire Department (FD) personnel within the Sally
|
||||||
|
Port/ECP area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) After FD departs, purge the ECP and Sally Port if FD had access to those areas and
|
||||||
|
relay status of the purge to SSCC upon completion. NOTE: If a fire exists in the ECP or
|
||||||
|
Sally Port area, immediately notify SSCC and attempt to extinguish the fire using
|
||||||
|
available fire extinguishers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• When emergency evacuation is warranted:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure personnel are not departing with ANY hand carried items. NOTE: The
|
||||||
|
only authorized items are classified material and/or radio. All other items will be
|
||||||
|
confiscated immediately and abandoned in place. AF FM 52 WILL NOT be
|
||||||
|
accomplished due to the nature of the emergency.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Unless obstructions don’t allow exit through V-6, all evacuating personnel to
|
||||||
|
exit loading dock through V-6. If the situation allows, have all evacuating personnel
|
||||||
|
swipe out at V-6. Topside patrols will accomplish AF Form 1109 annotations for all
|
||||||
|
evacuating personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ECP EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• When emergency evacuation is warranted:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If time/safety permits, EC personnel will log off the AECS console.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If time/safety does not permit, upon return to ECP, purge ECP, conduct a
|
||||||
|
complete changeover using changeover checklist, and conduct a routine verification of
|
||||||
|
the system using JRV.
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, one member of the ECP will
|
||||||
|
provide Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD) at V-5. Coordinate with Topside Area
|
||||||
|
Supervisor/SSCC for termination of ISD to minimize fratricide.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Remaining ECP personnel should man the weapons ports.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
X-RAY/METAL DETECTOR PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All personnel will place hand-carried items in a plastic bins for screening via X-
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7 of 10
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-10, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ray.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Verify the items via X-Ray monitor and ensure all hand-carried items are identified.
|
||||||
|
If items cannot be identified, reverse the X-Ray machine, have the owner and EC accomplish
|
||||||
|
a hand-on verification of the item unless it is considered a possible threat.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Items such as electronic circuit boards or unusual looking tools will be closely
|
||||||
|
scrutinized and treated as a possible threat until further investigation proves otherwise.
|
||||||
|
Contact munitions control for authorization and clarification of questionable items
|
||||||
|
entering/departing the area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All personnel should remove all metallic items prior to passing through the metal
|
||||||
|
detector. Any items removed from their person will be processed through the X-ray for
|
||||||
|
screening.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) NOTE: Unless the X-ray is broken, the EC will not conduct a simple hand-on
|
||||||
|
search of these items, they will always be processed through the X-ray.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Direct personnel through the metal detector. If the detector annunciates, direct the
|
||||||
|
individual to identify any items that may be causing the alarm. Any identified items removed
|
||||||
|
from their person will be processed through the X-ray for screening.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Instruct the individual to re-process through the metal detector, subsequent metal
|
||||||
|
detector alarms will be investigated with a hand-held transfrisker until positive identification
|
||||||
|
of all items can be made.
|
||||||
|
ITEMS EXEMPT FROM SEARCH:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Because of early expiration of service life, possible damage to equipment, possible
|
||||||
|
injury to personnel, accountability, exposure to hazardous materials, need-to-know basis, or
|
||||||
|
equipment needing continuous humidity protection, the following items are exempt from
|
||||||
|
inspection:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Hermetically sealed munitions supplies and equipment (e.g., limited life
|
||||||
|
components, explosive ejector cartridges).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Munitions supplies and equipment in heat sealed barrier bags (e.g., humidity
|
||||||
|
indicators, missile components, etc).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Munitions containers with intact shipping or storage seals (e.g., deployment kits
|
||||||
|
and classified munitions).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Limited Life Components in non-commercial closed wooden or cardboard
|
||||||
|
containers with affixed shipping documents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
• Conduct a joint changeover using the changeover checklist with the off-going EC. You will
|
||||||
|
conduct daily inspections and checks of your area.
|
||||||
|
• Receive a briefing from the off-going SEC concerning past, current, and planned events and
|
||||||
|
review the pass-on book and work orders. Contact the Alarm Monitor to verify open work
|
||||||
|
orders for accuracy. Refer to Joint Routine Verification.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the inbound X-Ray machine, outbound X-Ray machine, and metal detector
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
8 of 10
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-10, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
is tested at each shift change using the applicable testing device.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a check of all communications lines and a radio status check with SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Account for all checklist books and verify that each individual checklist is present
|
||||||
|
and accounted for. Ensure checklists are clean and ready for use i.e., all dry erase markers
|
||||||
|
are cleaned from the plastic sheet.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Verify the graphics display monitor to ensure all portals and special functions are in
|
||||||
|
the appropriate state. Refer to WSSS SOP 31-101 Vol. 4.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a joint routine verification of AECS with the off-going EC by obtaining the
|
||||||
|
system status. Verify the system is operating on primary comm. Refer to WSSS SOP 31-
|
||||||
|
101 Vol. 4.
|
||||||
|
• If there are discrepancies with any of the above items, both the on-coming and off-going
|
||||||
|
FCC/FC will be contacted. If the discrepancy cannot be corrected prior to off-going
|
||||||
|
departing, an informational blotter entry will be made. Once off-going personnel have been
|
||||||
|
relieved, the on-coming personnel are responsible for all items associated with this position.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Monitor and maintain situational awareness of all CCTV, AECS, X-ray computer,
|
||||||
|
and communication equipment.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
|
||||||
|
and any other O-6 or above, you will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing
|
||||||
|
by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 10 is all secure, and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
9 of 10
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-10, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
10 of 10
|
||||||
225
export/(DCNI) Cerberus-2 (V19-1).md
Normal file
225
export/(DCNI) Cerberus-2 (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cerberus-2 (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cerberus2
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC Internal Security Response Team
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Respond to Security Incidents and emergencies as the Internal Security Response
|
||||||
|
Teams for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
|
||||||
|
You comprise a portion of the Response Force (RF).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) During hostile situations, provide final denial security at blast doors B-3 and B-4
|
||||||
|
until arrival of back-up forces or termination of all hostile elements.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to any alarm annunciations or Security Incidents on the high
|
||||||
|
side of B-3/4 within 3 minutes.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Behind blast doors B3/4 except during emergency response (fire/medical), loading
|
||||||
|
dock operations and logistics movements. Maintain a 3 minute response capability to all
|
||||||
|
alarm activations or Security Incidents occurring on the high side of B3/4.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
|
||||||
|
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Cerberus-2A will be armed with an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm linked armor
|
||||||
|
piercing and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm
|
||||||
|
hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
|
||||||
|
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
|
||||||
|
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
|
||||||
|
recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
|
||||||
|
neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2 of 5
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
|
||||||
|
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
|
||||||
|
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
|
||||||
|
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
|
||||||
|
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DoE SAFEGUARDS TRANSPORTER ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) During loading dock upload and download operations, when B1-4 are open, post in
|
||||||
|
Brandt Hall final denial positions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
INTER AREA MOVEMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) During inter area movement you will be posted in Brandt Hall final denial positions
|
||||||
|
until movement is terminated.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) During an emergency response, maintain visual and accountability of Fire
|
||||||
|
Department (FD) personnel upon their arrival into Brandt Hall. After FD departs, purge
|
||||||
|
entire area to include all administration areas. Relay status of all areas to SSCC upon
|
||||||
|
completion of purge. NOTE: If a fire exists in the administration areas, notify SSCC
|
||||||
|
and attempt to extinguish the fire using available fire extinguishers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• When emergency evacuation is warranted:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure non-essential personnel are clear of administration areas.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) MC2 will be initiated. All personnel must depart in an orderly file formation.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) With the exception of classified material and radios, evacuating personnel are
|
||||||
|
not authorized to transport any hand-carried items out of the facility. All other items
|
||||||
|
will be immediately confiscated and abandoned in place.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3 of 5
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Direct all evacuating personnel through B1-4. In conjunction with Loading
|
||||||
|
Dock ISRT (if posted), route evacuating personnel to V6. If the situation allows, have all
|
||||||
|
evacuating personnel swipe out at V6.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Pass evacuees off to topside patrols for additional processing.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Shift change will be conducted in the ART room.
|
||||||
|
• Inspect your post and ensure it is free from trash, clean, organized and fully operational
|
||||||
|
(ballistic barriers) prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure the ballistic barriers are in operational condition, check barriers for:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Maneuverability (ensure they roll)
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Cleanliness (armored glass is clean)
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Operability (raise and lower)
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Serviceability (no cracks, no graffiti)
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) NOTE: Report discrepancies to SSCC or flight leadership immediately.
|
||||||
|
• Account for SSIs, vault door combination and available flexi cuffs/flexi cuffs cutter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the restricted/limited area display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the
|
||||||
|
outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
|
||||||
|
required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure compliance with the two-person concept within exclusion areas. An
|
||||||
|
exclusion area will exist in Brandt Hall when Protection Level 1 resources are in transit
|
||||||
|
between A/B sides, or in route to the Loading Dock.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually pump the blast doors. Detailed
|
||||||
|
instructions on how to pump the blast doors are located within the brown tool box adjacent to
|
||||||
|
B-3/4.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
|
||||||
|
and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing by
|
||||||
|
stating “Sir/Ma’am, Cerberus 2 is all secure and ready for inspection, do you request a post
|
||||||
|
briefing?”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4 of 5
|
||||||
|
Cerberus-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5 of 5
|
||||||
287
export/(DCNI) Charlie-1 (V19-1).md
Normal file
287
export/(DCNI) Charlie-1 (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Charlie-1 (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHARLIE 1
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SUBSEQUENT BACKUP FORCE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are the Charlie Back-up Force Leader and are responsible for all Charlie
|
||||||
|
Backup forces to include Charlie 2, 3, and 4. You will respond to KUMMSC and follow the
|
||||||
|
direction of Guardian1/2, or Scorpion 1. If Guardian 1/2 or Scorpion 1 is incapacitated you
|
||||||
|
will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
•
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader and member(s) will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
|
||||||
|
ball and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
|
||||||
|
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
|
||||||
|
Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
|
||||||
|
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armory with both
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
|
||||||
|
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
|
||||||
|
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
|
||||||
|
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
|
||||||
|
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
|
||||||
|
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the surrounding
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
|
||||||
|
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion 1.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA you/Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
will:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
|
||||||
|
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully pass the
|
||||||
|
correct counter-sign.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and ascertain reason
|
||||||
|
for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of foul
|
||||||
|
play or duress.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well as those personnel
|
||||||
|
staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to physically document the number
|
||||||
|
of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You should not rely on memory to record this
|
||||||
|
information.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged out of the
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur regardless of the
|
||||||
|
fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the AF Form 1109. The
|
||||||
|
annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual vehicles and vehicle occupants to
|
||||||
|
depart through V1AB.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency response
|
||||||
|
vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband materials. Upon
|
||||||
|
discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS personnel for official
|
||||||
|
determination of “contraband.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location, emergency
|
||||||
|
responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this case, responders will
|
||||||
|
not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE Patrol should be pre-positioned
|
||||||
|
outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the subsequent emergency location. The
|
||||||
|
patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the
|
||||||
|
subsequent emergency location. Make contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is
|
||||||
|
knowledgeable with respect to this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not
|
||||||
|
already in their possession).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FACILITY EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over evacuees
|
||||||
|
as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the exception of hand-held
|
||||||
|
radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not allowed. If hand-held classified
|
||||||
|
material is present, search the content to verify it is classified material. Log all evacuees on
|
||||||
|
an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive control over evacuees until the situation is resolved
|
||||||
|
or they are otherwise released by the Incident Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
• Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) parking lot
|
||||||
|
west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased to avoid congregation
|
||||||
|
of all patrols.
|
||||||
|
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
• Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377 WSSS
|
||||||
|
blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
|
||||||
|
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building (UB),
|
||||||
|
C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted through the
|
||||||
|
use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside patrol in the event
|
||||||
|
the card readers are not operational.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will make
|
||||||
|
telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name and badge
|
||||||
|
number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If AECS is not
|
||||||
|
operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted Area Badge Listing
|
||||||
|
(MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside patrol to meet the individual at
|
||||||
|
the applicable location and verify the identity of the personnel requesting access. If there
|
||||||
|
appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out,
|
||||||
|
notify SSCC and allow entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring avenues
|
||||||
|
of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to potential
|
||||||
|
aggressors.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such areas for observation and
|
||||||
|
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections and checks
|
||||||
|
of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour checks are
|
||||||
|
conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e. Armory, Utility Building,
|
||||||
|
C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not congregate for
|
||||||
|
longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or Flight Chief.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area display an
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on
|
||||||
|
the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
|
||||||
|
required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle denial
|
||||||
|
barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF
|
||||||
|
Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post and offer a
|
||||||
|
post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie-1 is all secure and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective Foot
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate your walking
|
||||||
|
patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate coverage of the
|
||||||
|
surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and termination of all
|
||||||
|
walking patrols.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System (PSRS) alarm
|
||||||
|
annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map. Upon arriving at the
|
||||||
|
applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and report your findings back to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
Charlie-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
288
export/(DCNI) Charlie-2 (V19-1).md
Normal file
288
export/(DCNI) Charlie-2 (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Charlie-2 (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHARLIE 2
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SUBSEQUENT BACKUP FORCE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding to
|
||||||
|
contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 3, and 4. If the situation demands
|
||||||
|
you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
|
||||||
|
•
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader and member(s) will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
|
||||||
|
ball and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
|
||||||
|
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
|
||||||
|
Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
|
||||||
|
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armory with both
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
|
||||||
|
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
|
||||||
|
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
|
||||||
|
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
|
||||||
|
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
|
||||||
|
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the surrounding
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
|
||||||
|
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion 1.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA you/Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
will:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
|
||||||
|
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully pass the
|
||||||
|
correct counter-sign.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and ascertain reason
|
||||||
|
for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of foul
|
||||||
|
play or duress.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well as those personnel
|
||||||
|
staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to physically document the number
|
||||||
|
of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You should not rely on memory to record this
|
||||||
|
information.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged out of the
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur regardless of the
|
||||||
|
fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the AF Form 1109. The
|
||||||
|
annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual vehicles and vehicle occupants to
|
||||||
|
depart through V1AB.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency response
|
||||||
|
vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband materials. Upon
|
||||||
|
discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS personnel for official
|
||||||
|
determination of “contraband.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location, emergency
|
||||||
|
responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this case, responders will
|
||||||
|
not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE Patrol should be pre-positioned
|
||||||
|
outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the subsequent emergency location. The
|
||||||
|
patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the
|
||||||
|
subsequent emergency location. Make contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is
|
||||||
|
knowledgeable with respect to this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not
|
||||||
|
already in their possession).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FACILITY EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over evacuees
|
||||||
|
as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the exception of hand-held
|
||||||
|
radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not allowed. If hand-held classified
|
||||||
|
material is present, search the content to verify it is classified material. Log all evacuees on
|
||||||
|
an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive control over evacuees until the situation is resolved
|
||||||
|
or they are otherwise released by the Incident Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
• Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) parking lot
|
||||||
|
west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased to avoid congregation
|
||||||
|
of all patrols.
|
||||||
|
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
• Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377 WSSS
|
||||||
|
blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
|
||||||
|
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building (UB),
|
||||||
|
C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted through the
|
||||||
|
use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside patrol in the event
|
||||||
|
the card readers are not operational.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will make
|
||||||
|
telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name and badge
|
||||||
|
number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If AECS is not
|
||||||
|
operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted Area Badge Listing
|
||||||
|
(MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside patrol to meet the individual at
|
||||||
|
the applicable location and verify the identity of the personnel requesting access. If there
|
||||||
|
appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out,
|
||||||
|
notify SSCC and allow entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring avenues
|
||||||
|
of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to potential
|
||||||
|
aggressors.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such areas for observation and
|
||||||
|
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections and checks
|
||||||
|
of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour checks are
|
||||||
|
conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e. Armory, Utility Building,
|
||||||
|
C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not congregate for
|
||||||
|
longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or Flight Chief.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area display an
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on
|
||||||
|
the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
|
||||||
|
required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle denial
|
||||||
|
barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF
|
||||||
|
Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post and offer a
|
||||||
|
post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 2 is all secure and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective Foot
|
||||||
|
Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate your walking
|
||||||
|
patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate coverage of the
|
||||||
|
surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and termination of all
|
||||||
|
walking patrols.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System (PSRS) alarm
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map. Upon arriving at the
|
||||||
|
applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and report your findings back to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
Charlie-2, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
289
export/(DCNI) Charlie-3 (V19-1).md
Normal file
289
export/(DCNI) Charlie-3 (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Charlie-3 (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHARLIE 3
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SUBSEQUENT BACKUP FORCE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding to
|
||||||
|
contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 2, and 4. If the situation demands
|
||||||
|
you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
|
||||||
|
•
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader and member(s) will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
|
||||||
|
ball and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
|
||||||
|
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
|
||||||
|
Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
|
||||||
|
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armory with both
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
|
||||||
|
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
|
||||||
|
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
|
||||||
|
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
|
||||||
|
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
|
||||||
|
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the surrounding
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
|
||||||
|
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion 1.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA you/Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
will:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
|
||||||
|
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully pass the
|
||||||
|
correct counter-sign.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and ascertain reason
|
||||||
|
for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of foul
|
||||||
|
play or duress.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well as those personnel
|
||||||
|
staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to physically document the number
|
||||||
|
of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You should not rely on memory to record this
|
||||||
|
information.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged out of the
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur regardless of the
|
||||||
|
fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the AF Form 1109. The
|
||||||
|
annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual vehicles and vehicle occupants to
|
||||||
|
depart through V1AB.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency response
|
||||||
|
vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband materials. Upon
|
||||||
|
discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS personnel for official
|
||||||
|
determination of “contraband.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location, emergency
|
||||||
|
responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this case, responders will
|
||||||
|
not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE Patrol should be pre-positioned
|
||||||
|
outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the subsequent emergency location. The
|
||||||
|
patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the
|
||||||
|
subsequent emergency location. Make contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is
|
||||||
|
knowledgeable with respect to this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not
|
||||||
|
already in their possession).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FACILITY EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over evacuees
|
||||||
|
as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the exception of hand-held
|
||||||
|
radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not allowed. If hand-held classified
|
||||||
|
material is present, search the content to verify it is classified material. Log all evacuees on
|
||||||
|
an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive control over evacuees until the situation is resolved
|
||||||
|
or they are otherwise released by the Incident Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
• Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) parking lot
|
||||||
|
west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased to avoid congregation
|
||||||
|
of all patrols.
|
||||||
|
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
• Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377 WSSS
|
||||||
|
blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
|
||||||
|
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building (UB),
|
||||||
|
C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted through the
|
||||||
|
use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside patrol in the event
|
||||||
|
the card readers are not operational.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will make
|
||||||
|
telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name and badge
|
||||||
|
number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If AECS is not
|
||||||
|
operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted Area Badge Listing
|
||||||
|
(MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside patrol to meet the individual at
|
||||||
|
the applicable location and verify the identity of the personnel requesting access. If there
|
||||||
|
appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out,
|
||||||
|
notify SSCC and allow entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring avenues
|
||||||
|
of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to potential
|
||||||
|
aggressors.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such areas for observation and
|
||||||
|
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections and checks
|
||||||
|
of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour checks are
|
||||||
|
conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e. Armory, Utility Building,
|
||||||
|
C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not congregate for
|
||||||
|
longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or Flight Chief.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area display an
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on
|
||||||
|
the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
|
||||||
|
required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle denial
|
||||||
|
barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF
|
||||||
|
Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post and offer a
|
||||||
|
post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 3 is all secure and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective Foot
|
||||||
|
Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate your walking
|
||||||
|
patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate coverage of the
|
||||||
|
surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and termination of all
|
||||||
|
walking patrols.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System (PSRS) alarm
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map. Upon arriving at the
|
||||||
|
applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and report your findings back to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
Charlie-3, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
288
export/(DCNI) Charlie-4 (V19-1).md
Normal file
288
export/(DCNI) Charlie-4 (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Charlie-4 (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS GUIDANCE IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CHARLIE 4
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SUBSEQUENT BACKUP FORCE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are part of the Charlie Back-up Force and are responsible responding to
|
||||||
|
contingencies at KUMMSC in conjunction with Charlie 1, 2, and 3. If the situation demands
|
||||||
|
you will immediately take steps to recap/recover/secure KUMMSC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Based on METT-TC.
|
||||||
|
•
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader and member(s) will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm
|
||||||
|
ball and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
|
||||||
|
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
|
||||||
|
Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal
|
||||||
|
of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armory with both
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
|
||||||
|
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
|
||||||
|
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
|
||||||
|
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
|
||||||
|
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EMERGENCY RESPONSE:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will position yourself at V1-AA with Scorpion 1 and await emergency
|
||||||
|
responders. The Alpha member will stay inside the turret and be vigilant of the surrounding
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure that you have a stop sign, search mirror, and AF Form 1109s Visitor
|
||||||
|
Register Log readily available for immediate use and be prepared to assist Scorpion 1.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prior to granting Fire Department responders access through V1AA you/Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
will:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not grant entry based upon lights/sirens alone, verify with SSCC that an
|
||||||
|
emergency condition exists, and ensure the FD response is not a ruse or deception.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Execute sign/counter-sign procedures.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Emergency responders will be given only ONE opportunity to successfully pass the
|
||||||
|
correct counter-sign.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If responders fail the counter-sign, stop vehicle, separate driver, and ascertain reason
|
||||||
|
for improper counter-sign/duress. If all in order, let pass.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a HASTY visual inspection of the vehicle looking for any signs of foul
|
||||||
|
play or duress.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Not all emergency responders will enter the facility/limited area. Assist Scorpion 1
|
||||||
|
with maintaining accountability of personnel entering the tunnel as well as those personnel
|
||||||
|
staying in the topside area. You are strongly encouraged to physically document the number
|
||||||
|
of vehicles and personnel entering the area. You should not rely on memory to record this
|
||||||
|
information.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon termination of the incident, all emergency responders will be logged out of the
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area via the AF Form 1109. This annotation will occur regardless of the
|
||||||
|
fact emergency responders were never logged into the area via the AF Form 1109. The
|
||||||
|
annotation will be accomplished before allowing individual vehicles and vehicle occupants to
|
||||||
|
depart through V1AB.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Before being allowed to depart the topside controlled area, all emergency response
|
||||||
|
vehicles will be inspected for readily detectable prohibited and contraband materials. Upon
|
||||||
|
discovery of a questionable contraband item, refer to MUNS personnel for official
|
||||||
|
determination of “contraband.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) In the event another emergency incident occurs at another location, emergency
|
||||||
|
responders may need to rapidly depart KUMMSC to respond. In this case, responders will
|
||||||
|
not be delayed by conducting a vehicle inspection. An LE Patrol should be pre-positioned
|
||||||
|
outside of V1AB and will shadow responders to the subsequent emergency location. The
|
||||||
|
patrolman will conduct vehicle inspections and annotation on an AF Form 1109 at the
|
||||||
|
subsequent emergency location. Make contact with the LE Patrolman to ensure he/she is
|
||||||
|
knowledgeable with respect to this task and provide him/her with AF Form 1109s (if not
|
||||||
|
already in their possession).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FACILITY EVACUATION:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If an evacuation of the facility is called for, maintain positive control over evacuees
|
||||||
|
as they are passed off to you from underground patrols. With the exception of hand-held
|
||||||
|
radios and classified materials, hand-carried items are not allowed. If hand-held classified
|
||||||
|
material is present, search the content to verify it is classified material. Log all evacuees on
|
||||||
|
an AF Form 1109 and maintain positive control over evacuees until the situation is resolved
|
||||||
|
or they are otherwise released by the Incident Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
• Shift change will be conducted within the Government Owned Vehicle (GOV) parking lot
|
||||||
|
west of the squadron operations building. Ensure changeover is phased to avoid congregation
|
||||||
|
of all patrols.
|
||||||
|
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. You will ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
• Account for SSIs, DoE courier listing, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All keys will be accounted for per Attachment 8 and annotated in the 377 WSSS
|
||||||
|
blotter.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLED AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Only personnel with open area 8 on their AF Form 1199CG will be granted
|
||||||
|
unescorted entry to KUMMSC, the topside controlled area, or into the Utility Building (UB),
|
||||||
|
C2B, Room F-1 or Enrollment Center.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Authorized vehicle entry into the topside controlled area will be granted through the
|
||||||
|
use of security card readers at the vehicle gates (V1AA), or by a topside patrol in the event
|
||||||
|
the card readers are not operational.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Personnel requesting entry into the UB, Room F-1, or Enrollment Center will make
|
||||||
|
telephonic contact with SSCC. SSCC will ask the individual for their name and badge
|
||||||
|
number and then verify the information in the cardholder database. If AECS is not
|
||||||
|
operational, then individual will be verified against the Master Restricted Area Badge Listing
|
||||||
|
(MRABL). Once verified, SSCC will then dispatch a topside patrol to meet the individual at
|
||||||
|
the applicable location and verify the identity of the personnel requesting access. If there
|
||||||
|
appears to be a discrepancy, initiate a challenge and notify SSCC. If all data checks out,
|
||||||
|
notify SSCC and allow entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are actively patrolling your dedicated Patrol Zone, monitoring avenues
|
||||||
|
of approach, and displaying an active, visible and aggressive deterrent to potential
|
||||||
|
aggressors.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around limited areas. Check for indications of use within such areas for observation and
|
||||||
|
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You may be dispatched to assist Scorpion 1 with daily visual inspections and checks
|
||||||
|
of your area in accordance with Attachment 4 of this instruction.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coordinate with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure 4 hour checks are
|
||||||
|
conducted on all alarm points located within topside facilities, (i.e. Armory, Utility Building,
|
||||||
|
C2B, Enrollment Center, and F-1).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure adequate separation with other Scorpion patrols and will not congregate for
|
||||||
|
longer than 1 minute unless approved by your Flight Commander or Flight Chief.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel who are present within the topside controlled area display an
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on
|
||||||
|
the outermost garment somewhere on the upper left portion of their body. Open area 8 is
|
||||||
|
required for KUMMSC access.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are familiar with procedures to manually raise/lower vehicle denial
|
||||||
|
barriers and manually start the back-up generator.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF
|
||||||
|
Commanders and any other O-6 or above you will report the status of your post and offer a
|
||||||
|
post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Charlie 4 is all secure and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a minimum of one walking patrol per shift within your respective Foot
|
||||||
|
Patrol Zones. Additional walking patrols are strongly encouraged. Coordinate your walking
|
||||||
|
patrols with Scorpion 1 and other Scorpion patrols to ensure adequate coverage of the
|
||||||
|
surrounding terrain. Radio SSCC and inform them of initiation and termination of all
|
||||||
|
walking patrols.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Respond as dispatched to Perimeter Surveillance and Radar System (PSRS) alarm
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
annunciations in conjunction with the Topside Alarm Sector grid map. Upon arriving at the
|
||||||
|
applicable sector, look for signs of unauthorized activity and report your findings back to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
Charlie-4, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
258
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258
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@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cobra 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cobra 1
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Convoy Commander
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide command & control during logistics movements. Provide safe,
|
||||||
|
secure, and effective transportation for Protection Level 1 munitions within the
|
||||||
|
confines of Kirtland, AFB.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Prepare and deliver a mission brief to all Air Base Wing logistics movement
|
||||||
|
participants.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Conduct a Multi-Agency Rehearsal within 48 hours from a PL1 ground
|
||||||
|
movement. Ensure the following agencies are present:
|
||||||
|
Convoy Commander
|
||||||
|
Senior Security Representative
|
||||||
|
Area Supervisor
|
||||||
|
SAAM Coordinator
|
||||||
|
Fire Department
|
||||||
|
MUNS Supervision
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
Trans Alert
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Prepare and deliver a detailed convoy briefing prior to the movement of a
|
||||||
|
resource. Ensure all required briefing items are included per DoDM S-5210.41- M
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-108 Volume 3.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) As determined by mission requirements. During the movement, remain with
|
||||||
|
visual range of the resource(s).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
|
||||||
|
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
|
||||||
|
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
|
||||||
|
radio communication capability.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but
|
||||||
|
will enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be
|
||||||
|
advised that when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can
|
||||||
|
potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited.
|
||||||
|
Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base
|
||||||
|
Wing Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will be armed with M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition with a 4
|
||||||
|
to 1 ratio. Additionally you will be armed with the M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow
|
||||||
|
point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
|
||||||
|
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
|
||||||
|
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
|
||||||
|
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
|
||||||
|
when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure your vehicle is equipped with a PA, if not you will use a Bullhorn.
|
||||||
|
All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
|
||||||
|
prior to movement for an outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
INBOUND:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all posted in support of PL1 resources are certified on PRP,
|
||||||
|
cleared to receive secret and fit for duty in the Convoy Mission Brief.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure route sweeps are conducted prior to convoy roll. Individuals
|
||||||
|
conducting sweeps must have a LMR while conducting sweeps of the route.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all personnel are tactically prepared 30 minutes prior to A/C
|
||||||
|
landing and taxing.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all forces are in place, and the route is swept and secure prior to
|
||||||
|
requesting permission to roll.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) When the download is complete, and the tow drivers are prepared to
|
||||||
|
depart, request permission to roll from the ABW/CC through the SAAM
|
||||||
|
Coordinator.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Authenticate the composition of the convoy with Guardian once
|
||||||
|
movement has been initiated.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure checkpoints are called and authenticated by either
|
||||||
|
Cobra-2 or Cobra-3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Authenticate the number of personnel entering the exclusion area
|
||||||
|
of KUMMSC with Guardian.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
OUTBOUND:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all posted in support of PL1 resources are certified on PRP,
|
||||||
|
cleared to receive secret and fit for duty in the Convoy Mission Brief.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure route sweeps are conducted prior to convoy roll. Individuals
|
||||||
|
conducting sweeps must have a LMR while conducting sweeps of the route.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all forces are in place, and the route is swept and secure prior to
|
||||||
|
requesting permission to roll.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Once Mustang-1 declares that Pad-5 is ready to receive, request
|
||||||
|
permission to roll from the ABW/CC through the SAAM Coordinator.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Authenticate the composition of the convoy with Guardian once
|
||||||
|
movement has been initiated.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure checkpoints are called and authenticated by either
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
Cobra-2 or Cobra-3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Authenticate the number of personnel entering the exclusion area
|
||||||
|
of Pad-5 with Mustang-10.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize
|
||||||
|
the intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander
|
||||||
|
or a senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest
|
||||||
|
priority until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their
|
||||||
|
actions to gain unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken
|
||||||
|
to deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody
|
||||||
|
of a seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or
|
||||||
|
vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
PAD 5 RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) PNAF Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security
|
||||||
|
challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
|
||||||
|
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent
|
||||||
|
security seams that could develop if PNAF area entry procedures are
|
||||||
|
changed as the weapons move (or the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent
|
||||||
|
extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon, the description of
|
||||||
|
the PNAF exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Encl
|
||||||
|
9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Once the PNAF aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated
|
||||||
|
PNAF limited (restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is
|
||||||
|
established. Therefore, the limited and exclusion area verification and
|
||||||
|
inspection will occur at the single entry control point at all times once the
|
||||||
|
weapons enter the PNAF restricted area. For personnel not authorized
|
||||||
|
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC
|
||||||
|
must contact the SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will
|
||||||
|
ensure compliance with the security requirements outlined in DoDM S-
|
||||||
|
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as DoDM S-5210.41-
|
||||||
|
M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
o (DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited
|
||||||
|
and exclusion areas established for alert parking areas where the
|
||||||
|
limited and exclusion area inspection and assignment of escorts occur
|
||||||
|
at the same entry point.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
PAD-5 ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All personnel entering the PAD 5 limited/exclusion area must have a valid
|
||||||
|
reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into Hot Cargo Pad 5 will be based on
|
||||||
|
the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
|
||||||
|
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for
|
||||||
|
aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential
|
||||||
|
and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other
|
||||||
|
agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
|
||||||
|
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring
|
||||||
|
entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the
|
||||||
|
PAD-5 ECP.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant
|
||||||
|
surveillance prior to entering the PAD-5 limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough
|
||||||
|
sweep is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be
|
||||||
|
conducted by SF personnel and an EDD team if available.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
180
export/(DCNI) Cobra 10.md
Normal file
180
export/(DCNI) Cobra 10.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cobra 10
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cobra 10
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Convoy Entry Controller
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Control entry/exit of personnel and vehicles to the exclusion area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) For any long halt situation you will create an ECP as directed by the
|
||||||
|
Convoy Commande r. It should be no closer than 10 feet no further than 60 feet
|
||||||
|
from the resource(s).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will search all personnel and their hand carried items prior to
|
||||||
|
allowing entry into the exclusion area utilizing a Transfrisker. If no Transfrisker is
|
||||||
|
available, conduct a simple frisk of individuals prior to allowing entry to the area.
|
||||||
|
All individuals will have their Restricted Area Badge cross checked against the
|
||||||
|
properly authenticated EAL. You will ensure name, rank, SSN and badge
|
||||||
|
number match. If any of the above listed items do not match, immediately deny
|
||||||
|
entry and notify Cobra-1.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Any personnel requiring escorted entry into the area will be logged in on
|
||||||
|
the AF Form 1109 Visitor Register Log (Attachment 1), all hand carried items will
|
||||||
|
be searched and the individual will be searched utilizing a Transfrisker. The SVA
|
||||||
|
must be present at the ECP to allow entry to persons not on any of the EAL's and
|
||||||
|
vouch for those entering.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Ensure all hand-carried items and persons are searched prior to any
|
||||||
|
individuals leaving the exclusion area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
Emergency responders must be preannounced. Emergency entry will be based
|
||||||
|
off a successful sign/countersign. Ensure you maintain strict accountability
|
||||||
|
during all situations. Prior to exiting, emergency responders will be searched
|
||||||
|
along with their vehicles and equipment. All emergency responders will be
|
||||||
|
signed in on an AF Form 1109 prior to exiting the area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
Posted with Cobra-1 during movement.
|
||||||
|
Within the immediate area of designated Entry Control Point (ECP) once
|
||||||
|
an ECP is established.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
Primary means of communication is Two Way Portable Radio. Secondary
|
||||||
|
means of communication are available landlines within the immediate area.
|
||||||
|
Alternate means, manual signal techniques including voice, whistle, hand and
|
||||||
|
arm signals and flashlight. As a last resort, utilize weapons by firing 3 rounds in
|
||||||
|
rapid succession in a manner not to endanger lives or resources IAW 31-117.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25 ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
M4 and 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball/tracer ammunition mixed at a 4 to 1 ratio.
|
||||||
|
Additionally you will be armed with the M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
|
||||||
|
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
|
||||||
|
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and
|
||||||
|
Type IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon
|
||||||
|
situations or when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
|
||||||
|
prior to movement for an outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance
|
||||||
|
with AFMAN 31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and
|
||||||
|
Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to, removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security Forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Account for ECP signs, AF Form 1109s, a transfrisker, and all other
|
||||||
|
equipment items prior to initiation of the movement.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, on-duty SF must
|
||||||
|
begin the recapture immediately, without the added delay of requesting and
|
||||||
|
receiving permission from an installation authority such as the installation
|
||||||
|
commander or a senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Actions to recapture or recover a weapon shall be undertaken
|
||||||
|
immediately and will remain the primary mission and highest priority until
|
||||||
|
completed.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized nuclear weapon and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
227
export/(DCNI) Cobra 2.md
Normal file
227
export/(DCNI) Cobra 2.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cobra 2
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cobra 2
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Convoy Lead Escort Team
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide lead escort security for Protection Level 1 Logistics Movements, to
|
||||||
|
the best of your estimation; maintain 75 feet between your Armored HMMWV and
|
||||||
|
the tow vehicle.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Sweep primary and alternate routes upon initiation of the applicable Step
|
||||||
|
Code paying particular attention to items listed in the mission briefing. Maintain
|
||||||
|
situational awareness of the appropriate Step Code currently in use. See
|
||||||
|
Attachment 1 for Step Codes. Ensure TCP’s are established prior to initiating route
|
||||||
|
sweeps.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon completion of your route sweeps for inbound operations, proceed to
|
||||||
|
the northeast corner of Pad-5 on Ordnance Street and maintain a sector of fire to the
|
||||||
|
northeast until Cobra 1 directs you to the south of Pad 5 to setup in a position to lead
|
||||||
|
75 feet in front of the tow vehicle(s).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon completion of route sweeps for outbound ops, return to the KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
exit tunnel, and position yourself to monitor avenues of approach.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Call out checkpoint progression to the Site Security Control Center as the
|
||||||
|
Tow Vehicle passes by the pre-determined points determined by the Convoy
|
||||||
|
Commander in the mission brief.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Authenticate with SSCC at the corresponding checkpoints during movement
|
||||||
|
(use proper step).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Post Restricted Area signs in case of long halt situations and take up a
|
||||||
|
security position to the 12 o'clock position to the convoy's forward direction.
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During movements, maintain a minimum of 75 feet in front of the tow vehicle.
|
||||||
|
During Pad 5 operations, monitor avenues of approach as directed by the Convoy
|
||||||
|
Commander.
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
|
||||||
|
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
|
||||||
|
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
|
||||||
|
radio communication capability.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but
|
||||||
|
will enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be
|
||||||
|
advised that when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can
|
||||||
|
potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
|
||||||
|
tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of
|
||||||
|
9mm hollow point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Machine Gunner (Alpha member) will be armed with an M240B with
|
||||||
|
800 rounds of 7.62mm armor piercing and tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and
|
||||||
|
also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of 9mm hollow point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN, 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
|
||||||
|
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
|
||||||
|
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
|
||||||
|
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
|
||||||
|
when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
|
||||||
|
prior to movement for an outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
|
||||||
|
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
|
||||||
|
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
|
||||||
|
senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
|
||||||
|
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) PNAF Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security challenge
|
||||||
|
because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are transferred from
|
||||||
|
loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams that
|
||||||
|
could develop if PNAF area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or
|
||||||
|
the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of
|
||||||
|
the weapon, the description of the PNAF exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41-
|
||||||
|
M_AFMAN 31-108, vol 3, Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Once the PNAF aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated PNAF
|
||||||
|
limited (restricted) area than a single limited and exclusion area is established.
|
||||||
|
Therefore, the limited and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the
|
||||||
|
single entry control point at all times once the weapons enter the PNAF restricted
|
||||||
|
area. For personnel not authorized access into the exclusion area but have duty in
|
||||||
|
the restricted area, the EC must contact the SVA to ensure an escort is assigned.
|
||||||
|
This procedure will ensure compliance with the security requirements outlined in
|
||||||
|
DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as DoDM S-
|
||||||
|
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and
|
||||||
|
exclusion areas established for alert parking areas where the limited and
|
||||||
|
exclusion area inspection and assignment of escorts occur at the same
|
||||||
|
entry point.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PAD-5 ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All personnel entering the PAD 5 limited/exclusion area must have a valid
|
||||||
|
reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into Hot Cargo Pad 5 will be based on
|
||||||
|
the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
|
||||||
|
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for
|
||||||
|
aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential
|
||||||
|
and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other
|
||||||
|
agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
|
||||||
|
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring
|
||||||
|
entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the
|
||||||
|
PAD-5 ECP.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant
|
||||||
|
surveillance prior to entering the PAD-5 limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough
|
||||||
|
sweep is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be
|
||||||
|
conducted by SF personnel and an EDD team if available.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
236
export/(DCNI) Cobra 3.md
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236
export/(DCNI) Cobra 3.md
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@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cobra 3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cobra 3
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Convoy Trail Escort Team
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide trail escort security for Protection Level 1 Logistics Movements.
|
||||||
|
Maintain a minimum of 75 feet between your Armored HMMWV and the tow
|
||||||
|
vehicle. Maintain Final Denial Fire capability at all times of resource(s) in transit.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Sweep alternate and primary routes upon initiation of the applicable Step
|
||||||
|
Code paying particular attention to items listed in the mission briefing. Maintain
|
||||||
|
situational awareness of the appropriate Step Code currently in use. Ensure
|
||||||
|
TCP’s are in place prior to initiating route sweeps.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon completion of your route sweeps for inbound operations, proceed
|
||||||
|
to the northeast corner of Pad-5 on Ordnance Street and maintain a sector of fire
|
||||||
|
to the northeast until Cobra 1 directs you to the south of Pad 5 to setup in a
|
||||||
|
position to trail 75 feet behind the tow vehicle(s).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon completion of route sweeps for outbound ops, return to the
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC exit tunnel, and position yourself next to V-8 in preparation to trail 75
|
||||||
|
feet behind the tow vehicle(s).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Post Restricted Area signs in case of long halt situations and maintain the
|
||||||
|
capability for final denial fire at all times to the 6 o'clock position of the convoy's
|
||||||
|
forward direction.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During movements, maintain a minimum of 75 feet behind the tow vehicle.
|
||||||
|
During Pad 5 operations, monitor avenues of approach as directed by the Convoy
|
||||||
|
Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
|
||||||
|
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
|
||||||
|
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
|
||||||
|
radio communication capability.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but
|
||||||
|
will enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be
|
||||||
|
advised that when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can
|
||||||
|
potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
|
||||||
|
tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and is also armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of
|
||||||
|
9mm hollow point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Machine Gunner (Alpha member) will be armed with an M240B with
|
||||||
|
800 rounds of 7.62mm armor piercing and tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and
|
||||||
|
also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of 9mm hollow point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-117, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
|
||||||
|
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
|
||||||
|
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
|
||||||
|
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
|
||||||
|
when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
|
||||||
|
prior to movement for an Outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
|
||||||
|
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
|
||||||
|
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
|
||||||
|
senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
|
||||||
|
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) PNAF Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security challenge
|
||||||
|
because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are transferred from
|
||||||
|
loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams that
|
||||||
|
could develop if PNAF area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or
|
||||||
|
the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of
|
||||||
|
the weapon, the description of the PNAF exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41-
|
||||||
|
M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Once the PNAF aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated PNAF
|
||||||
|
limited (restricted) area than a single limited and exclusion area is established.
|
||||||
|
Therefore, the limited and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the
|
||||||
|
single entry control point at all times once the weapons enter the PNAF restricted
|
||||||
|
area. For personnel not authorized access into the exclusion area but have duty in
|
||||||
|
the restricted area, the EC must contact the SVA to ensure an escort is assigned.
|
||||||
|
This procedure will ensure compliance with the security requirements outlined in
|
||||||
|
DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as DoDM S-
|
||||||
|
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and
|
||||||
|
exclusion areas established for alert parking areas where the limited and
|
||||||
|
exclusion area inspection and assignment of escorts occur at the same entry
|
||||||
|
point.
|
||||||
|
PAD-5 ENTRY REQUIREMENTS
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All personnel entering the PAD 5 limited/exclusion area must have a valid
|
||||||
|
reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into Hot Cargo Pad 5 will be based on
|
||||||
|
the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
|
||||||
|
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for
|
||||||
|
aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential
|
||||||
|
and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other
|
||||||
|
agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
|
||||||
|
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring
|
||||||
|
entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the
|
||||||
|
PAD-5 ECP.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant
|
||||||
|
surveillance prior to entering the PAD-5 limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough
|
||||||
|
sweep is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be
|
||||||
|
conducted by SF personnel and an EDD team if available.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
|
||||||
|
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will
|
||||||
|
facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for
|
||||||
|
AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide
|
||||||
|
standard, every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to
|
||||||
|
include actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are
|
||||||
|
not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
223
export/(DCNI) Cobra 4.md
Normal file
223
export/(DCNI) Cobra 4.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cobra 4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cobra 4
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Convoy Trail Escort Team
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide trail escort security for Protection Level 1 Logistics Movements.
|
||||||
|
Maintain a minimum of 75 feet between your Armored HMMWV and the tow
|
||||||
|
vehicle. Maintain Final Denial Fire capability at all times of resource(s) in transit.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Sweep alternate and primary routes upon initiation of the applicable Step
|
||||||
|
Code paying particular attention to items listed in the mission briefing. Maintain
|
||||||
|
situational awareness of the appropriate Step Code currently in use.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon completion of your route sweeps for inbound operations, proceed
|
||||||
|
to the northeast corner of Pad-5 on Ordnance Street and maintain a sector of fire
|
||||||
|
to the northeast until Cobra 1 directs you to the south of Pad 5 to setup in a
|
||||||
|
position to trail 75 feet behind the tow vehicle(s).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Upon completion of route sweeps for outbound ops, return to the
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC exit tunnel, and position yourself next to V-8 in preparation to trail 75
|
||||||
|
feet behind the tow vehicle(s).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Post Restricted Area signs in case of long halt situations and maintain the
|
||||||
|
capability for final denial fire at all times to the 6 o'clock position of the convoy's
|
||||||
|
forward direction.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) During movements, maintain a minimum of 75 feet behind the tow
|
||||||
|
vehicle . During Pad 5 operations, monitor avenues of approach as directed by
|
||||||
|
the Convoy Commander.
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If you do
|
||||||
|
not have an operational radio, do not deploy beyond voice, whistle, flashlight or hand
|
||||||
|
and arm signal communications capability and immediately work to obtain reliable
|
||||||
|
radio communication capability.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open circle)
|
||||||
|
on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to channel
|
||||||
|
6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable
|
||||||
|
radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when
|
||||||
|
transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by
|
||||||
|
unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
|
||||||
|
tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of
|
||||||
|
9mm hollow point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The Machine Gunner (Alpha member) will be armed with an M240B with
|
||||||
|
800 rounds of 7.62mm armor piercing and tracer ammunition with a 4 to 1 ratio and
|
||||||
|
also is armed with an M9 and 30 rounds of 9mm hollow point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-117, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
|
||||||
|
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-
|
||||||
|
1/Mustang-1 or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type
|
||||||
|
IV plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or
|
||||||
|
when directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
All alert equipment will be donned for an Inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and
|
||||||
|
prior to movement for an outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
|
||||||
|
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
|
||||||
|
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for
|
||||||
|
permission from an installation authority such as the installation commander or a
|
||||||
|
senior battle staff representative.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority
|
||||||
|
until completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) PNAF Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security challenge
|
||||||
|
because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are transferred from
|
||||||
|
loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams that
|
||||||
|
could develop if PNAF area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or
|
||||||
|
the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of
|
||||||
|
the weapon, the description of the PNAF exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41-
|
||||||
|
M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Once the PNAF aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated PNAF
|
||||||
|
limited (restricted) area than a single limited and exclusion area is established.
|
||||||
|
Therefore, the limited and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the
|
||||||
|
single entry control point at all times once the weapons enter the PNAF restricted
|
||||||
|
area. For personnel not authorized access into the exclusion area but have duty in
|
||||||
|
the restricted area, the EC must contact the SVA to ensure an escort is assigned.
|
||||||
|
This procedure will ensure compliance with the security requirements outlined in
|
||||||
|
DoDM S-5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as DoDM S-
|
||||||
|
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and
|
||||||
|
exclusion areas established for alert parking areas where the limited and
|
||||||
|
exclusion area inspection and assignment of escorts occur at the same entry
|
||||||
|
point.
|
||||||
|
PAD-5 ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All personnel entering the PAD 5 limited/exclusion area must have a valid
|
||||||
|
reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into Hot Cargo Pad 5 will be based on
|
||||||
|
the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
|
||||||
|
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for
|
||||||
|
aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential
|
||||||
|
and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other
|
||||||
|
agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
|
||||||
|
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring
|
||||||
|
entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the
|
||||||
|
PAD-5 ECP.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant
|
||||||
|
surveillance prior to entering the PAD-5 limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough
|
||||||
|
sweep is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be
|
||||||
|
conducted by SF personnel and an EDD team if available.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
|
||||||
|
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
|
||||||
|
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
|
||||||
|
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
|
||||||
|
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
|
||||||
|
nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
242
export/(DCNI) Cobra-1 (19-1).md
Normal file
242
export/(DCNI) Cobra-1 (19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cobra-1 (19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instructions
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cobra 1
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Convoy Commander
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Provide command & control during logistics movements. Provide safe, secure, and
|
||||||
|
effective transportation for Protection Level 1 munitions within the confines of Kirtland,
|
||||||
|
AFB.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prepare and deliver a mission brief to all Air Base Wing logistics movement
|
||||||
|
participants.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Conduct a Multi-Agency Rehearsal within 48 hours of a PL1 ground movement.
|
||||||
|
Ensure the following agencies are present:
|
||||||
|
• Convoy Commander
|
||||||
|
• Senior Security Representative
|
||||||
|
• Area Supervisor
|
||||||
|
• SAAM Coordinator
|
||||||
|
• Fire Department
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Cobra-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
• MUNS Supervision
|
||||||
|
• Trans Alert
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prepare and deliver a detailed convoy briefing prior to the movement of a resource.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all required briefing items are included per DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108
|
||||||
|
Volume 3.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) As determined by mission requirements. During the movement, remain with visual
|
||||||
|
range of the resource(s).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails, do not
|
||||||
|
deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and immediately
|
||||||
|
attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
|
||||||
|
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and
|
||||||
|
helmet will be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-1/Mustang-1
|
||||||
|
or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or when
|
||||||
|
directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure your vehicle is equipped with a PA, if not you will use a Bullhorn.
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Cobra-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
• All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and prior to
|
||||||
|
movement for an outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
|
||||||
|
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
|
||||||
|
Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
|
||||||
|
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
|
||||||
|
recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
|
||||||
|
neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
INBOUND:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all posted in support of PL1 resources are certified under Arming and
|
||||||
|
Use of Force (AUoF), cleared to receive Secret, and fit for duty in the Convoy
|
||||||
|
Mission Brief.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure route sweeps are conducted prior to convoy roll. Individuals
|
||||||
|
conducting sweeps must have a LMR while conducting sweeps of the route.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all personnel are tactically prepared 30 minutes prior to A/C landing
|
||||||
|
and taxiing.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all forces are in place, and the route is swept and secure prior to
|
||||||
|
requesting permission to roll.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) When the download is complete, and the tow drivers are prepared to depart,
|
||||||
|
request permission to roll from the ABW/CC through the SAAM Coordinator.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prior to movement, announce over radio, “When CDS is directed, it
|
||||||
|
becomes a top priority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Authenticate the composition of the convoy with Guardian once movement
|
||||||
|
has been initiated.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure checkpoints are called and authenticated by either Cobra-2
|
||||||
|
or Cobra-3.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Authenticate the number of personnel entering the exclusion area of
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC with Guardian.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
OUTBOUND:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all posted in support of PL1 resources are certified under Arming and
|
||||||
|
Use of Force (AUoF), cleared to receive Secret, and fit for duty in the Convoy
|
||||||
|
Mission Brief.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure route sweeps are conducted prior to convoy roll. Individuals
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Cobra-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
conducting sweeps must have a LMR while conducting sweeps of the route.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all forces are in place, and the route is swept and secure prior to
|
||||||
|
requesting permission to roll.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Once Mustang-1 declares that the Aircraft Parking Area is ready to receive,
|
||||||
|
request permission to roll from the ABW/CC through the SAAM Coordinator.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Prior to movement, announce over radio, “When CDS is directed, it
|
||||||
|
becomes a top priority.”
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Authenticate the composition of the convoy with Guardian once movement
|
||||||
|
has been initiated.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure checkpoints are called and authenticated by either Cobra-2
|
||||||
|
or Cobra-3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Authenticate the number of personnel entering the exclusion area of
|
||||||
|
Aircraft Parking Area with Mustang-10.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
|
||||||
|
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
|
||||||
|
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
|
||||||
|
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
|
||||||
|
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Loading/unloading operations provide
|
||||||
|
a unique security challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
|
||||||
|
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams
|
||||||
|
that could develop if SAAM area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the
|
||||||
|
aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon,
|
||||||
|
the description of the SAAM exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3,
|
||||||
|
Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
|
||||||
|
(restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
|
||||||
|
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
|
||||||
|
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
|
||||||
|
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
|
||||||
|
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the
|
||||||
|
security requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as
|
||||||
|
well as DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Cobra-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion areas
|
||||||
|
established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area inspection and
|
||||||
|
assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
|
||||||
|
AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All personnel entering the Aircraft Parking Area limited/exclusion area must have a
|
||||||
|
valid reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into the Aircraft Parking Area will be
|
||||||
|
based on the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge
|
||||||
|
and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for aircrew will
|
||||||
|
be based on the individual possessing a government issued credential and verified against the
|
||||||
|
crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other agencies will be based on the
|
||||||
|
individual possessing a valid government issued credential and verified against a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than
|
||||||
|
aircrew) will be prescreened at the Aircraft Parking Area ECP.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant surveillance
|
||||||
|
prior to entering the Aircraft Parking Area limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough sweep
|
||||||
|
is conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be conducted by SF
|
||||||
|
personnel and an EDD team if available.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
Cobra-1, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books).
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
214
export/(DCNI) Cobra-10 (19-1).md
Normal file
214
export/(DCNI) Cobra-10 (19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cobra-10 (19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cobra 10
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Convoy Entry Controller
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Control entry/exit of personnel and vehicles to the exclusion area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) For any long halt situation you will create an ECP as directed by the Convoy
|
||||||
|
Commande r. It should be no closer than 10 feet no further than 60 feet from the
|
||||||
|
resource(s).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will search all personnel and their hand carried items prior to allowing entry
|
||||||
|
into the exclusion area utilizing a Transfrisker. If no Transfrisker is available, conduct a
|
||||||
|
simple frisk of individuals prior to allowing entry to the area. All individuals will have
|
||||||
|
their Restricted Area Badge cross checked against the properly authenticated EAL. You
|
||||||
|
will ensure name, rank, SSN and badge number match. If any of the above listed items
|
||||||
|
do not match, immediately deny entry and notify Cobra-1.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Any personnel requiring escorted entry into the area will be logged in on the AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1109 Visitor Register Log, all hand carried items will be searched and the individual
|
||||||
|
will be searched utilizing a Transfrisker. The SVA must be present at the ECP to allow
|
||||||
|
entry to persons not on any of the EAL's and vouch for those entering.
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Cobra-10, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure all hand-carried items and persons are searched prior to any individuals
|
||||||
|
leaving the exclusion area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Emergency responders must be preannounced. Emergency entry will be based
|
||||||
|
off a successful sign/countersign. Ensure you maintain strict accountability during all
|
||||||
|
situations. Prior to exiting, emergency responders will be searched along with their
|
||||||
|
vehicles and equipment. All emergency responders will be signed in on an AF Form
|
||||||
|
1109 prior to exiting the area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• Posted with Cobra-1 during movement.
|
||||||
|
• Within the immediate area of designated Entry Control Point (ECP) once
|
||||||
|
an ECP is established.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
|
||||||
|
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and helmet will
|
||||||
|
be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-1/Mustang-1 or higher
|
||||||
|
authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or when
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Cobra-10, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and prior to
|
||||||
|
movement for an outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
|
||||||
|
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
|
||||||
|
Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
|
||||||
|
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
|
||||||
|
recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• Security Forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
|
||||||
|
neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Account for ECP signs, AF Form 1109s, a transfrisker, and all other equipment
|
||||||
|
items prior to initiation of the movement.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, on-duty SF must begin the
|
||||||
|
recapture immediately, without the added delay of requesting and receiving permission from
|
||||||
|
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Actions to recapture or recover a weapon shall be undertaken immediately and will
|
||||||
|
remain the primary mission and highest priority until completed.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized nuclear
|
||||||
|
weapon and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Loading/unloading operations provide
|
||||||
|
a unique security challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
|
||||||
|
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams
|
||||||
|
that could develop if SAAM area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the
|
||||||
|
aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Cobra-10, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
the description of the SAAM exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3,
|
||||||
|
Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
|
||||||
|
(restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
|
||||||
|
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
|
||||||
|
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
|
||||||
|
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
|
||||||
|
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the
|
||||||
|
security requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as
|
||||||
|
well as DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion areas
|
||||||
|
established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area inspection and
|
||||||
|
assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All personnel entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area must have a
|
||||||
|
valid reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into the aircraft parking area
|
||||||
|
limited/exclusion area will be based on the individual possessing an open area 9 on their
|
||||||
|
1199CG Restricted Area Badge and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by
|
||||||
|
898 MUNS. Entry for aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government
|
||||||
|
issued credential and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG
|
||||||
|
or other agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
|
||||||
|
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring entry
|
||||||
|
into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the aircraft parking
|
||||||
|
area ECP.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant surveillance
|
||||||
|
prior to entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough sweep is
|
||||||
|
conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be conducted by SF
|
||||||
|
personnel and an EDD team if available.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Cobra-10, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
214
export/(DCNI) Cobra-2 (19-1).md
Normal file
214
export/(DCNI) Cobra-2 (19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cobra-2 (19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cobra 2
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Convoy Lead Escort Team
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Provide lead escort security for Protection Level 1 Logistics Movements. To the
|
||||||
|
best of your estimation, maintain 75 feet between your Armored HMMWV and the tow
|
||||||
|
vehicle.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Sweep primary and alternate routes upon initiation of the applicable Step Code
|
||||||
|
paying particular attention to items listed in the mission briefing. Maintain situational
|
||||||
|
awareness of the appropriate Step Code currently in use. See Attachment for Step Codes.
|
||||||
|
Ensure TCPs are established prior to initiating route sweeps.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon completion of your route sweeps for inbound operations, proceed to the
|
||||||
|
predetermined location near the aircraft parking location and maintain your sector of fire
|
||||||
|
until Cobra 1 directs you to setup to lead 75 feet in front of the tow vehicle(s).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon completion of route sweeps for outbound ops, return to the KUMMSC exit
|
||||||
|
tunnel, and position yourself to monitor avenues of approach.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Call out checkpoint progression to the Site Security Control Center (SSCC) as the
|
||||||
|
Tow Vehicle passes by the pre-determined points determined by the Convoy Commander in
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Cobra-2, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
the mission brief.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Authenticate with SSCC at the corresponding checkpoints during movement (use
|
||||||
|
proper step).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Post Restricted Area signs in case of long halt situations and take up a security
|
||||||
|
position to the 12 o'clock position to the convoy's forward direction.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) During movements, maintain a minimum of 75 feet in front of the tow vehicle.
|
||||||
|
During aircraft parking area operations, monitor avenues of approach as directed by the
|
||||||
|
Convoy Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
|
||||||
|
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Cobra-2A will carry an M240B with 800 rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing
|
||||||
|
and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
|
||||||
|
point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
|
||||||
|
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
|
||||||
|
Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
|
||||||
|
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Cobra-2, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
|
||||||
|
neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and helmet will
|
||||||
|
be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-1/Mustang-1 or higher
|
||||||
|
authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations, or when
|
||||||
|
directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and prior to
|
||||||
|
movement for an outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
|
||||||
|
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
|
||||||
|
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
|
||||||
|
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
|
||||||
|
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Loading/unloading operations provide
|
||||||
|
a unique security challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
|
||||||
|
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Cobra-2, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
that could develop if SAAM area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the
|
||||||
|
aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon,
|
||||||
|
the description of the SAAM exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3,
|
||||||
|
Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
|
||||||
|
(restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
|
||||||
|
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
|
||||||
|
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
|
||||||
|
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
|
||||||
|
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the
|
||||||
|
security requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as
|
||||||
|
well as DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion areas
|
||||||
|
established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area inspection and
|
||||||
|
assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All personnel entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area must have a
|
||||||
|
valid reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into the aircraft parking area
|
||||||
|
limited/exclusion area will be based on the individual possessing an open area 9 on their
|
||||||
|
1199CG Restricted Area Badge and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by
|
||||||
|
898 MUNS. Entry for aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government
|
||||||
|
issued credential and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG
|
||||||
|
or other agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
|
||||||
|
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring entry
|
||||||
|
into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the aircraft parking
|
||||||
|
area ECP.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant surveillance
|
||||||
|
prior to entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough sweep is
|
||||||
|
conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be conducted by SF
|
||||||
|
personnel and an EDD team if available.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Cobra-2, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
220
export/(DCNI) Cobra-3 (19-1).md
Normal file
220
export/(DCNI) Cobra-3 (19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Cobra-3 (19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Cobra 3
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Convoy Trail Escort Team
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Provide trail escort security for Protection Level 1 Logistics Movements.
|
||||||
|
Maintain approximately 75 feet between your Armored HMMWV and the tow vehicle.
|
||||||
|
Maintain Final Denial Fire capability at all times of resource(s) in transit.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Sweep alternate and primary routes upon initiation of the applicable Step Code
|
||||||
|
paying particular attention to items listed in the mission briefing. Maintain situational
|
||||||
|
awareness of the appropriate Step Code currently in use. Ensure TCPs are in place prior
|
||||||
|
to initiating route sweeps.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon completion of your route sweeps for inbound operations, proceed to the
|
||||||
|
predetermined location near the aircraft parking location and maintain your sector of fire
|
||||||
|
until Cobra 1 directs you to setup in a position to trail 75 feet behind the tow vehicle(s).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon completion of route sweeps for outbound ops, return to the KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
exit tunnel, and position yourself next to V-8 in preparation to trail 75 feet behind the tow
|
||||||
|
vehicle(s).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Cobra-3, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Post Restricted Area signs in case of long halt situations and maintain the
|
||||||
|
capability for final denial fire at all times to the 6 o'clock position of the convoy's forward
|
||||||
|
direction.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) During movements, maintain a minimum of 75 feet behind the tow vehicle. During
|
||||||
|
aircraft parking area operations, monitor avenues of approach as directed by the Convoy
|
||||||
|
Commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
|
||||||
|
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Cobra-3A will carry an M240B with 800 rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing
|
||||||
|
and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
|
||||||
|
point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFMAN
|
||||||
|
31-222, Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of Force by Air
|
||||||
|
Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
|
||||||
|
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
|
||||||
|
recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
|
||||||
|
neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Cobra-3, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• Issued body armor with Type IV plates will be worn at all times. Gas mask and helmet will
|
||||||
|
be readily available at all times and worn when directed by Cobra-1/Mustang-1 or higher
|
||||||
|
authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor and Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates) will be worn in FPCON Charlie or higher, Covered Wagon situations or when
|
||||||
|
directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• All alert equipment will be donned for an inbound mission prior to A/C arrival and prior to
|
||||||
|
movement for an outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
|
||||||
|
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
|
||||||
|
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Do not wait for additional SF before taking action. Do not wait for permission from
|
||||||
|
an installation authority such as the installation commander or a senior battle staff
|
||||||
|
representative.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Recapture actions will remain the primary mission and the highest priority until
|
||||||
|
completed. The adversary must not be allowed to continue their actions to gain unauthorized
|
||||||
|
access to any PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Loading/unloading operations provide
|
||||||
|
a unique security challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
|
||||||
|
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams
|
||||||
|
that could develop if SAAM area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the
|
||||||
|
aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon,
|
||||||
|
the description of the SAAM exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3,
|
||||||
|
Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Cobra-3, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
|
||||||
|
(restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
|
||||||
|
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
|
||||||
|
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
|
||||||
|
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
|
||||||
|
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the
|
||||||
|
security requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as
|
||||||
|
well as DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion areas
|
||||||
|
established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area inspection and
|
||||||
|
assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All personnel entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area must have a
|
||||||
|
valid reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into the aircraft parking area
|
||||||
|
limited/exclusion area will be based on the individual possessing an open area 9 on their
|
||||||
|
1199CG Restricted Area Badge and be verified against the mission day EAL provided by
|
||||||
|
898 MUNS. Entry for aircrew will be based on the individual possessing a government
|
||||||
|
issued credential and verified against the crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG
|
||||||
|
or other agencies will be based on the individual possessing a valid government issued
|
||||||
|
credential and verified against a properly authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring entry
|
||||||
|
into the limited/exclusion are (other than aircrew) will be prescreened at the aircraft parking
|
||||||
|
area ECP.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant surveillance
|
||||||
|
prior to entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough sweep is
|
||||||
|
conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be conducted by SF
|
||||||
|
personnel and an EDD team if available.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and
|
||||||
|
are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of
|
||||||
|
the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will determine
|
||||||
|
how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of how to apply
|
||||||
|
the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Cobra-3, 19-1, Feb 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
440
export/(DCNI) Coyote 1.md
Normal file
440
export/(DCNI) Coyote 1.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Coyote 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 1
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Flightline Area Supervisor / External Security Response Team
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond as a part of the 15 personnel Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the
|
||||||
|
Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
|
||||||
|
Note: (DCNI) Response Times to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC
|
||||||
|
You are also the flightline Area Supervisor (AS) responsible for all flightline security
|
||||||
|
operations within the150th New Mexico Air National Guard (NMANG) restricted
|
||||||
|
area, 58th Special Operations Wing (SOW) restricted area, and 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
Transient Ramp restricted area. See Attachment 11-11.3 for flightline area
|
||||||
|
schematics.
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
Provide immediate armed response to any incident within your area of responsibility
|
||||||
|
and provide a back-up response for Coyote 2/3/4 and Coyote 5/10/11 (if posted).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct BAF responses to Protection
|
||||||
|
Level 1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Trips to the West side Shoppette and Subway are authorized. As the area
|
||||||
|
supervisor, you will manage patrols to ensure all IRST/ESRT requirements are
|
||||||
|
maintained. Those requirements are as follows:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Each restricted area containing PL3 resources must have a 2-man
|
||||||
|
ISRT capable of immediate response to defeat an adversary before any
|
||||||
|
negative effects against a resource occurs.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Additionally, restricted areas must have a 2-man ESRT, capable of
|
||||||
|
immediate response to defeat an adversary before any negative effects
|
||||||
|
against a resource occurs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within 10 feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25 feet of
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
|
||||||
|
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) At a minimum, the leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210
|
||||||
|
rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm
|
||||||
|
hollow-point ammunition. Member(s) may carry an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and 10 rounds of HE ammunition and 2 rounds
|
||||||
|
of white star ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition. Member(s) may also carry an M240B with 800 rounds of 7.62mm
|
||||||
|
linked armor piercing and tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm
|
||||||
|
hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun hand
|
||||||
|
grenade and 2 CS gas grenades.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
With the approval of your flight leadership, be prepared to assist Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
(LE) patrols for gate runner incidents. Coyote patrols with no protection level
|
||||||
|
resources in their respective areas will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all
|
||||||
|
flight-line entry points or at spike strip locations.
|
||||||
|
Ensure posted internal SRTs have valid, authenticated EALs or Crew Orders for
|
||||||
|
aircraft assigned to their respective restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Properly authenticate Crew Orders or utilize the Interim Entry Authority List as
|
||||||
|
described below.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body
|
||||||
|
above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
|
||||||
|
restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area.
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
|
||||||
|
restricted area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to hot cargo
|
||||||
|
pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and
|
||||||
|
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
Conduct a daily visual check of Pad 5 and all flightline physical security facilities,
|
||||||
|
including boundary barrier systems, gates, manholes, grates, and structures, for
|
||||||
|
tampering, deterioration, and inoperative equipment. You will radio SSCC upon
|
||||||
|
completion of this check. Reference Attachments 12 and 13 of this instruction for
|
||||||
|
guidance.
|
||||||
|
Flight line Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
|
||||||
|
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
|
||||||
|
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
|
||||||
|
discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all patrols conduct minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks
|
||||||
|
are randomly accomplished throughout the shift by all Coyote patrols within their
|
||||||
|
respective areas. Radio SSCC and inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation,
|
||||||
|
and termination of the perimeter/RAB checks. Exception: When a restricted area is
|
||||||
|
closed and no individuals are present, you will not be required to conduct RAB
|
||||||
|
checks.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 1 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
Ensure patrols in your assigned area exit their vehicles to enter keypad codes for
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
gate activation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(U) RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
|
||||||
|
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(U) TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon arrival of transit aircraft you will immediately make contact with the Aircraft
|
||||||
|
commander to obtain Entry Authority List (EAL) information.
|
||||||
|
Acceptable EAL information can come in two forms; Aircrew Orders or an Interim
|
||||||
|
EAL template found at Attachment 14.
|
||||||
|
Aircrew Orders are provided by the pilot or mission commander and if used,
|
||||||
|
must contain the following information:
|
||||||
|
Name
|
||||||
|
Rank
|
||||||
|
Organization
|
||||||
|
Last 6 of Social Security Number or Controlled Picture Identification
|
||||||
|
Number
|
||||||
|
Badge number
|
||||||
|
Dates of Visit
|
||||||
|
Clearance Status
|
||||||
|
Expiration Date
|
||||||
|
If the Crew Orders do not contain all information listed above, you may
|
||||||
|
hand-write in the missing information, if practical. If hand-writing the
|
||||||
|
information in on the Aircrew Orders would make them unreadable, utilize
|
||||||
|
the Interim EAL template in Attachment 14.
|
||||||
|
If Aircrew Orders are not available, use the Interim EAL template. Fill in all the
|
||||||
|
blocks on the template to include all members of the aircrew.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(U) RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
150th FW NMANG Restricted Area
|
||||||
|
There are fifteen light poles in the 150th FW NMANG restricted area. These light
|
||||||
|
poles each contain four to six lights; however, only two lights will be illuminated
|
||||||
|
on each pole at night. The purpose of this configuration is to have the other
|
||||||
|
lights act as emergency back-ups. The emergency back-up lights are operated
|
||||||
|
manually by way of a switches located an unlocked box at the base of each
|
||||||
|
individual light pole.
|
||||||
|
58th SOW Restricted Area
|
||||||
|
This are contains three hangars (1000, 1001, and 1002) with security lighting on
|
||||||
|
the sides of them. Hangars 1000 and 1001 have lights on the south, east and
|
||||||
|
west sides. Hangar 1002 has lights on all sides. The controls to turn these lights
|
||||||
|
on and off are located on the south side of each hangar. In order to turn the
|
||||||
|
lights on and off you must:
|
||||||
|
Locate the appropriate light control box
|
||||||
|
Open the door
|
||||||
|
Enter 1234* on the numerical keypad
|
||||||
|
Press either the green “Master On” button to turn on all lights for that zone,
|
||||||
|
or press the individual green buttons for the lights you wish to turn on.
|
||||||
|
There is a diagram depicting the various zones in each light box.
|
||||||
|
377th ABW Transient Ramp Restricted Area
|
||||||
|
The lights for this area are controlled by a light box on a pole to the east of
|
||||||
|
building 333 (Base Operations). The light box contains several individual
|
||||||
|
switches and a master power switch. In order to turn these lights on and off
|
||||||
|
use only the individual switches, always leaving the master power switch
|
||||||
|
turned on.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will be dispatched to Pad 5 to initiate security operations until the arrival
|
||||||
|
of recalled personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assist with sweeps for Pad 5 prior to Aircraft arrival. Coordinate with the
|
||||||
|
Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) to dispatch a MWD to aid with these
|
||||||
|
sweeps.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) In the event the aircraft should reach Pad 5 before the entire response force
|
||||||
|
is in-place, you will be posted as the Pad Supervisor and Coyote-1A will post as the
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Pad Entry Controller until qualified WSSS personnel arrive. Inform the aircrew they
|
||||||
|
will retain security responsibility of the aircraft until required SF personnel are in
|
||||||
|
place.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(U) REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, you will be dispatched to the
|
||||||
|
Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the Reflex Delta Kit.
|
||||||
|
Your patrols will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes, cones,
|
||||||
|
stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you have
|
||||||
|
enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20 stanchions, 4
|
||||||
|
RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered to Coyote 4’s
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
An additional ESRT, EC and CBS will be posted to secure these aircraft. They are
|
||||||
|
not counted as part of the KUMMSC IBF and will remain dedicated to this PL1
|
||||||
|
Aircraft. The ranking member on the ESRT will be the REFLEX DELTA area
|
||||||
|
supervisor.
|
||||||
|
The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material. The
|
||||||
|
presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
|
||||||
|
concept with the roped restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
|
||||||
|
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
|
||||||
|
If TPC material is onboard an unoccupied aircraft and cannot be removed, the
|
||||||
|
crew will secure the material in an approved onboard container. SF subsequently
|
||||||
|
ensure enforcement of the TPC rule upon granting access to the aircraft. Enforce
|
||||||
|
two-person control by using an EAL to identify two authorized individuals prior to
|
||||||
|
allowing entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
|
||||||
|
Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
|
||||||
|
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, you will take the both
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
documents and make copies for distribution as follows.
|
||||||
|
One copy for Coyote 1
|
||||||
|
One copy for Coyote 4
|
||||||
|
One copy for the Flightline Constable
|
||||||
|
The original crew orders will be filed in SSCC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flight line and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flight line vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flight line vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
|
||||||
|
vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(U) SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel. Additionally,
|
||||||
|
ensure each flight line IBF vehicle is properly inspected using the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In addition to the individual vehicle inspections, you will conduct vehicle inspections
|
||||||
|
of all coyote patrols for any discrepancies and will ensure all vehicles are in good
|
||||||
|
repair (to include BAF standby HMMWVs). You will notify SSCC and flight
|
||||||
|
leadership of any vehicle discrepancies discovered.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
You will conduct shift in the GOV parking lot as part of early Guardmount. Return to
|
||||||
|
flightline after shift change is complete to relieve the remaining patrols.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Ensure all flight line patrols conduct a purge of their respective areas immediately
|
||||||
|
after assuming post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
You will verify all current EALs are accounted for and verify with off-going that all
|
||||||
|
have been taken to SSCC. You will check all patrols SSI binders to ensure current
|
||||||
|
EALs are accounted for and expired documents have been removed. Ensure all
|
||||||
|
documents are destroyed appropriately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
8
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: The KUMMSC environment may
|
||||||
|
require special considerations during a recapture scenario. Although the
|
||||||
|
AFGSC AFCIA-R process should always be considered the following
|
||||||
|
immediate actions may be used in addition to the AFCIA-R process.
|
||||||
|
Immediate Actions for KUMMSC recap scenario:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
9
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
315
export/(DCNI) Coyote 10.md
Normal file
315
export/(DCNI) Coyote 10.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Coyote 10
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 10
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reflex Delta Entry Controller
|
||||||
|
&
|
||||||
|
Internal Security Response Team Member
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
You are the Entry Controller (EC) for all Reflex Delta missions and will stay within 25
|
||||||
|
feet of the established entry control point of the PL1 restricted area unless properly
|
||||||
|
relieved.
|
||||||
|
Additionally, in conjunction with Coyote 11 (Reflex Delta Close Bound Sentry), you
|
||||||
|
comprise a 2-man Internal Security Response Team. Coordinate with Coyote 11 to
|
||||||
|
ensure adequate coverage of the restricted area’s interior. To the greatest extent
|
||||||
|
possible, remain 180° apart with respect to the restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial Backup Force IBF and will not
|
||||||
|
respond to KUMMSC contingency operations
|
||||||
|
The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
immediate response capability to the area inside the perimeter in order to defeat an
|
||||||
|
adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
|
||||||
|
You will control entry and access to Reflex Delta aircraft using authenticated Entry
|
||||||
|
Authority Lists (EAL). For personnel desiring entry, compare the provided
|
||||||
|
identification credentials against the information listed on the authenticated EAL. All
|
||||||
|
information must match or entry is not authorized.
|
||||||
|
Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
|
||||||
|
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the orange radio
|
||||||
|
communication box.
|
||||||
|
A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
|
||||||
|
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
|
||||||
|
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
|
||||||
|
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
|
||||||
|
to Coyote 4’s area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
You will stay within 25 feet of the established entry control point of the PL1 restricted
|
||||||
|
area unless properly relieved.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition
|
||||||
|
and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9x19mm hollow-point ammuniton.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
|
||||||
|
to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Ensure those entering the roped restricted area must be on an authenticated EAL or
|
||||||
|
authenticated Aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body
|
||||||
|
above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
|
||||||
|
restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot
|
||||||
|
cargo pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
|
||||||
|
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline
|
||||||
|
photography letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If
|
||||||
|
photographers do not possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area
|
||||||
|
badge) with the proper open area, they must be annotated on a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL or be escorted by someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare
|
||||||
|
the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL
|
||||||
|
for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are
|
||||||
|
discovered.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 10 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
|
||||||
|
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. You will
|
||||||
|
assume entry control duties and Coyote 11 will assume Close Boundary Sentry
|
||||||
|
duties.
|
||||||
|
In conjunction with Coyote 5, make contact with the Aircraft commander as soon as
|
||||||
|
possible to obtain EAL information.
|
||||||
|
Acceptable EAL information will come in Aircrew Orders or an Interim EAL
|
||||||
|
template.
|
||||||
|
Aircrew Orders are provided by the pilot or mission commander and if used,
|
||||||
|
must contain the following information:
|
||||||
|
Name
|
||||||
|
Rank
|
||||||
|
Organization
|
||||||
|
Last 6 of Social Security Number or Controlled Picture Identification
|
||||||
|
Number
|
||||||
|
Badge number
|
||||||
|
Dates of Visit
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Clearance Status
|
||||||
|
Expiration Date
|
||||||
|
If the Crew Orders do not contain all information listed above, you may hand-
|
||||||
|
write in the missing information, if practical. If hand-writing the information in on
|
||||||
|
the Aircrew Orders would make them unreadable, use the Interim EAL template.
|
||||||
|
If Aircrew Orders are not available, use the Interim EAL template. Fill in all the
|
||||||
|
blocks on the template to include all members of the aircrew.
|
||||||
|
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
|
||||||
|
Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
|
||||||
|
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, Coyote-1 will take the both
|
||||||
|
documents and make copies for distribution as follows.
|
||||||
|
One copy for Coyote 1(Flightline Area Supervisor)
|
||||||
|
One copy for Coyote 5 (Reflex Delta Area Supervisor)
|
||||||
|
One copy (original) for Coyote 10 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller)
|
||||||
|
One copy for the Mission Commander
|
||||||
|
One copy for SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
You will use the authenticated EAL to control entry at the designated Entry Control
|
||||||
|
Point to the roped restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If personnel are being escorted into the restricted area, prior to allowing entry to
|
||||||
|
and exit from the restricted area, you must verify with escort officials that they
|
||||||
|
have completed an inspection of all vehicles and hand-carried items of those
|
||||||
|
they are escorting. NOTE: This entails two separate inspections; an inspection
|
||||||
|
prior to entry and an inspection prior to exit.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The on-duty Flight Chief or Flight Commander will meet the mission commander and
|
||||||
|
deliver a local area security briefing. If the Flight Chief or Flight Commander are not
|
||||||
|
available, Coyote 5 will brief the mission commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
|
||||||
|
The presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
|
||||||
|
concept within the roped restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
You will ensure enforcement of the two-person concept before granting access to
|
||||||
|
the aircraft. Enforce the two-person control by using an EAL to identify two
|
||||||
|
authorized individuals prior to allowing entry. Certified 2-person control team
|
||||||
|
members are identified with an “X” next to their name on the Entry Authority List
|
||||||
|
provided by the aircrew.
|
||||||
|
SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
|
||||||
|
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
|
||||||
|
vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted at the entry control point of the Reflex Delta restricted
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
If you have a vehicle, Inspect it using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from
|
||||||
|
trash, clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
Account for SSIs, and AF Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
249
export/(DCNI) Coyote 11.md
Normal file
249
export/(DCNI) Coyote 11.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Coyote 11
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 11
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reflex Delta Close Bound Sentry
|
||||||
|
&
|
||||||
|
Internal Security Response Team Member
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
You are the flight line Close Boundary Sentry (CBS) for all Reflex Delta missions.
|
||||||
|
The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
|
||||||
|
immediate response capability to the area inside the perimeter in order to defeat an
|
||||||
|
adversary before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
|
||||||
|
Additionally, in conjunction with Coyote 10 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller), you
|
||||||
|
comprise a 2-man Internal Security Response Team. Coordinate with Coyote 11 to
|
||||||
|
ensure adequate coverage of the restricted area’s interior. To the greatest extent
|
||||||
|
possible, remain 180° apart with respect to the restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial Backup Force IBF and will not
|
||||||
|
respond to KUMMSC contingency operations.
|
||||||
|
Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
|
||||||
|
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the orange radio
|
||||||
|
communication box.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
|
||||||
|
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
|
||||||
|
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
|
||||||
|
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
|
||||||
|
to Coyote 4’s area.
|
||||||
|
You must wear all required gear when responding to any situation or alarm. This
|
||||||
|
includes Flak Vest with Level IV ballistic plates, helmet, and gas mask with
|
||||||
|
appropriately filled out DD Form 1574/fit test.
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest with
|
||||||
|
ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on post.
|
||||||
|
This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any alarm
|
||||||
|
or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
If leaving your vehicle, all required gear must be worn.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
You will remain within the restricted area perimeter and to the greatest extent
|
||||||
|
possible, remain 180° from Coyote 10 with respect to the restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 20ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
You will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition
|
||||||
|
and an M9 with 30 rounds 9x19mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
|
||||||
|
to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
|
||||||
|
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. You will
|
||||||
|
assume Close Boundary Sentry duties and Coyote 10 will assume entry control
|
||||||
|
duties
|
||||||
|
The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
|
||||||
|
The presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-
|
||||||
|
person concept within the roped restricted area boundary. When in effect, you
|
||||||
|
will monitor enforcement of the two-person concept
|
||||||
|
SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
|
||||||
|
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Ensure those entering the roped restricted area must be on an authenticated EAL or
|
||||||
|
authenticated Aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body
|
||||||
|
above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
|
||||||
|
restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot
|
||||||
|
cargo pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
|
||||||
|
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
|
||||||
|
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
|
||||||
|
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
|
||||||
|
discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 11 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
|
||||||
|
vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted at the entry control point of the Reflex Delta restricted
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
If you have a vehicle, inspect it using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash,
|
||||||
|
clean, fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
321
export/(DCNI) Coyote 2.md
Normal file
321
export/(DCNI) Coyote 2.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Coyote 2
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 2
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond as a part of the 15 personnel Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the
|
||||||
|
Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide immediate response capability as the ISRT for the 150 NMANG
|
||||||
|
restricted area not to exceed 3 minutes when protection level resources are present
|
||||||
|
in your area.
|
||||||
|
Note: (DCNI) Response Times to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are assigned to the 150 NMANG restricted area unless properly
|
||||||
|
relieved or as directed by Area Supervisor/Flight Chief/Flight Commander or higher.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct BAF responses to Protection
|
||||||
|
Level 1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
|
||||||
|
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
|
||||||
|
point ammunition. Member(s) may carry an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition and 10 rounds of HE ammunition and 2
|
||||||
|
rounds of white star ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Member(s) may also carry an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm linked
|
||||||
|
armor piercing and tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
|
||||||
|
point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Member will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun
|
||||||
|
hand grenade and 2 CS gas grenades.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your area, plot all aircraft with your
|
||||||
|
area and up-channel to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flight line restricted areas display an
|
||||||
|
AF Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their
|
||||||
|
body, above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
|
||||||
|
flight line restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area,
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
|
||||||
|
NMANG restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open are 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot cargo
|
||||||
|
pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL for access to flight line restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and
|
||||||
|
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
In conjunction with Coyote 1 and other coyote patrols, you will conduct a daily visual
|
||||||
|
check of all flight line physical security facilities, including boundary barrier systems,
|
||||||
|
gates, manholes, grates, and structures for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative
|
||||||
|
equipment. You will radio SSCC upon completion of this check. Reference
|
||||||
|
Attachments 13 and 14 of this instruction for guidance.
|
||||||
|
Flight line Photography - Validate that all flight line photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flight line photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flight line Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
|
||||||
|
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
|
||||||
|
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
|
||||||
|
discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
Ensure a minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are randomly
|
||||||
|
accomplished throughout the shift within your respective area. Radio SSCC and
|
||||||
|
inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the perimeter/RAB
|
||||||
|
checks. Exception: When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are present,
|
||||||
|
you will not be required to conduct RAB checks.
|
||||||
|
In the event of a gate runner and you do not have protection level resources in your
|
||||||
|
respective area will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 2 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
|
||||||
|
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
|
||||||
|
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
|
||||||
|
150th FW NMANG Restricted Area
|
||||||
|
There are fifteen light poles in the 150th FW NMANG restricted area. These light
|
||||||
|
poles each contain four to six lights; however, only two lights will be illuminated
|
||||||
|
on each pole at night. The purpose of this configuration is to have the other
|
||||||
|
lights act as emergency back-ups. The emergency back-up lights are operated
|
||||||
|
manually by way of a switches located an unlocked box at the base of each
|
||||||
|
individual light pole.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You could be dispatched to Pad 5 to initiate security operations until the
|
||||||
|
arrival of recalled personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will assist with sweeps for Pad 5 prior to Aircraft arrival. In the event
|
||||||
|
the aircraft should reach Pad 5 before the entire response force is in-place, you will
|
||||||
|
be posted as a fire team until recalled personnel arrives.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
|
||||||
|
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
|
||||||
|
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
|
||||||
|
to Coyote 4’s area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
|
||||||
|
vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel. Ensure that you
|
||||||
|
sign the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
You will verify all current EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have been taken
|
||||||
|
to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure all
|
||||||
|
documents are destroyed appropriately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
You will conduct shift change at the GOV parking lot after Coyote-1 assumes post
|
||||||
|
during early Guardmount and returns to the flightline.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
|
||||||
|
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
|
||||||
|
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
|
||||||
|
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
|
||||||
|
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
|
||||||
|
nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
319
export/(DCNI) Coyote 3.md
Normal file
319
export/(DCNI) Coyote 3.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Coyote 3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 3
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond as a part of the 15 personnel Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the
|
||||||
|
Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide immediate response capability as the ISRT for the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area not to exceed 3 minutes when protection level resources are present
|
||||||
|
in your area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: Response Times to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are assigned to the 58th SOW restricted area unless properly relieved
|
||||||
|
or as directed by Area Supervisor/Flight Chief/Flight Commander or higher.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct BAF responses to Protection
|
||||||
|
Level 1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
|
||||||
|
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition. Member(s) may carry an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
|
||||||
|
tracer ammunition and 10 rounds of HE ammunition and 2 rounds of white star
|
||||||
|
ammunition and with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Member(s) may also carry an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm linked
|
||||||
|
armor piercing and tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
|
||||||
|
point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Member will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun hand
|
||||||
|
grenade and 1 CS gas grenade.
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your area, plot all aircraft with your
|
||||||
|
area and up-channel to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body,
|
||||||
|
above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
|
||||||
|
flight line restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area,
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
|
||||||
|
NMANG restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for the hot cargo pads (to include pad 5)
|
||||||
|
during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and
|
||||||
|
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
In conjunction with Coyote 1 and other coyote patrols, you will conduct a daily visual
|
||||||
|
check of all flightline physical security facilities, including boundary barrier systems,
|
||||||
|
gates, manholes, grates, and structures for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative
|
||||||
|
equipment. You will radio SSCC upon completion of this check. Reference
|
||||||
|
Attachments 13 and 14 of this instruction for guidance.
|
||||||
|
Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
|
||||||
|
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
|
||||||
|
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
|
||||||
|
discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their
|
||||||
|
associated compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
Ensure a minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are randomly
|
||||||
|
accomplished throughout the shift within your respective area. Radio SSCC and
|
||||||
|
inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the perimeter/RAB
|
||||||
|
checks. Exception: When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are present,
|
||||||
|
you will not be required to conduct RAB checks.
|
||||||
|
In the event of a gate runner and you do not have protection level resources in your
|
||||||
|
respective area will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 3 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
|
||||||
|
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
|
||||||
|
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
|
||||||
|
58th SOW Restricted Area
|
||||||
|
This are contains three hangars (1000, 1001, and 1002) with security lighting on
|
||||||
|
the sides of them. Hangars 1000 and 1001 have lights on the south, east and
|
||||||
|
west sides. Hangar 1002 has lights on all sides. The controls to turn these lights
|
||||||
|
on and off are located on the south side of each hangar. In order to turn the
|
||||||
|
lights on and off you must:
|
||||||
|
Locate the appropriate light control box
|
||||||
|
Open the door
|
||||||
|
Enter 1234* on the numerical keypad
|
||||||
|
Press either the green “Master On” button to turn on all lights for that zone,
|
||||||
|
or press the individual green buttons for the lights you wish to turn on.
|
||||||
|
There is a diagram depicting the various zones in each light box.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You could be dispatched to Pad 5 to initiate security operations until the
|
||||||
|
arrival of recalled personnel.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will assist with sweeps for Pad 5 prior to Aircraft arrival. In the event
|
||||||
|
the aircraft should reach Pad 5 before the entire response force is in-place, you will
|
||||||
|
be posted as a fire team until recalled personnel arrives.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
|
||||||
|
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
|
||||||
|
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
|
||||||
|
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
|
||||||
|
to Coyote 4’s area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and challenge, initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid
|
||||||
|
flight line POV vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel. Ensure that you
|
||||||
|
sign the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
You will verify all current EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have been taken
|
||||||
|
to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure all
|
||||||
|
documents are destroyed appropriately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
You will conduct shift change at the GOV parking lot after Coyote-1 assumes post
|
||||||
|
during early Guardmount and returns to the flightline.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
329
export/(DCNI) Coyote 4.md
Normal file
329
export/(DCNI) Coyote 4.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Coyote 4
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 4
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Respond as a part of the 15 personnel Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the
|
||||||
|
Kirtland Underground Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Provide immediate response capability as the ISRT for the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area not to exceed 3 minutes when protection level
|
||||||
|
resources are present in your area.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: Response Times to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are assigned to the 377th ABW transient ramp restricted area unless
|
||||||
|
properly relieved or as directed by Area Supervisor/Flight Chief/Flight Commander
|
||||||
|
or higher.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct BAF responses to Protection
|
||||||
|
Level 1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmission within ten feet of a Protection Level 1 weapon is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a
|
||||||
|
PL1 resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC who
|
||||||
|
will contact Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) The leader and member will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ball and tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Member(s) may carry an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
|
||||||
|
tracer ammunition and 10 rounds of HE ammunition and 2 rounds of white star
|
||||||
|
ammunition and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition. Member(s)
|
||||||
|
may also carry an M240B with 800 rounds of 7.62mm linked armor piercing and
|
||||||
|
tracer ammunition with an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Member will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun hand
|
||||||
|
grenade and 1 CS gas grenade.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while
|
||||||
|
responding to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your area, plot all aircraft with your
|
||||||
|
area and up-channel to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to
|
||||||
|
SSCC.
|
||||||
|
Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flight line restricted areas display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body,
|
||||||
|
above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Note: Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB
|
||||||
|
flight line restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area,
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th
|
||||||
|
NMANG restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the hot cargo
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
pads (to include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL for access to flight line restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and
|
||||||
|
surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
In conjunction with Coyote 1 and other coyote patrols, you will conduct a daily visual
|
||||||
|
check of all flight line physical security facilities, including boundary barrier systems,
|
||||||
|
gates, manholes, grates, and structures for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative
|
||||||
|
equipment. You will radio SSCC upon completion of this check. Reference
|
||||||
|
Attachments 13 and 14 of this instruction for guidance.
|
||||||
|
Flight line Photography - Validate that all flight line photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flight line photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flight line Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
|
||||||
|
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
|
||||||
|
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
|
||||||
|
discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
Ensure a minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are randomly
|
||||||
|
accomplished throughout the shift within your respective area. Radio SSCC and
|
||||||
|
inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the perimeter/RAB
|
||||||
|
checks. Exception: When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are present,
|
||||||
|
you will not be required to conduct RAB checks.
|
||||||
|
In the event of a gate runner and you do not have protection level resources in your
|
||||||
|
respective area will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 4 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin
|
||||||
|
recapture actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
intruder and/or force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to
|
||||||
|
deny unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a
|
||||||
|
seized PL1 resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle
|
||||||
|
containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TRANSIT A/C ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon arrival of the transit A/C the Area Supervisor will make contact with the A/C
|
||||||
|
Commander and retrieve a copy of the aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Once all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL has been validated, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
|
||||||
|
377th ABW Transient Ramp Restricted Area
|
||||||
|
The lights for this area are controlled by a light box on a pole to the east of
|
||||||
|
building 333 (Base Operations). The light box contains several individual
|
||||||
|
switches and a master power switch. In order to turn these lights on and off use
|
||||||
|
only the individual switches, always leaving the master power switch turned on.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You could be dispatched to Pad 5 to initiate security operations until the
|
||||||
|
arrival of recalled personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You will assist with sweeps for Pad 5 prior to Aircraft arrival. In the event
|
||||||
|
the aircraft should reach Pad 5 before the entire response force is in-place, you will
|
||||||
|
be posted as a fire team until recalled personnel arrives.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
|
||||||
|
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
|
||||||
|
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
|
||||||
|
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
|
||||||
|
to Coyote 4’s area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flight line and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flight line vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flight line vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flight line POV
|
||||||
|
vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that you sign the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
You will verify all current EALs are accounted for transient aircraft have been taken
|
||||||
|
to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure all
|
||||||
|
documents are destroyed appropriately.
|
||||||
|
You will conduct shift change at the GOV parking lot after Coyote-1 assumes post
|
||||||
|
during early Guardmount and returns to the flightline.
|
||||||
|
One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary
|
||||||
|
and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate
|
||||||
|
decision making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC
|
||||||
|
Security Forces personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE:
|
||||||
|
While the application of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard,
|
||||||
|
every tactical situation will determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include
|
||||||
|
actions, are used only as examples of how to apply the concept and are not
|
||||||
|
authoritative in nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
307
export/(DCNI) Coyote 5.md
Normal file
307
export/(DCNI) Coyote 5.md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Coyote 5
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico February 2017
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 5
|
||||||
|
Version 17-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Reflex Delta External Security Response Team (ESRT)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) You are the dedicated ISRT for all Reflex Delta missions which will be
|
||||||
|
located on the 377th ABW parking ramp. You are not part of the KUMMSC Initial
|
||||||
|
Backup Force IBF and will not respond to KUMMSC contingency operations.
|
||||||
|
The area inside the roped perimeter is a Protection Level 1 area. Maintain an
|
||||||
|
immediate response capability to this perimeter in order to defeat an adversary
|
||||||
|
before any negative effect against the resource occurs.
|
||||||
|
The ranking member of this team is the Reflex Delta Area Supervisor and
|
||||||
|
responsible to ensure all security requirements are maintained.
|
||||||
|
Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, a Coyote patrol will be
|
||||||
|
dispatched to the Kirtland Command Post (KCP) to retrieve the reflex delta kit.
|
||||||
|
A Coyote patrol will be dispatched to the Pad 5 storage shed to retrieve ropes,
|
||||||
|
cones, stanchions, restricted area signs, and entry control point signs. Ensure you
|
||||||
|
have enough to rope and cones for an E6B Aircraft, you will need at least 20
|
||||||
|
stanchions, 4 RA signs, and 1 ECP sign. These items will be immediately delivered
|
||||||
|
to Coyote 4’s area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
You will stay within the 377 Air Base Wing restricted area unless properly relieved.
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in secure/encrypted mode (open
|
||||||
|
circle) on primary channels 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted
|
||||||
|
channels on channels 3 (SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater becomes unavailable, switch to
|
||||||
|
channel 6 (R/D-1) or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will
|
||||||
|
enable radio communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that
|
||||||
|
when transmitting in this configuration, your messages can potentially be
|
||||||
|
monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Radio transmissions within 10ft of a PL1 resource are prohibited. Radio
|
||||||
|
transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within 25ft of a PL1 resource is
|
||||||
|
prohibited. If a transmission occurs, immediately notify Air Base Wing Weapons
|
||||||
|
Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
The leader will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
|
||||||
|
ammunition. The alpha member will be armed with an M4/203 with 210 rounds of
|
||||||
|
5.56mm ammunition and 10 rounds of high explosive ammunition and 2 rounds of
|
||||||
|
white star ammunition. Also, both members will be armed with an M9 with 30
|
||||||
|
rounds of 9mm hollow point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(U) EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
You must wear either your Individual Protective Equipment (i.e.…Kevlar helmet,
|
||||||
|
Body Armor and Type IV plates) or DFLCS-Harness (Rifleman’s Gear) or Flak Vest
|
||||||
|
with ballistic level IV plates with all required ammunition/communication while on
|
||||||
|
post. This gear MUST be immediately available in case needed to respond to any
|
||||||
|
alarm or situation. Helmet is not required to be worn while in your vehicle unless
|
||||||
|
dispatched or responding to any alarm or situation.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding
|
||||||
|
to real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
(U) USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
The use of force up to and including deadly force is authorized in accordance with
|
||||||
|
AFMAN 31-222 Air Force Use of Force Manual and AFI 31-117, Arming and Use of
|
||||||
|
Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and
|
||||||
|
effective action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to,
|
||||||
|
removal of, or to recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
2
|
||||||
|
Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their
|
||||||
|
actions to neutralize an adversary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
Ensure those entering the roped restricted area are on an authenticated EAL or
|
||||||
|
authenticated Aircrew orders.
|
||||||
|
Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be
|
||||||
|
displayed on the outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their
|
||||||
|
body above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
Open areas 4, 6, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline
|
||||||
|
restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 6 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 377th ABW
|
||||||
|
transient ramp restricted area
|
||||||
|
Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th NMANG
|
||||||
|
restricted area
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area, and
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization the hot cargo pads (to include pad 5)
|
||||||
|
during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in
|
||||||
|
and around restricted/limited areas for indications of use of such areas for
|
||||||
|
observation and surveillance of site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by
|
||||||
|
ensuring photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography
|
||||||
|
letter signed by the 377 WSSS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not
|
||||||
|
possess a Kirtland AFB Form 1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open
|
||||||
|
area, they must be annotated on a properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by
|
||||||
|
someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter.
|
||||||
|
Compare the photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied
|
||||||
|
on the EAL for accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if
|
||||||
|
discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
3
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
When approached by Flight Leadership, Security Operations personnel, Inspectors,
|
||||||
|
SF Commanders and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and
|
||||||
|
offer a post briefing by stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 5 is all secure, and ready for
|
||||||
|
inspection.”
|
||||||
|
You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
Upon aircraft arrival, help establish a roped perimeter around the aircraft that is no
|
||||||
|
closer than 10 feet but no farther than 60 feet from the aircraft’s perimeter. Coyote
|
||||||
|
10 will assume entry control duties and Coyote 11 will assume Close Boundary
|
||||||
|
Sentry duties.
|
||||||
|
In conjunction with Coyote 10, make contact with the Aircraft commander as soon as
|
||||||
|
possible to obtain Entry Authority List (EAL) information.
|
||||||
|
Aircrew Orders are provided by the pilot or mission commander and if used,
|
||||||
|
must contain the following information:
|
||||||
|
Name
|
||||||
|
Rank
|
||||||
|
Organization
|
||||||
|
Last 6 of Social Security Number or Controlled Picture Identification
|
||||||
|
Number
|
||||||
|
Badge number
|
||||||
|
Dates of Visit
|
||||||
|
Clearance Status
|
||||||
|
Expiration Date
|
||||||
|
If the Crew Orders do not contain all information listed above, you may hand-
|
||||||
|
write in the missing information, if practical. If hand-writing the information in
|
||||||
|
on the Aircrew Orders would make them unreadable, use the Interim EAL
|
||||||
|
template.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
|
||||||
|
Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a
|
||||||
|
Security Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the
|
||||||
|
documents by writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
4
|
||||||
|
Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
|
||||||
|
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, Coyote-1 will take the both
|
||||||
|
documents and make copies for distribution as follows.
|
||||||
|
One copy for Coyote 1(Flightline Area Supervisor)
|
||||||
|
One copy for Coyote 5 (Reflex Delta Area Supervisor)
|
||||||
|
One copy (original) for Coyote 10 (Reflex Delta Entry Controller)
|
||||||
|
One copy for the Mission Commander
|
||||||
|
One copy for SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 10 will use the authenticated EAL to control entry at the designated Entry
|
||||||
|
Control Point to the roped restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The on-duty Flight Chief or Flight Commander will meet the mission commander and
|
||||||
|
deliver a local area security briefing. If the Flight Chief or Flight Commander are not
|
||||||
|
available, you will brief the mission commander.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material. The
|
||||||
|
presence of TPC material aboard an unoccupied aircraft requires the 2-person
|
||||||
|
concept within the roped restricted area boundary.
|
||||||
|
Certified 2-person control team members are identified with an “X” next to their
|
||||||
|
name on the Entry Authority List provided by the aircrew.
|
||||||
|
SF personnel guarding an aircraft with TPC onboard must be certified under the
|
||||||
|
Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).
|
||||||
|
If TPC material is onboard an unoccupied aircraft and cannot be removed, the
|
||||||
|
crew will secure the material in an approved onboard container. SF subsequently
|
||||||
|
ensure enforcement of the TPC rule upon granting access to the aircraft. Enforce
|
||||||
|
two-person control by using an EAL to identify two authorized individuals prior to
|
||||||
|
allowing entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES ON THE FLIGHTLINE:
|
||||||
|
Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline and in restricted
|
||||||
|
areas if prior authorization has been granted in the form of a flightline vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
There are two types of flightline vehicle passes; temporary and permanent (both are
|
||||||
|
labeled KAFB Form 47).
|
||||||
|
The pass will be labeled either “permanent” or “temporary”.
|
||||||
|
The colors of the passes are either red or green. Every year the color is switched.
|
||||||
|
Permanent passes cannot exceed a year in length.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
5
|
||||||
|
Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV
|
||||||
|
vehicle pass.
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
|
||||||
|
377th ABW Transient Ramp Restricted Area lights are controlled by a light box on a
|
||||||
|
pole to the east of building 333 (Base Operations). The light box contains several
|
||||||
|
individual switches and a master power switch. In order to turn these lights on and
|
||||||
|
off use only the individual switches, always leaving the master power switch turned
|
||||||
|
on.
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
Shift change will be conducted immediately adjacent to the roped restricted area
|
||||||
|
of the Reflex Delta on 377th ABW parking ramp.
|
||||||
|
Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean,
|
||||||
|
fueled, and fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel.
|
||||||
|
Ensure that you have inspected your vehicle and signed the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
Account for SSIs, Quick Reaction Checklists (QRC), DOE courier listing, and AF
|
||||||
|
Form 1109s within your SSI binder.
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the
|
||||||
|
adversary and are broken down into six major movements: The acronym
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R will facilitate decision making processes and aid in the application of
|
||||||
|
decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces personnel performing duties in
|
||||||
|
support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application of the AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only
|
||||||
|
as examples of how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in
|
||||||
|
nature as specific actions upon contact.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force
|
||||||
|
has achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in
|
||||||
|
the defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
6
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to
|
||||||
|
the threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in
|
||||||
|
order to prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a
|
||||||
|
nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile
|
||||||
|
persons in the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of
|
||||||
|
resources and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum
|
||||||
|
of two personnel are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as
|
||||||
|
determined by the on-scene commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
environment may require special considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||||
|
7
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-government cell phone/communications device on post
|
||||||
|
• Possessing a non-authorized electronic device on post
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet
|
||||||
|
Computers, Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping or giving the impression of being asleep on post or at any time
|
||||||
|
during the flight’s duty day
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs,
|
||||||
|
OIs, Job Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study
|
||||||
|
Material, Books Listed in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present),
|
||||||
|
& Books Pre-Coordinated with & Approved by the FC/CC (e.g.,
|
||||||
|
History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law Enforcement
|
||||||
|
related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Digitally signed by
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
CORNIER.ROBER CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD,
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TO.J.1362414756 ou=PKI, ou=USAF,
|
||||||
|
cn=CORNIER.ROBERTO.J.1362414756
|
||||||
|
Date: 2017.02.28 12:25:25 -07'00'
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROBERTO J. CORNIER, Capt, USAF
|
||||||
|
Operations Officer
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
521
export/(DCNI) Coyote-1 (V19-1).md
Normal file
521
export/(DCNI) Coyote-1 (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,521 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Coyote-1 (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 1
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Flightline Area Supervisor / External Security Response Team
|
||||||
|
SAAM Response Force Leader / Security Response Team
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• The flightline Area Supervisor (AS) responsible for all flightline security operations within
|
||||||
|
the 150th Special Operations Wing (SOW) restricted area and the 58th SOW restricted area.
|
||||||
|
See Attachment 11-11.3 for flightline area schematics.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Respond as a part of the Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the Kirtland Underground
|
||||||
|
Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC) and for Convoy/SAAM operations
|
||||||
|
(as required).
|
||||||
|
• Note: (DCNI) Response Times to outside your area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES (SAAM):
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are the Response Force (RF) Leader for Aircraft Parking Area Operations. The
|
||||||
|
RF will be capable of responding, neutralizing and/or containing the situation until it is
|
||||||
|
resolved or until arrival of the Initial Backup Force (IBF).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assist Mustang-1 in supervision at the aircraft parking area during logistics
|
||||||
|
movements. If the Aircraft Parking Area Supervisor (Mustang-1) becomes incapacitated,
|
||||||
|
assume command and control of the Aircraft Parking Area Operations.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) BF Leader during logistical movements.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coyote (RF) and Viper (BF) members will switch roles after hearing proper step
|
||||||
|
code for BF/RF swap once movement is initiated for an Inbound mission and once resources
|
||||||
|
have entered the aircraft parking area for an Outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Maintain situational awareness of the convoy movement and ensure you are aware
|
||||||
|
which version of the step code will be used along with specific step codes applicable to your
|
||||||
|
post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• Provide immediate armed response to any incident within your area of responsibility and
|
||||||
|
provide a back-up response for Coyote 2/3/4 and Reflex 2/3/10 (if posted).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct IBF responses to Protection Level 1
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
• Trips to the West side Shoppette and Subway are authorized. As the area supervisor, you will
|
||||||
|
manage patrols to ensure all IRST/ESRT requirements are maintained. Those requirements
|
||||||
|
are as follows:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Each restricted area containing PL3 resources must have a 2-man ISRT capable
|
||||||
|
of immediate response to defeat an adversary before any negative effects against a
|
||||||
|
resource occurs.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Additionally, restricted areas must have a 2-man ESRT, capable of immediate
|
||||||
|
response to defeat an adversary before any negative effects against a resource occurs.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS (SAAM):
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you maintain the ability to respond to the aircraft parking area and bring
|
||||||
|
immediate fire to bear on the boundary of the restricted/limited/exclusion area and exposed
|
||||||
|
weapons.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you are capable of responding to any emergency in the convoy to ensure
|
||||||
|
denial of access in no longer than 15 minutes.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2 of 12
|
||||||
|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coyote-1 & 1C will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
|
||||||
|
tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coyote-1A will be armed with an M240B with 800 rounds of 7.62mm linked armor
|
||||||
|
piercing and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm
|
||||||
|
hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coyote-1B will be armed with an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
|
||||||
|
tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, 10 rounds of HE ammunition, 2 rounds of white
|
||||||
|
star ammunition, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun hand
|
||||||
|
grenade and 2 CS gas grenades.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
• All alert equipment will be donned for an Inbound SAAM movement prior to A/C arrival and
|
||||||
|
prior to movement for an Outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
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|
3 of 12
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|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
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|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
|
||||||
|
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
|
||||||
|
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
|
||||||
|
recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
|
||||||
|
neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• With the approval of your flight leadership, be prepared to assist Law Enforcement (LE)
|
||||||
|
patrols for gate runner incidents. Coyote patrols with no protection level resources in their
|
||||||
|
respective areas will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points or at
|
||||||
|
spike strip locations.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure posted internal SRTs have valid, authenticated EALs or Crew Orders for aircraft
|
||||||
|
assigned to their respective restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
• Properly authenticate Crew Orders or utilize the Interim Entry Authority List as described
|
||||||
|
below.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure daily physical security checks are conducted.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure daily RAMs are conducted.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure 100% RAB checks are conducted after shift change, and whenever returning to the
|
||||||
|
area after leaving it unattended.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF Form
|
||||||
|
1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the
|
||||||
|
outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
• Open areas 4 and 19 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
• Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW restricted area.
|
||||||
|
• Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th SOW restricted
|
||||||
|
area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC topside
|
||||||
|
controlled area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for unescorted access to hot cargo pads (to
|
||||||
|
include pad 5) during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
• Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly authenticated
|
||||||
|
EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
• Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in and
|
||||||
|
around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and surveillance of
|
||||||
|
site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
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|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
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|
4 of 12
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|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
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|
|
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|
• Conduct a daily visual check of Pad 5 and all flightline physical security facilities, including
|
||||||
|
boundary barrier systems, gates, manholes, grates, and structures, for tampering,
|
||||||
|
deterioration, and inoperative equipment. You will radio SSCC upon completion of this
|
||||||
|
check. Reference attachments of this instruction for guidance.
|
||||||
|
• Flight line Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by ensuring
|
||||||
|
photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography letter signed by
|
||||||
|
the 377 SFS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not possess a Kirtland AFB Form
|
||||||
|
1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open area, they must be annotated on a
|
||||||
|
properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
• Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare the
|
||||||
|
photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
|
||||||
|
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure all patrols conduct minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are
|
||||||
|
randomly accomplished throughout the shift by all Coyote patrols within their respective
|
||||||
|
areas. Radio SSCC and inform them of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the
|
||||||
|
perimeter/RAB checks. Exception: When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are
|
||||||
|
present, you will not be required to conduct RAB checks.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
|
||||||
|
and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing by
|
||||||
|
stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 1 is all secure, and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
• Ensure patrols in your assigned area exit their vehicles to enter keypad codes for gate
|
||||||
|
activation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES (SAAM):
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
• INBOUND CONVOY:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are the leader for the Initial Backup Force (IBF) during convoy movements.
|
||||||
|
In the event of hostilities you will direct the response of the IBF.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure that all the Coyote units have all required equipment and are properly
|
||||||
|
positioned.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Verify taxiway ropes and stanchions are removed upon arriving at the aircraft
|
||||||
|
parking area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon A/C arrival, ensure flightline units properly block traffic on the access
|
||||||
|
roads located on the flightline and secure swing gates. Assist as necessary.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) When directed by Cobra-1, proceed to KUMMSC GOV parking lot and await
|
||||||
|
further instruction from Cobra-1. Ensure all IBF Fire Team Leaders (FTL) account for
|
||||||
|
their required equipment and turn in all appropriate items to the Armorer and the
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
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|
5 of 12
|
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|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
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|
|
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|
operation section; i.e., Special Security Instructions (SSls), NVGs, keys and gear (if
|
||||||
|
issued). In addition, ensure all response vehicles have no less than 75% fuel, and free of
|
||||||
|
trash.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon initiation of proper step code for BF/RF swap, you and the rest of the
|
||||||
|
Coyote RF become the movements BF
|
||||||
|
• OUTBOUND CONVOY:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Upon initiation of proper step code for BF/RF you and the rest of the Coyote BF
|
||||||
|
become the movement's RF.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are the leader for the Initial Backup Force (IBF) during convoy movements.
|
||||||
|
In the event of hostilities you will direct the response of the IBF.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure that all the Mongoose units have all required equipment and are properly
|
||||||
|
positioned.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) When the A/C is ready to depart, Block traffic and secures swing gates on South
|
||||||
|
Gate Road.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) After the A/C departs, stand by for 30 minutes. Return to Squad Ops once
|
||||||
|
directed by Mustang-1 or Cobra-1.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) When directed by Cobra-1 or Mustang-1, proceed to KUMMSC GOV parking
|
||||||
|
lot and await further instruction. Ensure all IBF Fire Team Leaders (FTL) account for
|
||||||
|
their required equipment and turn in all appropriate items to the Armorer and the
|
||||||
|
operation section; i.e., SSls, NVGs, keys and gear (if issued). In addition, ensure all
|
||||||
|
response vehicles have no less than 75% fuel, and free of trash.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA (SAAM):
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Special Assignment Airlift Mission (SAAM) Loading/unloading operations provide
|
||||||
|
a unique security challenge because of the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are
|
||||||
|
transferred from loading platforms to the aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams
|
||||||
|
that could develop if SAAM area entry procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the
|
||||||
|
aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended task time that would add exposure of the weapon,
|
||||||
|
the description of the SAAM exclusion area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3,
|
||||||
|
Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires modification.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
|
||||||
|
(restricted) area then a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
|
||||||
|
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
|
||||||
|
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
|
||||||
|
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
|
||||||
|
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the
|
||||||
|
security requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as
|
||||||
|
well as DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
(DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion areas
|
||||||
|
established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area inspection and
|
||||||
|
assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6 of 12
|
||||||
|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
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|
|
||||||
|
AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA ENTRY REQUIREMENTS (SAAM):
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All personnel entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area must have a
|
||||||
|
valid reason for entry. Entry for MUNS personnel into the aircraft parking area will be based
|
||||||
|
on the individual possessing an open area 9 on their 1199CG Restricted Area Badge and be
|
||||||
|
verified against the mission day EAL provided by 898 MUNS. Entry for aircrew will be
|
||||||
|
based on the individual possessing a government issued credential and verified against the
|
||||||
|
crew orders provided by the aircrew. Entry for IG or other agencies will be based on the
|
||||||
|
individual possessing a valid government issued credential and verified against a properly
|
||||||
|
authenticated EAL. All personnel requiring entry into the limited/exclusion are (other than
|
||||||
|
aircrew) will be prescreened at the aircraft parking area ECP.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All vehicles requiring entry will be searched and kept under constant surveillance
|
||||||
|
prior to entering the aircraft parking area limited/exclusion area. Ensure a thorough sweep is
|
||||||
|
conducted checking for explosives/contraband. This search will be conducted by SF
|
||||||
|
personnel and an EDD team if available.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture actions
|
||||||
|
immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or force the
|
||||||
|
adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
• Upon arrival of transient aircraft you will immediately make contact with the Aircraft
|
||||||
|
commander to obtain Entry Authority List (EAL) information.
|
||||||
|
• EAL or Crew Orders are both acceptable.
|
||||||
|
• EAL will contain:
|
||||||
|
• Name, Rank (OFF/ENL/CIV), Controlled Picture ID number, Badge number,
|
||||||
|
Clearance Status, Dates of Visit, Expiration Date
|
||||||
|
• Note: A government issued photo ID with a controlled number (Driver’s License
|
||||||
|
Number, DoD Control Number, etc) is acceptable. Only enter the last 6 digits of
|
||||||
|
the DoD Control Number; all other media requires the full number.
|
||||||
|
• Crew orders will contain
|
||||||
|
• Name, rank, last six numbers of the SSAN, organization, clearance status, and
|
||||||
|
inclusive dates of travel, may be used as EALs for transit aircraft in lieu of the
|
||||||
|
procedures stated above. Compare a home base AF Form 1199, CAC, or other ID
|
||||||
|
(credential) with information contained on the crew order for positive
|
||||||
|
identification prior to allowing entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7 of 12
|
||||||
|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EAL AUTHENTICATION AND DISTRIBUTION:
|
||||||
|
• Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a Security
|
||||||
|
Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5/GS-7 or above must authenticate the documents and
|
||||||
|
sign with the following information on the bottom of page 2 of the cover letter:
|
||||||
|
• Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
• Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
• Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
• Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
• All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the authenticator
|
||||||
|
will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
• If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
|
||||||
|
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
• Once the Crew Orders or EAL has been authenticated, you will take the documents and make
|
||||||
|
copies for distribution as follows.
|
||||||
|
• Three (3) total. One (1) copy for the flightline area supervisor, one (1) copy for the
|
||||||
|
transient ramp ISRT, and the original crew orders will be filed in SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• REFLEX DELTA: Five (5) total. Original document for the Entry Controller, one (1)
|
||||||
|
copy for the ESRT, one (1) copy for the mission commander, one (1) copy for the SSCC,
|
||||||
|
and one (1) copy for BDOC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• 150th SOW Restricted Area
|
||||||
|
• There are fifteen light poles in the 150th SOW restricted area. These light poles each
|
||||||
|
contain four to six lights; however, only two lights will be illuminated on each pole at
|
||||||
|
night. The purpose of this configuration is to have the other lights act as emergency
|
||||||
|
back-ups. The emergency back-up lights are operated manually by way of a switches
|
||||||
|
located an unlocked box at the base of each individual light pole.
|
||||||
|
• 58th SOW Restricted Area
|
||||||
|
• This area contains three hangars (1000, 1001, and 1002) with security lighting on the
|
||||||
|
sides of them. Hangars 1000 and 1001 have lights on the south, east and west sides.
|
||||||
|
Hangar 1002 has lights on all sides. The controls to turn these lights on and off are
|
||||||
|
located on the south side of each hangar. In order to turn the lights on and off you must:
|
||||||
|
• Locate the appropriate light control box
|
||||||
|
• Open the door
|
||||||
|
• Enter 1234* on the numerical keypad
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
8 of 12
|
||||||
|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Press either the green “Master On” button to turn on all lights for that zone, or press
|
||||||
|
the individual green buttons for the lights you wish to turn on. There is a diagram
|
||||||
|
depicting the various zones in each light box.
|
||||||
|
• 377th ABW Transient Ramp
|
||||||
|
• The lights for this area are controlled by a light box on a pole to the east of
|
||||||
|
building 333 (Base Operations). The light box contains several individual
|
||||||
|
switches and a master power switch. In order to turn these lights on and off use
|
||||||
|
only the individual switches, always leaving the master power switch turned on.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHORT NOTICE TYPE I AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will be dispatched to the Aircraft Parking Area to initiate security operations
|
||||||
|
until the arrival of recalled personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assist with sweeps of the Aircraft Parking Area prior to Aircraft arrival. Coordinate
|
||||||
|
with the Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) to dispatch a MWD to aid with these
|
||||||
|
sweeps.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) In the event the aircraft should reach the Aircraft Parking Area before the entire
|
||||||
|
response force is in-place, you will be posted as the Pad Supervisor and Coyote-1A will post
|
||||||
|
as the Pad Entry Controller until qualified WSSS personnel arrive. Inform the aircrew they
|
||||||
|
will retain security responsibility of the aircraft until required SF personnel are in place.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA PROCEDURES:
|
||||||
|
• Upon notification of a REFLEX DELTA mission arrival, you will be dispatched to the 377
|
||||||
|
ABW Transient Ramp to meet the A/C.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure a sweep of the Alert Crew billets (Bldg #917) has been completed prior to aircrew
|
||||||
|
arrival. Note: If an explosive detection capable Military Working Dog (MWD) team is not
|
||||||
|
available, the Flightline ESRT will conduct the sweep of the building. This is not a tactical
|
||||||
|
sweep; patrols will be looking for obvious contraband or explosive items. All rooms and
|
||||||
|
cabinets must be searched. Use the master key provided by the lodging staff (located in the
|
||||||
|
east side billeting front desk, Bldg #22016) to conduct the sweep. Notify SSCC when sweep
|
||||||
|
has been initiated and completed.
|
||||||
|
• An additional EC and CBS will be posted to secure these aircraft. They are not counted as
|
||||||
|
part of the KUMMSC IBF and will remain dedicated to this PL1 Aircraft. The ranking
|
||||||
|
member on the ESRT will be the REFLEX DELTA area supervisor.
|
||||||
|
• The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) A No-Lone Zone (NLZ) will be established whenever Two-Person Control
|
||||||
|
(TPC) material is present on the aircraft. The NLZ will include the restricted area
|
||||||
|
perimeter around the aircraft when unoccupied. When the aircraft is occupied by an
|
||||||
|
authorized two-person concept team as identified on the EAL, the NLZ will shrink to
|
||||||
|
the interior of the aircraft. In either case, the SF entry controller will have entry
|
||||||
|
control responsibility for the aircraft and restricted area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
9 of 12
|
||||||
|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) When granting initial access to an unoccupied aircraft containing TPC material, the
|
||||||
|
Entry Controller (EC) will enforce two-person control by using the EAL to identify two
|
||||||
|
authorized individuals prior to allowing entry into the NLZ.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Authorized two-person teams will be identified on the EAL by a dollar sign
|
||||||
|
“$” next to their names. The Mission Commander may authorize access to personnel
|
||||||
|
not on the EAL as long as the “$” individual is the first to enter and they have a
|
||||||
|
second individual with them that has an “X” next to their name on the EAL.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Official flightline personnel, such as fuel handlers, firefighters, and Transient Alert
|
||||||
|
personnel may be granted close boundary access during launch and recovery operations when
|
||||||
|
the alert crew is onboard the aircraft or to respond to immediate emergencies without the
|
||||||
|
alert crew present.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FLIGHTLINE VEHICLE OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline as long as they are
|
||||||
|
operated outside of Restricted Areas and display appropriate passes.
|
||||||
|
• Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV vehicle
|
||||||
|
pass.
|
||||||
|
• All flightline patrols are encouraged to conduct periodic checks of vehicles on the flightline
|
||||||
|
(POVs and GOVs) in order to ensure drivers are authorized, and have appropriate paperwork
|
||||||
|
available (i.e. Flightline driver licenses, GOVs licenses, POV Passes).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FPCON CHARLIE OR HIGHER PROCEDURES
|
||||||
|
• Ensure all Coyote patrols immediately rally to KUMMSC and follow the instructions of
|
||||||
|
Scorpion-1, Guardian-1/2 and the SSCC to ensure proper coverage of the area.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure Coyote-2 and Coyote-4 post their respective Highball locations (2 & 4), initiate traffic
|
||||||
|
control procedures and close the corresponding gates.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure SSCC has initiated recall procedures in order to man appropriate flightline patrols as
|
||||||
|
needed.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure all required UA-HMMWVs from the Security Forces Quad are retrieved by Coyote
|
||||||
|
units as they come inbound, to assist in posting.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean, fueled, and
|
||||||
|
fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel. Additionally, ensure each flight line
|
||||||
|
IBF vehicle is properly inspected using the AF Form 1800.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• In addition to the individual vehicle inspections, you will conduct vehicle inspections of all
|
||||||
|
coyote patrols for any discrepancies and will ensure all vehicles are in good repair (to include
|
||||||
|
BAF standby HMMWVs). You will notify SSCC and flight leadership of any vehicle
|
||||||
|
discrepancies discovered.
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
10 of 12
|
||||||
|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• You will conduct shift in the GOV parking lot. Return to flightline after shift change is
|
||||||
|
complete to relieve the remaining patrols.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Ensure all flight line patrols conduct a purge of their respective areas immediately after
|
||||||
|
assuming post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• You will verify all current EALs are accounted for and verify with off-going that all have
|
||||||
|
been taken to SSCC. You will check all patrols SSI binders to ensure current EALs are
|
||||||
|
accounted for and expired documents have been removed. Ensure all documents are
|
||||||
|
destroyed appropriately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: The KUMMSC environment may require
|
||||||
|
special considerations during a recapture scenario. Although the AFGSC AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
process should always be considered the following immediate actions may be used in
|
||||||
|
addition to the AFCIA-R process. Immediate Actions for KUMMSC recap scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
11 of 12
|
||||||
|
Coyote-1, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
12 of 12
|
||||||
403
export/(DCNI) Coyote-2 (V19-1).md
Normal file
403
export/(DCNI) Coyote-2 (V19-1).md
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
|
|||||||
|
# (DCNI) Coyote-2 (V19-1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
377th Weapons System Security Squadron Special Security Instruction
|
||||||
|
Kirtland AFB, New Mexico July 2019
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coyote 2
|
||||||
|
Version 19-1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Internal Security Response Team (ISRT)
|
||||||
|
SAAM Response Force Fire Team
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Provide immediate response capability as the ISRT for the 58th SOW restricted area
|
||||||
|
not to exceed 3 minutes when protection level resources are present in your area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Respond as a part of the Initial Backup Force (IBF) for the Kirtland Underground
|
||||||
|
Munitions Maintenance Storage Complex (KUMMSC) and for Convoy/SAAM operations
|
||||||
|
(as required).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Note: Response Times to outside your area.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Within 30 minutes of being dispatched by SSCC
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
PRIMARY DUTIES (SAAM):
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are part of the Response Force (RF) for Aircraft Parking Area Operations. The
|
||||||
|
RF will be capable of responding, neutralizing and/or containing the situation until it is
|
||||||
|
resolved or until arrival of the Initial Backup Force (IBF).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Your team will be responsible for controlling entry into the Aircraft Parking Area
|
||||||
|
and monitoring all avenues of approach from that location. You are verifying/granting access
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
1
|
||||||
|
Coyote-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
to the SAAM mission area for required personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You are assigned to the 58th SOW restricted area unless properly relieved or as
|
||||||
|
directed by Area Supervisor/Flight Chief/Flight Commander or higher.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) As directed by Guardian-1/2 you will conduct IBF responses to Protection Level 1
|
||||||
|
resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
POST LIMITS (SAAM):
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Ensure you maintain the ability to respond to the aircraft parking area and bring
|
||||||
|
immediate fire to bear on the boundary of the restricted/limited/exclusion area and exposed
|
||||||
|
weapons within 5 minutes.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Swing Gate at Ordnance Street, or other designated location when applicable.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
COMMUNICATION:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) All members will carry an operational portable radio at all times. If your radio fails,
|
||||||
|
do not deploy beyond the range of voice, whistle, flashlight, or hand and arm signals, and
|
||||||
|
immediately attempt to regain reliable radio communication.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Whenever possible, operate radio in the secure/encrypted mode (open circle) on
|
||||||
|
primary channels: 8 (SF-1), 9 (SF-2), 10 (Pad-Ops), or 5 (MUNS).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the primary channels are unavailable, use the alternate encrypted channels: 3
|
||||||
|
(SP-1) and 4 (SP-2).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If the encryption system or repeater become unavailable, switch to channel 6
|
||||||
|
(R/D-1), or channel 7 (R/D-2). These channels are unencrypted but will enable radio
|
||||||
|
communication by bypassing the repeater system. Be advised that when transmitting in
|
||||||
|
this configuration, your messages can potentially be monitored by unauthorized listeners.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Radio transmission within ten (10) feet of a Protection Level 1 Nuclear (PL1N)
|
||||||
|
resource is prohibited. Radio transmissions using a vehicle mounted radio within twenty-five
|
||||||
|
(25) feet of a PL1N resource is prohibited. If transmission occurs, immediately notify SSCC,
|
||||||
|
who will contact 377 ABW Weapons Safety personnel.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
WEAPONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coyote-2 & 2C will be armed with an M4 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and
|
||||||
|
tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio; an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point
|
||||||
|
ammunition; and, when PL1 assets are present on the flight line, an M870 with 10 rounds of
|
||||||
|
12 gauge skynet ammunition.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coyote-2A will carry an M249 with 800 rounds of 5.56mm linked armor piercing
|
||||||
|
and tracer ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-
|
||||||
|
point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
2 of 9
|
||||||
|
Coyote-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Coyote-2B will carry an M4/M203 with 210 rounds of 5.56mm ball and tracer
|
||||||
|
ammunition loaded at a 4 to 1 ratio, 10 rounds of HE ammunition, 2 rounds of white star
|
||||||
|
ammunition, and an M9 with 30 rounds of 9mm hollow-point ammunition.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) The leader will also be issued and account for 1 smoke, 1 non-lethal stun hand
|
||||||
|
grenade and 1 CS gas grenade.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
EQUIPMENT:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Normal – Bravo: You must have your Level IV Body Armor with both
|
||||||
|
plates and all required ammunition/equipment readily available while on post. If your post is
|
||||||
|
being visited, or you are conducting patrols/checks, your body armor will be worn while your
|
||||||
|
helmet, gas mask, and additional ammunition/equipment will be readily available for
|
||||||
|
inspection and use if necessary. Control centers are not required to wear their gear when
|
||||||
|
being visited, unless directed by higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) FPCON Charlie – Delta, Covered Wagon situations or when directed by higher
|
||||||
|
authority: Individual Protective Equipment (i.e. Kevlar helmet, Body Armor with Type IV
|
||||||
|
plates, and gas mask carrier with gas mask) will be worn unless instructed otherwise by the
|
||||||
|
Flight Chief or higher authority.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure that all members maintain ammunition and required equipment while responding to
|
||||||
|
real world and exercise incidents.
|
||||||
|
• Upon termination of all incidents, and exercises, conduct a 100% accountability of all issued
|
||||||
|
equipment.
|
||||||
|
• All alert equipment will be donned for an Inbound SAAM movement prior to A/C arrival and
|
||||||
|
prior to movement for an Outbound mission.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
USE OF FORCE:
|
||||||
|
• The use of force up to, and including, deadly force is authorized in accordance with AFI 31-
|
||||||
|
117, Arming and Use of Force by Air Force Personnel.
|
||||||
|
• The presence of hostages shall not deter the taking of immediate, decisive, and effective
|
||||||
|
action, including the use of deadly force, to prevent unauthorized access to, removal of, or to
|
||||||
|
recover a PL1 resource.
|
||||||
|
• Security forces shall not let the concern over possible contamination deter their actions to
|
||||||
|
neutralize an adversary.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES:
|
||||||
|
• Upon assuming post you will conduct a purge of your area, plot all aircraft with your area and
|
||||||
|
up-channel to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
• Conduct a 100% RAB check after shift change and whenever returning to the area after a
|
||||||
|
KUMMSC response.
|
||||||
|
• You will purge all expired EALs within your EAL binder and report discrepancies to SSCC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
3 of 9
|
||||||
|
Coyote-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Once you have verified all information is on the Crew Orders or Interim EAL, a Security
|
||||||
|
Forces supervisor in the grade of E-5 or above must authenticate the documents by
|
||||||
|
writing the following information on the bottom of the first page:
|
||||||
|
• Printed name/rank of authenticator
|
||||||
|
• Signed name of the authenticator
|
||||||
|
• Date and time authenticated
|
||||||
|
• Page number authenticated (i.e., page 1 of 3, if there are multiple pages)
|
||||||
|
• All other pages, to include page 1 will be numbered (page X of X) and the
|
||||||
|
authenticator will place their initials by the page numbers.
|
||||||
|
• If an E-5 or higher is not present on flight line, request a rendezvous with the Flight
|
||||||
|
Chief/Flight Commander to authenticate the EAL as outlined above.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure all personnel who are present within flightline restricted areas display an AF Form
|
||||||
|
1199CG (restricted area badge) on their person. The 1199CG will be displayed on the
|
||||||
|
outermost garment somewhere on the upper portion of their body, above the waistline.
|
||||||
|
• Note: Open areas 4, 19 and 8 are required for access to the Kirtland AFB flight line
|
||||||
|
restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
• Open area 4 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 58th SOW restricted
|
||||||
|
area,
|
||||||
|
• Open area 19 denotes authorization for unescorted access to the 150th SOW restricted
|
||||||
|
area
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Open area 8 denotes authorization for unescorted access to KUMMSC
|
||||||
|
topside controlled area
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Open area 9 denotes authorization for the hot cargo pads (to include pad 5)
|
||||||
|
during PL1 logistical operations.
|
||||||
|
• Home station restricted area badges can be used in conjunction with a properly authenticated
|
||||||
|
EAL for access to flightline restricted areas.
|
||||||
|
• Area Checks and Patrols - Patrols shall inspect all areas of possible concealment in and
|
||||||
|
around restricted areas for indications of use of such areas for observation and surveillance of
|
||||||
|
site operations by unauthorized personnel.
|
||||||
|
• In conjunction with Coyote 1 and other coyote patrols, you will conduct a daily visual check
|
||||||
|
of all flightline physical security facilities, including boundary barrier systems, gates,
|
||||||
|
manholes, grates, and structures for tampering, deterioration, and inoperative equipment.
|
||||||
|
You will radio SSCC upon completion of this check. Reference Attachments 13 and 14 of
|
||||||
|
this instruction for guidance.
|
||||||
|
• Flightline Photography - Validate that all flightline photography is authorized by ensuring
|
||||||
|
photographers are in possession of an authenticated flightline photography letter signed by
|
||||||
|
the 377 SFS Flightline Constable. If photographers do not possess a Kirtland AFB Form
|
||||||
|
1199CG (restricted area badge) with the proper open area, they must be annotated on a
|
||||||
|
properly authenticated EAL or be escorted by someone with the proper open area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
4 of 9
|
||||||
|
Coyote-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Photographer’s information must be identified on the EAL/Photo Letter. Compare the
|
||||||
|
photographer’s personal credentials against information supplied on the EAL for
|
||||||
|
accuracy/consistency. Declare a security situation if discrepancies are discovered.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated
|
||||||
|
compensatory measures.
|
||||||
|
• Ensure a minimum of two perimeter checks and two RAB checks are randomly
|
||||||
|
accomplished throughout the shift within your respective area. Radio SSCC and inform them
|
||||||
|
of the applicable ramp, initiation, and termination of the perimeter/RAB checks. Exception:
|
||||||
|
When a restricted area is closed and no individuals are present, you will not be required to
|
||||||
|
conduct RAB checks.
|
||||||
|
• In the event of a gate runner and you do not have protection level resources in your
|
||||||
|
respective area will be utilized to set-up blocking forces at all flight-line entry points.
|
||||||
|
• When approached by Flight Leadership, Operations personnel, Inspectors, SF Commanders
|
||||||
|
and any O-6 or higher, you will report the status of your post and offer a post briefing by
|
||||||
|
stating “Sir/Ma’am, Coyote 2 is all secure, and ready for inspection.”
|
||||||
|
• You will exit your vehicle to enter keypad codes for gate activation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ADDITIONAL DUTIES (SAAM):
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will have a minimum of 2 members set up at a designated location with the
|
||||||
|
vehicle searching equipment and will be responsible for checking all vehicular and pedestrian
|
||||||
|
traffic requesting entry into the aircraft parking area with Kilo-2 (MWD).
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Be aware of the deviations in your assigned areas and their associated compensatory
|
||||||
|
measures.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED/LIMITED/EXCLUSION AREA (SAAM):
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) SAAM Loading/unloading operations provide a unique security challenge because of
|
||||||
|
the “floating” exclusion area as the weapon(s) are transferred from loading platforms to the
|
||||||
|
aircraft and vice-versa. To prevent security seams that could develop if SAAM area entry
|
||||||
|
procedures are changed as the weapons move (or the aircraft is sealed) or to prevent extended
|
||||||
|
task time that would add exposure of the weapon, the description of the SAAM exclusion
|
||||||
|
area in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Encl 9, para 1.c.(5)(e).1-4 requires
|
||||||
|
modification.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Once the SAAM aircraft and the weapon(s) are in the designated SAAM limited
|
||||||
|
(restricted) area than a single limited and exclusion area is established. Therefore, the limited
|
||||||
|
and exclusion area verification and inspection will occur at the single entry control point at
|
||||||
|
all times once the weapons enter the SAAM restricted area. For personnel not authorized
|
||||||
|
access into the exclusion area but have duty in the restricted area, the EC must contact the
|
||||||
|
SVA to ensure an escort is assigned. This procedure will ensure compliance with the security
|
||||||
|
requirements outlined in DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 3, Enclosure 9 as well as
|
||||||
|
DoDM S-5210.41_AFMAN 31-108, Vol 2 Enclosure 3.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
5 of 9
|
||||||
|
Coyote-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Note: This concept is essentially identical to the single limited and exclusion
|
||||||
|
areas established for alert parking areas where the limited and exclusion area
|
||||||
|
inspection and assignment of escorts occur at the same entry point.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RECAPTURE/RECOVERY ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) If recapture and/or recovery operations are needed, you will begin recapture
|
||||||
|
actions immediately. You will take immediate action to neutralize the intruder and/or
|
||||||
|
force the adversary to immediately stop their actions.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Immediate actions, including the use of deadly force, shall be taken to deny
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access or, failing that, to recapture and recover custody of a seized PL1
|
||||||
|
resource and to regain control of an area, structure, or vehicle containing PL1 resources.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
• Upon arrival of transient aircraft you will immediately make contact with the Aircraft
|
||||||
|
commander to obtain Entry Authority List (EAL) information.
|
||||||
|
• EAL or Crew Orders are both acceptable.
|
||||||
|
• EAL will contain:
|
||||||
|
• Name, Rank (OFF/ENL/CIV), Controlled Picture ID number, Badge number,
|
||||||
|
Clearance Status, Dates of Visit, Expiration Date
|
||||||
|
• Note: A government issued photo ID with a controlled number (Driver’s License
|
||||||
|
Number, DoD Control Number, etc) is acceptable. Only enter the last 6 digits of
|
||||||
|
the DoD Control Number; all other media requires the full number.
|
||||||
|
• Crew orders will contain
|
||||||
|
• Name, rank, last six numbers of the SSAN, organization, clearance status, and
|
||||||
|
inclusive dates of travel, may be used as EALs for transit aircraft in lieu of the
|
||||||
|
procedures stated above. Compare a home base AF Form 1199, CAC, or other ID
|
||||||
|
(credential) with information contained on the crew order for positive
|
||||||
|
identification prior to allowing entry.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESTRICTED AREA LIGHTING OPERATION:
|
||||||
|
• 58th SOW Restricted Area
|
||||||
|
• This area contains three hangars (1000, 1001, and 1002) with security lighting on the
|
||||||
|
sides of them. Hangars 1000 and 1001 have lights on the south, east and west sides.
|
||||||
|
Hangar 1002 has lights on all sides. The controls to turn these lights on and off are
|
||||||
|
located on the south side of each hangar. In order to turn the lights on and off you must:
|
||||||
|
• Locate the appropriate light control box
|
||||||
|
• Open the door
|
||||||
|
• Enter 1234* on the numerical keypad
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
6 of 9
|
||||||
|
Coyote-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Press either the green “Master On” button to turn on all lights for that zone, or press
|
||||||
|
the individual green buttons for the lights you wish to turn on. There is a diagram
|
||||||
|
depicting the various zones in each light box.
|
||||||
|
• 377th ABW Transient Ramp
|
||||||
|
• The lights for this area are controlled by a light box on a pole to the east of building 333
|
||||||
|
(Base Operations). The light box contains several individual switches and a master
|
||||||
|
power switch. In order to turn these lights on and off use only the individual switches,
|
||||||
|
always leaving the master power switch turned on.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHORT NOTICE TYPE 1 AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You could be dispatched to the Aircraft Parking Area to initiate security operations
|
||||||
|
until the arrival of recalled personnel.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) You will assist with sweeps of the Aircraft Parking Area prior to Aircraft arrival. In
|
||||||
|
the event the aircraft should reach the Aircraft Parking Area before the entire response force
|
||||||
|
is in-place, you will be posted as a fire team until recalled personnel arrives.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REFLEX DELTA AIRCRAFT ARRIVAL:
|
||||||
|
• You will perform duties as the ESRT to the Reflex Delta unless properly relieved. Your
|
||||||
|
response time is within five (5) minutes of the Reflex Delta parking area.
|
||||||
|
• Upon aircraft arrival, divide the Reflex Delta area with a rope and stanchions. Ensure
|
||||||
|
lighting equipment is placed on the exterior of each corner of the area, facing the A/C.
|
||||||
|
• The REFLEX DELTA aircraft may contain Two-Person Control (TPC) material.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) A No-Lone Zone (NLZ) will be established whenever Two-Person Control
|
||||||
|
(TPC) material is present on the aircraft. The NLZ will include the restricted area
|
||||||
|
perimeter around the aircraft when unoccupied. When the aircraft is occupied by an
|
||||||
|
authorized two-person concept team as identified on the EAL, the NLZ will shrink to the
|
||||||
|
interior of the aircraft. In either case, the SF entry controller will have entry control
|
||||||
|
responsibility for the aircraft and restricted area.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) When granting initial access to an unoccupied aircraft containing TPC material, the
|
||||||
|
Entry Controller (EC) will enforce two-person control by using the EAL to identify two
|
||||||
|
authorized individuals prior to allowing entry into the NLZ.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Authorized two-person teams will be identified on the EAL by a dollar sign “$”
|
||||||
|
next to their names. The Mission Commander may authorize access to personnel not on
|
||||||
|
the EAL as long as the “$” individual is the first to enter and they have a second
|
||||||
|
individual with them that has an “X” next to their name on the EAL.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Official flightline personnel, such as fuel handlers, firefighters, and Transient Alert
|
||||||
|
personnel may be granted close boundary access during launch and recovery operations when
|
||||||
|
the alert crew is onboard the aircraft or to respond to immediate emergencies without the
|
||||||
|
alert crew present.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
7 of 9
|
||||||
|
Coyote-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FLIGHTLINE VEHICLE OPERATIONS:
|
||||||
|
• Privately Owned Vehicles (POVs) are authorized on the flightline as long as they are
|
||||||
|
operated outside of Restricted Areas and display appropriate passes.
|
||||||
|
• Stop and initiate a security incident for vehicles not displaying a valid flightline POV vehicle
|
||||||
|
pass.
|
||||||
|
• All flightline patrols are encouraged to conduct periodic checks of vehicles on the flightline
|
||||||
|
(POVs and GOVs) in order to ensure drivers are authorized, and have appropriate paperwork
|
||||||
|
available (i.e. Flightline driver licenses, GOVs licenses, POV Passes).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
FPCON CHARLIE OR HIGHER PROCEDURES
|
||||||
|
• Immediately rally to KUMMSC and follow the instructions of Scorpion-1, Guardian-1/2 and
|
||||||
|
the SSCC to ensure proper coverage of the area.
|
||||||
|
• Post Highball-2, initiate traffic control procedures and close the corresponding gate.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SHIFT CHANGE:
|
||||||
|
• Inspect your vehicle using the AF Form 1800. Ensure it is free from trash, clean, fueled, and
|
||||||
|
fully operational prior to relieving off-going personnel. Ensure that you sign the AF Form
|
||||||
|
1800.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• You will verify all current EALs for transient aircraft are accounted for and have been taken
|
||||||
|
to SSCC. Purge your binder for expired EALs and documents. Ensure all documents are
|
||||||
|
destroyed appropriately.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• You will conduct shift change at the GOV parking lot after Coyote-1 assumes post and
|
||||||
|
returns to the flightline.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• One patrol must always be on the flightline during shift change.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AFCIA-R
|
||||||
|
• The following tactics are broad descriptions of friendly actions against the adversary and are
|
||||||
|
broken down into six major movements: The acronym AFCIA-R will facilitate decision
|
||||||
|
making processes and aid in the application of decisive steps for AFGSC Security Forces
|
||||||
|
personnel performing duties in support of nuclear weapons. NOTE: While the application
|
||||||
|
of the AFCIA-R process is an AFGSC wide standard, every tactical situation will
|
||||||
|
determine how it is applied. Scenarios, to include actions, are used only as examples of
|
||||||
|
how to apply the concept and are not authoritative in nature as specific actions upon
|
||||||
|
contact.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Assess: Immediately determine the level of access an enemy force has
|
||||||
|
achieved or their physical proximity in relation to areas containing nuclear resources.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Final Denial: The last line of defense prior to an adversary gaining
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
8 of 9
|
||||||
|
Coyote-2, 19-1, Jul 19
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
unauthorized access to nuclear weapons.
|
||||||
|
• Control: The goal of control is to optimize available weapon fire and
|
||||||
|
maneuverability through aggressive means to gain and maintain superiority in the
|
||||||
|
defined battle-space.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Immediate Sufficient Duress (ISD): Those actions, proportional to the
|
||||||
|
threat, that disrupt the adversary and delay them from meaningful work in order to
|
||||||
|
prevent theft, damage, sabotage, destruction, or detonation of a nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (FOUO) Assault: Actions taken by the security force to neutralize hostile persons in
|
||||||
|
the area surrounding the nuclear weapon.
|
||||||
|
• (DCNI) Restore Government Control: Physically regain possession of resources
|
||||||
|
and locations containing nuclear weapons and ensure a minimum of two personnel
|
||||||
|
are positioned to control entry to the affected area (as determined by the on-scene
|
||||||
|
commander). NOTE: The KUMMSC environment may require special
|
||||||
|
considerations during a recapture scenario.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MISCELLANEOUS:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
• Prohibited Activities
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized, non-government cell phone/communications device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing an unauthorized electronic device on post.
|
||||||
|
• Examples: Game Playing Devices, MP3 Players, Lap Top/Tablet Computers,
|
||||||
|
Portable DVD Players, Portable Televisions.
|
||||||
|
• Sleeping, or giving the impression of being asleep, on post or at any time during the
|
||||||
|
flight’s duty day.
|
||||||
|
• Possessing UNAUTHORIZED reading material on post.
|
||||||
|
• The following items are AUTHORIZED: SSIs, CDCs, PDGs, AFIs, OIs, Job
|
||||||
|
Knowledge Handbook, Airman’s Manual, College Study Material, Books Listed
|
||||||
|
in the CSAF Reading List (Past or Present), & Books Pre-Coordinated with &
|
||||||
|
Approved by the FC/CC (e.g., History, Management, Leadership, Military, Law
|
||||||
|
Enforcement related books)
|
||||||
|
• If you have any questions contact your supervisor.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOD UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED NUCLEAR INFORMATION
|
||||||
|
9 of 9
|
||||||
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user